

Abdurakhman Avtorkhanov Kremlin Empire

A. Avtorkhanov

EMPIRE OF THE KREMLIN

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Abdurakhman Avtorkhanov (1908-1997) - historian, writer, public figure of the second Russian emigration. Born in the Chechen village of Lakha Nevri. In 1937 he graduated from the Institute of Red Professors in Moscow with a degree in Russian history. He worked in the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, was sent to work in the city of Grozny. In 1938 he was arrested and spent 5 years in prison. Released in 1942. Having found himself in 1943 in the occupied territory, in 1943 he left for Germany. He worked for a German propaganda organization in Berlin. After the war, he taught at the US Army School of the Army. In 1950 became one of the founders of the Munich Institute for the Study of the History and Culture of the USSR. He often spoke on Radio Liberty. He gave lectures for American diplomats and intelligence officers about the USSR and the CPSU. The author of numerous works, including: "Technology of Power" (1959), "The Origin of Partocracy" (1973), "From Andropov to Gorbachev" (1986), etc.

It seems that I am greatly to blame before the workers of Russia for not intervening energetically and sharply enough in the notorious question of autonomization... foreigners from the invasion of that truly Russian person, Great Russian, chauvinist, in essence, a scoundrel and a rapist, which is a typical Russian bureaucrat ... One should not renounce in any way in advance from ... returning at the next Congress of Soviets back, i.e. . leave the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics only in respect of

military and diplomatic.

Lenin, "On the question of nationalities or "autonomization"".

FOREWORD

The national question and the national policy of the Kremlin have so far not been included in the circle

my research interests, although I, as a national, closely followed the Soviet national policy. There were two reasons for this: firstly, I made it my goal to write only about what constitutes the basis of all the disasters not only for small peoples, but also for the most powerful nation of the empire - about the emergence and functioning of the Soviet political system; secondly, who was interested in the fate and suffering of small peoples, except for themselves. Today the situation has changed dramatically. My own attitude towards this problem has also changed. I used to associate the collapse of the Soviet empire with a change in the political system in the metropolis, but now a different picture is emerging more and more clearly - the decomposition of the empire will probably begin from its outskirts. Hence, the Western world is also showing a growing interest in the fate of non-Russian peoples. I noticed this at my report on "perestroika" in Washington in November 1987 at a meeting of a group of American experts on Soviet affairs. I was asked to tell in more detail about the prospects for Gorbachev's "perestroika" in the field of national politics. When I mentioned in passing that my first article criticizing the theses of the Politburo for the 17th Party Congress was called "For the fulfillment of the Party's directives on the national question" and appeared in the Pravda newspaper of June 22, 1930, that is, a year before the birth of General Secretary Gorbachev, the people in the hall exchanged glances. Only I did not understand what was more surprised - my old age or Gorbachev's youth. I just wanted to emphasize that since that time I have been constantly following the national policy of the Kremlin. Not only official sources, but also my observations underlie the proposed

research.

Now about my general approach to the topic under consideration.

After the Second World War, only one world empire survived - the Soviet empire. In my opinion, there are three main reasons for this: the first reason lies in the absolute perfection of the military and police administration of the Soviet empire, when each of its inhabitants from birth to grave is under total police supervision. The second reason lies in the scientifically developed system of preventive, selective, but systematic terror against any manifestation of individual or group political dissent. The third reason lies in the political nature of the Soviet government system, in which the interests of retaining power by the party are placed not only above the interests of the individual, but also above the interests of social groups, classes and even entire peoples, which was proved by the collectivization, industrialization and genocide of small peoples during the war. The foregoing gives reason to consider the Soviet empire not an ordinary empire of the classical type of past times and not a simple continuation of the old tsarist empire.

The Soviet empire is primarily an ideocratic empire. Therefore, any comparison with the old empires is not only wrong, it simply misleads us: we overestimate the capabilities and scale of the old empires and underestimate the potential opportunities and monstrous consequences that the successful implementation of the ideocratic program of the Soviet empire on a global scale is fraught with - not only for outside world, but also for the peoples of the Soviet Union itself. After all, the Bolsheviks can achieve their goal only by sacrificing their own population and carrying out the genocide of foreign peoples, as the experience of Afghanistan has shown. The Soviet type of imperialism seeks not only the subjugation of foreign peoples and the appropriation of their wealth, but it also sets as its ultimate goal the conversion of the conquered peoples to the new communist faith in order to impose a communist way of life on them.

The Russian Empire was a relatively young empire. Rus' knew neither ancient nor medieval empires. On the contrary, in the territories now occupied by the Soviet Union, the influence and domination of a number of Western empires of the Roman, Greek, Byzantine, German, neighboring kingdoms - Polish-Lithuanian and Swedish, a number of Asian empires - Turkish, Persian, Chinese. Moreover, ethnographic Rus' itself was in vassal dependence on the Tatar-Mongol khanates for more than two hundred years. Only at the end of the reign of the first Russian dynasty of Rurikovich did the era of

the formation of a multinational Russian state, declared by the Russian Empire at the beginning of the 18th century by Peter the Great from the new Romanov dynasty (1613-1917). Since then, an intensive and very successful expansion of the Russian Empire has been outlined in almost all directions - in the east, in the south, in the west and in the north, from where foreign conquerors had previously pressed on Rus'.

The pretexts for the expansion of the empire were easy, and quite convincing for the Russian ear: according to the classical scheme of the famous historian Klyuchevsky, Russia was looking for a way out to its natural borders, which rested in the East on the Pacific Ocean, and in the West on the Baltic Sea. Russia was also looking for an outlet to the southern seas, beyond which opened the seductive expanses of the oceans.

The political and strategic motives for the expansion set out by Klyuchevsky were also, although unconvincing, clearly formulated in the spirit of the time: further Russian expansion was needed to secure the achieved imperial borders, military campaigns to foreign lands were needed to ensure the safety of Russian trade caravans. Russia's wars in Turkestan were needed to save the Turkestan peoples from British domination. Wars in the Caucasus were needed to save the Christian peoples - Georgians and Armenians - from the Muslim yoke of Turkey and Persia. The wars in the Balkans were fought in the name of saving the "Slavic brothers" from the same Ottoman Empire.

This whole scheme was declared by Lenin and his comrade-in-arms, the founder of Russian Marxist historiography, Academician Pokrovsky, as a great-power, chauvinistic concept of Russian "military-feudal imperialism", and Russia itself was recognized as the gendarme of Europe, starting with Catherine II. You will find this Marxist historical

concept in the book of Academician Pokrovsky "Russian history in the most concise outline", which is preceded by a letter from Lenin congratulating Pokrovsky on his new Marxist scheme. Moreover, Lenin indicated in this letter that Pokrovsky's book should become a school textbook and should be translated into foreign languages. This book, together with Lenin's letter, was withdrawn from circulation during the period of Stalin, and Klyuchevsky's books on history are being reprinted in a solid edition. The forcible annexation of non-Russian peoples to the Russian Empire in all Soviet textbooks and historical works is considered a positive act of the Russian tsars and a progressive event in the life of non-Russian peoples. However, Lenin fought against the tsarist empire not because it is an empire, but because it is tsarist. He was for the world Soviet empire. This is directly written down by Lenin's hand in the preamble to the "Constitution of the USSR" of 1924, where it is said: "The new Soviet state will be ... a new decisive step along the path of uniting the working people of all countries into a World Soviet Socialist Republic." The Kremlin has never claimed to have given up on Lenin's global goal. But in his dying article on the national question, Lenin himself doubted the reality of his strategy of creating a "world Soviet republic." Seeing, in connection with the "Georgian case", the danger of the collapse of his own empire, he proposed to revise the constitution of the USSR, leaving Moscow with competence only in two areas - diplomatic and military. This development was stopped by two events - the death of Lenin and the rise to power of Stalin. The Soviet federation of sovereign republics has now become the purest fiction, and the absolutization of the totalitarian regime is unprecedented in the history of state formations. The death of Stalin himself did not change one iota either the form or the essence of Stalin's imperial policy. Even worse, Stalin's heirs went even much further than Stalin in cultural and personnel policy in the national republics.

The focus of this work is a comparative analysis of the Bolshevik theory on the national question and the Bolshevik state-party practice in the Soviet national republics and regions. For the first purpose, I subjected to consideration all the most important works of Lenin and Stalin on the national question and all the most important documents on this question of the highest Party organs. As for the second goal - the Bolshevik practical solution of the national problem by creating an alliance of

"sovereign Soviet republics" in the form of the USSR, then, using the same official documents, I try to show the degree and nature of the "sovereignty" of the union republics in action. Today in Moscow it is already openly recognized that the entire history of the country and the party has been falsified and distorted for decades. This primarily applies to the history of the national question. A large caste of professional experts on the national question has developed in the Soviet Union, who even now continue to flood the Soviet book market with the most incompetent propaganda junk, deliberately falsifying Lenin and importunately preaching the unquoted Stalin. Paradoxically, the task fell on me to rehabilitate Lenin from the slander and falsification of people who call themselves his students, and to restore Stalin in their copyrights, which his heirs thievishly appropriate for themselves. The leading idea of the falsification of the national question is to pass off the Soviet type of colonialism as an ideal solution to the national question, and the Soviet great-power policy of russification of non-Russian peoples as a policy of "internationalization".

I have subjected to comparative consideration some official documents on the national question also from the new era, the era of "glasnost". Here I tried to understand how "perestroika" and "new thinking" in the field of national relations would be expressed. Despite the ongoing street demonstrations of the politically active part of the non-Russian peoples in defense of their national rights, despite the bold and repeated speeches of the most prominent figures of national cultures both in the press and in various forums with an open demand to recognize the national languages of the non-Russian republics as their state languages, the national policy of the Kremlin still remains the old, imperial policy. Probably, more amazing events on the outskirts than those that have taken place so far are needed for the Kremlin to understand the doom of its last empire in the world and draw a salutary conclusion before it is too late: dissolve the coercive empire and transform the USSR into a confederation of independent states from those national republics that wish to enter such

confederation. This is what I would call "revolutionary restructuring" in the field of national relations. Everything else is a new deception of nationalities and self-deception of the Kremlin.

A. Avtorkhanov

PART 1. LENIN'S TEACHING ON THE NATIONAL QUESTION |. The right of nations to self-determination

The democratic right of nations to self-determination is as old as democracy itself. As an idea and a practical principle, it has been used since the 18th and 18th centuries. Two historical events gave the greatest impetus to the movement of national independence: in 1775-1783 the "National Revolution" for the independence of America and in 1789 the Great French Revolution with its ever-living slogans: "Liberty, equality, fraternity." Since then, the era of the movement for independence and self-determination of modern large and small nationalities actually began. Since then, the very "right of nations to self-determination" has become the driving motive of the national liberation movement of dependent and oppressed peoples on all continents of the earth. In the world socialist movement, the right of peoples to self-determination was first formulated at the London Congress of the Second International in 1896 in the following words: "The Congress declares that it stands for the full right of self-determination of all nations and expresses its sympathy to the workers of every country now suffering under the yoke of military, national and other absolutism. The demand for the right to self-determination of the non-Russian peoples of the Russian Empire was included in the RSDRI program at its Second Congress in 1903, held in the same London.

Getting acquainted with the rich, but purely propaganda Soviet literature on the theory and history of the national question, the reader will never learn two elementary facts: firstly, the right of peoples to self-determination is a generally recognized principle of democracy in general, and not an invention of Lenin, and secondly, in the Russian socialist This principle was introduced into the movement not by the Bolsheviks or Lenin, but by the Mensheviks and their leaders Plekhanov and Martov. Plekhanov, as the founder of Russian Marxism, as Lenin himself recognized him, and Martov, as the author and speaker on the first Party Program at its Second Congress. Lenin's merits in this matter lie on a different plane in the anti-national interpretation of the right of peoples to self-determination and in the masterful use of the national question for strategic purposes on the path to power.

The right to self-determination of the peoples of Russia was recognized not only by the Russian Social Democrats, but also by the Party of Russian Socialist Revolutionaries (Socialist Revolutionaries), only in a more categorical formulation. Their central press organ, Revolutionary Russia, wrote in No. 18 of 1903 that the Socialist-Revolutionary Party stands on the point of view of "full and unconditional recognition of self-determination," and that the Socialist-Revolutionaries offered a free federation to those peoples who want to remain part of Russia after the revolution. Arguing with the Socialist-Revolutionaries about "full and unconditional recognition of self-determination" and interpreting the decision of the Second Congress in his own way, Lenin wrote: "The unconditional recognition of the struggle for freedom of self-determination does not at all oblige us to support any demand for national self-determination. The Social Democrats, as the party of the proletariat, set as their positive and main task the promotion of self-determination not of peoples and nations, but of the proletariat in each nationality "(Lenin On the national and national-colonial question. M., 1956, p. 13. My italics - A .A.).

Lenin repeated the same idea on the eve of the First World War in the following words: "The individual demands of democracy, including self-determination, are not an absolute, but a part of the general democratic (now: general socialist) world movement. It is possible that in individual specific cases the particle contradicts the general, then it must be rejected" (Lenin, 3rd ed., vol. XIX, pp. 257-258).

When the October Revolution took place, Lenin found that such a small "particle" as half of the tsarist empire represented by non-Russian peoples was not an "absolute" and, on the bayonets of the Red Army, drove it into his new Soviet empire.

Contradicting himself, Lenin elsewhere correctly defined the essence of self-determination.

Here is his definition: "If we want to understand the meaning of the self-determination of nations, without playing with legal definitions, without "composing" abstract definitions, but by analyzing the historical and economic conditions of national movements, then we will inevitably come to the conclusion: self-determination of nations means their state separation from foreign national movements. collectives, of course, the formation of an independent national state "(Lenin. On the right of nations to self-determination. M., 1956, p. 5).

Was Lenin himself prepared to allow non-Russian peoples to secede from the Russian Empire if he came to power in Russia? Of course not. As mentioned above, when almost all non-Russian peoples left the empire after the October Revolution, exercising their right to self-determination, he brought them back by force of arms. Lenin recognized the actual use of the right to self-determination for the peoples of any other empires - British, Austro-Hungarian, Ottoman, but not for the peoples of the Russian Empire, including even Poland. Lenin even invented in national politics such a sophisticated tactic that not a single Machiavellian of modern times has yet thought of. Lenin carried out a kind of division of labor between his supporters in the party: the Russian Bolsheviks were supposed to preach the "right of non-Russian peoples to self-determination", and the Bolsheviks of non-Russian nationality, on the contrary, were supposed to write and insist on the right of non-Russian peoples to "join" Russia.

When Lenin was pointed out this double game of his in the national question, he

He answered imperturbably: "People who have not thought about the question find it "contradictory" that the Social Democrats of the oppressor nations should insist on "freedom of secession" and the Social Democrats of the oppressed nations on "freedom of association." But a little reflection shows that there is no other way to internationalism and the merging of nations, there can be no other way to this goal from the given position "(Lenin, On the national and national-colonial question, p. 338)

This thesis of the "fusion of nations" is the true and final goal of Lenin. He wants to merge the non-Russian peoples with the Russian people in order to artificially create one single people with a single language. Lenin wrote this:

"The delimitation of nations within one state is harmful, and we Marxists strive to bring them closer and merge them" (ibid., p. 12).

Elsewhere: "Marxism is irreconcilable with nationalism, be it the most "just"...

Marxism puts forward, in place of all nationalism, internationalism, the fusion of all nations in a higher unity" (ibid., pp. 128-129).

In the third place: "The goal of socialism is not only the destruction of fragmentation into small states not only the rapprochement of nations, but also their merging" (ibid., p. 261).

In a word, Lenin is full of determination, having carried out his plan for the world revolution, to create a single international community of people with one or, perhaps, two languages. Here is his statement on the matter:

"The world language, perhaps, will be English, and perhaps, plus, Russian" (Lenin. PSS, vol. 24, p. 387).

From this it is already clear that for Russia and its non-Russian peoples the Russian language will become a single language. In other words, Lenin stood for the assimilation of non-Russian peoples into the Russian people, for such a national policy of Russification that even Tsarist Russia had abandoned, at least since Catherine II.

When critics reminded him of this fact, Lenin replied:

"Only reactionary Jewish philistines who want to turn back the wheel of history can shout against assimilation" (ibid., p. 126).

However, all this was related to a distant strategic goal after the victory of Marxism in Russia and worldwide. So far, it was necessary to develop a flexible tactic for using the national aspirations of the oppressed peoples, who wanted to create their own independent states, in the interests of their own strategy, directly on the principle: "the end justifies the means." Here Lenin was a master of genius.

More great-power than all Russian tsars put together, and more imperialist than any emperor in history, Lenin, however, was no Russian chauvinist. This was his colossal personal advantage as a politician in a multinational state. His first Politburo on the road to revolution consisted of seven people: two Russians (Lenin and Bubnov), four Jews (Trotsky, Zinoviev, Kamenev and Sokolnikov) and one Georgian (Stalin). Being already in power, he always fought in his party with Russian chauvinists, who, by their openly great-power actions, harmed his plans to create a Soviet empire in Russia, and on its basis to create a world Soviet empire.

We know from the documents of the 20th Congress that he included among these Russian chauvinists the non-Russian leaders of Bolshevism Stalin, Dzerzhinsky and Ordzhonikidze. Lenin wants, wherever possible, to avoid violence in the process of merging nations or turning the Russian language into a common and unified language in the new state. In this respect, the United States of America is pictured to Lenin as an ideal. Lenin cites statistics of different peoples in America and indicates how the peaceful process of formation of a single American nation with a single English language took place, and in conclusion he comes to the conclusion:

"Whoever is not mired in nationalist prejudices cannot fail to see in this process of assimilation of nations by capitalism the greatest historical progress, the destruction of the national hardness of various bearish corners - especially in backward

countries like Russia" (Lenin, On the national and national-colonial question, p. 124).

Lenin took a clearly unfortunate example and compared completely incomparable historical processes. Therefore, instead of a conscientious analysis, it turned out to be a propaganda juggling of facts and falsification of history. America was and remains a model for Russia only in other respects: as the state of the greatest democracy in the world with scientific, technical and creative intelligentsia, who raised America to such a material, scientific and technical height that for more than 70 years it cannot "catch up and overtake" "The most "advanced country of socialism in the world", excluding the field of the military industry.

America was formed as a state from various peoples of Europe and, in part, Asia, who voluntarily - except for blacks - moved there, and Russia was formed as an empire from foreign peoples attached to it. Moreover, many of them culturally, religiously and historically were more ancient peoples than the relatively young Russian nation and the Russian state itself. The formation of a single language - English - for the American nation was a spontaneous and voluntary process, while in Russia it would be possible only artificially to adopt a single language for all, that is, through direct or indirect Russification of non-Russians. Lenin knew this as well as we did. He also knew that violent Russification could have grave consequences in terms of accelerating centrifugal forces in his future socialist state. Therefore, he wanted to follow the path of peaceful, voluntary Russification. Lenin wrote:

"And we, of course, stand for the fact that every inhabitant of Russia has the opportunity to learn the great Russian language. We do not want only one thing: the element of coercion. We do not want to drive you into paradise with a club" (ibid., p. 147).

Lenin's students today completely manage without coercion and clubs: if you want to study technical and exact sciences, then there is no way to study them, except in Russian, if you want

to make a career in your national republic - party, state, scientist - you may not know your native language, but you must know Russian. This is indirect Russification.

In none of Lenin's works on the tactics and strategy of the Russian and world revolution is there such a virtuoso mastery of the great Machiavellian as in his interpretation of the democratic principle of the right of peoples to self-determination. In the art of masking his true strategic aims with a haze of phraseology and verbal juggling, Lenin was a master of the highest class. Even such a great master of hypocrisy as his disciple Stalin could not always see Lenin's true face in Lenin's disguise, which we will have a chance to talk about later.

If we briefly, but absolutely accurately, formulate Lenin's idea on the national question, then it is as follows: Lenin recognizes, and then conditionally, the right of nations to self-determination under capitalism, but Lenin categorically denies the right of nations to self-determination under socialism. Here is a classic example of Lenin posing this question before the revolution in relation to dependent peoples in Europe. Analyzing the history of the separation of Norway from Sweden in 1905, Lenin wrote that such a case was possible under capitalism only as an exception, and that he was interested not in the self-determination of the Norwegian nation from the Swedish nation, but in the self-determination here and there of the national proletariat. Here is his conclusion from this story:

"In the question of the self-determination of nations, we are primarily and most interested in the self-determination of the proletariat within nations" (Lenin, *On the Right of Nations to Self-Determination*. M., 1956, p. 35).

In other words, Lenin is not interested in the creation of national independent states, but in the creation of Marxist nation-states dependent on one revolutionary Marxist center. Lenin's Marxist great power emerges even more clearly in his discussion with the leader of the Polish Marxists, Rosa Luxemburg. In the Polish kingdom, which was part of the Russian Empire, two socialist parties were formed at the beginning of the century. Polish Party of Socialists (PPS), leader

which was Jozef Pilsudski, and the Polish Social Democratic Party, led by Rosa Luxemburg. On the national question, the PPS stood in the position of unconditional Polish independence and secession from the Russian Empire. The Polish Social Democratic Party, as an orthodox Marxist Leninist party, did not recognize the principle of complete Polish independence, but demanded for Poland only autonomy within Russia. Lenin categorically rejected the national program of the PPS with its demand for Poland to withdraw from Tsarist Russia, and Rosa Luxemburg, supporting her position on the merits, blamed it only for her inelasticity in politics, because she did not want to understand that the slogan of self-determination is not a goal, but Marxist tactics. Here is Lenin's conclusion from his discussion with Rosa Luxemburg:

"Not a single Russian Marxist has ever thought of blaming the Polish Social Democrats for being against Poland's secession. They make a mistake only when they try, like Rosa Luxemburg, to deny the need to recognize the right to self-determination in the program of Russian Marxists" (ibid., p. 37).

What could be more absurd: Lenin wrote that he recognizes the right of the PPS to demand Poland's withdrawal from the Russian Empire, but he does not recognize the withdrawal itself! Then why include in the program of Russian Marxists the demand for the right of nations to self-determination, if you are going to fight with all your might against its practical implementation? Lenin's answer this time is irresistible in its sincerity:

"Recognition of the right to secession," wrote Lenin, "reduces (underlined by Lenin) the danger of the disintegration of the state" (ibid., p. 29). Such fictitious "independence" Lenin was ready to grant even to Ukraine. Here is what Lenin wrote about the right of Ukraine to create its own state independent of Russia: "Whether Ukraine is destined to form an independent state depends on a thousand factors unknown in advance. And without trying to guess in vain, we firmly stand on what is undoubted: the right of Ukraine to such a state" (ibid., p. 21).

When attacks on Lenin by open Russian great powers became more frequent because he encouraged Ukrainian separatists in his national policy, Lenin replied:

"To accuse the advocates of freedom of self-determination, that is, the freedom of secession, of encouraging separatism is just as stupid and as hypocritical as accusing the advocates of freedom of divorce of encouraging the destruction of family ties" (ibid., p. 30).

Being a sophisticated tactician, Lenin cannot directly declare to the great powers: "Stupid gentlemen, understand that in essence I want to preserve, like you, the Russian Empire, but there is no other way to this than a formal, and for us optional, recognition of the right to self-determination ". Only a specialist in the field of the tactical art of Leninism will understand that Lenin puts precisely this thought into his following argument:

"The proletariat confines itself to a negative, so to speak, demand for the recognition of the right to self-determination, without guaranteeing any nation, without undertaking to give anything about another nation" (ibid., p. 18).

Elsewhere, in a dispute with the PPP, Lenin already more frankly explains what the real price is for the right to self-determination in his interpretation:

"The unconditional recognition of the struggle for freedom of self-determination does not at all oblige us to support any demand for national self-determination ... Does the recognition of the right to self-determination of nations require support for any demand of any nation for self-determination? After all, recognizing the right of all citizens to organize free unions does not at all oblige us to support the formation of any new union ... We recognize the right even of the Jesuits to conduct free agitation, but we are fighting against the union of the Jesuits and the proletarians "(ibid., p. 13).

Speaking in human language, Lenin rejects self-determination in practice, since it contradicts the totalitarian system that he wants to create in Russia in the name of Marxism and under the name "socialism". However, on this issue, Lenin unceremoniously

mocks not only democracy, but also his religious teachers. After all, it is Lenin himself who is quoting Engels' letter to Kautsky on the question of what should be the attitude of victorious socialism towards the demand for self-determination of the oppressed nations. Engels wrote:

"The victorious proletariat cannot impose any happiness on any foreign people without thereby undermining its own victory. Of course, this does not rule out defensive wars of various kinds" (Lenin, On the national and national-colonial question, M., 1956, p. 343).

How relevant these words of Engels sound just today, when the Kremlin is committing a barbaric genocide in Afghanistan, trying to "make happy" the Afghan people. But I think, in the light of our analysis of Lenin's concept of the right of peoples to self-determination, Lenin's heirs see their current colonial war in Afghanistan as a "defensive war" against the Americans, Pakistanis and Iranians, who do not have a single soldier in Afghanistan.

Of course, Lenin's goal in Russia was not a democratic revolution, but a "proletarian revolution", the establishment not of democracy, but of the dictatorship of one party called the "dictatorship of the proletariat". The first "proletarian" Lenin, the son of a hereditary nobleman, considered himself (he writes in the quoted works: "We, the proletarians").

For a multinational state like Russia, this meant that the future Bolshevik form of government, whatever name it might call itself, would be a dictatorship of one imperial center, and not a federation of sovereign and equal nations. Here it is appropriate to begin a story about the career of Lenin's first student on the national question - Dzhughashvili - Koba - Stalin.

Two circumstances played a decisive role both in the initial career of Koba-Dzhugashvili, the future Stalin, in the Bolshevik Party, and in his rapprochement with Lenin: firstly, Koba's leading participation in the Transcaucasian armed robberies of banks and the treasury in 1906-1911, the money from which went to Lenin's party fund abroad; secondly, Stalin's activities as Lenin's informant on Caucasian events and Caucasian parties, which made Stalin, in Lenin's eyes, an expert on the national question, who could be entrusted with a wider field of activity. In both areas, Stalin played such an outstanding role that it is worth stopping at this point. Stalin began his conscious life as a criminal and ended it as a criminal, possibly becoming the victim of another criminal - his comrade-in-arms and countryman Beria. However, Stalin was no ordinary criminal, but a criminal who acted in the name of political goals in the service of a radical political party - the Bolshevik party that Lenin created around himself. In those years, after the first Russian revolution, two types of people made their careers in Lenin's party: either bright publicists or fearless "exes". Lenin called the members of the so-called "military squads" of workers' self-defense, which the Bolsheviks created during the 1905 revolution, ex or expropriators. In front of them Lenin put

goals:

to raise money for the party by "expropriating the expropriators," that is, by robbing banks and treasuries;

to kill, as Lenin put it, "spies, Black Hundreds and commanding officers of the police, army and navy."

At the Fourth Unity Congress of the RSDLP in 1906, at the suggestion of its Menshevik section and with the support of the majority of the Bolshevik faction, except for Lenin, the practice of "military squads" was condemned and banned. Lenin's resolution, which stated that "military actions to seize funds" was rejected almost unanimously. Lenin was supported at the congress by the Caucasian ex-Koba-Dzhugashvili, already known to him. At the Fifth Congress in London in 1907, at which the majority of the delegates consisted of Bolsheviks, the question of "partisan actions" and exes was again discussed. The pro-Bolshevik congress again condemned the predatory activities of the partisans under the name "military squads" as anarchist and bandit

practice.

Lenin categorically protested against this decision. He was again supported by only a few of the Bolsheviks, among whom was again Koba.

And this is understandable if we remember how Stalin's career in the Bolshevik Party began. Knowing that it was impossible for him, a dropout from a theological seminary, to compete not only with the already well-known social-democratic publicists from Marxism, like Martov and Lenin, but even with his peers, such as Trotsky, or younger ones, such as Bukharin, Stalin chose a career in which he had every chance to distinguish himself - the career of the party leader of the "military squads" for robberies in the Caucasus. A great connoisseur of Caucasian psychology, Stalin took as his nickname the name of the Caucasian abrek, shrouded in heroic legends, from the novel by the Georgian writer Kazbegi - Koba. Very soon, the newly-minted Koba eclipsed the glory of his literary prototype.

Back in 1906, Koba sent several tens of thousands of rubles to Lenin's emigrant cash desk, taken during the robbery of a mail train in Chiaturi, private and state cash desks on ships in the seaports of Baku and Batumi. Along with this stolen money, for the first time, the military glory of the fearless ex, the Georgian Koba, also reached Lenin. Koba consolidated his fame as a Bolshevik hero and talented organizer of the exes, when he and his assistant Kamo Petrosyan, after a secret meeting in Berlin with Lenin, organized an unparalleled audacity robbery of the Tiflis treasury on Erivan Square in Tiflis in 1907, five weeks after the aforementioned meeting of Koba and Kamo with Lenin. There are descriptions of contemporaries how the robbery was organized. June 26, 1907 at about 11 o'clock in the afternoon,

when Erivan Square was full of people, two horse-drawn carriages appeared on the square, accompanied by an escort of Cossacks, carrying a large amount of money. At that moment, when a man in an officer's uniform gave a command, about a dozen bombs flew from different sides in an instant into the crowd with money and the escort of the Cossacks. Three people were killed, more than fifty people were wounded. The man in officer's uniform was Stalin's assistant Kamo. Extraction - 340 thousand rubles - Stalin-Koba immediately transferred Lenin abroad through the future People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs Litvinov. A few weeks later, the organizers of the exes, Koba and Kamo themselves, went to Lenin for a report without hindrance.

Lenin highly appreciated the merits of Stalin, appointing him first as an agent of the Central Committee in Russia (1910), and later co-opting him into the Central Committee (1912). Stalin was exiled several times for underground work, but each time he managed to escape without any difficulties, because dozens of *seksots* did not hunt for political exiles from the tsar, as now in the Soviet Union they hunt for people whom they only suspect of dissent.

Stalin also tried his talents in journalism. First he wrote in Georgian, and then in Russian, both on party and national issues. Koba's merits as an expert on the national question were more modest and less glorious. Stalin was completely deprived of journalistic talent. Trotsky called him a "flat empiricist." This negative assessment, in the eyes of Trotsky, nevertheless contains the whole truth of Stalin's superiority as a practical politician over his quasi-intellectual comrades-in-arms. Where the journalistic and theoretical talents of Marxism soared in empyreans, Stalin, an experienced observer of human deeds, stood with both feet on the soil of real life. Only such a person succeeds in achieving the set goal (which Stalin later proved to the same Trotsky). All Stalin's works of those years, from the point of view of journalistic canons, are student exercises. But in all his writings, both then and after, there is a purposeful utilitarianism, contraindicated to the theoretician of scientific generalizations, but useful to a politician with a hidden goal. Stalin's hidden goal was the same: to gain Lenin's confidence, not only as an organizer, but also as a party ideologist, in order to eventually take over from him his company - the Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party. A classic example in this regard is Stalin's work "The National Question and Social Democracy", written by him in Vienna at the end of 1912 with the help of Bukharin,

which Lenin attached to him so that Bukharin would translate for Stalin Austro-Marxist sources on the national question. Lenin wrote to Gorky about this: "We have a wonderful Georgian who sat down and writes a long article for Enlightenment, collecting all Austrian and other materials." When this legal Bolshevik journal *Prosveshchenie*, published in St. Petersburg, decided to publish Stalin's article in a discussion order, then Lenin protested in a letter to the editor: "Of course, we are absolutely against it. The article is very good. The issue of combat and we will not give up one iota of our principled position against the Bundist bastards." Elsewhere, about the same article by Stalin, he added: "We must fight for the truth against separatists and opportunists from the Bund" (see Stalin, *Marxism and the National Question*, p. 61).

For what truth did Stalin fight against the separatists in this work?

Stalin fought consistently and uncompromisingly for Lenin's truth on the national question, which, as we have seen, boiled down to the following central Lenin's thesis: the coming Bolshevik Russia would be a single and indivisible state, non-Russian parts of the empire, such as Poland, Finland, Ukraine, the Caucasus, would receive the status "regional autonomies", as well as purely Russian provinces. Stalin skillfully brought together into an integral system everything that Lenin wrote on the national question. Stalin was recognized by Lenin himself not only as an expert, but also as a party theorist on the national question.

A psychological moment characteristic of Stalin: this freshly baked national theorist and "wonderful Georgian" with a strong Georgian accent never publicly recognized himself as a Georgian, but considered himself Russian. His favorite expression in articles and speeches before and after the revolution is: "We Russian Marxists", "We Russian Communists", but he never

said "we are Russian", especially "we are Caucasian" or "Georgian" Marxists. In Russia, according to Stalin, there is only one nation - this is the sovereign Russian nation, and all the rest are simply foreigners or natives who are subject to the Russian nation.

However, no matter how Russian Stalin considered himself, he was haunted all his life by a painful complex of feelings of national inferiority due to the fact that he was born as a "native" on the far outskirts of the great Russian empire and that he did not have a drop of Russian blood, and in his Georgian blood people still find even Ossetian blood (remember Mandelstam's poems). He tried to compensate for this defective feeling by emphasizing his super-Russianness in imperial politics, just like the Corsican Napoleon pretended to be a "great Frenchman" ("Grand Nation") or the Austrian Hitler for a "Great German" ("Grossdeutschland"). This great-power status of Stalin suited Lenin quite well, until Stalin, having become General Secretary, began to abuse it.

]. The evolution of Lenin's tactics on the national question

Lenin's political philosophy fit perfectly into the scheme of the German philosopher Nietzsche - there are selected individuals who make history, and brainless cattle who are the manure of history. Only a person with a "will to power" can saddle the people-cattle and use it on the path to power. Lenin was an outstanding representative of such select personalities with a "will to power". People of this category are alien to all other goals, except for those that lead to power. If the social and national aspirations of the people coincide with their goals of ascending to power, all the better for them, but they will not place themselves at the service of it, the people. Lenin was one of those. In doing so, Lenin conquered the great Russia, which he did not even know very well. As for its national outskirts, he did not know them at all. He had never been to Central Asia, or the Caucasus, or even Ukraine. A communist cosmopolitan whose blood flowed from a mixture of both aliens and foreigners, Lenin was free from narrow Great Russian chauvinism, and as a hereditary nobleman he never had to experience the social needs of the people. I say all this for this: Lenin knew Russia poorly, he knew even worse

life

workers and peasants, and had only a book idea of the non-Russian peoples of the empire. All this led to the fact that the regime he created in this country for more than 70 years has been held not by the trust of its peoples, but by the total - physical and spiritual - terror of the Chekists. Herzen called Russia a "prison of peoples". Lenin followed suit. However, under his heirs, Russia became the "Gulag of the peoples" with the only difference being that the Russian people in this Gulag endure double oppression - political and social, while the non-Russian peoples suffer triple oppression: political, social and national.

The strategic genius of Lenin in politics lies precisely in the fact that Lenin began his struggle for the preservation and expansion of this "prison of peoples" under the banner on which flaunted incendiary slogans: "for political freedoms", "for social equality", "for national self-determination." Under these slogans, Lenin created his first revolutionary fighting cells in central Russia, but had little success among the non-Russian peoples. The Polish Marxists acted independently, in the Caucasus most of the Marxists belonged to the Mensheviks, the Finns were all separatists, and among the Caucasian Muslims, Tatars and Turkestans there were no Marxists at all, because atheistic philosophy was absolutely alien to the Muslim worldview (when the Bolsheviks came to power they were forced to push through false slogan: "communism and Islam do not contradict each other", as the Kremlin did in Afghanistan). After the February Revolution of 1917 and after Lenin's return from exile, there was a significant evolution in his views on the national question. Evolution was not about a general strategy, but about tactics in accordance with changed conditions. This very evolution of Lenin's national tactics took place not only on the basis of taking into account the growth of centrifugal forces in the border regions, but also in close connection with the general tasks of the rapidly changing revolutionary situation in the country. Each new stage in the evolution of Lenin's views on the national question, as it were, characterizes the aggravation of this situation and is designed to approach the date of the Bolshevik revolution itself. The more generous Lenin is with promises,

entirely subordinated to the tasks of the forthcoming denouement. These promises go so far that voices are heard not only from the outside, but also within his own party, that Lenin wants the dismemberment of Russia and pours water on the mill of the separatists. Four stages can be noted in this evolution of Lenin's national tactics: the first stage, when Lenin limited himself to verbal and conditional recognition of the right to self-determination without its guarantee (from the Second Party Congress of 1903 to the April Conference of 1917); the second stage, when Lenin speaks of self-determination with a guarantee of state secession even for Ukraine (end of April to June); the third stage began when Lenin first put forward the idea of a federation at the 1st Congress of Soviets in June 1917, declaring: "Let Russia be a union of free republics" (PSS, vol. 32, p. 286). Let us document this evolution of Lenin in the period after the February revolution. In such a program document as the April Theses, Lenin bypassed the national question, because the situation that had developed on the outskirts of the empire after the revolution was not clear to him. During the second stage in the Draft Platform of the Proletarian Party, Lenin already speaks of guaranteeing the right to secession: "In the national question, the proletarian party must uphold the proclamation and immediate implementation of complete freedom to secede from Russia for all nations and nationalities oppressed by tsarism, forcibly annexed or forcibly retained within the borders of states (Lenin, "On the national-colonial question", p. 441).

Lenin instructed Stalin to substantiate the new thesis in the national policy of the party at the All-Russian Party Conference (April 24–29, 1917). Stalin clearly did not cope with this task, judging by the heated debate and weighty objections that the report aroused. Therefore, Lenin himself had to make a big and, as usual, pogrom speech against the opponents of the "dismemberment" of Russia. The arguments against Lenin were most vividly developed by his long-time critic on the national question, Pyatakov, who did not recognize any "self-determination" at all. Pyatakov, like his Bolshevik supporters,

I thought that the task of the Bolsheviks was not to dismember the future socialist Russia, but to annex more and more new states to it. Our ultimate goal, the oppositionists on the national question asserted, is the victory of the world socialist revolution. So why should we be hypocritical, recognizing the right to self-determination and exit from the future socialist Russia of all non-Russian nations and nationalities? On the contrary, Pyatakov said, socialism knows no state frontiers—that is why our slogan is "Away with all frontiers." Pyatakov accurately formulated the secret strategic goal of Lenin himself, but, while declaring it so openly to the entire multinational Russia, Pyatakov and his supporters dealt more sensitive blows than the separatists could do at Lenin's complex and very subtle tactical game and at his efforts to give out this tactics in the national question for the true national program of the Bolsheviks. For the same tactical reasons, Lenin was deprived of the opportunity to directly declare, as his unlucky students did, that his ultimate goal is the same, but it is not a straight high road that leads to it, but endless meanders and lanes with many dead ends in a great empire with its unparalleled mosaic of nationalities. Only the concealment of our strategic plans, skillful and patient maneuvering in their implementation—such is the meaning of Lenin's objections to Pyatakov—leads to our goal. But not daring to say it aloud even to his students, Lenin confines himself to the following statement: "What Comrade Pyatakov said here is an incredible confusion ... The method of socialist revolution under the slogan "away from the borders" is just porridge ... We are towards the separatist movement indifferent, neutral. If Finland, if Poland, Ukraine secede from Russia, there is nothing wrong with that. What's wrong here? Whoever says this is a chauvinist" (pp. 444-445). As a result of the discussion, Lenin's resolution was adopted, which stated: "All the nations that make up Russia must be recognized the right to free secession and to form an independent state. The denial of such a right and the failure to take measures to guarantee its practical feasibility is tantamount to supporting the policy of seizures and annexations" (p. 447). But for those nations that will remain in the new Russia, the resolution still promises only "regional autonomy" and not federation. The voting results showed that more than one-third of the delegates to the conference consisted of those people whom Lenin in his speech called chauvinists, for out of 90 delegates 16 delegates voted against Lenin, and 18 delegates abstained. Lenin devoted the subsequent months of the third stage after the April Conference to a closer study of

the state of affairs on the national outskirts both through information from the press and through meetings with national cadres. Such a study suggested to him a new idea, with the help of which he wanted to win the sympathy of non-Russian cadres. This idea is to shift the emphasis from the recognition of the right to self-determination of peoples to the right of their separation from Russia. At the beginning of October 1917, he writes: "Instead of the word self-determination, which many times gave rise to rumors, I put an absolutely precise concept: 'the right to free secession ...' Having won power, we would certainly immediately recognize this right for Finland, and for Ukraine, and for Armenia, and for every nationality oppressed by tsarism" (p. 458). However, even here Lenin did not lose sight of his main goal - to preserve in the future Russia all the peoples that were part of the old Russian Empire. But there is no other way to this, says Lenin, than the recognition of the right to secession. Lenin writes thus: "For our part, we do not want secession at all. We want the largest possible state... We want free union and therefore we are obliged to recognize freedom of secession" (pp. 458-459).

The fourth stage in the development of Lenin's national policy was already the stage of the beginning of the history of a new type of colonial empire, when Lenin, having seized power on October 25, 1917, announced the creation of the Russian Soviet Socialist Republic, where he invited all the peoples of the former Russian Empire to join. In the very first government act of the Council of People's Commissars of November 2, 1917 - the "Declaration of the Rights of the Peoples of Russia" spoke about the "equality and sovereignty" of the peoples of Russia, about the right of these peoples "to

free self-determination up to secession and formation of their own independent states". As part of the first Soviet government, Lenin also established a special people's commissariat for nationalities, headed by Stalin. Taking into account the exceptional importance of preserving the Muslim peoples of Tatarstan, Bashkiria, Turkestan, the Caucasus and Crimea as part of Russia, the Council of People's Commissars issued an "Appeal" to them on November 20, 1917 for the signatures of the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars Lenin and the People's Commissar for Nationalities, Stalin. The document said: "We appeal to you, the working and disadvantaged Muslims of Russia and the East. Muslims of Russia, Tatars of the Volga and Crimea, Kirghiz and Sarts of Siberia and Turkestan, Turks and Tatars of Transcaucasia, Chechens and highlanders of the Caucasus, all those whose mosques and chapels were destroyed, whose beliefs and customs were trampled on by the kings of Russia. From now on, your beliefs and customs, your national and cultural institutions are declared free and inviolable. Arrange your national life freely and without hindrance. You are entitled to it. You yourself must be the masters of your country. You yourself must arrange your life in your own image and likeness. ("Documents of Foreign Policy of the USSR", 1957, part 1, pp. 34-35).

But when the Muslim peoples of Bashkiria, Tataria, Turkestan, the Crimea and the Caucasus, in full agreement with this Appeal, announced almost simultaneously in the first half of 1918 the creation of their own independent Muslim states, Lenin returned them by force back to Russia.

Sh. From the tsarist empire to the Soviet empire

If Lenin had been born in England and come to power there, the British Empire would have existed to this day. Moreover, relying on the industrially developed and culturally and technically advanced England, Lenin would have more likely achieved his ultimate strategic goal. He formulated this goal before coming to power in Russia in the following words: "The United States of the world (and not Europe) is the state form of association that we associate with socialism" (vol. 18, 3rd ed., p. 232). After the seizure of power by the Bolsheviks, Lenin clarified the question of the form of power. In his report on the second party program at the Eighth Party Congress in 1919. Lenin declared that his party was determined to create a "World Soviet Republic", adding that, in contrast to the current all-Russian program, "perhaps we will have a common program when the World Soviet Republic is created" (see "Eighth Congress of the RCP (6) , protocols, p. 101).

Thus, Lenin's program on the national-colonial question is not the liquidation of large empires, not the liberation of the peoples subject to them, but the reduction of all national

empires into one world Soviet super-empire in order to implement the second part of the Bolshevik program - the denationalization of nationalities by merging all nations - both mother countries and colonies - into one international hybrid in the form of communist humanity. This experiment is now being carried out in the USSR, where they are trying to create one single nation out of more than a hundred peoples - the "Soviet people". Meanwhile, the ideologists of the Kremlin, clearly falsifying Lenin, are spreading legends in the Third World countries that Lenin is the founder of the doctrine of the ways and methods of liberating the colonized peoples from the yoke of world imperialism, that he allegedly stood for the preservation and development of their national authenticity, for the creation of independent nation states. In this regard, the ideologists of the Kremlin refer to the Soviet experience in resolving the national question. They present the Soviet totalitarian empire with its absolute centralism as a loose federation of sovereign non-Russian states with their former mother country, Russia. And this makes an impression, because the Bolsheviks invented a form of "national independence" unique in history with all the classic attributes of independent states: the union republics have (of course, only in name) their own constitutions, their own parliaments, their own governments,

their communist parties, their national flags, their state emblems. And each of these union republics allegedly has the right to freely secede from the USSR. So says

The Constitution of the USSR. Every Soviet person knows that all these attributes of the independence and sovereignty of the Soviet republics are a fiction. However, a fiction turned into an ideological

category, became an effective tool of Soviet propaganda in the Third World.

Lenin did not immediately find this fiction. How happy the formula "the right of peoples to self-determination" turned out to be in its dialectical interpretation by Lenin as a fictitious right, just as long as Lenin's wandering in search of another dialectical formula: namely, how to find such a form of government for the future Bolshevik empire, so that such an empire looked like a voluntary association of free and sovereign nations. The task was not easy even for such a dialectician as Lenin: to create national republics independent in form, but absolutely dependent on Moscow, in the new empire he planned ...

At the same time, before the revolution, Lenin categorically rejected any idea of a federation. Here is what he argued: "As long as and in so far as different nations form a single state, Marxists will in no case preach either the federal principle or decentralization" (PSS, vol. 24, p. 140). Elsewhere: "It is not difficult to see why neither federation nor autonomy can be understood by the right of self-determination of nations... Marxists cannot in any way insert the defense of federalism into their program; there is nothing to say about it" (ibid., p. 218).

And what did Lenin propose? Here is his directive on governing the non-Russian peoples in his future empire: "It is necessary, wrote Lenin, to have broad regional autonomy (not for Poland alone, but for all regions of Russia) and completely democratic local self-government" (Lenin. On the national-colonial question, p. 145). In all Lenin's pre-revolutionary writings and documents of his Bolshevik Party, only the "regional autonomies" of Poland, Finland, the Baltic States, and the Caucasus are spoken of. Moreover, this "regional autonomy" itself is interpreted as simply local self-government, created on the same basis as in any Russian region. However, when, after the February Revolution, Lenin returned to Russia and saw with his own eyes the growth of the movement of centrifugal forces on the outskirts of the former Russian Empire, he had to state that his "regional autonomy" had no prospects and was rejected by non-Russian peoples. Lenin, who had never been a slave to either Marxist dogmas or his own writings, drew a sober conclusion from the new situation. At the First Congress of Soviets in June 1917, as already noted, he announced for the first time on behalf of the Bolshevik Party that his goal was a federation of republics. Four months later, having seized power in Petrograd, Lenin announced the creation of the Russian Federation of Russian and non-Russian peoples. This first attempt by Lenin to preserve the former tsarist empire, giving it the form of a federation, was not successful. The non-Russian peoples, referring to their right to independence recognized by the Bolsheviks, began in 1918 t

one after another about their secession from Russia and the formation of independent states. Such independent states were created by Ukraine, Belarus, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Turkestan, Tatar-Bashkiria, the North Caucasus, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan. All of them subsequently, some earlier, others later, were conquered. Some of them were annexed directly to the RSFSR (Northern Caucasus, Turkestan, Tatar-Bashkirs, Crimea), while other peoples were declared "independent" Soviet republics (Ukrainian SSR, Byelorussian SSR, ZSFSR, which included Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan). Until 1922, that is, before the creation of the USSR, they were not subordinate to the central state bodies represented by the RSFSR, and in this sense they were "independent" Soviet republics. However, this was a semblance of independence, in other words, fictitious independence, because these republics, like the Russian Federation, were led by the highest legislative, executive and control body in one person: the Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party directly and

directly from Moscow, the Central Committee, which never recognized, both in its charter and in practice, not only the independence, but even the local autonomy of the Communist Parties of these republics. Experienced in these matters, the old Bolshevik, chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of Georgia, then chairman of the Central Executive Committee of the Transcaucasian Federation, Philip Makharadze, spoke at the 12th Party Congress in 1923: independence. After all, we have one party, one central body, which, in the final analysis, determines for all the republics, even for all the tiny ones, everything decisively, and common directives, up to the appointment of responsible leaders ... "(12th Congress of the RCP (6), stenographer, report, M., 1923, p. 472).

And yet, the management of these "independent" Soviet republics was not so easy even for such a generally recognized leader as Lenin and such an inventive student of his as Stalin. But here's a curiosity: all the "independent" Soviet republics, including Ukraine and Belarus, seriously began to consider themselves, although Soviet, but still independent republics. Quite often, the directives of the central organs of the party were ignored, and party overseers appointed from Moscow were generally dismissed in these republics. All leading positions in the republics were occupied by representatives of local peoples who put the interests of their peoples above the general Soviet interests. The power of the People's Commissariat of Nationalities, headed by Stalin, did not extend to them. If Stalin, as the party's expert on the national question, began to make claims to the leadership of the "sovereign" republics, then serious conflicts arose between Moscow and the localities. Their first instigator was always Stalin, who even during Lenin's lifetime claimed the role of an orthodox Leninist, a greater Leninist than Lenin himself. However, having become the General Secretary of the Central Committee and taking advantage of the fact that Lenin, who was very cautious about the national question, was absent due to illness, Stalin decided to put an end to the communist sovereignty of the Soviet republics of the Ukrainian SSR, the BSSR and the ZSFSR at once by including them all in the RSFSR on the basis of "autonomy". The corresponding decision of the Organizing Bureau of the Central Committee on the report of Stalin was adopted on September 24, 1922. Lenin protested this decision the next day and demanded to himself in Gorki all the materials of the commission of the Organizing Bureau of the Central Committee on this issue. A sharp conflict arose between Lenin and Stalin, which could have cost Stalin his post as general secretary if Lenin had returned to leadership. At the heart of the conflict are not strategic differences, but tactical differences. The student, underestimated by all, began to oppose himself to the teacher, who was still without sin.

Lenin's cunning tactics on the national question—Russian Bolsheviks should emphasize the right of non-Russian peoples to secede from Russia, while National Bolsheviks, on the contrary, should emphasize the right of their peoples to join Russia—did not work when the revolution became a fact and the "prison of peoples" collapsed. Even in those regions where the Bolsheviks had their supporters before the revolution (the Baltic States, Ukraine, Belarus, Transcaucasia), the national Bolsheviks, who opposed their independent, this time already Soviet, states in favor of Moscow, only exposed themselves as enemies of any independence and direct agents of Bolshevik Moscow, alien and hostile to the peoples. Lenin sensed the danger of the collapse of the Soviet empire in time and made a new tactical turn in the national

When at the 8th Party Congress (1919) Bukharin and Pyatakov wanted to restore Lenin's old slogan that the party should recognize the right to self-determination not of nations, but only of the working classes of formerly oppressed peoples, Lenin raised his own dialectic to a new, higher level. This new, higher dialectic was designed to cater both to the national aspirations for independence and to the communist goals of integration. Lenin decided to create, as a transitional form to centralization, independent Soviet socialist states in all those regions where the Red Army destroyed the independent national states that had arisen earlier.

However, the new "dialectics" turned out to be a double-edged sword. Designated very

a serious danger from a completely unexpected side: many leaders of the Soviet "independent" republics began to play the role of "independent" in earnest, defiantly ignoring even the directives of the Central Committee. This forced Lenin to reveal his true cards. It happened at the 10th Party Congress. Under the leadership of Lenin and on the basis of Stalin's report on the national question, the Congress predetermined the liquidation of the Soviet "independent" republics. The congress resolution on this matter stated: "The isolated existence of individual Soviet republics is unstable, unstable, in view of the threat to their existence from the capitalist states. The common interests of defense imperiously dictate the state union of the individual union republics, as the only way of salvation from imperialist bondage and national oppression. ("CPSU in resolutions", Part I, p. 557). Now, for the first time, a political dispute arises between Lenin and his expert on the national question, Stalin: how, in what form and at what pace to put into practice the decision of the 10th Party Congress. The initial document on this issue was compiled by Stalin. At the suggestion of the Politburo on August 10, 1922, an Orgburo commission was created under the chairmanship of Secretary General Stalin to draw up a project to create a new federation from the existing Soviet republics: Ukraine, Belarus, the Transcaucasian Federation and the RSFSR. Stalin himself personally drew up a corresponding draft, according to which all independent Soviet republics are part of the RSFSR on the rights of "autonomy". Stalin sent his draft to the republics for approval without the knowledge and decision of the Central Committee. Belarus and Georgia rejected Stalin's project. Ukraine took a wait-and-see position, as there was no unanimity among the leaders of Ukraine about the projected federation. In the meantime, Stalin resorted to his favorite method of pressuring the "national deviationists" with the apparatus. It came down to Lenin. In the history of the party, it is known as the "Georgian case". Party textbooks and all party history literature are still engaged in the most unceremoniously pro-Stalinist and anti-Leninist falsification of the actual history of the Georgian Case. Let's illuminate its essence. Party subordination in the "independent" republics differed among themselves with respect to the hierarchy of this subordination. If the Slavic Soviet republics were directly subordinate to the Central Committee of the RCP (6), then in the non-Slavic republics the party-administrative ladder resembled the model of the tsarist time: the Caucasian Bureau of the Central Committee of the RCP (6) was placed over the Caucasus (under the tsar there was a royal governorship in the Caucasus), and in the Middle In Asia, the Central Asian Bureau of the Central Committee of the RCP (6) was created (under the tsar there was a governor-general of Turkestan). The national communist parties in these parts were not directly subordinate to the Central Committee in Moscow, but to these local branches of it. Since the Bureau of the Central Committee was headed by Russian Bolsheviks or Russified Nationals, it turned out that, despite all the decisions about "independence", the national republics were ruled not by the Nationals, but by the Russians. It sounds paradoxical, but it is a fact: if a Russified national became the head of the national outskirts, then he openly carried out a great-power policy against his nation, which a purely Russian communist would not dare to do. Such a great power in the Caucasus was Ordzhonikidze, whom Lenin put at the head of the Caucasus as secretary of the Bureau of the Central Committee, renamed in February 1922 into the Transcaucasian regional committee of the party, subordinating to it the central

Sergo Ordzhonikidze played an outstanding role in the early history of the party, not inferior to the role of Stalin before the revolution. He was closer to Lenin as his student at a party school near Paris than Stalin himself. It was to him, Ordzhonikidze, that Lenin owed the restoration and re-establishment of the Bolshevik Party in Russia on the eve of the war. In 1912, he traveled to Russia on behalf of Lenin to prepare the convening of the famous Prague Party Conference of 1912 with the participation of delegates from Russia, whom he himself selected there. This conference elected

the new Central Committee of the party of seven people, one of whom was Ordzhonikidze. Stalin was not in its composition, since his candidacy was rejected by the delegates (Lenin co-opted him later). Ordzhonikidze was put at the head of the Russian Bureau of the Central Committee and returned back to Russia (the falsifiers of the Stalinist school later

wrote that Stalin was elected a member of the Central Committee at the conference, and allegedly he, and not Ordzhonikidze, headed the Russian Bureau of the Central Committee).

Stalin and Ordzhonikidze - both Georgians by nationality - as human and psychological types were obvious antipodes. In the imperial Bolshevik Ordzhonikidze, much of the Georgian nobleman he was was preserved - the remnants of Caucasian chivalry, honesty, directness, personal courage, sacrifice - all those features that his future ruler, who had risen from the Georgian bottom - Koba-Dzhughashvili, was completely deprived of, but it was Stalin who knew how to use the honest character of people for his own criminal purposes. Stalin subsequently surpassed his countryman in the eyes of Lenin by virtue of those qualities that Ordzhonikidze lacked: Stalin was cunning, inhuman and domineering. Lenin knew for sure that Stalin was capable of carrying out any of his obviously inhuman tasks, up to the murder of "enemies of the revolution", as he proved not only during the "ex" in the Caucasus, but also during the civil war on the fronts.

But it was precisely these qualities in Stalin's character that Lenin was afraid of now, in the period of peaceful construction, when it was necessary to move from naked mass repressions, as he expressed it, to "culturalism", to peaceful means, especially when dealing with such a complex social complex as non-Russians. peoples.

Nothing was so alien to Stalin as "peaceful means" when it came to politics in general and the national question in particular. Stalin showed great zeal in this in the Transcaucasian, in particular, Georgian affairs close to him. It was no accident. The Georgian old Bolsheviks were well aware not only of Koba's exploits in organizing exes, but also of his criminal offenses, his intrigues against his own comrades in the struggle for leadership in the pre-revolutionary Caucasian Union Committee, up to direct cooperation with the tsarist police to remove their rivals in leadership (for example, the arrest of Shaumyan in 1908 in Baku on the denunciation of Stalin). So, while these old Bolsheviks were in charge of the Caucasian and Georgian governments, Stalin's career in Moscow was under eternal threat. Hence Stalin's constant intrigues against them in order to discredit them in the eyes of Lenin. Things got to the point that Stalin's agents launched "draft laws" that they had composed on behalf of the Georgian government, according to which Soviet Georgia protects itself from other Soviet republics with "cordons", introduces a high tariff for the use of the Batumi port, moreover - Soviet Georgia supposedly is preparing a law according to which Georgian women are forbidden to marry Russians. These forgeries were exposed at the 12th Congress by the "deviators". On the basis of such fakes of his own invention, Stalin created the famous "Georgian case", declaring almost the entire composition of the Central Committee and the government of Georgia "national deviationists." Stalin claimed that the "Mensheviks" and the Georgian "princes" ruled Georgia with their hands. In order to prepare the defeat of the "national deviationists", Stalin three times sent commissions of the Central Committee of the RCP (6) to Tiflis to collect materials discrediting them, including his personal supporters in these commissions - Dzerzhinsky, Kuibyshev, Kamenev. But even such commissions were unable to collect any facts against the imaginary "deviators", and Stalin raged more and more. That's when Lenin intervened in this matter.

No. Differences between Lenin and Stalin on the national question

After conquering power over Russia, Lenin considered it his life mission to carry out in this gigantic and multinational country two experiments unprecedented in history: firstly, to build a classless socialist community based on direct violence ("the dictatorship of the proletariat") and, secondly, to create from more than 190 peoples and nationalities of different races, languages and religions, one single communist nation with a single language and a single atheistic faith, relying on indirect violence (ideological reforging, linguistic assimilation,

"internationalization" of races and families). A couple of years before his death, Lenin realized the utopian nature of this mission. "War Communism", conceived

Lenin, by his own admission, as a direct transition to socialism, was buried under the roar of the guns of the Kronstadt sailors, the peasant uprising in Tambov, under the clear threat of a new uprising of the vanguard of the revolution of the workers of Petrograd. Here are Lenin's words of October 17, 1921, with a frank admission of the failure of his socialist utopia, which sound very relevant just today: "We thought that production and distribution would be carried out at the communist command ... If we tried to solve this problem directly, so to speak, frontal attack, then failed ... Frontal attack failed, let's go around. We will act by siege and glanders" (Lenin, vol. 33, p. 47).

Lenin also suffered severe disappointment in his attempts to "frontal attack" to resolve the national question in Soviet Russia. By renaming the former Russian Empire the RSFSR, Lenin took it for granted that all non-Russian peoples would enter this RSFSR. However, the national communists of Ukraine, Belarus, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan, comrades-in-arms and students of the same Lenin, preferred to remain outside the RSFSR and create their own sovereign Soviet socialist republics with their own borders, governments, parliaments, and their own communist parties. Of course, the national communist parties were subordinate to the Moscow general party center of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) headed by Lenin, but the local governments were not subordinate to the government of the RSFSR. Of course, Lenin did not even in his thoughts allow that this conditional sovereignty of the local republics could become a lasting state. The whole problem with the national republics came down to how to annex them to the RSFSR, so that such accession would not look like their absorption or annexation by a new Russia, albeit a Soviet one.

The national communists of the non-Russian Soviet republics, having taken Lenin's tactical conception for his true program on the national question, almost unanimously steered the course towards the transition from conditional sovereignty to full sovereignty of their republics in all spheres of state life, except for defense and foreign policy, which were coordinated with Moscow by special allied contracts. Apart from the writings of Lenin, the decisions of the highest leading bodies of the party — the April Conference of 1917, the 3rd Party Congress of 1919, and the 10th Party Congress of 1921 on the national question served as the political and legal basis here. The decisions of the Tenth Party Congress on this score were very definite and very concrete. Here is what was said in the resolution of the Tenth Congress on nation-building in the non-Russian Soviet republics: with regard to the non-Russian peoples, "the policy of tsarism was to kill among them the rudiments of any statehood, to cripple their culture, to restrict their language, to Russify them ... The task party is to help the working masses of the non-Russian peoples to catch up with central Russia that has gone ahead, to help them:

a) to develop and strengthen Soviet statehood in the forms corresponding to the national and living conditions of these peoples; b) to develop and strengthen local courts, administrations, economic bodies, and authorities that operate in their native language and are made up of local people; c) to develop a press, a school, a theater ... in their native language" ("CPSU in Resolutions", Part 1, M., 1953, p. 559). Taking these decisions literally, the national republics set about reviving their national culture, science, art, national economy, creating national military formations, and decisively and universally indigenizing, in Stalin's words, all types of government bodies and their apparatus at all levels.

It was only then that Soviet totalitarian imperialism showed its true face: the great-power-communist apparatus of Moscow found that under the guise of "indigenization" in the Soviet national republics, under the guise of Ukrainization and Belarusization in Soviet Ukraine and Belarus, local nationalists began to come to power: national deviationists in Georgia, "Borotbists" in Ukraine, "National Democrats" in Belarus, pan-Turkists in Tatar-Bashkiria and Turkestan. A broad campaign began against those national communist cadres who, referring to the above-mentioned decisions of the party, continued to resist the great powers from the Moscow center. Stalin, who became

meanwhile, General Secretary, decided to give a frightening lesson to all local nationalists by the total defeat of the "national deviationists" of Georgia. Moreover, taking advantage of Lenin's illness, who, according to the decision of the Politburo, was not supposed to receive information about current politics, Stalin decided to end the sovereignty of all Soviet republics by incorporating them into the RSFSR with one party apparatus act. However, Lenin, informed in the meantime by his comrades-in-arms from Georgia, called by Stalin "national deviationists" - Budu Mdivani, Philip Makharadze and others, felt that Stalin was playing with fire and threatening the integrity of the new empire created by the Bolsheviks. According to Lenin's secretary Fotiyeva, Lenin was preparing a bomb against Stalin at the KhP Congress, but when he fell ill, he could only write an article on the national question against him. Lenin's article was titled "On the Question of Nationalities or 'Autonomization'". Lenin wrote it for the Pravda newspaper. Stalin and his unfortunate allies Zinoviev and Kamenev rejected Lenin's article. Lenin also wrote a "Letter to the Congress", addressed to the upcoming KhP Congress, in which he demanded the removal of Stalin from the post of General Secretary, but it was not read out at the congress. The party and the country learned about the existence of these documents of Lenin only after the death of Stalin, at the 20th Party Congress, at which his crimes were exposed.

As we have already promised, let us dwell briefly on this article by Lenin. I have already mentioned, but I will emphasize again: there were no strategic differences between Lenin and Stalin on the national question in the Soviet state. Differences concerned only tactics, methods of imperial policy and the pace of denationalization of nationalities. Lenin stood for a slow, more peaceful than violent assimilation of non-Russian peoples. Stalin pursued the same goal, only in an accelerated manner, relying more on the arguments of violence than on persuasion. Lenin well understood how deeply hostile to the national aspirations of the non-Russian peoples were the international goals of his communist program. He also understood that among non-Russian communists there are not only Russified nationals with imperial or international thinking, like Stalin, Ordzhonikidze, Dzerzhinsky, but for the most part communists of the outskirts - nationally minded communists, especially those who joined the party after the Bolshevik revolution. They actually held the Soviet power in the field. Under these conditions, Lenin considered Stalin's plan to mechanically incorporate these still legally and formally sovereign republics into the RSFSR on the rights of "autonomization" downright adventurous undertaking, fraught with great dangers. After all, Stalin's plan exposed in practice the whole philosophy of equality and sovereignty of the peoples of Russia. A new form of federation of nominally "equal" and still "sovereign" peoples had to be found. First rejecting Stalin's "autonomization" plan as vicious and dangerous, Lenin proposed calling the new association the "Union of Soviet Republics of Europe and Asia." Then he himself rejected this name, finding it too narrow and regional in the light of his world goals to create, as Lenin put it, a "World Soviet Republic". Lenin found the still existing, regionally and ethnically unlimited, global formula for the unification of Soviet states - the "Union of Soviet Socialist Republics", which, according to Lenin's plan, states of any continents and nationalities of Europe, Asia, Africa, America, Australia, Oceania can join.

A further presentation of the differences between Lenin and Stalin on this issue must be preceded by one important remark. Lenin was wrong when he condemned the unworthy and dishonest methods of Stalin. Stalin's fault was that he was a more consistent guide to the life of Lenin's moral philosophy than Lenin himself. It is worth recalling this philosophy. At the Third Congress of the Komsomol in 1920, as if commenting on the Machiavellian philosophy of his book *The Childhood Disease of "Left-Wing" in Communism*, Lenin taught the Soviet youth: the Communists do not recognize what is commonly called universal morality, for the Communists morality and morality are a class category. For communists everything is moral that helps the interests of their struggle for the dictatorship of the proletariat. In this struggle, Lenin argued, any methods and

methods, if they are placed at the service of the main strategic goal of the conquest of power by the proletariat. Lenin considered subtle cunning and deliberate lies to be completely acceptable and legal means in the political struggle, with the only proviso that all this should serve the interests of communism. But Lenin was deeply mistaken in taking Stalin for a communist. Stalin did not seek to build communism, but to perpetuate the state under his personal

dictatorship. Therefore, strictly following his own teachings, Stalin begins to apply the tactical principles of Leninism already within the party in the struggle for power not only against his rivals in the Kremlin, but also in the national quasi-sovereign republics, resorting to the same "tricks", "cunning", deceit and lies, the permissibility of which is discussed in the said book of Lenin. After all, Lenin's goal is not personal power, but the harmony of the central government with the "sovereign" national republics. Therefore, Lenin fears that Stalin's excessive zeal to "become a Leninist more than Lenin himself" (this expression was used by Lenin himself about his zealous students) could lead to the collapse of the still unstrengthened Soviet empire. How clearly Lenin's mind worked in this respect, even during a fatal illness, is shown by his last documents already mentioned. Almost all of them are dedicated to Stalin and the national question. Lenin began his offensive against Stalin in a letter to the Politburo, which is purely tactical in nature. The letter says: "I declare a fight to the death against Great Russian chauvinism. As soon as I get rid of the damned tooth, eat it with all healthy teeth. We must absolutely insist that a Russian, a Ukrainian, a Georgian, etc., preside in turn in the allied Central Executive Committee." (Lenin, 4th ed., vol. 33, p. 335). The essence of Lenin's disagreement with Stalin is outlined in the already mentioned article: "On the question of nationalities or 'autonomization'", consisting of a number of his "notes". Lenin was outraged not so much by the fact that Ordzhonikidze ruled Transcaucasia as a royal governor, but also by the fact that Ordzhonikidze, in the presence of Rykov, slapped the "deviator" A. Kabakhidze, who called him "Stalin's donkey," and Stalin, instead of condemning the behavior of Ordzhonikidze, demonstratively supported the action of Ordzhonikidze, moreover, by the decision of the commission of the Central Committee of the RCP (b), headed by Dzerzhinsky, it was not Ordzhonikidze, but Mdivani who was condemned. On this occasion, Lenin wrote: "If it came to the point that Ordzhonikidze could go too far to the use of physical violence, then one can imagine what a swamp we have flown into. Apparently, this whole idea of 'autonomization' was fundamentally wrong." Lenin accuses Russified aliens—Stalin, Dzerzhinsky, and Ordzhonikidze—of the Great Russian chauvinist campaign against Georgia. At the same time, he remarks: "It is known that Russified foreigners always overdo it in terms of a truly Russian mood." Finishing his notes on the behavior in Georgia of two leading Georgians acting under his own mandate, Lenin adds: "In this case, in relation to the Georgian nation, we have a typical example of where extreme caution, precaution and compliance are required on our part.. The Georgian who scornfully regards this side of the matter, scornfully hurls accusations of 'social nationalism' (while he himself is a real and true not only 'social nationalist', but also a rude Great Russian scumbag), that Georgian, in essence violates the interests of proletarian class solidarity." (Lenin, PSS, vol. 45, pp. 356-360).

It is precisely to these Georgian Bolsheviks whom Stalin accused of "social nationalism" and "national deviationism" that Lenin wrote the following letter on March 6, 1923: "To Comrades Mdivani, Makharadze and others. Dear comrades! I follow your work with all my heart. Outraged by the rudeness of Ordzhonikidze and the indulgence of Stalin and Dzerzhinsky. I am preparing notes and speeches for you. Sincerely. Lenin" (PSS, vol. 54, p. 330).

Lenin demanded from the Plenum of the Central Committee to expel Ordzhonikidze from the party, to punish Dzerzhinsky, and from the upcoming KhP Congress of the Party, he demanded the removal of Stalin from the post of General Secretary. Fearing that his illness would prevent him from speaking at the plenum of the Central Committee, Lenin wrote to Trotsky:

"Strictly secret. Personally.

Dear comrade Trotsky!

I would ask you to take it upon yourself to defend the Georgian case at the Central Committee. This matter is now under persecution by Stalin and Dzerzhinsky, and I cannot rely on their impartiality. Even quite the opposite. If you agreed to take his protection, then I could be calm "(Lenin, PSS, vol. 54, p. 329).

Lenin proposed to Trotsky a "bloc of Lenin-Trotsky" to liquidate Stalin and his faction. This already proved what a huge party apparatus force General Secretary Stalin became in just one year,

if, in order to overthrow him, Lenin proposes the creation of a "Lenin-Trotsky bloc." However, Trotsky, who was always brave in words against Stalin when it was necessary to act, and even in a bloc with Lenin himself, showed political helplessness, grave in its tragic consequences for millions. And yes, he bragged about it. Here is what Trotsky said to Stalin's ally Kamenev: "Keep in mind and tell others that the last thing I intend to do is raise a struggle at the congress for the sake of any organizational restructuring. I stand for the status quo... I am against the liquidation of Stalin, against the expulsion of Ordzhonikidze, against the removal of Dzerzhinsky. No need for intrigue. We need honest cooperation" (L. Trotsky, "My Life", part P, p. 224).

It turns out that it is not Stalin and his company who are engaged in "intrigues", but Lenin, who demands the expulsion and punishment of this company. Thus, when Trotsky joined the essentially anti-Leninist "troika" in the Politburo—Stalin, Zinoviev, and Kamenev—the 11th party congress in April 1923, nine months before Lenin's death, became the first Stalinist congress to go against Lenin's wishes in two crucial questions. Namely: 1) "Troika" concealed Lenin's "Political Testament" from the KhP Congress in the form of his "Letter to the Congress", in which Lenin demanded the removal of Stalin; 2) "Troika" plus Trotsky refused both to announce at the congress and to fulfill Lenin's demands from the cited article "On the Question of Nationalities and Autonomization" about the punishment of Dzerzhinsky and Ordzhonikidze. The congress condemned not Stalin, Ordzhonikidze and Dzerzhinsky, but Mdivani, Makharadze, Tsintsadze, Okudzhava and other "national deviationists". Who turned out to be right in this dispute - Lenin or Stalin? Lenin wanted to peacefully achieve the communist integration of non-Russian peoples into a single nation with the Russian people. Stalin wanted the same thing, but in an orthodox Leninist way, that is, by the methods of the "dictatorship of the proletariat." Stalin, who knew the non-Russian peoples, at least from the experience of the Caucasus, better than Lenin, was convinced that Lenin had hit a utopia, thinking that the merger of nations could be carried out by persuasion. It was in this case that Stalin was more of a Leninist than Lenin himself. In fact, we already know that for Lenin the interests of socialism are higher than national interests, and the national question itself is not the main question in his revolutionary strategy, but a side question, a question of tactics, not a program. Stalin was faithful to Leninism when he wrote: "The national question is part of the general question of the proletarian revolution, part of the question of the dictatorship of the proletariat" (Stalin, Questions of Leninism, p. 47). Therefore, according to Stalin, the national question in a multinational socialist empire cannot be resolved otherwise than by revolutionary methods of the "dictatorship of the proletariat." Indeed, in all his speeches, Stalin connects the final solution of the national question not with the method of persuasion, as Lenin demanded, but with the method of violence, as Leninism requires. Lenin came into conflict with the quintessence of his teaching, namely the theory and practice of the proletarian revolution and the dictatorship of the proletariat, believing that it was possible to force non-Russian peoples to abandon their thousand-year-old national authenticity without resorting to the methods of dictatorship. In this, Stalin saw the inconsistency of Lenin and in his letter to the members of the Politburo called Lenin a "national liberal" for this. That Stalin proceeded in his strategy from the general teachings of Lenin will be shown by a couple of quotations from Lenin about the "dictatorship of the proletariat." Here is Lenin's definition of what the "dictatorship of the proletariat" is: "The scientific concept of dictatorship means nothing more than power unrestricted by anything, by no laws, absolutely not constrained by any rules, b

Lenin also has a "synthetic" definition of the "dictatorship of the proletariat", which allows for an alternative choice of methods - peaceful and non-peaceful. Here it is: "The dictatorship of the proletariat is a stubborn struggle, bloody and bloodless, violent and peaceful, military and economic, pedagogical and administrative, against the forces and traditions of the old society" (ibid., p. 190).

Stalin chose from this alternative bloody, violent, military and administrative methods, and by this he saved the regime of Leninism not only in the national republics, but also in Russia. In Stalin's defense, it must be said that he took Lenin's sometimes empty threats too literally. In the notes and orders of Lenin, it is often said that the ruling party, for the most part, is careerists who deserve to be "shot" all of them, or during the NEP period, "Smenovokhites" appeared who should be put up against the wall, or former tsarist officials, the White Guards and the former Mensheviks with the Socialist-Revolutionaries are sabotaging Soviet measures—they must all be "driven to prison"!

Stalin did not say empty words, but mowed down all the people of these categories even before he became General Secretary. Why did this same Lenin decide that it was necessary to flirt with the Georgian "nationalists", "Mensheviks" and "princes", Stalin thought. Stalin—Lenin taken to its logical conclusion—was right in his own way.

U. The National Question at the 11th Party Congress

Stalin and the Stalinists, like their heirs, have always been and remain Great Russian ideologists in their national politics, in comparison with which the Russian tsars and their ideologists, the Uvarovs, Pobedonostsevs and Purishkeviches, were mere dilettantes. The difference here between tsarist and Soviet Russia lies in the fact that the tsars and their ministers in their domestic and foreign policy were sincere and honest, calling a spade a spade, while the Bolsheviks and their leaders were forced to mask their imperialist policy with international phraseology (a classic example: according to Kremlin, the Soviet army is not waging a colonial war in Afghanistan, but is fulfilling an "international duty" or, even more cynically, providing "fraternal assistance" to the Afghans by practicing barbaric genocide there). The difference between Lenin and Stalin on the national question lay in the fact that, for the success of his strategy, Lenin preferred to carry out the Bolshevization of the national outlying districts by national rather than Russian hands. Lenin therefore proposed to transfer all local power into the hands of the Nationals, eliminating the appearance of a Russian presence there. Otherwise, Lenin wrote, "freedom to leave (these republics) from the USSR will turn out to be an empty piece of paper, unable to protect Russian foreigners from the invasion of that truly Russian person, Great Russian, chauvinist, in essence, scoundrel and rapist, which is a typical Russian bureaucrat. There is no doubt that an insignificant percentage of Soviet and Sovietized workers will drown in this sea of chauvinistic Great Russian trash like a fly in milk" (Lenin, PSS, vol. 45, p. 361).

This is, downright, a brilliantly prophetic characterization of the entire post-Leninist national policy of the Party. In Lenin's eyes, because of Stalin's great-power practices, the danger of the collapse of the Soviet empire became so formidable that he directly demanded a return to the original position that existed before the creation of the USSR - until December 30, 1922. Here are his words: develop "a detailed code that can be compiled only the nationals living in the given republic are any successful. Moreover, one should not renounce in any way in advance that, as a result of all this work, to return back at the next Congress of Soviets, that is, to leave the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics only in military and diplomatic respects, and in all other respects to restore the complete independence of individual people's commissariats" (there same, p. 362, italics mine - A. A.).

Lenin frankly writes that there is nothing to say about the struggle against the Western

imperialism if we start our own Soviet imperialism at home. Here are Lenin's words: "It is one thing to rally against the imperialists of the West... It is another thing when we ourselves fall into imperialist relations with the oppressed peoples, thereby completely undermining all our principled sincerity, all our principled defense of the struggle against imperialism" (ibid.). The Central Committee agreed to Lenin's demand to discuss and resolve the national question at the KhP Congress in April 1923. Lenin himself was going to make a report on this question. (Already one order to Stalin to make a report on the national question at this congress was a direct mockery of the Central Committee of its sick leader.) Since Lenin's article on the national question, contrary to the wishes of the "troika", became the property of the congress delegates (at the request of Lenin's secretaries, it was announced at unofficial meetings of congress delegations), then Stalin had no choice but to repeat the political principles of Lenin, carefully avoiding the facts of the great power policy of his group in Georgia, against which the article was directed. Stalin was compelled to declare that the danger of Great Russian chauvinism existed not only in the party, but also in the Central Committee; since Stalin considered himself and his group among the true Leninists in this matter, no one understood who, then, were the Great Russian chauvinists in the Central Committee?

It is piquant that in order to confirm this thesis, Stalin referred not to Lenin, but to the authority of the White Guard professor Ustryalov and his "Smenovekhites", whose opinion, however, is quite

confirmed the practice of the chauvinists from Stalin's group. Here is the relevant passage from Stalin's report: "It is no coincidence that the Smenovekhites praise the Bolshevik communists, as if saying: you talk as much as you like about Bolshevism, chat as much as you like about your international tendencies, but we know that what has failed arrange for Denikin, you will arrange it, that you, the Bolsheviks, have restored the idea of a great Russia, or you, in any case, will restore it! It is no coincidence that this idea has even penetrated into some of our Party institutions. As for Lenin's accusation that Stalin's own grouping was to blame for this Great Russian idea and practice, Stalin passed him over in complete silence.

Moreover, Stalin directly went against Lenin's guidelines about "social nationalism", arguing that in addition to Russian great-power chauvinism, there is also the danger of "local nationalism", the representatives of which in Georgia are supposedly Georgian "national deviationists" headed by Mdivani. Stalin proved not only contrary to the facts, but even to common sense, that these "national deviationists" wanted to establish Georgian rule over the whole of Transcaucasia. Alas, as it turned out later, it turned out to be much easier for one Georgian - Stalin - to establish his personal dominance over all of Russia than to rule the Caucasus together for all Georgians.

In the positive part of his report, Stalin put forward a demand that sounded very encouraging to the oppressed peoples, but in fact contradicted the goals of communism, and therefore unrealistic - the demand for the creation of its own national economy in each national republic. Here is how Stalin substantiated this position: "You won't get far in schools ... But actual inequality remains the basis of all discontent and all friction ... It is necessary that, in addition to schools and language ... in the outskirts, in the culturally backward republics, and they lagged behind because they were previously considered as sources of raw materials - it is necessary to ensure that centers of industry are established in these republics" (Stalin, Works, vol. 5). Everyone now knows how Stalin himself carried out this programmatic demand of the Party. Both in the old empire, and now, the national outskirts, remaining in many respects sources of raw materials, become additionally the sphere of expansion of centralized capital, in connection with which the colonialists in the form of industrial leaders and masters of production are settling in the national outskirts. This has led to the fact that in some Asian republics the indigenous population is a minority, and in the Baltic republics the ratio between the local population and the newcomers is changing dramatically in favor of the imperial element. As for the development of the national economy, its objects in

national republics are built only if they are planned in local budgets approved by Moscow. At the same time, the central planning of all-Union and republican industrial facilities is carried out in such a way that in none of the union republics, except for the RSFSR, something like an intra-national economic "autarky" is created, in which this or that republic could exist independently if it there will be an opportunity to leave Russia. The one-sided development of industrial oases in the national republics, to whose income they have nothing to do, especially when it comes to natural resources, should create in them eternal economic dependence, firstly, from each other, and secondly, and this is the main thing, from the metropolis.

Let's go back to the convention. The debate on Stalin's report was conducted by the "deviators" with great tact and in full agreement with Lenin. The debate on the part of Stalin's supporters was aggressive and defiant in its anti-Leninist orientation, because both the "troika" and its followers were convinced that Lenin would no longer return to power and therefore they were not in danger. But they needed the name of Lenin with his unquestioned authority in the party, so they always referred to him, even when they deliberately falsified his ideas.

Since Lenin's criticism of Stalin, Ordzhonikidze and Dzerzhinsky was just as justified as dangerous for them, Stalin's group declares this criticism to be the fantasy of a sick person who, moreover, became a victim of "deviators' misinformation." Let us dwell first on the speeches of the "deviators". The leader of the "deviators" Budu Mdivani was the first to speak at the congress, whom Stalin, together with his like-minded people, recalled from Georgia and put him on the student bench of Marxism courses at the Komakademiya. I will be Mdivani, despite all the bullying

Stalinists over him, up to a slap in the face from Ordzhonikidze, was restrained in his speech in form, but in essence very decisive. Referring to Lenin's letter, he said: "There were differences of opinion on the national question, and these differences have now been resolved in favor of our group. This group exists, its policy should be carried out there, but people remain here. So what is Comrade Stalin, politics for individuals or individuals for politics? The central point of his speech Mdivani, on the one hand, made Lenin's letter against the Great Russian chauvinism of Stalin, and, on the other hand, Stalin's campaign against the "Great Georgian chauvinism" of the "deviators". Mdivani said:

"We have a school of Lenin on the national question, which once and for all resolved the national question... Many of our comrades did not reject the national program, but pushed it aside... One of the members of the Central Committee declared that the national question for us is a matter of tactics. ... We need what Comrade Ilyich always taught us and what he called on us to do in his last letters, known to the congress only through individual delegations ... fought.

Ordzhonikidze's remark: Geniuses.

Mdivani: No, we are not geniuses, we have others elevated to the rank of geniuses ... I have to object, which I did not think, to the speaker. The comrade speaker devoted much space to Georgia and Georgian chauvinism.

Stalin's remark: As a sign of special respect!

Mdivani: Thank you, Comrade Stalin. But allow me, as a sign of "most special" respect, to remind you of something from our past life ... ".

And Mdivani spoke about all the infringements and intrigues in Georgia against the Georgian national minorities (Adjarians, Abkhazians, South Ossetians, etc.), which were undertaken on the orders of Stalin himself. Mdivani added: "When this is done by order of Stalin, then I must say: I obey, Comrade Stalin!" (KhP Congress of the RCP(b). Protocols. M., 1923, pp. 456-457). Mdivani concluded the speech with the words: "Yes, we are all a Soviet association! Give this Soviet association the most important commissariats,

determining our foreign policy, the defense of our republic. Give these individual nationalities other commissariats, where they can show their will, their ability to manage things, their ability to create a new life" (ibid., pp. 455, 458).

Poor Bud Mdivani! An active Bolshevik from the time when Stalin hobnobbed with the Georgian Mensheviks, the conqueror of Georgia, who at the head of the Red Army crushed the Menshevik Republic, the author of the then famous pun: "I won't be if I won't be in Tiflis in a week", a student of Lenin and his first viceroy in Soviet Georgia, this Budu Mdivani could not understand in any way that that member of the Central Committee (perhaps Stalin), who said that for Bolshevism the national question is a matter of tactics, was deeply right, and he, Mdivani, demanding the preservation of the sovereignty of the republics, was walking against the will of the party, which within a year had taken the openly chauvinistic position of its general secretary, against whom Lenin himself proved helpless. This was especially clearly demonstrated in their speeches at the congress by those old Bolsheviks whom Stalin managed to recruit into his network.

Stalin had an exceptional gift for bribing people: equals with flattery, inferior ones with the promise of a brilliant career. Stalin proved his ability to flatter his comrades-in-arms during Lenin's illness. The HP Party Congress was being prepared. The Politburo, as usual, instructs Lenin to make a political report to the Central Committee at the congress. But it turns out that the disease will not allow Lenin to speak at the congress. Then Stalin offers Trotsky to speak instead of Lenin, motivating his proposal by the fact that it is Trotsky who is the most popular leader of the party after Lenin. Trotsky refuses, making a politically naive argument - "I didn't want," says Trotsky, "that the party thought I was claiming to be Lenin's heir." Stalin's proposal was the veiled flattery of a true pretender to Lenin's

throne, in order to disorientate its main competitor. For the same purpose and with the same motive, Stalin made an offer to Zinoviev, who, openly claiming as the head of the Comintern, the role of the second leader of the party after Lenin, immediately appreciated Stalin's modesty and accepted the offer. Stalin also endeared himself to the third contender for the throne, Lenin, Kamenev, suggesting that he open the congress with an introductory speech and close it with a closing speech. This role has also been filled by Lenin. With these flattering proposals to the leading members of the Politburo, Stalin achieved his immediate goal: he neutralized Trotsky, and finally won over Zinoviev and Kamenev to his side in order to avoid, despite Lenin's demand, the announcement of his article on the national question and the "Political testament" at the congress. Yes, and Stalin prepared his first congress as General Secretary with such thoroughness in the alignment of active forces and reserves that the master of these affairs, Lenin himself, could envy him if he participated in it. This was clearly demonstrated at the KhP Congress itself, when Stalin, smashing Lenin's position on the national question, passed it off as a defense of it. Stalin already demonstrated his ability to bribe people with the promise of a career in his organizational report on the work of the Central Committee. He promised those young party leaders who know how to think "independently" membership in the Central Committee of the party, by expanding its membership. The idea of expanding the Central Committee was put forward by Lenin himself in his "Notes" on the organizational question, which the "troika" - Stalin, Zinoviev, Kamenev - concealed from the congress. Stalin passed off Lenin's idea as his own, omitting that Lenin proposed expanding the composition of the Central Committee at the expense of workers, and not party apparatchiks: "There is one question about expanding the Central Committee ... It's time to think about how to forge a new shift. There is one means for this—to draw new, fresh workers into the work of the Central Committee and, in the course of the work, to raise them to the top, to raise up the most capable and independent, who have their heads on their shoulders" (ibid.). Every congress delegate sitting in the hall knew that in the historical dispute between Stalin and Lenin, only that delegate has a chance of getting into the enlarged Central Committee who, on the national question, has a pro-Stalinist "head on his shoulders." During the debate, almost all the speakers turned out to be like this, except for the "deviators" and three members of the Central Committee. There were 11 participants in the debate, including three "deviators" (Mdivani, Makharadze, Tsintsadze), five Stalinists (Ordzhonikidze, Orakhelashvili, Yenukidze, Sturua, Akhundov) and three members of the Central Committee (Bukharin, Radek and Rakov

In addition to the already cited speech by Mdivani, of the other speeches worthy of attention are the speeches of Rakovsky, Yenukidze and Bukharin.

The speech of the chairman of the Ukrainian government, Rakovsky, against Stalin's policy of Great Russian chauvinism sounded in Stalin's ears like a bolt from the blue. Why this was so, explains in his valuable work "The National Policy of the CPSU", a participant in the events of those times, Ukrainian publicist Ivan Maistrenko: "Rakovsky, a European left socialist, a Bulgarian by birth from the Romanian Dobruja. He was released from a Romanian prison by Russian troops during the revolution of 1917. From that time on, he joined the Bolsheviks. At one time he took a clearly anti-Ukrainian position, did not even recognize the Ukrainian language. For this, he was appointed by Moscow as chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of Soviet Ukraine. But in the course of his work in Ukraine, Rakovsky became convinced of his anti-Ukrainian mistakes. He came to the conclusion that the Soviet government was threatened by great-power chauvinism and degeneration into a new "united and indivisible Russia"" (p. 89). Rakovsky began his speech by expressing his regret that there was no Lenin at the congress, who "with his authoritative word would have struck loudly at our party and showed it that it is making fatal mistakes in the national question ... When I look at the calm with whom, in particular, the Russian part of our party relates to disputes over the national question ... I am worried about the fate of our party ... For some time we harbored the hope on the eve of the congress that the national question, as Ilyich assumed, would become the center of our congress, and he became the tail of our congress... The fact is that our central organs are beginning to look at the administration of the country from the point of view of their office conveniences. Of course, it is inconvenient to govern twelve republics, but if it were all one, if, by pressing one button, it would be possible to govern the whole country, it would be convenient... The central authorities were given ten, twenty times more rights, than they had before, before the creation of the Union Constitution... After the first Union Congress of Soviets, they became the masters of our entire life... Nine-tenths of their rights must be taken away from the Union Commissariats and transferred to the national republics... The district executive committee knows its rights better, than national republics. Allied

building went the wrong way. As you know, this is not only my opinion, it is the opinion of Vladimir Ilyich" ("KhP Congress of the RCP(b)...", pp. 529, 532).

When you carefully analyze the materials of the KhP Congress, the following facts are striking: despite the categorical demands of Lenin on the national question, despite the indisputability of the facts indicated by Lenin of the great-power chauvinist policy of Stalin, Dzerzhinsky, Ordzhonikidze, despite Lenin's unconditional support for the policy of Mdivani and his group in Georgia, Stalin's group is discussing the national question from openly anti-Leninist positions. This is all the more strange since Lenin's article on the national question was known to all the congress delegates, since it was read out at meetings of individual delegations. Besides, Lenin was still alive. Opening the congress, Kamenev assured, referring to medical authorities, that there was every chance that Lenin would overcome his illness. But then one wonders why the Stalinists mocked Lenin so unceremoniously, deliberately falsifying his documents? The only answer to this I see in Stalin's conviction that Lenin is doomed to death. Perhaps even Trotsky was right when he wrote that Stalin gave the poison to the dying Lenin, which Lenin, according to a statement to the Politburo of Stalin himself, asked him to get rid of severe pain. It would be super-naïve to deny Stalin's ability to do this. Let us now dwell on some of the anti-Leninist speeches at the congress. Stalin entrusted one such speech to the secretary of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR, the Georgian Yenukidze. Here are his main theses:

1) The questions raised by Lenin do not matter for Georgia or Ukraine, but only for our international position (that is, in other words, Lenin wrote all this for propaganda purposes abroad);

"There were many complaints here that the policy of Ordzhonikidze was a policy of violence, the policy of Derzhimorda. This word appears in the letter of Comrade Lenin ... In fact

Ordzhonikidze pursued the policy of the Central Committee" (in other words, Ordzhonikidze acted in this way on the orders of Lenin himself);

"Now about Comrade Lenin's letter. Here comrade Mdivani every second declined the name of comrade Ilyich and he wanted to create the impression that comrade Lenin wrote this letter on purpose to support the comrade deviators and justify their policy ... "

Bukharin's remark: Of course, for this purpose.

Yenukidze: Not for this purpose, Comrade Bukharin.

With regard to Lenin's criticism of Stalin, Ordzhonikidze and Dzerzhinsky, Yenukidze self-confidently declared: "T. Lenin became the victim of one-sided incorrect information" (ibid., pp. 537-541).

Mdivani's remark: Why is the letter not published?

Then neither Yenukidze, who defended Stalin so cheekily, for which Stalin later thanked him with a bullet in the back of the head, nor even Budu Mdivani knew that there were not one, but three letters from Lenin, and all of them were directed against Stalin. In addition to the letter on the national question, there were two other letters of Lenin - one, the so-called "Political Testament" of Lenin dated December 24-25, 1922, with an addition of January 4, 1923. In this letter, as it became known after the 20th Congress of 1956, Lenin demanded that Stalin be removed from the post of General Secretary.

For the first time, Lenin's Testament was published in America by the Trotskyite Eastman, in the fresh wake of the congress. The Troika forced Trotsky to declare in the pages of the magazine Bolshevik (now Kommunist) that Lenin did not leave any "Testament" and that Eastman's publication was a fake. After the Twentieth Congress, the whole world learned that not only the Troika, but Trotsky as well, deceived the party, declaring that Lenin had not written any letter about the removal of Stalin to the KhP Congress. Both the members of the "troika" - Stalin, Zinoviev, Kamenev, and Trotsky - had personal grounds for considering Lenin's letter non-existent. Lenin wrote that the mistakes of Zinoviev and Kamenev when they voted in 1917

against the October Revolution, are not accidental, but that this episode "can just as little be blamed on them personally as non-Bolshevism on Trotsky." However, by this mere mention, Lenin blamed them for these sins precisely because of their direct (Zinoviev and Kamenev) or indirect (Trotsky) support for the Stalinist policy of the Great Russian Derzhimorda. But about Stalin himself, Lenin spoke outwardly with restraint, but in fact categorically. Stalin knew for sure that the reading of Lenin's letter at the party congress meant certain political death for him. Indeed, let us recall what Lenin says about Stalin in it: "T. Stalin, having become General Secretary, has concentrated immense power in his hands, and I am not sure whether he will always be able to use this power with sufficient caution. But the essence of Lenin's letter is in the postscript, which he completed on January 4, 1923: "Stalin is too rude ... This shortcoming becomes intolerable in the position of General Secretary. Therefore, I suggest that the comrades consider a way to move Stalin from this place and appoint another person to this place.

In addition to Lenin's article on the "Georgian case", in addition to Lenin's "letter" to the party congress about the removal of Stalin, there was also another letter from Lenin dated March 5, 1923 about breaking off all personal relations with Stalin if he did not apologize to his wife Krupskaya for rude phone call. Only three people knew about this letter - Zinoviev, Kamenev and Trotsky. Of course, Stalin did not even think of apologizing to Krupskaya (there are no documents on this subject, except for a fake attributed to Lenin's sister that Stalin apologized to Krupskaya, but Krupskaya herself did not confirm this). Another thing is important: Stalin was ready for a fight with Lenin, for he was the complete master of the KhP Congress precisely because of his Great Russian chauvinism. This was testified by Bukharin: "You will notice what happened to Zinoviev when he spoke against local chauvinism - a thunder of applause rained down from everywhere. What wonderful solidarity! But what does this mean? This means that in those parts of speeches where it is about local chauvinists, everyone is against ... But when it comes to Russian chauvinism, on it is

the most dangerous" (XII Congress of the RCP (6). Protocols). It was precisely from this openly chauvinistic position of the new Derzhimords, who were at the head of the party, that Lenin proceeded when he put forward the tactical slogan of intensifying the struggle against Great Russian chauvinism. Lenin's goal is to prevent the danger of the collapse of the Soviet empire. Lenin's strategic calculations were old: - recognition of the right to secession of non-Russian peoples made it easier for him to preserve "one and indivisible Russia", declaring war on Russian chauvinism made it possible to forestall the danger of its disintegration. This tactic of Lenin was well understood by Bukharin, and he also understood that after overcoming the great-power deviation, a new, "second phase" in national politics would begin, when the struggle against local nationalism would begin. Here are Bukharin's words: "Why did Comrade Lenin sound the alarm on the Georgian question with such frenzied energy? And why didn't Comrade Lenin say a word in his letter about the mistakes of the deviators, and, on the contrary, he said all the words, and said four-yard words against the policy that was waged against the deviators? Because he did not know that there is a local chauvinism? But because Comrade Lenin is a brilliant strategist. He knows that it is necessary to beat the main enemy. For example, at this congress there is nothing to talk about local chauvinism. This is the second phase of our struggle" (ibid., pp. 561-564).

Central Committee member Karl Radek joined Bukharin: "I share the opinion of the growing importance of the national question ... And it was better here that Mdivani yelled with might and main than the peasants in Georgia" (ibid., pp. 565-563). In his closing remarks, Stalin dismissed all the demands and arguments of his opponents (i.e., the arguments and demands of Lenin), and after the congress proceeded to "re-plough" Georgia from the Menshevik-deviationist "weed". In response to the Stalinist repressions, what Lenin feared happened then: in August 1924, the Georgians raised a general uprising for the independent republic of Georgia. Up to five thousand killed and wounded, thousands arrested and shot - such were the victims of the Georgian uprising. The international inquisitor began the all-Russian meat grinder from his native Georgia. He even warned about it when, in one of his speeches to the Central Committee, he openly declared: "What happened in Georgia can be repeated throughout Russia" (Stalin, vol. 4, pp. 326-327). And it happened again: five years later, all over Russia, including its outskirts, forced collectivization began, accompanied by anti-collective farm uprisings, which took on the widest scope in the national republics. La

Stalin admitted that this collectivization cost the Soviet Union up to ten million human victims.

M. Fight on two fronts - a method of Bolshevization of the empire

The true essence of the Bolshevik national doctrine and the history of the zigzags of the Bolshevik policy in the national question is not falsified by anyone so godlessly as by the Soviet ideologists. In the West, the national question is often interpreted in isolation from the general Bolshevik policy and its strategic goals. At the same time, the functional role of the national policy of Lenin and Stalin on the Bolshevization of the peoples of the empire is ignored. It must be remembered, firstly, that the Bolsheviks did not fight against Russian chauvinism and local nationalism as such, but against the main obstacle to Bolshevization: against the intellectual and spiritual elite of all peoples, in order to isolate it politically, prepare its physical isolation; secondly, in this matter, despite the differences in tactics, there is an unspoken distribution of roles between Lenin and Stalin. The Russian Lenin is fighting against Great Russian chauvinism, and the "nationalist" Stalin is against local nationalism. Moreover, both have in mind not Russian and national biases in politics as a current of thought, but the elite of nations - the intelligentsia, regardless of its nationality. The history of Soviet power in the first years after the revolution is characterized by a campaign against the Russian intelligentsia. The signal was given by Lenin himself. As you know, Maxim Gorky quarreled with Lenin after the October Revolution because of the general, sometimes senseless, terror.

security officers against the color of the Russian nation - against its intelligentsia. When Gorky began to bombard Lenin with endless complaints about the atrocities of the Chekists against the intelligentsia, Lenin answered Maxim Gorky in a letter of October 15, 1919, that the Russian intelligentsia were only "intellectuals, lackeys of capital, who imagine themselves to be the brains of the nation. In fact, this is not a brain, but shit" (Lenin, PPS, vol. 51, p. 48). The Institute of Marxism-Leninism did not hesitate to publish such a rude, obscene letter from Lenin against the Russian intelligentsia, because that was the official policy. Lenin wanted to spread terror against the civil intelligentsia and the military intelligentsia, that is, to expel representatives of the former tsarist officer corps from the Red Army. And this is in the conditions of a civil war against the whites, when there were no red officers yet. Lenin was pushed to this by the "military opposition" against the head of the Red Army - Trotsky, who was actually headed by Stalin. Only the decisive resistance of Trotsky helped to keep the tsarist officers in the ranks of the Red Army for the benefit of the government itself. Here is Trotsky's testimony in his book *My Life*. Questioning Trotsky about the affairs at the front, Lenin added: "Isn't it better to drive out all the former officers?"

Trotsky asked Lenin: "Do you know how many of them we have in the army now?"

- Don't know.

- Approximately?

- Don't know.

- Not less than 30 thousand. Who will replace them all?

These officers were used in the civil war as "military specialists", and after its victorious end they were dismissed from the army. In subsequent years, almost all of them were eliminated as "enemies of the people." The same fate befell the Russian clergy. The beginning of the massacre of the clergy was marked by Lenin's letter to the members of the Politburo dated March 19, 1922.

In the collected works of Lenin, in Lenin's collections, in the endless "Leninians" every trifle is registered, if it came from Lenin's pen. But this Leninist letter of cardinal significance has not yet been published, declaring it a great state secret. And in this, the heirs of Lenin act reasonably. After all, UNESCO in 1970, on the centenary of the

birth declared Lenin (moreover, unanimously) "the great humanist of the twentieth century", and the publication of this letter would show the true face of the "humanist" Lenin. There is an indication of this letter in Lenin's writings with a clear softening of Lenin's formulations. It says that Lenin demanded "to suppress the resistance of the clergy to the implementation of the decree of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of February 23 on the seizure of church valuables." (Lenin, PPS, vol. 45, pp. 666-667). Thanks to samizdat, the full text of this letter from Lenin has now become known. Here is an excerpt from it: "The Politburo gives a detailed directive to the judicial authorities so that the process against the Shuya rebels (in the city of Shuya, believers did not allow the authorities to rob church valuables - A. A.) should be carried out with maximum speed and ended with nothing more than the execution of a very large number of the most influential and dangerous Black Hundreds of the city of Shuya, and if possible also not only of this city, but also of Moscow and several other spiritual centers "(Journal" Bulletin of the Russian Student Christian Movement ", No. 98, 1970, p. 55— 56).

What Lenin did with the Russian intelligentsia and clergy, Stalin did with the intelligentsia and clergy in the national outskirts. After Lenin's death, but even before the general secretary became the sole dictator, Stalin personally determined the party's strategy on the national question. This strategy includes two stages in the development of the national policy of the party: the first stage is the struggle on two fronts - against "Great Russian chauvinism" as the main danger (1923-1933) and "local nationalism" and the second stage - the struggle against "local" or "bourgeois nationalism" as the main danger (1934-1953), and "Great Russian chauvinism" disappeared altogether. Thus began that "second phase" in the national question, which Bukharin spoke of at the 12th Party Congress. How poorly the party leaders themselves understood the distribution of roles between Lenin and Stalin,

showed Bukharin's ridiculous explanation of why Lenin was fighting against the chauvinism of the Russians, and Stalin against the chauvinism of the nationalists. Here is Bukharin's explanation in his speech at the KhP Congress: "I understand that our dear friend, Comrade Koba Stalin, is not so sharply opposed to Russian chauvinism (meaning the speech of Lenin - A. A.) and that he, as a Georgian, is against Georgian chauvinism.

Stalin also learned from Lenin to attach political labels to his opponents. Where Lenin said "a", Stalin also said "b", with the only difference being that his political labels eventually acquired the meaning of a criminally punishable delict. And then Stalin did not have enough of the entire alphabet to number the socio-political categories of enemies of the Soviet regime. Stalin scheduled people to be liquidated not for the crimes committed, but only for their political past, social origin, for imaginary or potential dissent in ideology. In order to justify this criminal policy in a Marxist way, not only the theory of "aggravation of the class struggle" was called for help, but also the misanthropic philosophy of Bolshevism, which Maxim Gorky formulated in a lapidary slogan: "If the enemy does not surrender, he is destroyed."

And at the KhP Congress of the Party, Stalin had the opportunity to legalize this philosophy and at the same time receive a congress mandate for the political isolation of the enemies of Bolshevism in the field of national politics in both camps - Russian and national. If Lenin said that at this first stage of politics in the national question, Russian chauvinists are dangerous, and even supported the "national deviationists", for which Stalin accused him of "national liberalism" in the documents we cited, then Stalin found that there was more than one, like Lenin, but three chauvinisms: Russian chauvinism against the nationalists, national chauvinism against the Russians, and chauvinism in the national republics against their own national minorities. Stalin called the latter in the resolution of the congress on his report as follows: Azerbaijani chauvinism, Armenian chauvinism, Uzbek chauvinism against their own national minorities. In this regard, the same resolution of Stalin said: "All these types of chauvinism, encouraged to the same by the conditions of the NEP, are the greatest evil ... Needless to say, all these phenomena hinder the actual unification of peoples into a single state union" (KhP congress of the RKI (6. Verbatim report. M., 1923, p. 647). The congress noted, at the suggestion of Ukraine, the danger of Russian chauvinism in words that are relevant just today:

Russian culture over the cultures of more backward peoples (Ukrainian, Azeri, Uzbek, Kirghiz, etc.) are nothing but an attempt to consolidate the dominance of Great Russian nationalism. Therefore, a decisive struggle against the remnants of Great Russian chauvinism is the first immediate task of our Party... The struggle to eliminate the actual inequality of nationalities is the second immediate task of our Party" (ibid.). Stalin recognized both of these tasks of the party only in words. In Stalin's eyes, the "greatest evil" lay in the numerous local "chauvinisms" that became a brake on the "united state union." Barely two months after the congress, Stalin began to carry out not the "first" but the "second" task of the party, the task that Lenin did not even set in his letter—the liquidation of these "local deviators." The campaign against them was announced at the All-Union National Conference of the Central Committee of the Party (June 9-12, 1923). There were two issues on the agenda: 1) the case of Sultan-Galiev (report by the chairman of the Central Control Commission Kuibyshev), 2) the resolution of the KhP Congress on the national question (report by Stalin). The focus of the meeting was not Georgia, where Stalin had already successfully "resolved the national question", but the Turko-Tatar republics. For this meeting, Stalin created through the organs of the GPU a falsified case against the leader of the Tatar communists, his former assistant to the people's commissar (as a member of the board) - Sultan-Galiyev. The resolution of the meeting, in which the communist defenders of the interests of their own nationality are put on a par with the enemies of Soviet power, became indictment against nationally minded

communists of all republics. Moreover, the national communists are credited not only with a deviation from Soviet politics, but also with a direct political connection with the counter-revolution. This resolution stated that Sultan-Galiyev "created illegal organizations in the republics and regions in order to counteract the measures of the central organs (...), undermined the confidence of the previously oppressed nationalities in the revolutionary proletariat (...), trying to contact his supporters in some eastern states (Persia, Turkey) and rally them on a platform opposed to the policy of the Soviet government in the field of the national question (...), in an attempt to contact the Bukhara-Turkestan Basmachi supported by international imperialism through one of its leaders, Zaki Validov" ("The CPSU in resolutions", part 1, p. 760).

It is only 1923 and Lenin is still alive, but seriously ill and disavowed just on this issue by the congress that has just ended, he is helpless and deprived of power. Stalin, clearly violating the decisions of the congress, using the services of the GPU, over which he oversaw on behalf of the Central Committee, creates from beginning to end a falsified criminal case against Sultan-Galiyev according to recipes that he will form the basis of millions of such cases during the "great terror" of the thirties years.

During the belated repentance of the Zinovievists for their help in Stalin's rise to power, Kamenev told Trotsky in 1926: "Remember the arrest of Sultan-Galiev, the former chairman of the Tatar Council of People's Commissars, in 1923? This was the first arrest of a prominent member of the party, made on the initiative of Stalin. Zinoviev and I, unfortunately, gave our consent. From that time on, Stalin seemed to lick the blood" (Trotsky, "Stalin", vol. 2, p. 260). Then came the chain reaction of purges of national republics from nationally minded communists. They, following the example of Georgia, Tatar-Bashkiria and Turkestan, were associated with parties, classes and movements hostile to Bolshevism. Every time National Communists were purged, arrested and executed, they were invariably associated either with hostile parties or directly with the counter-revolution: Georgian National Communists were associated with Georgian Mensheviks and princes; Armenian - with Dashnaks, Azerbaijani - with Musavatists; Tatar-Bashkir and Turkestan - with Basmachi; Ukrainians with separatists, Belarusians with "National Democrats"; Jewish - with the Zionists. Stalin's criminal fantasy was bottomless. However, who can doubt that, going against the letter of Lenin's last letters on the national question, he was faithful to the end to the Leninist spirit when, with unparalleled cruelty, he mowed down the enemies of Bolshevism precisely where the danger of the collapse of the Soviet empire was growing rapidly. The general growth of the Basmachi movement in Turkestan and the popular uprising in Georgia that began a year later, threatening to turn into a general Caucasian uprising, were not only a formidable signal, but also a welcome justification for the repressive course of the party on the national outskirts.

The underlying causes of disagreements between Lenin and his party on the national question lay on a different plane than is clear from Lenin's letters and from the materials of the KhP Congress of the Party, at which discussions on the national question unfolded. It was, as I have already pointed out, about two tactics in solving the national question to achieve the same strategic goal - to strengthen the Soviet empire as the base of the world revolution.

Lenin thought that after the power was in the hands of the party, the method of persuading the "deviators" with flexible tactics and the method of coercion of the party great powers, which discredited Soviet internationalism and objectively provoked the collapse of the Soviet empire, became the first place in the national question. Stalin, and with him the majority of the party, believed that the Great Powers in the party existed only in Lenin's imagination. There are only local "deviators" who should not be persuaded, but thrown out of the party.

Lenin's glances towards the world proletariat and the oppressed East in the interests of organizing the "world revolution" are aimless, for the world revolution can be organized only by the "united and indivisible" Soviet Russia, if, relying on Russian nationalism, it creates a highly developed industrial and military base. Later his

Stalin justified the policy of industrialization and collectivization not by the desire to raise the standard of living of the people, but by great-power motives - to make Soviet Russia an invincible world military power. Stalin looked straight into the souls of the Great Powers when he embarked on a completely new philosophy for the Bolsheviks. Stalin did not scold tsarist imperialism for its aggressive wars with its neighbors, but condemned it for its military weakness. Here is Stalin's philosophy: "The retarded are beaten. But we don't want to be beaten. No, we don't. The history of old Russia consisted, among other things, in the fact that she was constantly beaten for her backwardness. Beat the Mongol khans. Turkish beks beat. Beat the Swedish feudal lords. They beat the Polish-Lithuanian pans. The Anglo-French capitalists fought. Beat the Japanese barons. Everyone was beaten for backwardness. For military backwardness, for cultural backwardness, for state backwardness, for industrial backwardness, for agricultural backwardness... That is why we must no longer lag behind" (Problems of Leninism, p. 338).

According to Stalin, only a highly developed USSR will become "the first stage of the world revolution and a powerful base for its further development" (ibid., p. 105).

Stalin achieved his industrial and military-political goals. But his victory was one-sided. The Soviet Union, on the blood of millions and the poverty of the broad masses of the people, has become a great military-industrial power. The political tyranny, social inequality and "social imperialism" created by Stalin's "general line" surpassed all the worst that we know from the history of Eastern despotisms and ancient slave-owning tyrannies. Was this how Lenin wanted to see Soviet socialism? I doubt it. Moreover, it seems to me that if Lenin could survey the fruits of the work of his heirs from Stalin to the present day, he would repeat what he said about old Russia a year and 9 months before the revolution: "It was indecent for us, representatives of a great-power nation we should forget about the enormous significance of the national question, especially in such a country, which is justly called "a prison of peoples" ... It is most painful for us to see and feel what violence, oppression, and mockery our beautiful homeland is subjected to ... We remember how the Great Russian democrat Chernyshevsky said: "A miserable nation, a nation of slaves, from top to bottom - all slaves" (Lenin, On the national-colonial question, pp. 232-233).

But for all this, Lenin would have to blame his teacher Marx, himself and his student Stalin, for the concept of "world revolution" turned out to be a utopia. A utopia, because the subjective calculations of the calculators of the world revolution have shattered against the monstrous reality of the first real socialism in the world.

What were those calculations? Lenin proceeded from the fact that:

the first - the nationalization of the means of production in town and country, plus agricultural cooperatives - already signify the foundations for the creation of a classless society;

second, the socialist society created on this basis will surpass capitalism in terms of labor productivity and economic profitability;

thirdly, the policy of rapprochement and merging of nations in the Soviet state will serve as proof that only under socialism can chauvinism, nationalism and national oppression be eliminated.

Such socialism will become, according to Lenin's plan, that earthly paradise from where no one flees, but where everyone aspires, or they want to build the same socialist paradise at home. As you know, nothing came of such socialism. In place of the old exploiting classes, new exploiting classes appeared. The Leninist type of state in the form of "Soviet democracy" turned into a tyranny unique in history. As for the national question and national contradictions, Stalin and his heirs "resolved" them by driving them deep into the depths of military police terror, having previously destroyed the old nationally-minded elites in both camps - in Russian and national. I may be reproached for the illogicality of the thesis: Stalin led the party of Russian great powers against non-Russian peoples and at the same time destroyed not only local nationalists, but also Great Russian chauvinists. Where is the logic here? Logics

is, and the Bolsheviks themselves call it "dialectical logic" when they do not find reasonable arguments to justify their unreasonable actions or unexpected zigzags of the "general lines".

Indeed, if you trace the history of the Russian and national question in Soviet Russia in the 1920s and until the mid-1930s, you will easily come to the conclusion that this entire period is characterized mainly by unprecedented mass terror against nationally minded Russian people and wild vandalism directed against the national-historical and spiritual-religious monuments of old Russia. Accordingly, its entire old history is interpreted. Truly, the "rainy day" of national Russia lasted more than 15 years. Terror against local nationalism in the Caucasus and the Muslim East during this period was limited, if only because, according to the official doctrine of the party, local nationalism is still considered a lesser danger than Russian chauvinism, and the national intelligentsia was not numerous there.

Stalin's "dialectical logic" in the Russian question boiled down to the fact that he destroyed the great powers with a communist ideology in exactly the same way as he destroyed the old classes with a monarchist culture, creating new classes of unprincipled, but obedient performers with new class great power thinking in the mask of internationalists. The new general line of the party in domestic politics required a radical revision of Lenin's tactics on the national question, both in terms of assessing various "deviations" and in terms of the degree of their danger to the existing regime at this stage. It was not the Caucasian, not the Turkestan, and not the Tatar-Bashkir affairs that troubled Stalin in the early 1930s. He believed that if the deviations there take on a wider scale and become a threat to the existence of Soviet power in the localities, then these peoples can be brought to obedience rather quickly, as was often done by the expeditions of the Red Army. But a formidable danger emerged on the outskirts, where a large and freedom-loving nation lived, where one of the most important industrial, agricultural and human reservoirs of the Soviet empire was located, on the outskirts, which was also the most important military-strategic outpost - in Ukraine. If the national bias in Ukraine were to develop into a general national movement, then the existence of the Soviet empire itself would be called into question. Moreover, such a Ukrainian national movement would immediately spread not only to neighboring Belarus and the Crimea, but also to the Caucasus and the Tatar-Turkestan world. The central government had enough warning signals from Ukraine that things could take such a turn. The Party's misfortune also lay in the fact that, ironically, it herself inspired the danger of developments in this direction at its Tenth Congress in 1921, when it proclaimed a course towards "indigenization", that is, in other words, a course towards derussification of national republics. The said congress issued a directive to fill in the party, state, cultural,

economic bodies in the national republics by representatives of the local, indigenous nationality, conduct business in the republican institutions in the national language as the state language, develop the national economy, national culture, national science, national literature and art in national languages.

Ukrainians and Belarusians quite logically and, based on the terminology of Stalin himself, translated the concept of "indigenization" into their own language, calling it "Ukrainization" and "Belarusization" respectively. The course of "Ukrainization", "Belarusization", that is, "indigenization" in the republics was thus the official policy of the party. Very soon, however, it became clear that the party had proclaimed such a course not for its practical implementation, but for the same tactical purposes: to stabilize the Bolshevik regime, which was still very weak in the newly Sovietized national outskirts. Indeed, how did Moscow react when the same Ukraine began to plan Ukrainization in accordance with the decisions of the Tenth Party Congress on the national question? Let us first recall what Stalin said at this congress, proclaiming

"indigenization" in Ukraine and Belarus.

Here is an excerpt from his report: "I have a note that we, the Communists, are allegedly implanting the Belarusian nationality artificially. This is not true, because there is a Belarusian nationality, which has its own language, different from Russian ... The same speeches were heard five years ago in Ukraine ... And recently it was also said that the Ukrainian Republic and Ukrainian nationality are inventions of the Germans ... The Ukrainian nationality exists and the development of its culture is the duty of the communist. You can't go against history... In the cities of Ukraine, Russian elements prevail, but these cities will inevitably be Ukrainized... The same will happen with Belarus, in the cities of which non-Belarusians still predominate "(10th Congress of the RCP (6). Verbatim report. M., 1963, p. 213).

However, the directives of the Moscow Central Committee to the national communist parties, the directives in which the decisions of the Tenth Congress were interpreted, were directly opposite to the directives of the congress. In the spirit of these directives, two months later (in May 1921), the All-Ukrainian Conference of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine (6) U put forward the thesis that the preaching of national independence and the slogans of the national movement, progressive before the revolution, have now become counter-revolutionary, for they have become "a means of inciting the working masses of Ukraine against the workers and peasants of Russia" (see Maistrenko, p. 68).

Note that Stalin was not yet General Secretary, and Lenin was at his post. The real price of the policy of "indigenization" was shown by the persecution that unfolded against the then People's Commissar of Education of Ukraine Grinko. He was removed from his post a year after the Tenth Congress - in 1922 - on charges of "too hasty Ukrainization." To prevent Ukrainians from rushing with their Ukrainization, the purge of the party of 1921 was directed with its edge against the former "Ukapists" and "Borotbists" ("Ukrainians" - members of the Ukrainian Communist Party, which, unlike the CP (b) U, stood on point of view of the complete independence of Ukraine from Moscow; "Borotbists" - members of the Left-SR, national-Ukrainian party, which joined the Communist Party in 1919).

It must be emphasized that it was more difficult for Lenin and his party to fight the Ukrainian Marxists, who stood on the point of view of the state secession of Ukraine from Russia, than with open anti-Marxist separatists. The latter can be declared "bourgeois nationalists" or even Austrian or German mercenaries, but it was more difficult to declare like-minded Marxist ideology as such, especially those who were then in the leading bodies of the party and government.

Thus, after the 10th and 20th party congresses, the main problem of the Kremlin in Ukraine is not great-power chauvinism, but Ukrainian communist separatism.

PART II. RUSSIA, USSR AND UKRAINE 1. Ukrainian question

The Soviet ideologist will immediately object: "There is no Ukrainian or national question in the USSR. We decided a long time ago."

The ideologue is not so much mistaken as pretending. However, pretense, especially if you yourself begin to believe in it, in serious matters can turn into a disaster. This is exactly how matters stand in the USSR in the national question in general, and in the Ukrainian question in particular. The Ukrainian question exists in the USSR, and the exact dates of its emergence are also known. There are two of them: on October 1, 1653, when the Zemsky Sobor in Moscow decided to annex independent Ukraine to Russia and at the same time declare war on Poland, with which Ukraine had been at war for five years, defending its independence. Another date is January 8, 1654, when the Pereyaslav Rada, under the leadership of Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky, agreed to unite with Russia as an ally in the struggle for the unification of the motherland and the liberation of the Ukrainian territories occupied by Poland, Turkey and Hungary. Moreover, in so

called "March Articles" of the same year, the complete internal autonomy of Ukraine was formalized while maintaining the hetmanate and the structure of his government. The liberation and unification of Ukrainian territories first came down to the fact that 13 years later, according to the Andrusovo truce of 1667, Russia and Poland divided Ukraine among themselves: the left-bank - along the Dnieper - Ukraine went to Russia, and the right-bank Ukraine went to Poland. After another 14 years - according to the so-called "eternal peace" of 1686 with Poland - the Left Bank, Kiev and Zaporozhye were finally assigned to Russia, and the right-bank Ukraine and Galicia were recognized by Poland. Podolia and Northern Bukovina remained with Turkey, and Transcarpathia with Hungary. Thus, "liberated" by Russian tsarism in the 17th century, and then united in the 20th century in the Soviet empire by the tyrant Stalin, Ukraine has been deprived of its former centuries-old state independence for three centuries. As long as Ukraine is governed from Moscow and not from Kyiv, the Ukrainian question exists and will continue to exist. Thrown back by tsarism and Bolshevism three hundred years ago in its national-state development, systematically subjected to de-Ukrainization by the invaders, the Ukrainian nation turned out to be indestructible. The recognition by the Bolsheviks of Ukraine's right to independence even before the revolution was a tactical tribute to this indisputable historical fact. Having come to power, the Bolsheviks, it is true, clarified their promise: they declared that they did not recognize the self-determination of the peoples, but of the working people, that is, they recognized such independence, which depended on Moscow. Therefore, the Bolsheviks did not recognize the Ukrainian People's Republic headed by Professor Grushevsky, but recognized the Ukrainian Soviet Republic, which was created by such ersatz Ukrainians as Rakovsky, Pyatakov, Ordzhonikidze, Gamarnik, Voroshilov, Dzerzhinsky ...

However, by recognizing in principle Ukrainian, even communist, independence, as well as the right of Ukrainians to develop their "national in form, socialist in content" culture, the Bolsheviks did not resolve, but, on the contrary, exacerbated the Ukrainian question. Political logic and historical experience speak for the fact that only Ukraine itself can solve it.

Being on the famous trade waterway that connected the Baltic Sea with the Black Sea, the capital of Ukraine - Kyiv - occupied an extremely advantageous position in trade, economic and military-strategic terms. But just this benefit turned into a national tragedy for Ukraine. Not to mention the ancient campaigns of countless East Asian conquerors on Ukrainian lands, Ukraine also had many warlike neighbors that it often encountered: Turks, Hungarians, Austrians, Moldavians, Lithuanians, Poles, Russians.

Since the second half of the 17th century, two powers have been fighting for dominance over Ukraine: Catholic Poland, which is alien to it in religion, and Orthodox Russia, which is of the same faith with it. I am deliberately emphasizing this difference of faith, because, in my opinion, it played a decisive role in the choice of the "lesser" evil by Ukrainians - Russia. The situation of Ukraine became threatening when the "Rzeczpospolita" was formed as a result of the Union of Lublin between Poland and Lithuania (1569). The forced expansion of the new Polish-Lithuanian state into the Ukrainian lands began, which caused a retaliatory national liberation war of the Ukrainian people (1648-1654). At the forefront of this war were the Cossack troops of the Zaporozhian Sich. Zaporizhzhya Sich is the first and last

the army in history, created on a democratic basis - its command staff, from foremen and atamans to the supreme commander in chief - the hetman himself, was all elected. The supreme power belonged to the Sich Rada. This exhausting war for Ukraine continued for several years with heavy casualties and varying successes. The widespread destruction of cities and villages, the depletion of material and human forces, the ever-increasing onslaught of superior enemy forces forced the Cossacks to make a decision, which was expressed in the act of the Pereyaslav Rada.

From the point of view of international law, the decision of the Pereyaslav Rada on the accession of Ukraine to Russia was the same price as the "Testament" of the last Georgian king,

who gave the Georgian state to the Russian Tsar. Both decisions were made without the participation of the true sovereign - the people. Therefore, it is quite natural that among the Ukrainian people, primarily in the Zaporizhzhya Sich itself, a dull dissatisfaction with the results of the Pereyaslav Act grew. This discontent was secretly led by the hetman of Ukraine since 1687, Ivan Mazepa. Both tsarist and Soviet historiography unanimously and in the same terms characterize Mazepa as a "traitor" and "traitor". The question is, what is "betrayal" and "treason"? The Soviet official historian replies that the "betrayal" and "treason" consisted in the fact that Mazepa wanted to tear Ukraine away from Russia and declare its independence, with the help of other powers. Here is a statement from the TSB: "Nursing nationalist ideas about the independence of Ukraine and tearing it away from Russia, Mazepa conducted secret negotiations with the Polish king Leshchinsky, and then with the Swedish king Karl HP" (TSB, 3rd edition, vol. 15. M., 1974, p. 212). Just because Mazepa wanted to restore the independence of Ukraine, he is a "traitor" and even a scoundrel, and the one who denounced him to the tsar, Vasily Kochubey, the general judge of the hetmanate, is a national hero! Mazepa was guided in his uprising against Tsarist Russia not by personal interests, but by the national ideals of his people. In an address to his officer corps, he outlined the motives for speaking out against Petrine Russia in the following words: "I call on the almighty God to be my witness and I swear that I am not looking for high honor, nor wealth, nor other things, except for the well-being of our mother - poor Ukraine, the entire Ukrainian people, so that this people regain their full rights and freedoms. With God's help, I intend to protect you, your wives and our Fatherland from the yoke of Moscow" (I. Kholmsky. History of Ukraine (in English). Munich, 1949, p. 256).

Mazepa knew that he was making a fateful decision. Either to submit to Peter's course of intensive Russification of Ukraine, nullifying the status of the hetmanship and internal autonomy of Ukraine, or to defend the independence of Ukraine in an armed struggle - such was the dilemma facing Mazepa. When an opportunity presented itself, during the Great Northern War between Peter I and the Swedish king Charles XII, Mazepa declared the Pereyaslav Act annulled and entered the war on the side of Sweden. Nature endowed this great Ukrainian patriot with extraordinary personal courage, but history was merciless with his military program. In the battle near Poltava, the Cossack troops of the hetman and the Swedish troops of the king were defeated by Peter's army. In response to his "treason", Peter I destroyed the force to which Russia was indebted for the annexation of Ukraine - the Zaporizhzhya Cossack Sich (1709). Subsequently, the very institution of elected hetmans was liquidated. The administration of Ukraine assumed a purely colonial character.

At the end of the 18th century, Ukraine was divided into a number of governorships headed by tsarist governors, and then the governorships were divided into ordinary provinces, as in Russia itself. Of course, over time, the government created for itself from the Ukrainians themselves a supporting class for managing Ukrainian lands, in particular, the Cossack elites - foremen - were elevated to the nobility, and Peter I himself had many Ukrainian employees in his reformist activities.

With the departure from the historical scene of the Polish state, divided under Catherine II between Russia, Prussia and Austria, the position of Ukraine has not changed. The policy of Polonization in Western Ukraine was replaced by a policy of Germanization, and in Eastern Ukraine the policy of Russification intensified even more. Both powers set as their goal the final

deukrainization of Ukraine to make it easier to manage. And yet, there was a difference between the Austrian and Russian de-Ukrainization: the Austrians recognized the existence of Ukrainian culture and the Ukrainian language, but their Slavic and fellow faith "big brother" did not recognize either one or the other.

To be historically accurate, then the "elder brother", in fact, was not the elder, but the younger brother, the "refugee", who, fleeing from the Asian hordes, fled from Kievan Rus

and created in the north between the Oka and the Volga, which became strong over time, the great Moscow principality. The well-known Russian public figure and publicist Petrov-Skitalets wrote: "From a historical point of view, the elder brother of the Eastern Slavs is undoubtedly the Ukrainians and the mother of the Slavic cities is undoubtedly Kyiv. And if we recall the attitude towards Ukraine on the part of the ruling circles of pre-revolutionary Russia: dismissive and offensively patronizing, denying Ukrainians as a nation, appropriating the country "Little Russia", then the desire of Ukrainians to protect their historical rights, as one of the great Slavic peoples, becomes understandable and justified. (E. Petrov-Skitalets. "The National Problem of the USSR", Ottawa, 1965, p. 28).

The entire subsequent history of Ukraine is characterized by national uprisings, unrest and national-spiritual quests of Ukrainians both in Russia and in Austria. As is usual with all humiliated peoples, the spiritual and political figures of the new Ukrainian movement appeal in their national program to the greatness of their historical past and the vitality of its spiritual values. The Ukrainians had something to be proud of. Ancient Kyiv was, after all, the capital of the first large Slavic state, regardless of the purely academic dispute, who were its organizers - Russians or Ukrainians, Varangians or Slavs themselves. Ancient Kyiv was also the site of the baptism of Rus' and the adoption of Christianity, the millennium of which was celebrated in 1988.

|. The history of Ukraine and its culture in the image of Soviet historians

In the history of the development of Ukrainian national thought and national culture, two centers of the divided Ukraine played an outstanding role: the capital of independent Ukraine, Kyiv, and the capital of the Right-Bank Ukraine, which was under Poland, Lvov. While the Left-bank Ukraine was free, Kiev dominated, but after tsarism began the policy of de-Ukrainization, the role of Lviv gradually becomes leading, to such an extent that many Russian historians and politicians believed that Galicia, led by Lvov, was actually a hotbed of Ukrainian separatism. In the first half of the 17th century, Kyiv became the center of the general revival of Ukrainian culture, science and education. At the apogee of the glory of this revival stood the Metropolitan of Kiev and Galicia Peter Mogila.

He created the famous Kiev-Mohyla Academy (1632), turned Kyiv into a scientific and spiritual-religious center of all Eastern Europe. The great Ukrainian philosopher and poet Gr. Pan. As it was then customary in Western Europe, they taught at the academy in Latin. The list of scientific disciplines of the Academy shows the breadth and volume of its program: mathematics, physics, astronomy, geometry, architecture, geography, history, economics, medicine, logic, philosophy, literature, ancient and new Western languages, Slavic languages and other subjects. Russia has not yet had such a cultural and scientific-academic center. Therefore, Moscow also sent its young men to study in Kyiv. Six years after the death of Peter Mohyla, Ukraine was included in Russia, but the academy lasted more than 160 years - it was closed only in 1817, its importance was so great. Just a new wave of Russification policy demanded that the main scientific center of Ukrainian culture be destroyed, just as the so-called "brotherly schools" in the Ukrainian language were destroyed earlier. The first government decree on the prohibition of the Ukrainian language was issued in 1721, and the last in 1879. The language of Ukrainians and the name Ukraine became taboo.

When Soviet historians write about these periods in the history of Ukraine, they are clearly out of tune with the facts of history. Judge for yourself what the official TSB writes: "The reunification of Ukraine with Russia was of progressive importance for the development of Ukrainian culture and education," and then, forced to bashfully admit, adds: "Ukrainians did not have the opportunity to study in their native language" (TSB, vol. 26, M., 1977, p. 562). What is it

Ukrainian culture without the Ukrainian language?

Soviet historians, in touching unanimity with the extremely reactionary ideologues of tsarism, such as Magnitsky, Uvarov, Katkov, Pobedonostsev, Il'ovaisky, believe that the accession of Ukraine to Russia was not only an act of progress, but also the greatest blessing for the Ukrainian people themselves. However, an objective study proves that "progress" and "good" were expressed in the fate of the Ukrainian people by two facts of epochal significance. First, Ukraine has lost the most precious thing in the life of every nation - national independence. Secondly, Russia extended to Ukraine its political system and socio-economic system - tsarist absolutism and Russian serfdom. The free Ukrainian society, which, according to the richly documented studies of Academician Grushevsky, did not know either feudal serfs or bourgeois predators and did not fit into the flat Marxist scheme of class struggle, was strangled by the soldier's boot of the "big brother" colonialist. The tsars presented their capital nobles and "Little Russian" vassals with rich Ukrainian lands, giving hundreds of thousands of free Ukrainians into serfdom. Ekaterina P. was especially distinguished in this. And the Soviet monarcho-Marxists call this triumph of absolutism and feudal reaction in a hitherto free country "historical progress", while even the historian Klyuchevsky condemned the spread of serfdom to Ukraine (vol. 5, p. 142). The Ukrainians themselves, of course, were of a different opinion. Ukrainian thinkers unanimously resent the new order in their homeland. Historians conscientiously describe in what terrible conditions these orders were created. Writers mourn the death of their native country and sing a hymn to its future freedom. The nineteenth century is particularly distinguished by the astonishing growth of Ukrainian "nostalgic" literature in all its genres, but with one constant leitmotif: the sorrow and suffering of the people, hope and faith in the revival of a free Ukraine. All representatives of the Ukrainian national-political, scientific-historical and cultural-fiction literature, who sing of Ukraine's independence from Russia, are listed in Soviet historiography as "reactionaries" and "bourgeois nationalists". With this assessment, Soviet historians only repeat what is said in all the monarchist textbooks on the history of pre-revolutionary Russia. The only difference is that tsarist historians directly and honestly defend the interests of a powerful nation, while Soviet historians, in order to protect the same interests, have to hypocrisy, lie and falsify, to the point of primitiveness, well-known historical facts and events. Theoretically, the extremely miserable, historically anti-scientific scheme of the Soviet ideologists on the history and culture of Ukraine is as follows: in the ancient and Middle Ages, the Ukrainians, in essence, did not constitute a separate people, being only an offshoot of the Russian people. Their national self-name "Ukraine" indicates not their ethnic origin, but their geographical position on the "outskirts" of Russia, hence the name "Ukrainians", who in old Russia were called "Little Russians".

Since ancient times, Soviet historians argue, Rus' was divided into three branches - Great Rus' (Great Russia), Little Rus' (Little Russia) and White Rus' (Belarus). Soon a fourth branch, Novorossiia, was formed. The entire past history of these branches is their permanent struggle for reunification around their common mother, Great Russia. In this struggle, Soviet historians argue, two camps have formed in Ukrainian politics and culture: a large progressive camp of supporters of the reunification of Ukraine with Tsarist Russia and a small reactionary nationalist camp against Russia. According to this scheme, Hetman Bogdan Khmel'nitsky is a progressive and a hero, and his son and Hetman of Right-Bank Ukraine Yuriy Khmel'nitsky is a reactionary and nationalist, because the son wanted to correct his father's mistake and restore Ukrainian independence from Moscow, relying on Poland, just as the second wanted to correct this mistake. hetman after Mazepa - Pavlo Polubotok (1722-1724). Having learned that Hetman Polubotok was preparing Ukraine's exit from Russia, Tsar Peter I imprisoned him in the Peter and Paul Fortress, subjecting him to torture. On

During interrogation, Hetman Polubotok told Peter G: "Neither fear of prison, nor disgust for shackles
make me give up

my fatherland. I prefer a terrible death than to live, constantly contemplating the suffering of my relatives "(I. Nagaevsky, History of the modern Ukrainian state. Munich, 1966, p. 11 (in English)). Two years before the death of Peter I - in 1723 - Polubotok died in prison. These are the fearless Ukrainian heroes and great martyrs in the struggle for independence, the Bolsheviks call "traitors." Ukrainian culture, science and historical sources are interpreted in the same way. Historical documents - chronicles, chronicles and works in which one can subtract or assume a pro-Russian orientation - are considered reliable and valuable, historical sources and works in which the motif of the greatness of the Ukrainian national spirit in the fight against both the "Polyakhs" and "Muscovites," are declared dubious and harmful. The apology of the Zaporizhzhya Cossack freemen in the works of Ukrainian historians is recognized as a "sergeant-noble concept". The classic works of prominent Ukrainian historians of the 19th and 20th centuries are banned for use in Ukrainian higher schools as nationalist works. The classics of Ukrainian historical science Antonovich and Grushevsky are listed as "bourgeois nationalists", and the leader of the Ukrainian historical front of the thirties, the communist and talented historian Yavorsky was declared an Austrian spy for his excellent German language and origin from Galicia and was shot. But even Stalin did not dare to do this with the world-famous academician Grushevsky, a long-term professor at Lviv University, the first president of the Ukrainian People's Republic. He was offered to go on vacation to the Caucasus, to Kislovodsk, where he fell ill with the flu and died from a medicine prescribed by a doctor. If we remember how, on the instructions of Stalin, the head of the NKVD, Genrikh Yagoda, killed Menzhinsky, Kuibyshev and Maxim Gorky with similar drugs, then everything will fall into place. Grushevsky died five days before Kirov was assassinated by Stalin.

The Soviet scheme for the history of Ukrainian folklore, literature and art is completely analogous. The folklore in which the "Muscovites" get it is reactionary-nationalist, but the folklore in which the "unreasonable Khazars", "Poles", Turks get it is progressively revolutionary. Ukrainian writers and critics, their talents and their work are also judged not by how they created their native literature, developed their native literary language, served their own national idea, but only by one criterion - who and how of them served the Russian great-power idea. Even such founders of Ukrainian literature as Kotlyarevsky, Kvitka-Osnovyanenko, Gulak Artemovsky, Grebyonka, Metlinsky, Borovikovsky, Kostomarov are subjected to such an "international" purge. Whoever most vividly depicts the tragedy of his native people under tsarist Russia and yearns for the restoration of the former free Ukraine, Soviet criticism lists him in the category of "pessimists" and "reactionary dreamers." They, according to the Soviet official organ of the TSB, "pessimism prevailed, longing for the irrevocable historical past of Ukraine, which they portrayed in an idealized light" (vol. 26, third ed., M., 1977, p. 575). This means that if Kotlyarevsky, in his famous poem "Aeneid" (1798), Ukrainianizes Virgil in the style of burlesque, mourns the death of the Zaporozhian Sich, is indignant at the transformation of its free Cossacks into serf slaves and longs for free Ukraine, then he is a pessimist and stays in nostalgia for "the irrevocable historical past of Ukraine".

Sophisticated masters of literary manipulation, Soviet ideologists surpass themselves when they undertake to prove that in the 19th century in Ukraine there was no single patriotic literature, but two literatures: nationalist reactionary, which closed itself in a narrow Ukrainian framework or was oriented towards the West, and progressive humanistic literature. literature, which tried to include Ukrainian literature in the all-Russian literary process. Soviet literary scholars even rank the same Kotlyarevsky among the representatives of the second literature, stating that he "contributed to the greater extent to the inclusion of new Ukrainian literature in the all-Russian literary process," only because his "Aeneid" was first published in 1798 in

Petersburg in Russian without his knowledge. Later, in 1809. The Aeneid was also published in Ukrainian. But the founder of modern Ukrainian prose, Kvitko-Osnovyanenko, is accused of idealizing patriarchal Ukraine and preaching Christian morality. The writers of the second half of the 19th century, Kostomarov, Storozhenko, Korsun and Kulish, get even more: they are declared conservatives and reactionaries for their hostile attitude towards tsarism and Russian imperialism. The most prominent of them - Kulish - a historian, writer and revolutionary (he was convicted along with Shevchenko for participating in the "Cyril and Methodius Brotherhood") was also labeled a "bourgeois nationalist", a literary definition known only in Soviet belles-lettres. With some classics of Ukrainian literature, Soviet literary critics act in the same way as they do with Russian classics and critics - Belinsky, Herzen, Nekrasov, Chernyshevsky. These ardent enemies of despotism and slavery in any form have long been listed among the semi-Bolsheviks under the name of "revolutionary democrats". Ukrainian classics Lesya Ukrainka, Ivan Franko, Kotsyubinsky, and the brilliant Shevchenko were also promoted to the same rank with a pro-Russian orientation. Hushing up the fundamental credo of their work - the identity of the Ukrainian people and the philosophy of its independence and independence, Soviet historians emphasize their philanthropy, which is alien to any chauvinism, including anti-Russian. From this a false conclusion is drawn: the Ukrainian classics stood on Russian-imperial positions. How can this be proven? Very simple. When publishing collected works of Ukrainian classics, Soviet publishers and censors do not include in these publications the most striking patriotic works of old Ukrainian writers. A Ukrainian writer recently spoke about this in the Soviet press: the collected works of Ivan Franko were published not only without including many of his most striking patriotic works, but even with large denominations and in those things that they decided to publish.

However, there were times when Soviet historical science was still a real science and, taking into account facts, events and historical authenticity, recognized that Bogdan Khmelnytsky was "a traitor and the first enemy of the national liberation movement of Ukraine", and his Pereyaslav act of joining Ukraine to Russia was "the legal registration of the beginning of the colonial domination of Russia over Ukraine." That is how the Great Soviet Encyclopedia of 1935 (vol. 39, first edition) interpreted the national tragedy of Ukraine. Compare with this what the new Soviet historians write about the annexation of Ukraine by Tsarist Russia in the same Great Soviet Encyclopedia of its latest, third edition: the accession of Ukraine to Russia "played a great progressive role in its further economic, political and cultural development" (vol. 26, third ed., M., 1977). The colonial regime of tsarist absolutism has triumphed in Ukraine, Russian serfdom is spreading to Ukraine, Ukrainian culture, literature and the Ukrainian language itself are banned in Ukraine. And the Soviet monarcho-Marxists call all this "great progress." Truly bottomless Soviet scientific charlatanism!

Sh. Revolution and Ukraine

The revolution of 1917 was that social touchstone on which history, as it were, tested the two forces of the former Russian Empire - the centripetal great power and the centrifugal separatist. The test gave instructive results: after the democratic February revolution of 1917, none of the non-Russian peoples announced their withdrawal from the future democratic federal Russia, but nine months later the October Revolution took place and then many non-Russian nations announced their withdrawal from the Soviet Russia and the proclamation of their state independence. One of the first to declare this independence was the people who ethnically and culturally-historically stood closest to the Russian people -

Ukrainian people.

An incredibly colorful mosaic of national-political forces operating in Ukraine after the revolution. Accordingly, their programs are diverse. However, against the backdrop of rapidly changing events, sometimes dizzying and contrasting, two parallel movements are clearly visible: the national movement for complete independence and the federal movement for alliance with

Russia. There is no way, and for my purpose and need, to characterize the entire complex national-political landscape in Ukraine in those years. Let us point out only very briefly the leading forces, the most important events, and their summary results. Both the democratic and socialist movements in Ukraine, which took shape in different, first national-cultural ("Hromada"), and then in political unions and parties, were formed in the underground at the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th centuries. At the origins of the national-democratic movement in the 60-90s is the Kiev "Hromada", which was headed by Antonovich, Drahomanov, Chubinsky, Grushevsky. "Hromada" had its branches in large Ukrainian cities. Formally, the cultural and educational organization "Hromada", which in the 1990s embraced almost all the leading intellectual forces of Ukraine, essentially became a university for the development and substantiation of the Ukrainian national democratic ideology. The tsarist government saw in Gromada a danger to imperial interests and banned it. But the ideas of its leaders became a program of action for subsequent Ukrainian political parties, including, or even especially, Ukrainian socialist parties. It is the Ukrainian socialist parties, the Ukrainian Social Democratic Labor Party, the Ukrainian Party of Socialist-Revolutionaries, the Ukrainian Party of Socialist-Federalists, that initiated the creation of the Central Rada of Ukraine on March 4, 1917, that is, two days after the abdication of Tsar Nicholas II from the throne. The Central Rada - the Ukrainian parliament consisted of 150 elected representatives of parties, organizations and societies (later the composition of the Rada was expanded to 815 people). The executive body of the Rada was the Malaya Rada of 30 people headed by Grushevsky, Vinnichenko and Efremov. Provincial, district and city Radas were also created. Ukraine has begun to create its own army. During the period from June 1917 to January 1918, the Rada issued four important program documents, which were called "universals". The first station wagon dated June 10, 1917 proclaimed the autonomy of Ukraine. A government called "General Secretariat" was established. Under pressure from the Provisional Government, the Central Rada agreed to a compromise - a second universal was issued on July 3, 1917, according to which the implementation of autonomy was postponed until the convocation of the All-Russian Constituent Assembly. Two weeks after the Bolshevik coup, the third universal was released on November 7, 1917. The Central Rada announced in it the formation of the Ukrainian state, but within Russia. The Central Rada became the supreme body of the Ukrainian People's Republic. The fourth station wagon dated January 22, 1918. Ukraine's independence was proclaimed. They will ask, where was the Ukrainian Bolshevik Party or the Ukrainian Communist Party during these fateful events for Ukraine? Yes, nowhere. There was no such party. There were separate Bolshevik groups, consisting mainly of Russians, in industrial areas. It is paradoxical, but true - there is still no Ukrainian Communist Party, there is a Communist Party of Ukraine. For someone who is not strong in the knowledge of the "national philosophy" of the Bolsheviks, there seems to be no difference - the Communist Party or the UKP. However, for Bolshevism, the difference is gigantic: the Bolsheviks never recognized the existence in Russia of national Bolshevik parties among non-Russian nations. There were only territorial organizations that were previously directly subordinate to the RSDLP, the RCP (b), the VKP (b), and now the CPSU. There is the Ukrainian people, there is the Ukrainian language, there is even the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, but there was not and cannot be the Ukrainian Communist Party, just as there are no Russian, Georgian, Armenian, Uzbek, etc. Communist Parties, but there is the Communist Party of Georgia, the Communist Party Armenia, Communist Party of Uzbekistan. This is done to emphasize that they are not

national, and territorial organizations that govern their republics, as branches of the Moscow Central Committee of the party (the only idea to create the UKP belonged to the socialist and independentist Vladimir Vinnichenko, when he joined the Ukrainian Council of People's Commissars in 1920 as deputy chairman of the government, but, having learned with whom he was dealing, he fled to the West in the same year). If, for example, Ukrainians or Georgians say "our party", then they mean only the CPSU.

Let's return to the chronology of events. After the February Revolution of 1917, Russia was, according to Lenin, "the freest country of all the warring countries." It is therefore natural that, both in the center and in the national outlying regions, all the old and new political parties should operate freely. We saw that the Central Rada included all the national democratic and socialist parties of Ukraine, among which there was not only one

party - the party of the Bolsheviks of Ukraine, because it never occurred to any of the Ukrainians to create such a party. It was created only in July 1918 at the first congress of the CP(b) of Ukraine, which took place not in Ukraine, but in Moscow. The last fact contains all the ominous symbolism of the new era, which marked the beginning of the formation of a new empire - the Soviet empire.

This congress of pseudo-Ukrainians was attended by 212 delegates, of which more than half were Russians, Jews, Poles, Latvians. The rest were Russified Ukrainians with an imperial mindset. It is ridiculous now to read the writings of Soviet historians when they list in "clips" active Ukrainian communist leaders of that time, including such "Ukrainians" as Voroshilov, Gamarnik, Felix Kon, Dzerzhinsky, Ordzhonikidze and others, and those who were really Ukrainians (Chubar, Zatonsky, Skrypnyk, Lyubchenko, Grinko and others) were subsequently liquidated as spies and "bourgeois nationalists". Of course, Stalin's inquisition was quite international and in those years he did not destroy anyone, guided by only one racial attribute. However, analyzes of the victims of the "Great Terror" of the 1930s show that it was precisely among the Ukrainian party and non-party intelligentsia that there were several times more victims of terror than in the central regions of Russia.

In the establishment of Soviet power in Ukraine, or rather in the annexation of the Ukrainian People's Republic by Soviet Russia, the Ukrainian communists played a dual role: on the one hand, they believed Lenin that Ukraine, even Sovietized, would remain an independent republic, and on the other hand, on behalf of Moscow, they in fact, they headed for the systematic uprooting of the roots of the Ukrainian national idea and its bearers. During the period from 1917 to 1920. The Ukraine was occupied five times by foreign troops - once by the Austro-German army, once by Denikin's White Army, and three times by the Red Army. Initially, Lenin thought that he would succeed in liquidating the Ukrainian People's Republic, either through negotiations with the Central Rada or by an armed uprising from within. In December 1917, Lenin gave the Rada an ultimatum to surrender. The Rada rejected it, referring to its right to self-determination, recognized by the Bolshevik government itself. The attempts of the Bolsheviks to raise a general uprising in Ukraine also failed. Only in Kharkov, populated mainly by Russians, did the Bolsheviks seize power on December 11, 1917 and proclaim the Ukrainian Soviet Republic, headed by the Ukrainian Council of People's Commissars. Although the power of this republic extended only to one city, Moscow recognized it as the power of all Ukraine. The strategic goal of the Soviet government became clear very soon. At the end of December 1917, at the request of these Kharkov Bolshevik rebels for "fraternal help", Lenin sent an army to Ukraine, occupying Kyiv. The Central Rada moved to Volyn. It was the first Soviet occupation of Ukraine. However, on March 1, 1918, Ukrainian troops expelled the Red Army and occupied Kyiv.

This victory was helped by the skillful maneuvering of Ukrainian diplomacy, led by Vinnichenko, in the ongoing war between Germany and Russia. On January 27, 1918, Ukraine signed an agreement with Germany and Austria-Hungary on the supply of bread to them, with

on the condition that these countries recognize the independence of Ukraine and render assistance to it against the Soviet occupiers. This diplomatic step turned out to be so far-sighted that it led to the recognition of the Ukrainian People's Republic not only by the German bloc, but also by Soviet Russia itself. The Brest Separate Peace Treaty of March 3, 1918 between Soviet Russia and the German bloc included the sixth clause, which stated that the Soviet government recognizes the peace treaty between Ukraine and Germany and its allies, the Soviet government also recognizes the independence of the Ukrainian People's Republic, pledging to conclude a peaceful agreement with the Central Rada, which will define the state borders between Ukraine and Russia. However, Ukraine did not fight for independence from Russia in order to become an Austro-German vassal. Meanwhile, the Austrians and Germans were doing just that. When the Central Rada resolutely opposed actions of this kind, the Austrian troops overthrew the Ukrainian People's Republic headed by the Rada and transferred power over Ukraine to General Skoropadsky, declaring him hetman of Ukraine (April 29, 1918). In November 1918 Germany and its allies, weakened by the revolutions in Austria and Germany, capitulated to the powers of the Entente, and in December 1918 Hetman Skoropadsky was overthrown. Has been restored

the power of independent democratic Ukraine, which was headed by the Ukrainian General Directory (December 14, 1918). The old Ukrainian socialists Vinnichenko and Petlyura became the heads of the General Directory of Ukraine.

In February 1919, the Red Army occupied the capital of Ukraine for the second time, but not for long. Already in the spring, Petlyura's troops liberated Kyiv.

In the autumn of 1919, heavy attacks on Ukraine followed from two sides at once - the Red Army moved to Ukraine from the north, but from the southeast it was outstripped by the White Army of General Denikin. This time the capital of Ukraine was under the white occupiers. The tenacity and perseverance of Ukrainians in the struggle for their independence are amazing and unprecedented. On April 21, 1920, the Petliura government signed an agreement with Poland on the joint struggle against both the Red and White armies. In this union treaty, the national interests of Ukraine and Poland were quite identical. Red Lenin and white Denikin, who for purely great power reasons differed from each other only in these colors, were equally enemies of Polish and Ukrainian independence, which Germany and Austria imposed on Moscow in Brest-Litovsk in a separate peace in March 1918. When the Polish troops, together with the Ukrainian troops of Petliura, liberated the capital of Ukraine (May 6, 1920), the Ukrainian People's Committee created the last government of independent Ukraine, headed by V. Prokopovich. In the summer of 1920, the third occupation of Ukraine by the Red Army followed. On June 12, the Red Army entered Kyiv. The third red occupation was the last. Ukraine was re-incorporated into the new Soviet empire and given the sham status of a pseudo-sovereign Ukrainian Soviet Republic.

The struggle for the independence of Ukraine took place in the conditions of a civil war within Russia - between the Red Army of the Bolsheviks and the White or Volunteer Army of the former tsarist generals. It is quite natural that the leaders of both camps of the civil war, for all the difference in their ideology, were vitally interested, not only for imperial reasons, but also because of the interests of the military-political strategy, to preserve for Russia such a rich industrial, grain and raw material base as Ukraine, moreover, it occupies the most important territorial and strategic position in the south-west of the empire. From here, a significant part of northern and southeastern Ukraine became the theater of military operations of Russian armies fighting among themselves. Because of this, the belligerents were not indifferent to how the Ukrainian national movement treated one side or another, just as it was important for the leaders of Ukraine themselves to use their civil strife for their national goals.

But civil war by its very nature is a social and ideological war. A decisive role in such a war is played not only by weapons, but also by political

and social programs. However, if a civil war takes place in a multinational state, then the "foreigners" are not indifferent to what the national programs of the warring great-power camps are. This was just proved by the course and outcome of the civil war in Russia. Its leaders were - on the side of the Reds, Lenin, on the side of the Whites - Denikin. Both of them wanted to defend "one and indivisible Russia." But Denikin openly proclaimed this program and thereby declared a new war of conquest against the non-Russian peoples, without having yet won his civil war against the Reds. Lenin, on the contrary, proclaims publicly: "If the non-Russian peoples do not want to live as part of Russia, good riddance!", although he immediately adds: "But so that you can use this natural right of yours, let's beat the Russian imperialist Denikin together!". And how did Denikin act? Just two examples: when the Chechens and Ingush demanded that they be granted internal autonomy, which Alexander II promised them, Denikin burned two dozen of their auls, to which they responded with a general uprising. General Denikin himself wrote that moving on Moscow, he was forced to leave one third of his army in Checheno-Ingushetia, the struggle of which was led by Lenin's disciples - Ordzhonikidze, Sheripov, Zyazikov. Second example. When Denikin's former colleague in the Russian imperial army, the Finnish General Mannerheim, offered him a military-political alliance against the Bolsheviks, Denikin replied that the first person he would hang after the victory over the Bolsheviks would be the traitor to Russia, General Mannerheim!

Denikin was a brave, honest, sincere and resolute warrior - qualities that are highly commendable for a soldier, but clearly insufficient for a politician. He promised nothing to anyone. Russia must be "one and indivisible" and that's it! What will be the socio-political system in such a Russia, he did not prejudge, referring to the will of the Russian people after the victory. The social demagoguery so characteristic of the Bolsheviks was absolutely alien to him. Thus, when history placed the non-Russian peoples in front of a dilemma: Lenin or Denikin, then Lenin won the Machiavellian over the straightforward warrior.

The reason is clear to everyone. Lenin promised the Russian and non-Russian peoples everything they wanted for themselves: factories and factories to the workers, all the land to the peasants, all power to the Soviets of Workers', Peasants' and Soldiers' Deputies, a guaranteed right for non-Russians to freely leave Russia. Having won, Lenin made Russia so "one and indivisible" that Denikin never dreamed of.

When the Central Rada, in response to Lenin's ultimatum on surrender, reminded him of his own writings and the first decrees of the Soviet government on the right of nations to self-determination, then Lenin, who, in addition to everything that was said, was also a dialectician, found how to answer: "That was yesterday day of history, besides, we recognized the right to self-determination not of the Ukrainian landowners and the bourgeoisie, but of the Ukrainian workers."

Let us note that in the Rada, created on the model of the Petrograd Soviet, there was not a single landowner or bourgeois, and its leaders - Vinnichenko, Petliura, Makarenko were socialists of the Western European persuasion. It was precisely the Western socialists that Lenin hated more than the Western bourgeoisie. Therefore, Lenin and his Cheka began their construction of socialism in Ukraine with the destruction of Ukrainian socialists. Lenin and his disciple Stalin considered this the best guarantee for uprooting the roots of Ukrainian separatism.

No. Ukrainization and its fate

The tragedy of the communist intellectuals in the national republics was that they not only took Lenin's word for it, but were sincerely convinced that Lenin himself believed what he said on the national question. Therefore, for them, all the writings of Lenin, as well as the decisions of the April conference of 1917, the Tenth Party Congress of 1921, and the XII Party Congress of 1923 were something like "Holy Scripture". But it is a strange thing: as soon as these communists set about putting into practice the theoretical principles of Lenin and the decisions of party congresses on the national question in their regions and

republics, they immediately fell into disgrace, from which even Lenin himself could not pull them out (remember the story of Bud Mdivani and his supporters in Georgia, the story of Sultan-Galiyev and his supporters in Tataria and Turkestan).

After Lenin's death, Stalin, as they said in Moscow, raised Lenin's national policy to the highest level. But, as you know, from the highest step and fall is more terrible. This was confirmed by a new "counter-revolutionary nationalist case" - the "Crimean Case" of the Chairman of the Crimean ASSR Veli Ibrahimov in 1928. Veli Ibrahimov was that staunch student of Lenin on the national question who decided to turn the Crimean ASSR into a Leninist exemplary Soviet national republic at the gates of Turkey, calling on Turkey to create the same Leninist order in itself as in the Crimea. Stalin considered the appeals of the chairman of the Central Executive Committee of the Crimean ASSR as just a disguise for his espionage activities in favor of Turkey and put him with the entire Crimean government in the basement of the GPU. This was in January 1928. Even the biased KGB investigation failed to prove the guilt of Ibrahimov and members of his government. Because of this, his case was not accepted by the Supreme Court in May 1928. Ibrahimov and his people were shot in absentia by the collegium of the GPU. The "Crimean case" in Stalin's national strategy had signal significance, which was followed by a large series of sentences in absentia by the GPU in similar cases of "counter-revolutionary-nationalist conspiracies" of Georgian Mensheviks, Armenian Dashnaks, Azerbaijani Musavatists, Chechen Chermoyes, Turkestan Pan-Turkists, Tatar Pan-Islamists, Ukrainian separatists ("Splitka liberation of Ukraine"), Belarusian

"Natsdemovtsy" ("Union for the Liberation of Belarus"), in which national communists were involved and objectionable to Stalin.

At the same time, processes began in Russia itself against the "wrecking counter-revolutionary organizations" "Shakhty case", "case of the Industrial Party", "Case of the All-Union Bureau of Mensheviks". All these "cases", of course, were fabricated in the offices of the GPU under the leadership of Menzhinsky, his deputy Yagoda, but according to the plan and initiative of the Central Committee, headed by his general secretary Stalin. What were the reasons for creating such cases? There were no legal grounds. But there were foundations of an ideological order. As has already been pointed out, there were still delusions among the national intelligentsia that "indigenization" was not a tactic, but a program of the party. Therefore, in the national republics, there was a growing movement for the deepening and expansion of this "indigenization". In the eyes of the Party, such a movement assumed a particularly dangerous character precisely in two Slavic republics—the Ukraine and Belorussia. An unsurpassed master of criminal fantasy, Stalin even invented a link between local nationalists and Russian chauvinists. Stalin found that since the local nationalists and great-power chauvinists had the same goal - the overthrow of the Soviet regime, they were in spiritual kinship and silent alliance with each other. Stalin went further. In the emphasized concern for the needs of his own people, he saw not only pernicious nationalism, but also hostility to Bolshevism, undermining the foundations of the "dictatorship of the proletariat." Stalin, who had accused Lenin of "national liberalism" in 1922, now made Lenin responsible for letting the "national genie" out of the bottle. Now Stalin was in search of funds to drive him back there. This turned out to be far from an easy task. In the Caucasian and Muslim East, the party already had extensive experience in suppressing nationalism by force of arms, sending there an expeditionary corps of the Red Army, as, for example, in the 20s against a number of uprisings in Chechnya, in the same years against the Menshevik uprising in Georgia or Basmachi movement in Turkestan. But since the end of the 1920s, the largest Slavic republic after the RSFSR, Ukraine, has moved into the vanguard of the national movement in the USSR. After all, you cannot send a military expedition there without risking, as Stalin feared, an interethnic war. But the most unpleasant thing was that at the head of the Ukrainian national movement were not some ardent separatists, but Ukrainian communist intellectuals who put forward a very well-founded and integr

"Ukrainization", consisting entirely of quotes from Marx, Lenin, Stalin and materials from party congresses. In order to judge the difficult situation in Moscow, one must look at the arguments of the Ukrainians. In the movement for Ukrainization in the 1920s, the following substantive problems of a sovereign republic occupied an outstanding place: national independence in internal affairs, in accordance with the federal constitution, national culture, national economy, national science, national technology. On all these issues, the Ukrainian communist, but nationally minded, intelligentsia put forward a national program based with scrupulous accuracy on Lenin's federal conception against the "autonomization" of Stalin. But this program had one drawback - it fundamentally contradicted Moscow's daily anti-constitutional practice in the national republics; most importantly, it undermined the foundations on which the very pre-revolutionary building of Leninism stood with its idea of denationalizing all nations and merging them into one communist hybrid, an idea that Lenin essentially abandoned in 1922, but the party did not abandon. The decisions of the party congresses on the national question, like the federal constitution of the USSR itself, were conceived as a provisorium for a transitional period, until the communist government felt strong enough to abandon its own decisions and begin to implement its real strategic goal. Namely, to the actual liquidation of the federation on the basis of the totalitarian dictatorship of the party, in which even the state itself is recognized as a "link" in the party-political system itself (see the new program of the CPSU).

But all this came later, and in those years, the national communists, unlike Moscow, took the provisorium as a constant value, and the fictitious rights of the "sovereign" union republics, fixed in the Soviet constitution, for the current law.

Such was the situation when the Ukrainian national communists launched a struggle for Ukrainization on all the problems mentioned above. It was headed by then recognized authorities on the national question: prose writer and poet Mykola Khvylevoy (culture), Mikhail Volobuev (economics) and member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Ukraine Alexander Shumsky (politics). If their ideological position was based on the works of Lenin, then their historical and national-cultural argumentation was based on the scientific works of Academician Hrushevsky, who then headed the Ukrainian historical science. Academician Grushevsky, as we have seen, was the first president of the Ukrainian People's Republic, after its fall he emigrated to Austria, then, having repented, returned to Ukraine. In 1924 he was elected a member of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, and in 1929 a member of the USSR Academy of Sciences.

In those years, the party and the Soviet government considered the historical and national-cultural concept of academician Grushevsky about the origin of the Ukrainian state and the Ukrainian nation to be objective, scientifically substantiated and sustained by the party. The position of the Ukrainian national communists was considered the same until they began to actively preach it in the party press. This "sermon" met with such unanimous support from both the Ukrainian party and non-party intelligentsia that Moscow clearly saw where such a development would lead and hastened to declare the heralds of Ukrainization "national deviationists" a terrible accusation, after which the word usually goes to the Chekists.

Let us turn to some of their arguments, using data from Maistrenko's book ("The National Policy of the CPSU"). The campaign for the practical implementation of Ukrainization was initiated by Khvylovy's speech. In a series of articles published in 1925 on the KhP Congress of the RCP (6) and its decisions on indigenization, he focuses on two questions. Firstly, the Ukrainian writer argues that the decisions of the congress regarding the equality of peoples and the need to indigenize the apparatus of power in the republics remain on paper, because Ukrainization is impossible without de-Russification of the Ukrainian city,

without Ukrainization of the proletariat; secondly, he believes, "until the proletariat masters the Ukrainian culture, it is impossible for the cultural revolution in Ukraine to produce the desired results." Khvylovy raises the question: who is preventing this? His answer is categorical: "A Russian tradesman, who has this Ukrainization in his liver (...) who, with a "grinding of teeth", studies this "dog language", who shouts to Moscow: "Save me!"

Khvylovy warns against slavish imitation of Russian literature. His argument: "our political alliance with Russia should not be confused with literature... The Poles would never have given Mickiewicz if they had not ceased to focus on Russian art. The fact is that Russian literature has weighed on us for centuries, like a master of the situation, who has accustomed our psyche to slavish imitation... We know the ideas of the proletariat even without Moscow art... Give us your own mind! Away from Moscow!

Understanding well that he could be accused of nationalism, in fact, forestalling such an accusation, Khvylovy stipulates that he is not talking about proletarian communist Moscow, where the Comintern is the center of the world revolution, but about the Moscow of literary philistines and Great Russian bureaucrats. He widely quotes Marxist theorists, Lenin himself, all the decisions of the party on the national question, so that he would not be declared a "separatist".

No tricks could save the national communist, who so passionately smashed Moscow, if he was paid attention to, in the words of Lenin, "the first scoundrel and the first rapist", which was Comrade Stalin. This is what happened to Khvylev. On April 26, 1926, Stalin wrote an indignant letter addressed to the secretary of the Central Committee of the CP(b)U. The letter stated that the communist Khvylovy did not love Moscow, while the Western European proletariat and its communist parties were full of love for her. Stalin assessed Khvylovy's speeches not as a defense of the decisions of the party itself on the national question, but as a pernicious deviation. Moreover, as a whole trend of anti-party, nationalist thought in the Communist Party of Ukraine, pasting a new label on it: "hvylevism". Stalin demanded from the Secretary of the Central Committee of Ukraine L. Kaganovich to crush and liquidate nationalism in the Communist Party of Ukraine. Kaganovich did not have to be taught in parts

"destructions". Not only the main "sinner" himself, but also hundreds of Ukrainian intellectuals from among the communists, thousands from among the non-party intelligentsia were removed from work, and then physically destroyed. They also defeated and dispersed those party workers from the Central Committee of Ukraine, who, led by Central Committee member Alexander Shumsky, not only supported Khvylovy's position, but also, in turn, demanded that Moscow finally move from words to deeds on the Ukrainization of the party, state apparatus. This demand of Alexander Shumsky was unanimously supported by the Communist Party of Western Ukraine (in what was then Poland).

Then Stalin first sent Shumsky and his supporters into exile, and then shot them too. As for the Communist Party of Western Ukraine, Stalin dissolved it through the Comintern, which by this time had already become a simple sub-department of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b). These Ukrainian communists were saved from KGB bullets by the fact that they lived in capitalist Poland.

"Ukrainian nationalism" looked like that mythical hydra, in which new heads grew in place of severed heads. Indeed, before Kaganovich had time to report to Stalin that the plan to defeat nationalism was "fulfilled and overfulfilled," a new anti-Moscow speech followed, and not somewhere on the side, but in the very political and theoretical organ of the Central Committee of the CP (b) U in the journal "Bolshevik of Ukraine". It was a study by the prominent Ukrainian economist and communist Mikhail Volobuev entitled "On the Problem of the Ukrainian Economy", published in early 1928. The study was conceived to help the party develop practical measures to create a comprehensive "national economy" in the spirit of the decisions of the party congresses.

The main theses of the author were as follows:

the old Russia pursued a colonial policy in Ukraine, plundering its economic resources;

Ukraine under Soviet rule must develop harmoniously within its natural national economic boundaries;

colonial policy is contraindicated for communism, "only the Ukrainian people have the right to dispose of their economy", "to exploit the Ukrainian economy to the detriment of the Ukrainian people is hostile to communism";

4) the plan for the "economic zoning of the USSR", developed by the USSR State Planning Committee according to the scheme and with the participation of the old tsarist specialists-great powers, "completely ignores the national economies of the former Russian colonies and proposes a centralized zoning of the USSR on the old great power principles" (Maistrenko, p. 108).

Volobuev was sincerely convinced that the Central Committee of the party in Moscow thought the same about the national economy and culture as he did. This was a profound delusion not only of Volobuev, but of almost all the national communists of that time. After all, the national communists seriously believed that the "general line" of the party in the national republics was the creation of their own national economy, a genuine national culture, not only in "form", but also in "content", national science and technology. The nationals themselves should head the party bodies and national governments of the sovereign Soviet republics, not by appointment from Moscow, but through free democratic local elections. All this turned out to be an illusion. The illusion of the national communists of those years was shared by the writer of these lines. On the eve of the XNUMXth Party Congress, criticizing the theses of the Politburo for this congress, I wrote: "In the period of reconstruction, the practical resolution of the national question in the light of the elimination of actual inequality, which, of course, has not yet been eliminated, acquires a special relevance both in the economic and cultural and in the political respect... However, the current pace of our cultural and economic development in the national regions and the achievements we have made do not ensure the fulfillment of the very clear and practical directives of the Tenth and XII Party Congresses... Unfortunately, after the XII Party Congress, the national problem has not been revisited and its practical solution comes from case to case ... From this point of view, the theses of Kuibyshev (Chairman of the Supreme Economic Council of the USSR) and Yakovlev (People's Commissariat of

deemed sufficient. Each of them touches upon the national problem in passing, "by the way", "by the way", and thus bypasses the most pressing issues of economic development in the national context" ("Pravda", June 22, 1930, A. Avtorkhanov. "For the implementation of party directives on the national question).

Criticizing Yakovlev's theses on the collective-farm movement, I rejected collective farms for the national republics, referring to Lenin. I wrote: "Lenin said: 'It would be a mistake if the comrades copied the decrees for all the places in Russia according to the template, if the Soviet workers in the Ukraine and the Don began to spread them indiscriminately, indiscriminately to other regions. We do not bind ourselves to a monotonous pattern, we do not decide once and for all that our experience, the experience of central Russia, can be transferred in its entirety to all the outlying regions'" (Vol. XII, p. 106).

"Elsewhere," I continued to quote Lenin, "in a well-known letter to the communists of the Caucasus, Lenin calls on them to 'understand the uniqueness of their republic from the provisions and conditions of the RSFSR, understand the need not to copy our tactics, but to deliberately modify it in relation to the development specific conditions'" (vol. 5-6, part 1, p. 200)".

It was precisely on the basis of Lenin that I declared the "experience of central Russia" "Complete collectivization and the liquidation of the kulaks as a class" as contraindicated in the specifics of non-Russian regions and republics and demanded for them not collective farms and not tozes, but land management. In a number of articles in the same "Pravda" I was subjected to various criticisms.

Referring to the same Lenin, one of my critics ranked me not only among

"Right opportunists", but also to the "traitors" of the party. He wrote: "We must categorically object to the obviously liquidationist and right-wing opportunist theory and proposals of Avtorkhanov on the question of ways to collectivize the national outlying areas ... What happens if we follow the path proposed by Comrade. Avtorkhanov? This means the removal in earnest and for a long time of the slogan of the complete collectivization of national regions ... since land management will be the land management of individual peasant farms. That is why we cannot regard Comrade Avtorkhanov's proposal otherwise than as an attempt to drag the Party back away from the general line of the Party, onto the very path that all right-wing opportunist elements whine and whine about. Tov. Avtorkhanov has definitely fallen ill with opportunistic myopia and panic moods... He does not see what is on the national outskirts... Why do we object so sharply to Comrade. Avtorkhanov? Yes, if only because 'the time is more difficult, the question is a million times more important, to fall ill at such a time means to risk the death of the revolution'" (Lenin. From a speech at the UP Party Congress against Comrade Bukharin). The treacherous ears of the right deeds of the master stick out from the reasoning of Comrade. Avtorkhanov on the ways of collectivization of the national outskirts" ("Pravda", June 30, 1930, L. Gottfried. "On the correct and right-wing opportunist proposals of comrade Avtorkhanov").

I was put next door to the Bukharinites in regard to the diagnosis of my "right-wing opportunist disease." In those years, such a neighborhood was considered not very cozy, and the disease itself was recognized as incurable. Stalin, who followed our discussion - "Collective farms or land management" - stated in the report of the Central Committee of the KhUT to the congress: "The party has revised the method of land management in favor of collective farm construction," and the congress itself wrote: "The 18th Congress instructs the Central Committee of the Party ... to steadily liquidate the kulaks as a class, on the basis of complete collectivization throughout the Soviet Union."

Since then, in a gigantic agricultural country, there has been a permanent crisis of underproduction of grain crops and livestock products. Meanwhile, before the revolution, only Ukraine fed the whole of Europe with its wheat, and the export of Russian bread on the world market was second only to America. For several decades now, the USSR has been ranked first in the world in importing American bread.

U. Ukrainian national movement during the war

The well-informed bulletin of Kronid Lyubarsky "News from the USSR", published in Munich, dated February 16, 1987, contains the following message: "On March 13, 1986, Roman Silaraups was arrested in Riga. He is charged with demanding an open denunciation of the Molotov-Ribbentrop treaty. In October 1986, R. Silaraups was sentenced to 5 years in strict regime camps and two years in exile."

In other words, the demand to annul the most criminal pact in the entire history of diplomacy between Stalin and Hitler, the pact that unleashed the Second World War, as well as the war against the USSR itself, the pact that cost humanity 55 million dead, of which 20 million fall to the share of the peoples of the USSR, - so, the Soviet government considers annulment of this criminal pact an action that undermines the foundations of its state. The pact was closely related to the fate of Ukraine and Belarus, since as a result they were reunited with the western Ukrainian-Belarusian territories. There may be different views on such a reunification, but it was not a solution to either the Ukrainian or Belarusian issues. Stalin only increased the number of Ukrainians and Belarusians imprisoned in the Soviet "prison of peoples". Stalin's plans for the "reunification" of the "fraternal" peoples with the Soviet empire went much further. He planned to return to the Soviet empire all those peoples that were part of the tsarist empire. Not with the Western democratic powers, but only with the same type of totalitarian state - with the Nazi regime of Hitler - could Stalin carry out such plans. Therefore, Stalin stops the former flirting with

democratic West, and surreptitiously preparing for a pact with Hitler. Moreover, Stalin accuses Western democracy of inciting the Soviet Union and Germany against each other in order to provoke a war between them precisely on the Ukrainian issue.

Here is what Stalin said on this score in March 1939 at the 18th Party Congress:

"The uproar that the Anglo-French and North American press raised about Soviet Ukraine is typical. The members of this press shouted until they were hoarse that the Germans were marching on Soviet Ukraine, that they now had in their hands the so-called Carpathian Ukraine, with a population of about 700,000, that the Germans would annex Soviet Ukraine, with a population of more than 30 million, no later than this spring. , to the so-called Carpathian Ukraine. It seems that this suspicious noise was intended to raise the fury of the Soviet Union against Germany, poison the atmosphere and provoke a conflict with Germany for no apparent reason" (Stalin, "Problems of Leninism", p. 571).

It was essentially an appeal to Hitler with a proposal to conclude an anti-Western pact: this happened exactly five months later - on August 23, 1939, a "non-aggression pact" was signed in Moscow between the USSR and Germany, which will be discussed later.

Stalin reunited the two Ukraines and two Belaruss, but because of this reunification, distrust towards them increased even more, because the Western brothers brought with them both Western separatism and Western ideology. After the artificial "Skrypnik case," Stalin staked not only on Russian patriotism, but also on nationalism. It should be noted that Stalin was right in his own way. He perfectly understood that if a new war broke out, then only the mighty power itself, the Russian nation, could save the Soviet empire. And here's the trouble - for a quarter of a century it was denationalized, internationalized, Marxism was hammered into its brains, eradicating Russian pride, Russian patriotism, Russian spirituality from there. For decades, Russian people have been taught to mock not only their great ancestors, but also their national history. This long spiritual inquisition did not achieve its goal - Russian nationalism turned out to be stronger than Marxism. Stalin decided that in the event of war he would lead the Russian people into battle not under the banner of Marxism, but under the banner of Russian patriotism and Russian historical heroes tested for centuries. Hence the logical conclusion - the rehabilitation of Russian "military-feudal imperialism" with all its policy of expansion in the outskirts of Russia. Hence also an entirely new stage in the Party's national policy. The old policy of combating "Great Russian chauvinism" is recognized as a past stage, and the struggle against local nationalism is declared an urgent and permanent task of the party.

The first devastating blow to local nationalists in the Communist Party itself, Stalin directed against Ukraine. It wasn't by chance. Stalin did not succeed in a radical purge of supporters of Ukrainization in Ukraine, because Ukrainization was the official policy of Lenin's Ukrainian comrades-in-arms, headed by Skrypnyk. Stalin decided that in order to put an end to Ukrainization, it was necessary to put an end to Skrypnyk. For this purpose, Stalin sent to Ukraine in 1933 one of the secretaries of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, a candidate member of the Politburo, Pavel Petrovich Postyshev, a Russian by nationality. In Ukraine, then the first secretary was Stanislav Kosior, who was also a member of the Moscow Politburo. Postyshev's official rank read: "Second Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine." A strange subordination was created, unknown in practice even to such a virtuoso bureaucracy as the Bolshevik bureaucracy. As the second secretary of the Central Committee, Postyshev reported to the first secretary of the Central Committee of Ukraine, but the first secretary of the Central Committee of Ukraine, Kosior, in turn, reported to Postyshev, as secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks.

The strangeness of the situation and the meaning of this cunning mechanics of Stalin became clear very soon, when Postyshev, over the head of the first secretary, launched, as secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, a campaign against Ukrainization, declaring it a manifestation of "bourgeois nationalism" in practice on the part of the Ukrainian old Bolsheviks Skrypnyk, Shakhrai, Lapchinsky. A frenzied persecution of Skrypnyk began, who, being People's Commissar of Education, spent

Ukrainization course in secondary and higher schools, cultural institutions, in literature, art. In the midst of this persecution, in the summer of 1933, Skrypnyk committed suicide. Soon the well-known writer Khvylovy also committed suicide.

Skrypnyk's "Ukrainian affair" gave Stalin the pretext for a radical turn in ideological politics in general, and in national politics in particular. From now on, Ukrainian and other local national deviations are declared to be the main danger. The term "Great Russian chauvinism" was forever banished from the Soviet press. Here is how Stalin himself justified this turn in 1934 at the 17th Congress: "Many people think that the fall of Skrypnyk is an isolated case, an exception to the rule. The same dislocations are observed among individual comrades in other national republics... They argue about which deviation represents the main danger, the deviation towards Great Russian nationalism or the deviation towards local nationalism?... The main danger is the deviation against which they have ceased to fight and which thus allowed to grow to the state danger. In Ukraine, quite recently, the deviation towards Ukrainian nationalism did not pose the main danger, but when they stopped fighting it and allowed it to grow to the point where it joined forces with the interventionists, this deviation became the main danger" (ibid., p. 474).

It was for this Ukrainian nationalism that the Kremlin organized an artificial famine in Ukraine in 1931-32, which took 6 million people to the grave.

According to Khrushchev, Stalin organized the second artificial famine in Ukraine after the war. When Khrushchev began to be reproached for why we buy grain in the West, while under Stalin we exported it to other countries, the imperturbable Khrushchev replied at the June plenum of the Central Committee (1963): "Under Stalin and Molotov, we exported bread abroad, and the Soviet people were plump and were dying of hunger." Of course, Ukrainian bread was exported abroad, and Ukrainians also died of hunger. This was Stalin's punishment for the fact that the Ukrainians, as he believed, during the war did not show enough enthusiasm in defense of his tyrannical regime.

Faced with a choice during the war: the Nazis or the Communists - the leaders of the Ukrainian national movement chose the third path - the path of Ukrainian independence. As soon as the German invaders entered Lvov, the congress of Ukrainian national-political organizations in June 1941 proclaimed the restoration of the Ukrainian People's Republic and the creation of a Ukrainian national government headed by Yaroslav Stetsko. However, the German Nazis were the same enemies of an independent Ukraine as the Moscow communists. Moscow at least formally created the Ukrainian Soviet Republic, while Berlin generally considered Ukraine as its future colony. Therefore, without exception, the entire composition of the Ukrainian

government was arrested by the Gestapo. They were in prison until the end of the war. The case of those arrested was continued in the rear of the Germans and the Bolsheviks by their surviving associates, creating the Ukrainian Liberation Rada - UGVR.

The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN), whose leader was Bandera, who was killed by Chekists in 1959 in Munich, created the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (1942). Since Bandera was in a German concentration camp, it was headed first by M. Lebed, and then by R. Shukhevych. Hundreds of thousands of UPA soldiers died in the fight against both the German invaders and the Chekist troops. The survivors, the so-called "Benderites", died in the Gulag.

Great were the material and human losses of Ukraine in World War II. According to official Soviet figures, Ukrainian losses are relatively higher than even those of Russia. Here are the data: during the Soviet-German war, material assets were destroyed throughout the occupied territory of the USSR in the amount of 679 billion rubles, of which Ukraine accounted for 285 billion. However, the loss of life was horrendous: Ukraine lost 15 percent of its population in the war. Of these, 4.7 million did not return from the war, and 1.5 million from

The civilian population of Ukraine were massacred by the Nazis. But no one has yet counted how many millions of "Benderites" Stalin drove into the camps, because the entire Ukrainian people in his eyes consisted entirely of "Benderites". Therefore, he even came up with an extravagant idea, and not whether to exile the entire Ukrainian people, following the example of the Caucasian peoples, Kalmyks and Crimean Tatars. We remember the famous passage from Khrushchev's report on the "cult of personality" at the Twentieth Party Congress (1956). Here it is: "Ukrainians escaped this fate only because there were too many of them, there was no place where to exile them, otherwise Stalin would have exiled them too."

During Brezhnev's rule, Soviet Ukraine began to set an example for other Soviet republics on how to circumvent Moscow's absolute centralism by solving some of its internal problems on its own, especially in personnel policy. To some extent, the actual Ukrainization of the party-state apparatus began. In Ukraine, the first secretaries of regional party committees from Moscow have not been appointed for a long time. They are appointed by the Ukrainian Central Committee itself, predominantly from Ukrainians. When the new Gorbachev leadership tried to restore the old practice and purify the old Ukrainian party apparatus headed by Shcherbitsky, it suffered an obvious defeat for everyone. Shcherbitsky is not only the last Brezhnevist, but also the last first secretary of the party in the national republics, who emerged victorious in an open clash with the new general secretary. How long? This, of course, is another matter. However, if Gorbachev's new "general line" with its "revolutionary perestroika" and its broad-based policy of glasnost, openness, and democratization is not yet another tactical maneuver, then this new policy should recognize for Ukraine, as well as for other union republics, the status of sovereign states that verbally recognizes even such a document of rare hypocrisy as the Soviet Constitution.

PART III RUSSIA, THE USSR AND NON-SLAVIC PEOPLES OF THE USSR |. Twice conquered Turkestan and the Caucasus

Departing from the classical scheme of Lenin on the national-colonial issue, according to which the Russian tsars, by their external wars of conquest, turned Russia into a "prison of peoples", Soviet ideologists faced a puzzling problem: how to withdraw the theory of the "prison of peoples" from circulation, and depict the subjugation of foreign peoples dictated by the just state interests of Russia, which allegedly coincided with the national interests of the conquered peoples. Cunning ideologists, who deftly exploited their all-saving "dialectic" in any situation, hopelessly gave up here. After all, Soviet ideologists live on quotes from "the founders of Marxism-Leninism," and here you can't dig up any quotes not only from the "founders," but even from Stalin himself. But since the Marxist dialecticians also have a dialectical conscience, they found a way out: instead of the Marxist Pokrovsky, they republish the monarchist Klyuchevsky in order to prove the legitimacy of the tsarist colonial expansion, and the historians of the conquered peoples were forced to rewrite history

nationalities, proving the "progressiveness" of the conquest of their peoples by the Russian tsars. This is how the history of all non-Russian peoples has now been rewritten. There are no words, Russian history itself was also shamelessly falsified. Therefore, the "Course of Russian History" by the liberal monarchist V.O. Klyuchevsky has today become the reference book of every Soviet ideologist (the fundamental courses of Russian history are now being published in the second edition not only by Solovyov and Klyuchevsky, but also by the extremely reactionary historian of the monarchist Karamzin).

For this reason, I want to first outline Klyuchevsky's concept of how the Russian empire expanded. Klyuchevsky happily combined the breadth of historical interests with the talent of a historical storyteller. But it was not for this that Soviet historians took him to

armament. More important was his quality as an outstanding interpreter of the Russian patriotic concept of the formation of the Russian Empire. However, Klyuchevsky, who knew Russian history so well, was deprived of elementary knowledge of the history of the peoples that Russia conquered. The history of these peoples, perhaps, was better known by Russian generals than by Russian historians (for example, the best works on the Caucasus so far were written by tsarist generals).

The Russian-imperial concept of Klyuchevsky, sustained in downright idyllic tones, is very popular with the current Soviet imperialists, whose fathers were recently taught another, anti-tsarist, concept of Lenin and Pokrovsky. If, according to Pokrovsky and Lenin, the 19th century entered the history of Russia as a century of aggressive colonial wars that finally completed the formation of the Eurasian Russian Empire by the methods of Russian "military feudal imperialism", then Soviet historians believe that the tsarist colonial wars were objectively liberating in nature, for the forcible annexation to cultural Russia of non-Russian peoples, became an act of historical progress for the conquered peoples. Klyuchevsky himself was too scholarly not to be hypocritical, arguing, like Soviet historians, that Russia had a "cultural mission" here. He explains these conquests by purely state and even geographical interests, which suits the Soviet ideologists as well. Here is the essence of Klyuchevsky's imperial concept: "In the course of the 18th century, Russia almost completed its long-standing desire to become within natural ethnographic and territorial boundaries. This aspiration was completed at the beginning of the 19th century by the acquisition of the entire eastern coast of the Baltic Sea by the annexation of Finland with the Aland Islands under an agreement with Sweden in 1809 with the continuation of the western border, by the annexation of the Kingdom of Poland by an act of the Congress of Vienna and the southwestern border, by the annexation of Bessarabia along the Bucharest treaty of 1812. But as soon as the state became within its natural borders, Russia's foreign policy bifurcated: it pursues various aspirations in the Asian, eastern and European southwest ..."

Moving on to the Russian borders in the east, Klyuchevsky developed a very original philosophy about the "political societies" there (obviously, we are talking about khanates and emirs), some of which were much older than the Russian principalities. Here is a continuation of his reasoning: "The Russian borders in the east were not distinguished by sharp certainty or isolation: in many places they were open; moreover, there were no dense political societies beyond these borders, which, by their density, would have restrained the further expansion of Russian territory. That is why Russia here had to step over the natural boundaries and go deep into the steppes of Asia. This step was taken by her part against her own will. Klyuchevsky is referring to the conquest of the Caucasus and Central Asia. It is difficult to agree that Russia waged bloody wars there "against her own will", and the peoples with whom they were fought did not represent "dense political societies". Ancient tribes of Turkic origin lived in the Asian steppes, which in the 6th century created a kind of federation of peoples called the "Turkic Khaganate". In the middle of the 30th century, Central Asia was conquered by the Arabs. Islamization began. The beginning of the Islamic period in the history of the Central Asian peoples was marked by a great flourishing in the development of productive forces, the expansion of trade and foreign trade relations, the growth of amazing national Muslim architecture and urban planning. At the same time, such historical cities as Samarkand, Tashkent, Termez, Bukhara were built. The reign of the Caliphate and the new

religion - Islam - led to the unification of all Turkic peoples, who after the collapse of the "Turkic Kaganate" were in constant civil strife among themselves.

The era of the Samanid state, which began in the 9th century, was marked by the transformation of the cities of Samarkand, Tashkent and Termez into large economic, craft and trade centers that exported their products to China and the countries of Eastern Europe.

In the 11th century, a new Turkic state of Khorezm arose, defeated as a result of

invasion of the Tatar-Mongol horde of Genghis Khan (in 1219), but already in the next century the Turkic commander Timur (Tamerlane) again restores the Turkic state, creating a large empire.

After Timur, a long era of strife and national-tribal disengagement began, until three independent Turkic states stabilized in Turkestan - the Bukhara Khanate, the Khiva Khanate and the Kokand Khanate, but while maintaining Islamic unity and commonality in cultural development (the great flowering of Turkestan culture dates back to the 19th century). and literature). All types of urban and agricultural development are intensively developing, irrigation facilities, which are very important for Asia, are being improved and expanded. This is what the "loose political societies" of Central Asia looked like when, after the conquest of the Caucasus, Russia turned its imperial policy in its direction.

The Central Asian khanates traded briskly with Russia, and at the beginning of the 19th century, an exchange of Russian ambassadors with these khanates took place. Although these khanates were rich in all kinds of raw materials, they were very poor in weapons. And that sealed their fate. Russia conquered them in two steps: in 1864-65. - Kokand and Bukhara, in 1880-81 - Khiva.

Recognizing that tsarism established a "colonial regime" in Central Asia, Soviet historians at the same time assert: "The entry of Central Asia into Russia objectively had a progressive impact on its development" (TSB, vol. 24, third ed., p. 378, M. 1976). The "progress", it turns out, consisted in the fact that Russia built 208 of its 220 cotton-paper factories in Turkestan, turning it into the cotton base of the empire (when Western empires did the same in their colonies, bringing capital here to cheap labor, then the TSB does not call this "progress", but colonial robberies).

Soviet historians also blame tsarism for one thing when they write: "Tsarism deliberately supported the preservation of the reactionary feudal regimes in Bukhara and Khiva. The peoples of Central Asia experienced a double oppression: from the side of the Bai elite and the Russian colonizers" (ibid., p. 278). In other words, Tsar Alexander II did not act "progressively", retaining the Bukhara and Khiva khanates as his vassal states with internal autonomy. If the tsar liquidated these khanates (as he liquidated the Kokand khanate for supporting the uprising of the Kirghiz against Russia), then there would be no "double oppression", but one oppression would remain - the oppression of the Russian colonialists. However, I argue that the autonomous statute of the khanates gave the Turkestans more actual rights than the constitution of the current Turkestan union republics gives them.

Rus' has been interested in the Caucasus for a long time. The first Russian Tsar Ivan IV (the Terrible) was married for the second time to the daughter of a Kabardian prince, Maria Temryukova. The marriage was concluded in 1561, after Ivan the Terrible conquered the Kazan Khanate (1552) and the Astrakhan Khanate (1556). It was under Ivan the Terrible that the Russian borders advanced to the Terek River, where there were already Cossack settlements of runaway serfs. Repeated attempts by the Russian expeditionary forces in the 17th, 19th and 18th centuries to seize the Caucasus remain unsuccessful not only because of the resistance of the Caucasians, but also because the colonial-strategic interests of the three states of Russia, Persia and Turkey clashed here. The situation was further complicated by the fact that the two most ancient Christian states in Transcaucasia, Armenia, which was occupied by Persia, Georgia, which was often subjected to invasions by both Persians and Turks, expected disinterested help from Russia of the same faith. The same, as if, was the goal of the Georgievsky treatise of 1783 between Russia and the Kartli-Kakheti kingdom, according to which

Russian protectorate over Eastern Georgia. When, in connection with this, a large movement of Russian troops to the North Caucasian lands began, the highlanders raised the first holy war under the leadership of the Chechen sheikh Ushurma-Mansur, which lasted 6 years.

According to Klyuchevsky, Russia also came to the Caucasus in search of its natural borders, and when it stood face to face with the giant Caucasian ridge as a natural

border, then Russia allegedly crossed this ridge against its own will, as it was after that in Asia. Here is how it happened according to Klyuchevsky: "In 1739, the possessions of Russia in the southeast reached the Kuban ... Russia found itself in front of the Caucasus Range. The Russian government did not at all think of crossing this ridge, had neither the means nor the desire to do so; but behind the Caucasus, among the Mohammedan population, several Christian principalities vegetated, which began to turn (to the Russians) for protection ... Catherine was forced to send a Russian regiment beyond the Caucasus Range, to Tiflis. Klyuchevsky's remark sounds like an anecdote when he writes that, sending a Russian regiment to Tiflis, Catherine II didn't even really know where Tiflis lies - on the Black Sea, on the Caspian Sea or somewhere inside Russia. But what the empress did not know, her generals knew well. The Russian government, which "didn't think at all to cross the ridge", in 1784 laid down on the Terek, in front of the main Caucasian ridge, a military fortress with the symbolic name "Vladikavkaz", that is, "own the Caucasus", which has now become the city of Ordzhonikidze. At the same time, the generals began the construction of the famous Georgian Military Highway connecting Russia with Tiflis. The road was completed in 1799. In the same year, Catherine's son Pavel [sent Russian troops to Tiflis.

Then some operetta actions take place, in which the Georgian people themselves do not participate. The last Georgian tsar, George KhP, writes Klyuchevsky, "bequeathed Georgia to the Russian emperor, and in 1801, willy-nilly, I had to accept the will." In other words, more willingly than not, Paul I annexed Eastern Georgia, and then his son Alexander I conquered Western Georgia. This annexation was followed by two wars with Persia, as a result of which two Caucasian peoples were annexed to Russia: one Muslim people - Azerbaijanis (1813) and the other - the oldest Christian people in the world - Armenians (1828). A strategically strange situation was created: Russia now stood with both feet in Transcaucasia, and in the Caucasus its power extended only to the line of military fortresses with the Cossack fugitive population from the Kuban through the Terek to Baku, Erivan and Tiflis.

Russian troops crossed the Caucasus Range, defeating Mansur, but not yet conquering the peoples in front of this range. This is how Klyuchevsky describes both these peoples and the new strategic problem of Russia: "The Russian regiments in Tiflis found themselves in an extremely difficult situation: communication with Russia was possible only through the Caucasian ridge inhabited by wild mountain tribes; from the Caspian to the Black Seas, Russian detachments were cut off by native possessions ... ". It was necessary, says Klyuchevsky, for security to break through to the west of the Caucasus (against the Circassians) and to the east of the Caucasus against the Chechens and Lezgins (here Klyuchevsky confuses the Lezgins with the Avars, because the Lezgins live on the northern borders of Azerbaijan). (Klyuchevsky, vol. U, p. 194).

Unlike Professor Klyuchevsky, the hero of the gauntlets and hangman of the Decembrists, Nicholas I, expressed himself more energetically about the conquest of the Caucasus. Rewarding the conqueror of Armenia, General Paskevich, with the title of "Count of Erivan" (for the suppression of the Polish uprising of 1831, he was also awarded the new title of "High Serene Prince of Warsaw"), the tsar wrote in a rescript addressed to him: "After this task has been completed, the task of conquering Armenian highlands, you have another task, in my eyes no less important, and in the discussion of direct benefits much more important - this is the subjugation of the mountain peoples or the extermination of the recalcitrant" (M. N. Pokrovsky, "Diplomacy and wars of tsarist Russia in the 19th century") .

This famous Caucasian war began in 1817 and ended almost 50 years later - in 1859, with the capture of the outstanding commander and organizer of the all-mountain state - Imam Shamil (the last name of the Imam Shamil of Circassia fell in 1864).

Not a single war to conquer foreign peoples cost Russia as many victims as the Caucasian War, and its duration (55 years!) is unprecedented in general in the history of colonial wars. It began under Alexander I, continued throughout the reign

Nicholas [and ended only under Alexander P. From the highlanders, it was headed by imams Kazi mullah, Gamzat-bek, and since 1834 by Imam Shamil. When Chechnya joined Shamil in 1840, the war took on an all-Caucasian character. There is a huge amount of pre-revolutionary Russian and foreign literature about the Caucasian War. The most objective about the Caucasian war was written by its direct Russian participants. They were all struck by the stubbornness of the highlanders in the struggle for their independence. A Moskovskie Vedomosti correspondent reported to his newspaper from the Caucasian Front: "In Chechnya, only our place is where our detachment is stationed; the detachment moved, and this place immediately passes into the hands of the rebels.

The special admiration of contemporaries is caused not only by the heroism of the highlanders, but also by the military genius of Shamil. Traveling through the territory of Shamil's Imamate, the writer Alexandre Dumas wrote in his correspondence to Paris: "Shamil is a titan who fights against the lord of all Russians." Marx calls Shamil "a great democrat."

The classics of Russian fiction - Pushkin, Lermontov and Tolstoy (the last two - participants in the Caucasian War) condemned her and sympathized with the highlanders. About the most ferocious conqueror - about the first commander-in-chief of the Caucasian war, General Yermolov, Pushkin wrote:

Your move is like a black infection

Destroyed, annihilated the tribes ...

But behold, the East raises a howl.

Hang with your snowy head

Humble yourself, Caucasus: Yermolov is coming.

And the ardent cry of war ceased:

Everything is subject to the Russian sword ...

Caucasian proud sons,

You fought, you died terribly;

But our blood did not save you,

Nor enchanted armor,

Neither mountains, nor dashing horses,

No wild liberties love!

Lermontov entered the history of the Caucasus as a great singer of his freedom. Everyone remembers these fiery lines of the poet:

Caucasus, a distant country!

Liberty dwelling simple!

And you are full of misery

And bloodied by the war! ..

No! don't look forward to past years

Circassian, to your fatherland:

Freedom before dear land

Significantly perishes for her.

This great Russian man deeply comprehended the whole philosophy of the highlanders when he wrote in the introductory part of Izmail Bey:

And the tribes of those gorges are wild,

Their god is liberty, their law is war...

There it is not a crime to strike the enemy;

Friendship is true there, but revenge is more true;

There for good - good, and blood - for blood,

And hate is immeasurable, like love.

According to official figures, the active Russian army in the Caucasus was 200 thousand people (Tsarist General Fadeev wrote that in the last years of the war it reached 280 thousand people). For the then scale, this is a large figure (remember, the Russian army against Napoleon reached only 240 thousand people). Shamil's army was about 20 thousand people with primitive equipment against outstanding Russian artillery, and even

plus new Russian rifled weapons, which first appeared after the Crimean War, which the highlanders did not have.

The attitude of Soviet historians to the Caucasian War has changed as many times as the "general line" itself has changed. At first, Shamil was, as according to Marx, a "great democrat", and the conquest of the Caucasus was an act of colonial robbery by tsarism. Then Shamil became a reactionary and even a Turkish spy, and the conquest of the Caucasus became the "lesser evil." Finally, a new scientist from the Caucasus appeared in historical science, who found that the "lesser evil" is also "evil", and the conquest of the Caucasus by Russia was not evil at all, but a great "historical progress". This new scientific discovery has now been extended to all conquered peoples. The whole world now knows the name of its author—Shevardnadze.

As already mentioned, the peoples of Turkestan and the Caucasus, taking advantage of the victory of the October Revolution and the repeated statements of the Bolshevik Party about the right of non-Russian peoples to secede from Russia, formed their own independent states, which immediately found themselves between two fires: between the Red Army of Lenin and Trotsky and the White Army of Kolchak and Denikin. Since these former tsarist officers fought for "one and indivisible Russia", and the Bolsheviks continued to preach the right to self-determination of non-Russian peoples, they sympathized with the Bolsheviks and even supported them against the Whites. Stalin attributed the victory of the Bolsheviks to this very support when he wrote: "The revolution in Russia would not have won and Kolchak and Denikin would not have been defeated if the Russian proletariat had not had sympathy and support from the oppressed peoples of the former Russian Empire" ("Issues of Leninism" , page 52).

But in 1920, the Bolsheviks put an end to Kolchak and Denikin, and immediately began the second conquest of Turkestan and the Caucasus by the Red Army. Shevardnadze called this perfidious act of Soviet imperialism "the rising of Lenin's sun from the north." This is probably the only reason why the Leninist empire made its foreign minister a man who knows no other country than its colony - Georgia.

Yes, it is true that Russia has always been generous in rewarding its Caucasian lackeys, but the true Caucasus is alive with its national heroes: on May 28, 1988, at mass rallies in Georgia and Armenia, they praised the heroes who 70 years ago announced the withdrawal of Caucasians from Soviet Russia peoples and formed independent Caucasian republics, burned three years later by the "Leninist sun".

]. Muslim peoples in Russia and the USSR

The Islamic revolution in Iran and the heroic resistance of Muslim Afghanistan against the Soviet superpower increased interest in the Muslim peoples of the USSR as well. The current clash between Islam and communism in Afghanistan, the ongoing political, strategic and energy confrontation of the great powers in the Muslim region (Afghanistan, Iran and the Arab East) may eventually set in motion the Soviet Muslim East. The Kremlin is trying, while continuing to fight against Islam in the USSR, to introduce Soviet Muslims into its expansionist game in the Middle and Near East, allegedly to "protect" the Muslim peoples there against the Americans. But this is not only a false and insidious game, but also a game with fire. In the event of a military confrontation in the region between America and the Soviet Union, the Kremlin's current bet on the "Muslim patriotism" of its subjects could turn into a disaster for itself. The Muslim peoples of the USSR are highly unreliable even in the event of a serious political and revolutionary crisis within the country, as evidenced by the vitality of the ideology of Basmachism in Turkestan and Muridism in the Caucasus, based on the dogmas of Islam. It is also characteristic that all dissidents who were repressed among Muslims were accused of reprinting and distributing the Koran. The foregoing makes it necessary to pay special attention to the tenets of Islam, the history of Muslim

peoples of the USSR and the present state of Islam in the USSR.

Islam, the religion of the great conquerors by word and sword, evolved over time into the religion of the conquered and enslaved colonial peoples of Asia and Africa. Just on these two continents, where the European colonialist followed in the footsteps of the Arab conquerors, although he conquered the Muslim peoples physically, he could never conquer them spiritually. Attempts by missionaries from the metropolises to return back to Christianity at least those peoples who preached Christianity before they were conquered by the Arabs, turned out to be mostly futile. One well-known Soviet orientalist notes in relation to the countries of the Arab East: "In these previously Christian countries, in the Middle Ages, the majority of the indigenous population converted to Islam, but there were never cases of Christianity being adopted by Muslims" (E. A. Belyaev, "Muslim Sectarianism", Moscow, 1957, p. 152).

It is difficult for a non-specialist to understand, and even more so to correctly assess, the greatest success that fell to the lot of Islam, which was born in the Middle Ages in the same region where such world religions as Judaism and Christianity have dominated for several centuries. It is much easier to explain the success of Islam in modern and recent times, when it became the religion of the colonial peoples. Islam, unlike Christianity, embodies not only a creed ("Din"), but also a state doctrine ("Sharia"). Here, both God's and Caesar's were concentrated in one supreme sovereign - first in Mohammed, and then in the caliphs. Hence, Islam, being a faith, simultaneously becomes a driving national-political force, first in the Arab wars of conquest, and then in the liberation movement of the colonial peoples (Basmachi in Turkestan, Muridism in the Caucasus).

As for the tenets of Islam, there is a theory that Islam is just a synthesis of elements of Christianity, Judaism and the pagan beliefs of the Arab tribes. If it really is some kind of synthesis, then it must be recognized as a brilliant synthesis, designed to satisfy the spiritual need of that part of humanity that has remained outside the sphere of influence of the existing world religions.

The dogmas and moral philosophy of Islam ("Islam" - "surrendering oneself to God") are set forth in the holy book of Muslims ("Muslim", "devotee") - in the Koran ("Koran" is "reading"), which is a collection of sermons of Mohammed (born 570, died June 8, 632), inspired by God through the angel Jabrail (Gabriel). The Qur'an was collected after the death of Mohammed by his direct disciples. The main dogma of Islam, although it is not found in the Koran, says: "There is no God but God and Mohammed is his prophet" (the meaning of this dogma becomes clear if we keep in mind that up to 360 idols were collected in the sacred pre-Islamic temple of the Kaaba in Mecca, which was worshiped by various Arab tribes). She also opposed herself to the Christian dogma about God in three persons ("Trinity"). The introductory sura of the Koran - "Fatih" - which among Muslims plays the role of the Christian "Our Father", reads: "In the name of the Lord the Merciful, the Merciful! Praise be to God, the Lord of the worlds, the Merciful, Merciful Lord of the day of judgment. We truly worship You and we ask You for protection. Guide us on the right path, on the path of those to whom You have been merciful, to whom there is no anger, and who do not err. Each of the 114 surahs of the Qur'an begins with the formula "In the name of the Lord, the Merciful, the Merciful," which in Arabic sounds like this: "Bismillahir Rahmanir Rahim." There are four ritual prescriptions for a Muslim: 1) praying five times a day, 2) fasting (the lunar month of Ramadan), 3) "sunset" (paying 2.5% of one's income to orphans and the poor) and 4) with the material opportunity to make time in life pilgrimage to Mecca. The moral and ethical obligations that the Koran imposes on its followers, one German commentator on the Koran reduces to the following six main principles: 1) respect for human life, 2) fidelity and decency, 3) kindness and devoted gratitude to parents, 4) help to fellow tribesmen and co-religionists in their need, 5) fidelity to duty, 6) generosity to those who are dependent on you ("Per Kogap", Mipshuen, Soitapp Wepae, 1959, pp. 12-13). In the fourth sura of the Qur'an, it is said that everything good that is done

man is from Allah, and all bad things are from him. The bliss of paradise that awaits the faithful Muslim, the Koran describes with extraordinary pathos and brilliance. The Qur'an frees a person from fear in the struggle for a just cause.

In the ninth sura we read: "Say: 'Nothing will ever befall us except what Allah has written for us.'" The Qur'an frees a person from the fear of death. In the same sura it is said: "The property of the present life in comparison with the future is negligible." A medieval Muslim philosopher comments on the Qur'anic teaching on the meaning of death in the following way: "Death is the disappearance of matter, not the soul... Death is only a change of state. The soul begins to live on its own, while it was in the body, it held with its hand, looked with its eyes, listened with its ears, but it was she, and only she, who knew the essence of things. This philosophy of the meaning of life and death according to Islam was described by the outstanding Soviet scientist Uzbek Talib Saidbaev, whose data I use, in the words: "An important role in the fulfillment of the compensatory function by Islam in society was played by its teaching about the purpose and meaning of earthly life as preparation for the afterlife. A person, according to Islam, is a 'pilgrim', for whom the purpose of the journey, of course, is much more important than the vicissitudes of the path" (TS Saidbaev, "Islam and Society", M. 1978, p. 57). None of the theologians, both Christian and Muslim, disputes the influence of Judaism and Christianity on the formation of the teachings of Islam. The Koran recognizes the divine origin of the Bible and the Gospel. Recognizes the messengers of God - Adam, Noah (in Arabic Nuh), Abraham (Ibrahim), Moses (Musa), Jesus Christ (Isaal Masih, that is, the Messiah). There is a cult of Christ in the Koran, but they consider him not God, but the prophet of God, which Mohammed considered himself to be. The Qur'an essentially reproduces the gospel story of the Virgin Mary's virgin birth. Islam claims that Mohammed is the very Paraclete whose coming was foretold by Jesus Christ (in the Gospel of John).

After the death of Mohammed, there was a split in Islam. It was caused not by dogmatic, but by dynastic differences due to a dispute over the heir of Mohammed. They say that Mohammed wanted his son-in-law Ali to become his heir and the first caliph in order to start a dynasty along the family line. However, Mohammed's entourage recognized the establishment of the principle of election as the best, and not Ali (however, the most prominent commander of Mohammed), but Abubekir, was chosen. Hence the split into "Sunnis" ("true believers" from the entire "community"), supporters of Abubekir, and into "Shiites" ("sectarians" from "part of the community"), supporters of Ali. In the middle of the 30th century, Shiism became a special trend in Islam based on a new dogma: the deputy of the prophet - the caliph - cannot be elected by people. Therefore, all caliphates from Abubekir, Omar, Osman,

Umayyad and Abbassid are illegal for Shiites. The Shiites recognize the Koran, Mohammed and the Sunnah, except for those parts of it that talk about the opponents of Ali, but the Shiites also have their own sacred tradition, different from the Sunni: the Shiites, in particular, adopted from their old beliefs the doctrine of the absence of divine predestination and free will. The schism, however, did not prevent the triumphal march of Islam across the earth. Barely a hundred years after the death of Mohammed, Islam spread with incredible speed, by force of arms, through Syria, Persia, Central Asia, the Caucasus, Egypt, North Africa and almost the entire Iberian Peninsula at the beginning of the 30th century. Even after the fall of the centralized power of the caliphate, Islam conquered Constantinople, hoisting the moon on the temple of Hagia Sophia (1453). At the beginning of the 16th century and at the end of the 17th century, the Turks twice tried, both times unsuccessfully, to seize even Vienna. This was already the end of Islamic expansion towards Europe. From now on, Islam tends to the countries of Africa and Asia not conquered by Christianity - up to the Philippine Islands, where Islam penetrated through Indonesia in the 14th-16th centuries. But history loves paradoxes. The more Islam succeeded, this time not by the sword, but in a word, among the Afro-Asiatic peoples, the more intense was another parallel process - the colonization of these peoples by the great and even middle powers of Europe.

The last caliphate - the Ottoman Empire - after an unsuccessful war with Russia in 1877-78. so weakened that the European powers gradually began to capture it

separate provinces with their Muslim peoples, and after the First World War they generally divided the Arab countries among themselves.

Of the great Muslim empire, only Turkey survived, declaring itself a purely national state and republic. From now on, three Muslim peoples enjoyed sovereignty: Türkiye, Persia and Afghanistan.

The Second World War and its consequences led to the collapse of all world empires, except for the Soviet one. European cultural powers, some voluntarily, others forced, recognized the national independence of their former colonies. Thus, 33 new Muslim states were formed in Asia and Africa. Together with the old three Muslim states, there are now 36 independent states in the world with a majority Muslim population in them.

III. The spread of Islam in the territory of the USSR

On the current territory of the USSR - in the Caucasus and Central Asia - Arab conquerors appeared even under the first heirs of Mohammed - Azerbaijan was conquered by the Caliphate in 639 (seven years after the death of Mohammed), Dagestan in 642-643. In 673-674. Arab troops crossed the Amu Darya and entered the Bukhara lands. Finally, the Kingdom of Bukhara and neighboring territories lying beyond the Amu Darya were conquered by the Arabs in 706-716. About 15 Central Asian feudal states were annexed to the Caliphate. The pre-existing numerous local religions were declared false, and the population gradually began to convert to Islam. To speed up the process of Islamization, the Arabs exempted local residents from the poll tax. The Arab conquerors were not only outstanding commanders, but also excellent psychologists. They conquered the lands with the sword, but they conquered the peoples by word, persuasion, story and demonstration of the advantages of the new faith. At the same time, they made a broad compromise between the Islam of the conquerors and the adat law of the conquered peoples. Islam successfully dressed up in a national form. Since the Caliphs, like Mohammed, were both religious teachers and heads of state in one person, Islam and its jurisprudence - Sharia ("guide", "making laws") - became the basis for the formation of future national theocratic states in Central Asia after the fall of the power of the aliens. He did not preach Islam and asceticism, which is so alien to the Central Asian peoples. The saying of the prophet was: "The best of you is not the one who neglects earthly things for the sake of heaven, and not the one who does the opposite; the best of you is the one who takes from both."

Comparing the attitude of Islam and Christianity towards man, the Soviet author draws the following conclusion: "A Christian, in order to fulfill the requirement of his faith, must forget himself for the sake of God and faith; his law requires a Muslim that he should not forget either God or his neighbor in the midst of his deeds,

performed a prayer ceremony at the proper time and gave away part of his property for the benefit of the poor" (T. Said-baev, *ibid.*, p. 40).

Many Soviet authors attribute the success of Islam to its flexibility, malleability, amazing ability to adapt to local beliefs, customs, and rituals: "Islam (compared to other monotheistic religions) quickly adapts to the conditions of real life. In the era of the formation of Arab statehood and external conquests, he hovered not in heaven, but in the world of earthly life" (*ibid.*, p. 31). Islamization of other peoples of Asia and the Caucasus in the future occurs

already without the Arab conquerors - by peaceful means. Muslim missionaries spread Islam in Bulgaria (modern Tataria) at the end of the IX - beginning of the X century, in Bashkiria - in the X-XII centuries, in Kabardino-Balkaria and Circassia - in the X-XII century, in

Chechen-Ingushetia - in the 17th-14th centuries.

After the creation of the Russian centralized state, Russia proceeds to conquer the Muslim peoples of the Volga, Siberia, Central Asia and the Caucasus. This turned out to be far from an easy task, and therefore the very process of conquering the peoples of these regions

went on for quite some time. Here not only two worlds (Europe and Asia) confronted each other, but also two religions (Christianity and Islam). Both sides tried to give the war a national religious character - the advancing Russians fought under the banner of Orthodoxy, and the defending Muslims began the "Holy War" ("Ghazavat" under the green banner of Islam). Without exception, all Muslim peoples offered long-term armed resistance to Russia. Even under Ivan the Great, the Kazan (1552) and Astrakhan (1556) khanates were conquered. Under Catherine II, the Crimean Khanate was conquered (1772). The conquest of the Caucasian peoples began and ended in the 19th century - in 1813 Azerbaijan was taken (after the war with Persia), in 1859 Dagestan and Chechnya were taken, in 1864 - Circassia. In the second half of the 19th century, the conquest of the Muslim peoples of Central Asia began. In relation to the previously conquered Tatars and Bashkirs, the government followed a policy of forced baptism. After a number of Tatar and Bashkir uprisings, as well as after the well-known Pugachev uprising, in which many Bashkirs participated, it was decided to recognize the policy of forcible conversion of Muslims to Orthodoxy as erroneous. Catherine II legalized Islam and recognized it as the legal religion of her Tatar-Bashkir subjects. Under Alexander II, in 1872 in Transcaucasia, in 1878 in Orenburg, then in Ufa, "Spiritual Assemblies for managing persons of the Mohammedan faith" were created. The same spiritual administration existed since 1831. in Crimea. Their heads - muftis - were appointed by the Ministry of Internal Affairs and were paid by them. In the recently conquered countries - in Central Asia and the North Caucasus - there were no spiritual administrations. There, the military authorities - governors-general - themselves were directly in charge of spiritual affairs. The printing of Muslim spiritual literature began (the Koran was printed in Kazan). New secondary and higher theological schools, madrasahs, were opened. In Uzbekistan alone, before the revolution, there were over 400 madrasahs, and maktabas (village theological schools) were in every village (I.M. Muminov. *Selected Works*. Vol. 2, Tashkent, p. 37). In Russia, the Koran was also published in Russian. The first translation of the Koran into Russian was made by order of Peter I. The Koran was translated by the first doctor of philosophical sciences in Russia - P. V. Postnikov. This translation was published in St. Petersburg in 1716 under the title "Alkoran about Mohammed and the Turkish law." There are also later translations - 1879 (Kazan), 1880 (Moscow) and the translation of Krachkovsky in Soviet times - 1963 (Moscow).

The pre-revolutionary Muslim clergy of the Russian Empire acted not only as the highest moral leadership of the Muslim peoples living in it, but it was also an organized national-political force, with which the government reckoned. It was also an economic force - Muslim institutions owned waqfs - movable and immovable property bequeathed in favor of mosques. Waqfs had charitable institutions (hospitals, shelters for the elderly, widows, orphans). They also had lands at their disposal, which were cultivated by believers free of charge.

The greatest merit of the Muslim clergy of the Russian Empire before the history of their peoples was that they introduced a new concept into the consciousness of their co-religionists - all Russian Muslims, regardless of race, language and territory, are a single spiritual, historical and social community, they are interconnected by one faith and destiny.

The position of the Muslim clergy and the degree of power of Sharia jurisdiction in different areas, as already mentioned in passing, were different. In Central Asia, the Bukhara and Khiva khanates placed under Russian rule were retained with complete internal autonomy, I repeat, incomparably greater than that of the current "union republics" in Central Asia. The Emir of Bukhara, for example, according to the tradition of the caliphates, was both the supreme secular and spiritual ruler, who ruled according to Islam, issued administrative acts, but did not issue laws, because all laws were already set out in Sharia. Acting as an interpreter of these laws, the higher clergy provided

influence on the emir, sometimes forcing him even to cancel already issued acts. The first person after the emir was Sheikh ul-Islam ("the head of Islam"), who owned the functions of an interpreter of Sharia, the second person was the qazi-kalon ("judge of judges"). Less significant was the influence of the clergy in areas directly annexed to the Russian Empire - in the Turkestan Governor-General and the Governor-Generals of the Caucasian viceroy.

Interestingly, the most prominent Soviet orientalists recognize the integrative function of Islam in the consolidation of Muslim peoples into a nation. The Soviet author Saidbaev, already quoted by us, writes: "Researchers are unanimous in the opinion that in the conditions of a feudal society, religious unity is often ethnic ... A specific feature of the formation of Central Asian peoples, without taking into account which it is impossible to explain the relationship between the religious and the national, both in the past and in the present, is the following: they were formed from clans and tribes that had previously converted to Islam, and among the Kirghiz and Kazakhs, the process of folding nationalities was accompanied by the spread and strengthening of Islam" (Saidbaev, *ibid.*, p. 80). We find similar statements in other Soviet researchers (see, for example, Yu. V. Bromley, "Ethnos and Ethnography", M., 1973, p. 109; I. M. Dzhabbarov, "Craft of the Uzbeks ...", M., 1971, p. 34; M. S. Dzhunusov, "Two tendencies of socialism in national relations", Tashkent, 1975, p. 46; A. P. Novoseltsev, V. T. Pashuto, L. V. Cherepnik, "Ways of development of feudalism", M., 1971, pp. 29-30). Summing up the statements of these scientists, our author comes to the conclusion: "In pre-revolutionary Central Asia, Islam played a certain integrating role in ethnic processes... Islam was the force that facilitated the mutual existence of various tribes, strengthened their relationships from within, provided them with an internal connection, softened and erased mental differences between tribes, ethnic communities... Islam contributed to the formation of ideas about the ethnic community of various tribes and clans" (*ibid.*, pp. 82-83). All this led, on the one hand, to the formation of a common consciousness that there are not separate tribes, but a single people that arose on a common spiritual basis for all - on the basis of Islam, and, on the other hand, this common foundation for all - Islam, makes all Muslim peoples are kindred, they can and should have one common goal - the creation of a single state from all Muslim peoples (the theory of pan-Islamism). Since the Muslim peoples of the Russian Empire were almost all peoples of the Turkic language (except for the majority of the mountaineers of the Caucasus and Tajikistan), another idea arose - the creation of a single Turkic state together with the same faith and consanguineous Turkey (the theory of pan-Turkism). In the great integrating role of Islam among different, often warring tribes, its social components also occupied a central place. The spirit of elitism, classism, and chosenness is organically alien to the social philosophy of Islam. Islam came to the nations with the slogan: "In Islam, all people are brothers," and therefore there should be neither slaves nor slave owners. Therefore, it is clear that the first Muslims during the life of Mohammed were Arab slaves. In this regard, it is necessary to mention the democratic nature of the internal organization of the mosque of Islam, unknown in other religions. Islam knows neither a spiritual-administrative hierarchy, nor spiritual fathers appointed from above. In Islam, there is no official rite of passage and ordination to the priesthood, therefore there is no institution of ordained clergy at all. The clergy of Muslim communities - qazis, imams, mullahs are elected in the general elections by the believers themselves, only women do not participate here, which is not prescribed

attend mosques, which again does not come from the Qur'an). Although madrasahs prepare spiritual fathers, every Muslim can be the imam of a religious community if he knows the basics of Islam and is able to lead the prayer in the mosque. In addition, there is a critical attitude among believers towards educated mullahs if they serve more earthly than heavenly. Hence the mass of folk sayings and proverbs addressed to negligent mullahs: "No one has seen the money of the mullah, the conscience of the judge and the eye of the mole", "Do what the mullah says, but do not do what what is he doing", "Two mullahs are one person, one mullah is half a person".

Islam performed a cultural and educational mission among the conquered peoples of Central Asia and the Caucasus - it brought them a script based on the Arabic script. It existed among these peoples until 1925, when it was replaced by the Latin alphabet, and then the Latin alphabet was replaced by the Russian alphabet (1937).

It is quite natural that in an empire whose official ideology was Orthodoxy, Islam was an orphan, but it was not an absolute orphan. By the time of the first Russian revolution, in the depths of the peoples of Russia who profess Islam, the concept of Muslim peoples as a national social community had finally matured and taken shape. It was not, as it was before, about Muslims and about Islam in general, this time it was about a new national political worldview, according to which the Russian Muslim peoples belong to their own and special world (the Germans would say "KokkigKgeiv") unity - according to religion, culture, history, tradition, language and even territory. All elements of the formation of a nation were present here, except for the most important one - the presence of independence. First, the pan-Islamist, then the pan-Turkist movement, which arose at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries, tried to achieve precisely this goal. simultaneously in the Muslim regions of Russia and Turkey. The Russian government, like the Soviet government later, regarded this movement as a weapon of Turkish policy and therefore persecuted it. But this was and remains the most primitive attempt to discredit the ideals of the national liberation movement of the Russian Muslim peoples by referring to the favorite alibi of the tsarist and Soviet colonialists - to the imaginary intrigues of Turkey. However, after the first Russian revolution, after the promulgation of the "Manifesto of October 17, 1905", with its declared freedoms of conscience, speech, press, assembly and political associations, the working conditions for the Muslim movement also changed dramatically. This made it possible to convene for the first time in the history of Russian Islam at the end of the same 1905 the First All-Russian Congress of Muslim Peoples. At this congress, the first united political party of Russian Muslims was created - Itti-Fak, headed by I. Gasprinsky, the leader of the Crimea. The new party was represented by two wings - "conservative" pan-Islamists who fought for the withdrawal of Muslim peoples from Russia, and "progressives" pan-Turkists ("jadids") who fought for autonomy within the empire with a program similar to that of the Russian Cadets ("party of people's freedom"). Not all Muslim peoples were admitted to the elections to the State Duma, but those who participated created one common "Muslim faction" (group) in all four Dumas. After the February Revolution of 1917 the struggle of the Moslem peoples develops into an Islamic form of movement, in some regions for complete independence, and in others for autonomy. In May 1917, the 1st Congress of the Highlanders of the Caucasus demanded the creation of an Islamic state, and later such a state was proclaimed by Imam Uzun-Khadzhi under the name "North Caucasian Emirship". In the same 1917, the Mufti of Crimea Chelebiev headed the government of the National Directory of Crimea. In November-December 1917, the 1st Extraordinary Congress of the Peoples of Turkestan demanded the autonomy of Turkestan on the basis of Sharia and announced the creation of the "Kokand autonomy". Muslim regiments are being formed as the core of the future "Army of Islam" ("Basmachi"). However, the Muslim peoples announced their complete national independence and secession from Russia only after the Bolsheviks seized power.

On the way to power and in the first years after the seizure of power, the Bolsheviks showed extreme caution and prudence in the Muslim question. Given the complexity of this issue and the need for flexible tactics in resolving it in the spirit of communism, the Bolsheviks divided the Muslim question into two parts: 1. The Muslim question as a political national question (meaning all the peoples of the Muslim religion), 2. The Muslim question as a cultural question -religious.

In order to successfully resolve the first part of the issue, it was necessary to show high tactical flexibility in relation to the second part (cultural-religious). This was required

and the program of the RCP (6), which states that "special caution and special attention is needed to the vestiges of national feelings." Stalin interpreted this indication of the Bolshevik program as follows: "That is, if, for example, the direct path of compacting an apartment in Azerbaijan repels from us the Azerbaijani masses, who consider apartments, a home, inviolable, sacred, then it is clear that the direct path of compacting an apartment must be replaced by an indirect one, bypass. Or one more thing: if, for example, the Dagestan masses are strongly infected with religious prejudices, they follow the communists "on the basis of the Sharia," then it is clear that the direct way of fighting religion in this country must be replaced by indirect, more cautious ways, etc. etc. it. d.

In short: from cavalry raids on the part of "immediate communization" it is necessary to move on to a thoughtful and prudent policy of gradually drawing these masses into the mainstream of Soviet development "(Stalin, vol. IV, pp. 361-362).

Lenin said the same thing in his famous "Letter to the Communists of the Caucasus" in 1921, when he wrote that the Communists of the Caucasus should not "copy our tactics", the tactics of the Russian Communists, but "modify it in relation to local conditions ... More softness, caution, compliance towards the petty bourgeoisie, the intelligentsia, and especially the peasantry... A slower, more cautious, more systematic transition to socialism is what is possible and necessary for the republics of the Caucasus, in contrast to the RSFSR. This is what we must understand and be able to carry out, in contrast to our tactics" (Lenin, vol. XXIX, 3rd ed., pp. 191-192).

Numerous declarations, legislative acts, and, to a large extent, in the practical work of the Soviet government in the first years of the existence of Soviet power, this tactical flexibility is reflected in its tactical flexibility to achieve the strategic goal of systematic sovietization of the Muslim peoples of the USSR.

In December 1917 The Soviet government decided to return to the Muslims a copy of the "Holy Quran Osman", which was confiscated at one time by the tsarist government and was kept in the State Public Library. This copy was solemnly presented to the Muslim Congress, which took place in Petrograd in December 1917 (SU, 1917, No. 6, p. 90). In January 1918, by decision of the People's Commissariat for National Affairs, a mosque in Orenburg ("Caravanserai") and the Suyumbek Tower in Kazan (a national-religious monument of the ancient Tatar state) were transferred to the Bashkirs. The same religious-historical and national monuments, confiscated by the tsarist government, were returned to the Muslim peoples of Central Asia, Kazakhstan, the Caucasus and the Crimea. All this raised the prestige of the Soviet government in the eyes of Muslims. The tactics of the Bolsheviks bore fruit. In addition, the Bolsheviks emphasized in their propaganda in Muslim areas that "communism" and "Sharia" do not contradict, but complement each other. From here, part of the Muslim clergy put forward the slogan: "For Soviet power, for Sharia!".

It was this movement of "Soviet Shariatists" that Stalin had in mind when he openly (for roundabout blows) supported the slogan of "Soviet Shariatists" at the congresses of the peoples of the Terek region and Dagestan in 1921 (the most prominent ideologists of this movement were Babahai in Turkestan, Rasulev in Tatarstan, Tarko-Khadzhi in Dagestan, Ali Mitaev and Sugaip-mulla in Chechnya, Katkhanov in Kabarda).

For the practical guidance of the political and spiritual affairs of the Muslim peoples, a special "Muslim Commissariat" was created under the People's Commissariat for National Affairs (see Questions of History, Moscow, 1949, No. 8, p. 14). It was precisely that it was created not on a national basis, like the Western "commissariats" (Polish, Lithuanian, Belarusian, etc.), but on a religious one. The "Muslim Commissariat" was supposed to serve the peoples of the Muslim faith, regardless of their geographical location and racial affiliation.

Here is how a Soviet historian describes the role and significance of this "Muslim Commissariat" for the Bolsheviks:

"The Muslim Commissariat developed draft decrees and resolutions of the Soviet government in relation to the characteristics of individual Eastern peoples and put them into practice. He helped other Soviet bodies in carrying out the socialization of the land ... collected statistical information, carried out a lot of agitation and propaganda work, etc. " ("Questions of history", M., 1949, No. 8, p. 21). The "Muslim Commissariat" carried out Soviet-religious propaganda through the "Soviet Shariatists", generously subsidizing their political and religious activities aimed at establishing Soviet power in the Muslim outskirts of Russia, at least "on the principles of Sharia" for the transitional "people's democratic period".

However, the most prominent representatives of the Muslim intelligentsia and clergy clearly saw that the Bolsheviks were playing a double game in the Muslim question, in order to use demagogic means of propaganda and even outright deception ("communism does not contradict Shariah") to achieve "involvement in the mainstream of Soviet development" of Muslim peoples. When, in connection with this, Muslim democratic organizations launched very effective work against the Bolsheviks, the Soviet government embarked on the path of repression - it closed the "Central Muslim Council" in Petrograd, its Moscow branch - Milli-Shuro - "All-Russian Muslim Military Council" (see. "Izvestia" No. 101, dated May 22, 1918). They were declared "narrow nationalist" and "bourgeois nationalist". At the same time, the Soviet government is taking a number of legislative and executive measures to expand the network and influence of the central "Muslim Commissariat".

In June 1918 Lenin signs the resolution of the Council of People's Commissars "On the organization of Muslim commissariats" in the field. Muslim commissariats are created in the provinces - Arkhangelsk, Vyatka, Kazan, Nizhny Novgorod, Orenburg, Perm, Petrograd, Ryazan, Saratov, Tambov, Ufa, etc. They are also created in Central Asia (Semipalatinsk, Tashkent, Verny) and in Siberia (Chita, Tobolsk, Novonikolaevsk). By creating these "Muslim commissariats", the Bolsheviks hold a series of "Muslim congresses", in which gray-bearded Muslim mullahs take part alongside the atheist Bolsheviks. At these congresses, the Bolsheviks, proclaiming the slogan of faith, freedom and national independence, promised what they could not give even with all their desire. Thanks to this, the congresses were a huge propaganda success for Soviet politics.

If in the first year of Soviet power the expansion of Bolshevism into Muslim countries takes place along peaceful paths, then starting from 1919, in view of the growth of resistance, the Bolsheviks begin in Central Asia to implement their broadly conceived military-strategic plan: to conquer Turkestan by the Red Army.

It was then that the famous movement of "Basmachism" ("Basmak" in Turkic "attack", "attack") resumed, which broke out for the first time in the late 60s of the nineteenth century in the regions of Central Asia that had just been conquered by Russia - in Turkestan region, Bukhara and Khorezm. Soviet historians at one time recognized the "Basmachi" against the tsarist invaders as a "progressive national liberation movement." Now that the old "Basmachism" has revived against the Soviet occupiers, then, of course, the attitude towards it has changed. Here is what was written in 1927 in the TSB about the Basmachi of the Soviet period: "After the revolution, the Basmachi took on a different color. The Basmachi movement acquired a pronounced political, anti-Soviet character and became almost a mass movement of the dekhkan population in all three republics of Central Asia - Bukhara, Khorezm and Turkestan. Its leaders were no longer only individual leaders of bandit gangs, like Kursh Shirmat, Ibrahim Bey, and others, they began to be led by the local national intelligentsia, mullahs and bais "(BSE, vol. 5, pp. 35-38, 1927, 1st edition). The Basmachi called themselves the "Army of Islam". Politically, the Basmachism was headed by two organizations, Shuri-i Islam (Council of Islam) and Shura-i-Ulema (Council of Scholars).

After the defeat of Kolchak in the fall of 1919. The Red Army more energetically took up the conquest of Turkestan. A special "Turkestan Front" was created, headed by such prominent Bolshevik leaders as Frunze, Kuibyshev, Rudzutak, Eliava. In view of the mass and widespread support of the Basmachi by the people, the Soviet government at first resorted to a trick - it recognizes the "Army of Islam" as the national army of Turkestan with its commanders at the head, if they recognize Soviet power. When the purpose of the trick became clear - to buy time to throw new units of the Red Army into Turkestan, released after the defeat of the White movement and the end of the war with Poland, the Basmachi rebelled again. But it was already too late. The Red Army defeated the "Army of Islam", although individual detachments of the Basmachism still fought until the end of 1926. However, in the Muslim countries occupied by the Red Army, the Bolsheviks are still pursuing a very cautious and highly elastic national-religious policy. Lenin, in whom a sober realist in politics easily got along side by side with a utopian in philosophy, argued at the 13th Party Congress in 1919 to his overly zealous students: communism and atheism cannot be preached in the conquered Muslim countries, it is even impossible to overthrow the "exploiters" there. He said: "What can we do in relation to such peoples as the Kyrgyz, Uzbeks, Tajiks, Turkmens, who are still under the influence of their mullahs?... Can we approach these peoples and say: 'We will throw off your exploiters?' We cannot do this, because they are completely subordinate to their mullahs" (Lenin, PSS, vol. 38, pp. 158-159). Lenin recommended to begin the siege of the fortress of Islam from afar and to act on the sly. Therefore, the Bukhara and Khiva khanates were preserved, they were renamed in 1920. to the Bukhara People's Soviet Republic and the Khorezm People's Soviet Republic. In Muslim countries, at first, not only were waqf properties returned, new madrasas were opened, Sharia courts were preserved, but representatives of the Muslim "progressive clergy" were even admitted to the Communist Party. The Soviet author notes: "Given the role that religion continued to play in their lives, believers were also accepted into the party. For many years, believers constituted a significant part of the Communist Party of Turkestan" (Saidbaev, *ibid.*, p. 127). Soviet documents also give specific figures on the composition of believers in the party - in the Communist Party of Khorezm, in addition to ordinary believers, in 1923 there were 10% of the clergy (see "History of the Khorezm People's Soviet Republic. Collection of Documents", Tashkent, 1976, p. 39-40, 169, 219), and in the Communist Party of the Bukhara People's Soviet Republic, believers and representatives of the clergy together accounted for about 70%; if we exclude from here Russian non-believing communists, there were 90% of believers in the party! (See "History of the Bukhara People's Soviet Republic. Collection of Documents." Tashkent, 1976, pp. 134, 135, 136, 139). The branch of the Central Committee of the RCP (6) in Turkestan was originally called not the Central Asian Bureau, but the Muslim Bureau of the Central Committee of the RCP (6).

When, feeling stronger in the saddle of power, the Bolsheviks switched from their "Muslim" tactics to the implementation of the strategic goals of communism in the Muslim countries of the Soviet empire, a powerful wave of insurrection swept again - in the Caucasus, in Tataria, Turkestan; the new Basmachi movement developed especially widely in Bukhara and Khorezm. In April 1922 in Samarkand, the rebels convene a united Muslim Turkestan Congress, which solemnly proclaimed the creation of the Turkestan-Turkic independent republic with the full restoration of Sharia law (A. A. Roslyakov. Sredazburo of the Central Committee of the RCP (6) / Questions of strategy and tactics /, Ashgabat, 1975, p. 23 -24). Feeling a real threat to the existence of their power here, the Bolsheviks quickly made new concessions. By the decision of the Central Committee of May 18 and the Central Asian Bureau of the Central Committee of the RCP (6) of May 20, 1922, the Sharia courts, which were liquidated on the eve of the uprising, were restored and their newly confiscated property was returned to mosques and madrasahs (*ibid.*, p. 25). Under the People's Commissariat of Education, the Main Waqf Directorate with local departments was created. At the head of them

clerics paid by the state were appointed with the right to further maintenance, expansion, and even the establishment of new waqfs.

The Soviet historian writes: "During this period, for the first time in the history of the region, the Spiritual Administration ("Mahkam-i-Sharia") was created in Tashkent, which was headed by famous figures of Islam. It had a secretariat, departments that dealt with issues related to inheritance and divorce

affairs, training, education and appointment of clergy, religious educational institutions, etc. The creation of the Spiritual Administration led to the unification of imams, introduced their appointment and removal into a certain system, which was not observed before. Traditionally, authoritative persons of the quarter were elected as imams and were not directly subordinate to anyone" (Saidbaev, "Islam and Society", M., 1978, pp. 146-147). The Soviet government went so far as to declare Friday instead of Sunday as a holiday in the Soviet Muslim republics. The secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan, subsequently shot in the process of Bukharin and Rykov, Akmal Ikramov frankly admitted in one of his reports: "The measures taken by the Soviet state in relation to Islam and its organizations were not a concession, but the tactics of the party" (A. Ikramov, "Selected Works, Tashkent, 1972-1974, vol. 3, p. 301). As if it still had to be proven! This Machiavellian tactic undoubtedly tore a certain part of the clergy and a large part of the people from the insurrectionary movement. Moreover, the Bolsheviks put the detached part of the clergy into the service of their goals - on December 23, 1923, the Bolsheviks carried out the so-called. The "All-Kai Conference" with the participation of all the mullahs under the slogan "Soviet power does not contradict Islam", then such meetings are held in other regions of Central Asia (Saidbaev, p. 148). The "fraternization of communism" with Islam ended by the end of the twenties. The era of the methodical and systematic eradication of Islam began, the physical extermination of the Muslim clergy, the national intelligentsia, and even the total annihilation of the national communist cadres, as "fraudulently creeping into the party" and "openly communicating with the Muslim clergy." From now on, the very use of the word "Muslim peoples" was recognized as criminal. Majestic monuments of Muslim architecture of the XIII-XV centuries. (Samarkand, Bukhara) were turned into anti-Islamic museums, rural mosques were turned into warehouses or demolished. But Islam lives and thrives. Even more. In the Muslim regions of the Soviet Union, there is an unprecedented revival of the most militant-ascetic, essentially religious-political "brotherhood" in Islam - the Sufi movement, whose ideology in the form of a tarikat cemented Muridism in the Caucasus and Basmachism in Turkestan. The social base of the Sufi movement is now wider - not only peasants, but also industrial workers and intellectuals participate in it. This probably explains Gorbachev's unexpectedly harsh speech against Islam in Tashkent. (The phenomenon of Sufism and the connection between Islam and the national movement have been thoroughly studied in our time in the books: "Muýýýsý apý sottiýýarý", "Miýýýtý ýý Fe Souýýý Etriye" Bu A. Vepshozep apa \$. E. MiibizV, Gopdop 1985.).

Saidbaev writes: "Islam acts as a force that unites believers and non-believers within one nation and creates a sense of community between representatives of the peoples who professed Islam in the past ... It is impossible not to notice this, especially since it manifests itself in everyday life" (Saidbaev, *ibid.*, p. 193). The author provides additional evidence in favor of his undoubtedly correct, but very risky conclusion for a Soviet scientist: "A number of factors contribute to the preservation of ideas about the community of peoples who professed Islam in the past. All peoples who professed Islam in the past speak related languages ... (Turkic language family) ... The common historical destinies, socio-economic conditions of existence have developed in all these peoples similar traits of character, psychology, customs and traditions. And the ethnic community often appears under the guise of a community of Muslims. This feeling materializes in the prevalence of nationally mixed marriages. In Central Asia, such marriages are dominated by marriages between representatives

indigenous nationalities of the region and marriages of women of indigenous nationalities with representatives of non-Muslim peoples are rare everywhere ... Today, Islam not only unites believers of one nation, but integrates its believing and unbelieving parts" (*ibid.*, pp. 193-194). The widespread observance by believers and "officially" unbelieving Muslims of the rites prescribed by Islam testifies to the complete fiasco of atheistic propaganda among Muslim peoples. So even the underestimated data of Soviet sociological studies in a number of regions of Uzbekistan showed that the number of people performing Muslim rites is four times higher than the number of "officially" believers. (A. Khasanov, "The role of social and progressive traditions...", Tashkent, 1976, p. 129). The rite of circumcision, which is considered a symbol of belonging to Islam, is supported in

three surveyed areas of Uzbekistan - 81.9% of the population ("Modernization of Islam", M., 1968, p. 74).

The appearance of a Muslim woman in a mosque must be recognized as an unprecedented fact in the entire history of Islam. Sunnism forbids a woman to be an imam or even visit a mosque (as mentioned above, this prohibition is not in the Koran and women under Mohammed visited the mosque with open faces). Muslim women in Tataria initiated the opening of previously closed mosques. They visit mosques not only in Tatarstan, but also in Bashkiria, in Astrakhan, Ulyanovsk and other regions, as well as in Moscow and Leningrad. The Soviet author writes: "In recent years, this geography has expanded significantly. Along with men, women participate in divine services in the mosques of Azerbaijan... in a number of regions and autonomous republics of the RSFSR... in some mosques, up to one third of the community is made up of women... In Chechen-Ingushetia, muridist (sectarian) groups are often also headed by women who perform the role of toastmaster (sheikh), which has never happened before in Islam... Currently, in Central Asia and Kazakhstan, women attend mosques on religious holidays (Saidbaev, pp. 215-216).

What is the secret of such a stubborn, indestructible vitality of Islam? Saidbaev replies: "Thanks to simplicity, stability, many rituals and prescriptions of Islam turn into habits. Repeatedly repeated, they take on the character of solid vital needs, a dynamic stereotype" (Saidbaev, *ibid.*, p. 226). But the "dynamic stereotype" is itself explained by the social dynamism of Islam. Islam arose in the era of slavery and the beginning of the division of land and the formation of latifundia. Islam opposed both slavery and the transformation of land into the private property of the feudal lords. Another prominent Soviet jurist, who devoted an entire book to the "reactionary essence" of Sharia, is nevertheless forced to admit: "The socio-political, legal, moral and ethical norms of Islam condemn slavery. It is no coincidence that Sharia offers the liberation of slaves as one of the types of atonement for sin" (G. M. Kerimov, "Sharia and Its Social Essence", M., 1978, pp. 213-214). He is forced to state that Sharia stands for public ownership of land and denies private ownership of land: "Sharia fixes the absence of legal consolidation of private ownership of land ... We find in it the statement "Earth and heaven belong to God", "The blessings of the earth do not may be private property, they belong to everyone" (*ibid.*, p. 214). Communism countered this social conception of the Shariah with "nationalization", under which not only the land, but the entire national economy as a whole became the property not of the people, not even the property of the state, but the property of the Party. Sharia did not and cannot tolerate this. This is where the party sees the "reactionary" nature of Shariah.

What are the general conclusions?

The half century old efforts of the old Russian government to settle and merge the Asian Muslim peoples with the Russian European empire proved to be as unsuccessful as the more than seventy years of efforts of the Soviet government to Bolshevize these peoples remain unsuccessful. There are general and specific reasons for this. One of the common reasons is the eternal confrontation between two spiritually alien

worlds to each other - the world of Europe and the world of Asia. The most important of the specific reasons is the vitality and indestructibility of Islam, which, over 1200 years of its dominance in Central Asia, in Tatar-Bashkiria and the Caucasus, has organically grown from the original faith alone into the substance of national existence, forming the adats, character, and psychology of people. into a single spiritual world common to all Muslim peoples of the USSR. Even such cruel rulers as the Bolsheviks are now convinced that it is impossible to divide or destroy this Islamic world except through physical violence, which Stalin practiced methodically and systematically. His heirs are trying to do the same, but only through spiritual violence.

In Lenin's "Appeal" of November 20, 1917. on behalf of the Soviet government, it was said that the Muslim peoples "should be masters of their country", that they themselves "should arrange their lives in their own image and likeness" (Documents of Foreign Policy of the USSR. vol. 1. M. 1957, p.

35). The history of the 70-year-old communist dictatorship is precisely the tragic history of the permanent struggle of the Muslim peoples of the USSR to remain the masters of their country and live "in their own image and likeness." The victims of this struggle, who remained unknown to the outside world, are innumerable. In addition, the outside world was mainly interested in the fate of the peoples of the western outskirts of the Soviet empire. Abroad very soon learned about the monstrous crime of the Stalinist government in 1931-1932, when it artificially created starvation killed up to 6 million Ukrainians or when it immediately after the war undertook a partial deportation to Siberia of Ukrainians, Belarusians and the Baltic peoples. But how the Soviet government in the 1930s destroyed by terror and starved to death also many millions of Muslims, and during the war it completely deported a number of Muslim peoples of the Crimea and the North Caucasus, remained unknown abroad for a long time. This was partly due to the fact that in the outside world, in particular in America, Soviet Muslims did not have influential emigration groups that could inform the outside world about the plight of their peoples, as did representatives of the emigration of Ukraine and the Baltic states.

Only during the period of the Cold War, at the end of the 1940s, when Stalin completely loosened his belt and threatened a new war, did the outside world learn not only about Hitler's genocide against Jews, but also about Stalin's genocide against Muslim peoples (military censorship of the Allies during the war did not allow the press of their countries to write about the deportation of Crimean Tatars, North Caucasians, Kalmyks and Volga Germans). At the same time, for the first time, the stunning testimony of a prominent Moscow official who served in Tashkent, Lev Vasiliev, about the artificial famine in Uzbekistan in the 30s, was published for the first time. I will cite only one excerpt from it: "I received a promotion and, as the head of the department of the People's Commissariat of Finance, I am moving to Tashkent ... Hungry mothers with children roam the streets and, with a plea in their eyes, stretch out their hands for alms. Corpses, endless piles of corpses, like firewood, are piled on trucks and taken to a landfill, where they are somehow buried in common pits. Hungry surviving dogs tear holes and fight for prey. More than once I saw these terrible trucks - hearses of death" ("The Ways of Soviet Imperialism", New York, Chekhov Publishing House, 1954).

The fate of the deported Muslim peoples was hard. In the unsanitary conditions of the "special camp" in the steppes of Turkestan, they were mowed down by a typhus epidemic in masses.

How many of the Muslim population of the USSR died from the Stalinist famine and terror? Only the Central Committee of the CPSU and the KGB know the exact answer. However, there are official Soviet data on the growth dynamics of the Muslim population. From these data one can extract an indirect answer to this question. Here is a table of the growth of the Muslim population after its conquest by Russia and the USSR.

1880 - 11 million

1910 - 20 million

1923 - 30 million

1959 - 24 million

1970 - 35 million

1979 - 43 million

1988 - about 50 million (estimate).

Data for 1923, taken by me from the resolution of the KP Congress of the Party, says that in 1923 there were 30 million Muslims living in the USSR, and data from the 1959 census show that during the Stalinist dictatorship, the Muslim population fell to 24 million people, and this despite the usually high birth rate among Muslims.

There is every reason to attribute these 6 million people to the number of victims of Stalinist terror and artificial famine, both in the 1930s and in the war, and partly even in the post-war years.

But - a surprising thing - neither Stalin's thirty years of physical terror, nor the 70 years of psychological terror of the gigantic state machine of atheism achieved their goal: they failed to expel Muslims from their religion and from the Muslim way of life. 70 years after the destruction of mosques, madrasas, mullahs, even "Arabists", that is, people who can read the Koran and lead the prayer, about 80% of Muslims, according to Soviet data, openly recognize themselves as believers, and the remaining 20%, as Khrushchev put it, they do not believe in the service, but they believe at home. After all, it is not for nothing that accusations are very often found in the Soviet press that in the Muslim republics, not only ordinary communists, but sometimes party activists, including secretaries of district committees of the party, observe Muslim rituals and celebrate Muslim holidays. Yes, this is understandable. Islam is not only a faith, but at the same time a synthesis of national thinking and national psychology. This complex of national religious consciousness of the Muslim population of the USSR took shape over the course of twelve and thirteen centuries, starting two or three centuries before the Baptism of Rus'.

A person who has become an unbeliever does not cease to be himself. Therefore, when a Soviet activist from Turkestan says that he is an atheist, but a Muslim, he is referring to the culture and nation to which he belongs. Hence the question of the destruction of Islam among the Muslim peoples of the USSR is connected for the party with its common strategic, but clearly utopian, goal: the denationalization of nationalities.

From the history of relations between the communist countries of Eastern Europe and Asia and the Soviet Union, we know very well that when their interests came into conflict with each other, it was not their common communist ideology that always won, but their own nationalism. Tito broke away from Stalin not because of differences in communist ideology, but because of the national interests of Yugoslavia. The split between Moscow and Beijing took place not on the basis of the strategy of communism, but on the basis of national-territorial contradictions between these great communist powers. But Lenin argued in the preamble to the first Constitution of the USSR that there would be no national borders between the communist states of the future - there would be a single, as he wrote, "the world Soviet socialist republic." It's no secret that if the Kremlin were to withdraw its troops from the Eastern European satellites, democratic national governments would immediately come to power there. In a word, in every clash of communism with nationalism, nationalism won, if it was not suppressed by tanks, as in East Berlin in 1953, in Hungary in 1956, in Czechoslovakia in 1968. Only under the threat of the invasion of Soviet tanks was the Polish Solidarity Revolution of 1980 suppressed. Before our eyes, Afghan nationalism is victorious against Afghan and Soviet communism.

Within the Soviet empire, where from the beginning of the 1930s local nationalism was declared the main danger, in the clash between communism and nationalism, communism was physically victorious, but spiritually, local patriotism. Proof? During the thirty years of Stalin's rule, not a year passed without purges of "bourgeois nationalists", "pan-Islamists" and "pan-Turkists" in the Muslim republics; moreover, the entire Muslim communist intelligentsia in

Tatar-Bashkiria, Turkestan and the Caucasus was destroyed during the Yezhovshchina, also on charges of "bourgeois nationalism."

35 years have passed since Stalin's death. In Alma-Ata there is a demonstration of thousands of Kazakh students under the slogan "Kazakhstan - for the Kazakhs!" in defense of their nation, against its denationalization, against the appointment of a Russian bureaucrat as the head of Kazakhstan instead of the removed Kazakh Kunaev. The accusation remains the old Stalinist one: "bourgeois nationalism".

However, Moscow still has some benefit from fighting the bogeyman of "bourgeois nationalism". So, Chingiz Aitmatov testified on the pages of Ogonyok that responsible party workers of Turkestan are afraid to speak at meetings in their native language so that they are not accused of "nationalism"! One has only to remember the population that speaks this native, that is, the Turkic language, to see the success of psychological terror.

great-power bureaucrats - in the USSR, the Turkic language is spoken by almost the entire Muslim population - this is about 50 million people, right next door, this language is spoken by 40 million of the population of Turkey. Only 90 million. This is more than half of the Russian ethnic population. And a representative of such a widespread language is afraid to speak with his people in his native language! This is what I call the success of the great-power Russifiers and the servility of their local national vassals. Although the Bolshevik Muslim policy at all stages of the Soviet regime has its own internal connection and consistency, nevertheless, over these 70 years, its various variants and nuances have taken place. Lenin, the founder of this policy, was cautious, patient and tactful. He placed his main bet on persuasion. His successor Stalin relied on individual, group, class and national terror. Khrushchev returned to his homeland the peoples deported by Stalin, except for the Crimean Tatars and Volga Germans, but he clearly intended to reorganize the national republics into ordinary administrative territorial units, and declared teaching in his native language in national schools a voluntary matter. Under Brezhnev, widespread and intensive Russification began. The era of glasnost has so far proved only one thing: it has not been possible and will not be possible to denationalize the non-Russian peoples. The speeches of Ukrainian, Belarusian, Baltic, Caucasian, Tatar-Turkestan cultural and literary figures in favor of their native language are considered by the authorities as an increase in national self-consciousness, but demonstrations in favor of their nations of Kazakhs, Crimean Tatars, Estonians, Latvians and Lithuanians are qualified as "nationalism" and "extremism". Gorbachev's leadership, which preaches "new thinking" and "revolutionary perestroika in all spheres of life," still adheres to the old, Stalinist thinking on the national question. Two speeches on the national question by two outstanding leaders of the Kremlin, Gorbachev and Ligachev, lead to serious reflections. In 1986 Gorbachev, speaking in the capital of an almost 100% Islamic nation - before the Uzbeks in Tashkent - demanded that the Uzbek communists intensify their fight against the reactionary religion of Islam. In 1987, Ligachev, speaking at the Georgian State University in Tbilisi, expressed his dissatisfaction with the fact that too many Georgians were studying at the Georgian university. Ligachev, apparently, is unaware that the Georgian university was created in 1919 by the Menshevik government of independent Georgia specifically for Georgians, although non-Georgians were also accepted there. Such remarks from the lips of the leading leaders of the party acquire a programmatic character. We know from Gorbachev's speech on the 70th anniversary of October that the Politburo set up a commission to develop a new Soviet nationality policy. The non-Russian peoples are full of hope that the work of this commission will be based, at a minimum, on the provisions of Lenin's "National Testament" in his article of the end of December 1922 "On the Question of Nationalities or "Autonomization"", excerpts from which I took as an epigraph to this book. The party that endlessly swears by the name of Lenin must begin its reorganization in the field of national policy by carrying out this will of its founder and

leader.

IM. The pact that started the war and expanded the empire

In 1985, Moscow celebrated the fortieth anniversary of the victory over Germany. Speaking on this occasion on May 8, 1985, Secretary General Gorbachev attributed this victory to Stalin and the Soviet political system, but passed over in silence the most important document that unleashed the war - the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact of August 23, 1939. However, speaking with report on the 70th anniversary of October, he dwelled on this pact, giving it an orthodox Stalinist assessment. Here is what Gorbachev said: "They say that the decision that the Soviet Union made by concluding a non-aggression pact with Germany was not the best. Perhaps so, if not guided by harsh reality ... the question was ... to be or not to be our country independent, to be or not to be socialism on Earth.

Gorbachev repeats Stalin's false thesis, long refuted by documents, that he concluded a pact with Hitler because the Western democratic powers did not want to conclude a defensive alliance with the USSR against Germany, and even pushed her to war with the Soviet Union. Here are Gorbachev's words: "The Western powers had a different calculation: to entice the USSR with the promise of an alliance and thereby prevent the conclusion of the non-aggression pact offered to us, to deprive us of the opportunity to better prepare for the inevitable attack of Nazi Germany on the USSR" ("Pravda", 3. 11. 1987).

Gorbachev and the authors of his report are clearly out of tune with elementary human logic: why did the Western powers, when Hitler really attacked the USSR, act in this war not on the side of Germany, or did not remain neutral, but came out on the side of the USSR? If Moscow had entered into an alliance with the democratic West, then Hitler would not have dared to attack the USSR, but Stalin would not have dared to expand his empire either. Let us dwell on the analysis of the mutual obligations of the pact. The prehistory of the "Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact" itself is interesting.

At the 18th party congress in 1939, Stalin made it clear to Hitler that their interests in a possible future war were identical. Stalin persistently inspired Hitler that it was the Anglo-Americans and the French who were interested in provoking a war between Germany and the USSR. Why? Stalin argued that if a war broke out between Germany and the USSR, then the Western democratic powers would want to let them weaken in a protracted war, and then dictate their will to Germany and the USSR. According to Stalin, the policy of England, France, and the United States boils down to "not preventing Germany from getting bogged down in European affairs, getting involved in a war with the USSR, letting all participants in the war get bogged down deep in the mire of war, encouraging them in this on the sly, letting them weaken, exhaust each other, and then, when they are sufficiently weakened, come on stage with fresh strength, act, of course, in the "interests of peace" and dictate their conditions to the weakened participants in the war

The uproar that the Anglo-French and North American press raised about the Soviet Ukraine is characteristic ... It seems that this suspicious noise was intended to raise the fury of the Soviet Union against Germany, poison the atmosphere and provoke a conflict with Germany for no apparent reason "(see Questions of Leninism, p. 571).

Stalin, as can be seen from this quote, deliberately deflected the warnings of the Western democratic powers and the Western press that Hitler was preparing a war against the USSR (after all, this was also provided for in the Nazi bible - in Hitler's *Mein Kampf*), so that, firstly, to psychologically prepare the future alliance of the USSR with Hitler's Germany for precisely the purpose that Stalin ascribed to the Western powers, namely: to drag Hitler into the war against them; and secondly, by allowing Germany and the Western Powers to weaken each other in this war, to take the stage themselves to impose the Bolshevik order on the whole of Europe instead of the Hitlerite "new order".

This "long-range aim" strategy only partially worked, but Stalin's miscalculations had horrendous consequences for the peoples of the USSR.

Preparing a radical turn in the foreign policy of the Soviet Union towards aggression, Stalin thought that Hitler would be a worthy ally in this, if

seduce him with the idea of an anti-democratic coalition to divide Europe between Germany and the USSR. To convince Hitler that the Kremlin's intentions were serious, it was necessary to remove the psychological obstacle along the way. Such an obstacle was an Anglophile, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR, a Jew - Maxim Litvinov, with whom Hitler and Ribbentrop did not want to deal. Therefore, Stalin removed Litvinov from his post and appointed Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars Molotov in his place on May 4, 1939, instructing him to probe the ground for concluding a pact with Germany.

It soon became clear that Stalin had entrusted Molotov with a far from easy mission.

When Soviet historians write about the causes and preconditions of the Second World War, they either pass over in silence the "Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact" or clearly falsify its prehistory and content. The goal of the falsification is clear to everyone: to whitewash Stalin and remove the blame from the Kremlin for unleashing World War II by Hitler, because the "Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact", dividing Europe into spheres of influence, guaranteed Hitler freedom of action in Western Europe, provided him with Soviet strategic and military-strategic raw materials, gave Hitler the opportunity to more thoroughly prepare for an attack on the USSR, isolated by this one pact from the democratic West. Even Soviet historians try to ascribe the initiative to conclude the pact to Hitler, and not to Stalin. Meanwhile, from the secret documents of the archive

German Ministry of Foreign Affairs, published by the US State Department in 1948, it is clear that Hitler wanted to conclude with Stalin only an economic pact, and Stalin wanted to have a political pact. Let us first quote Soviet historians. In the official six-volume "History of the Great Patriotic War 1941-1945" they write that on May 30, 1939, the German secretary of state told Astakhov, the Soviet charge d'affaires in Berlin, that "there are possibilities to improve Soviet-German relations", and on August 3, Ribbentrop allegedly offered the same Soviet attorney a "Soviet-German secret protocol, which would demarcate the interests of both powers along the entire length from the Black to the Baltic Seas" (p. 174). The authors of the six-volume edition claim that the Soviet government refused these proposals. Of course, the Soviet authors do not provide any evidence on this score, because there is no such evidence. On the contrary, there are documents that speak of a Soviet initiative in the preparation of the pact. So, on May 20, 1939, to the proposal of the German ambassador in Moscow, Count Schulenburg, to start economic (trade) negotiations between Berlin and Moscow, Molotov replied that before concluding any economic deals, it was necessary to create a "political basis" ("Ma21- 1939-1941 Rokitepyÿ Not yÿ arÿÿÿÿÿÿ yÿÿÿ Segtap Eogÿÿop Oyse, 1948, Ger. oÿ Ze, Maÿÿÿnÿÿop, pp. 6-7. There is a Russian translation by Y. Felshtinsky, Telex, 1983, New York) .

Ribbentrop's department unmistakably understood that Molotov's proposal to create a "political basis" was not a game of diplomacy, but a serious signal of a possible turn in the Kremlin's foreign policy towards the Axis powers - Germany and Italy. Having wound this on his mustache, the leaders of the Third Reich began to act on the sly. First, they do everything to whet the Kremlin's appetite for a turn in the desired direction, and then they create the appropriate psychological atmosphere among their people in order to prepare them for the fact of a possible end to the long-standing ideological war against Bolshevism. Ribbentrop succeeded so well in achieving both goals that on August 20, 1939, Hitler sent a telegram to Stalin in which he invited him to receive the German Foreign Minister on August 22-23 to conclude a pact between Germany and the USSR on "friendship and non-aggression." Stalin immediately agreed. How do Soviet historians interpret this fact? Here are their comments from the History of the Great Patriotic War: "The USSR could either refuse the German proposals or agree with them. In the first case, war with Germany would become inevitable in the coming weeks. In the second case, the Soviet Union received a gain in time" (pp. 175-176). If this Soviet commentary is to be believed, Hitler blackmailed Stalin into signing the notorious

pact within 12 hours! If we believed Soviet historians, it would appear that the pact that unleashed the Second World War and, ultimately, provoked Hitler's attack on the USSR, was concluded under Hitler's dictation, and was not prepared by three months and very intense diplomatic negotiations and political bargaining between Hitler and Stalin about the division of Europe between them, as it was in practice.

The German documents just speak of the latter. Here are some excerpts from them on this subject. Count Schulenburg after May 30 visited Molotov again on June 5, and he reports the result of this visit to his boss in Berlin, emphasizing that Molotov still insists on a political discussion and that "our proposal to start only economic negotiations seems to him insufficient" ("Ma71-Sou1e{ qelaHops...", p. 16).

On June 15, the Soviet charge d'affaires in Berlin Astakhov visited the Bulgarian envoy Draganov. Bulgaria was in close ties with Germany, and the Kremlin was well aware that the content of Astakhov's conversation with Draganov would immediately become known to Ribbentrop. Astakhov informed Draganov: in the current international situation, the Soviet Union could either conclude a pact with France and England, or drag out negotiations in order to renew friendly relations with Germany. Astakhov expressed the Kremlin's desire very clearly: "If Germany had announced that it would not attack the USSR or would have concluded a non-aggression pact with the USSR, then the USSR might have refrained from concluding a treaty with England" (p. 21). (Note immediately that the mutual assistance treaty with France was concluded as early as 1935.)

At a meeting with Molotov on June 29, Count Schulenburg asked Molotov what he had in mind when he proposed "creating a new basis for relations" between the USSR and Germany. The ambassador telegraphed to Berlin the same day that Moscow was very interested in continuing contact, but he was instructed by Ribbentrop not to force further political negotiations with Moscow. On the other hand, economic negotiations advanced so far that already on July 22, Soviet newspapers reported that Soviet-German trade and financial negotiations had been successfully completed in Berlin. Five days later, Astakhov was summoned to the Foreign Ministry, where Dr. Schnurre informed him that, according to Berlin, Soviet-German relations would go through three stages: the first stage - the conclusion of a trade agreement, the second stage - the normalization of political relations, the third stage - the return to the old treaty of April 24, 1926 on friendship and neutrality between Germany and the USSR or the conclusion of a new treaty.

At the end of the conversation, Dr. Schnurre, Ribbentrop's closest collaborator, made a statement about the identity of the ideology of Bolshevism, fascism and National Socialism. Here are literally his words: "There is one thing that is common in the ideologies of Germany, Italy and the USSR - this is the opposition against the capitalist democracies. Neither we nor Italy have anything to do with the capitalism of the West. Therefore, it would seem to us completely paradoxical if the USSR, as a socialist state, were on the side of the Western democracies" (p. 33).

The ideological argumentation of Dr. Schnurre was irresistible - National Socialism, Fascism and Bolshevism created the same type of state with a totalitarian system and terrorist practices of government, as an alternative to Western liberal democracy. Therefore, they had no grounds for ideological contradictions, there were only territorial and strategic contradictions, namely, who, what and how much to capture foreign countries. Now we are talking about this factual side of the problem. It turned out how right Ribbentrop was when he suggested that his ambassador in Moscow take a wait-and-see attitude in contacts with Molotov, knowing that Moscow would not stand it for a long time and reveal its cards. Indeed, two days after the conversation with Dr. Schnurre - on July 29 - Astakhov made an inquiry in Berlin whether the German government agreed that the problems of interest to both sides should be discussed at a higher level. On August 4, Ribbentrop told Astakhov that Berlin agreed to improve relations with

Moscow, and on August 14 Molotov invited Ribbentrop to start political negotiations in Moscow. Ribbentrop accepted the offer to visit Moscow with the aim, as he put it, to report Hitler's point of view to Stalin. But the Kremlin did not want to listen to a point of view, but to make concrete decisions. Therefore, Molotov informed Berlin that Moscow wanted to start political negotiations, but they should be conducted in Moscow and "in stages." Thus, now the Kremlin, convinced that Hitler seriously wants to conclude a political pact, itself resorts to delaying tactics. Not because Moscow wants to disrupt the negotiations or, for whatever reason, lead them to a dead end. Stalin firmly decided to conclude a pact: after all, the very idea belonged to him. However, in the political game that began with Hitler, Stalin had a trump card in his hands, which Hitler did not have. The fact is that Britain and France offered the Soviet Union to conclude a defensive alliance against the growing military threat from Germany. Such an alliance should become like the old "Entente" "Triple Entente" of the beginning of the century between France, England and Russia - directed against Kaiser Germany and its

then allies.

In short, Stalin, having decided to come out with the Anglo-French card against Hitler, began his usual double game. As already mentioned, on March 10, 1939, at the 18th Party Congress, he openly accused England, France, the USA and their press of a provocative campaign that they were allegedly waging to provoke a war between Germany and the Soviet Union. According to Stalin, the goal of these powers was to let Germany and the USSR weaken in the war, and then to enter the war themselves and defeat both Germany and the USSR. However, true to his two-faced policy, Stalin, a week later - March 18, 1939 - proposes to convene a meeting of representatives of the USSR, Great Britain, France, Turkey, Romania and Poland to discuss the situation that has developed in Europe after the German invasion of Czechoslovakia. The Soviet Union, under a 1935 agreement with Czechoslovakia on mutual military assistance, was obliged to help Czechoslovakia. However, Stalin refused to do so. The 1938 Munich surrender of the Western powers to Hitler to some extent

was explained by the fact that even then, in the autumn of 1938, Stalin made it clear that by military assistance to neighboring states, Moscow understands their actual occupation by the Red Army, which these countries feared no less than the occupation by the German army.

So, Stalin continues the double game. On July 2, in the midst of Soviet-German negotiations in Berlin and Moscow, the Kremlin handed over to England and France a draft treaty on the union of the USSR, France and England against Germany. But the Soviet Union put forward as a condition for the conclusion of this tripartite alliance the right to introduce the Red Army into the territory of Poland, the Baltic countries and Finland in the form of a guarantee against a possible German invasion of these countries. August 11, 1939 The Kremlin invites French and British military missions to Moscow to discuss its draft military convention. The Soviet military delegation was headed by Marshals Voroshilov and Shaposhnikov. And it is precisely these negotiations that the Kremlin deliberately leads to a dead end, insisting on a demand that is clearly unacceptable for democratic countries to sanction the actual occupation of the territories of Poland, the Baltic countries and Finland by the Red Army. However, the Anglo-French military missions did not and could not have the authority to control the fate of sovereign states. Naturally, the negotiations ended in vain, but they played the role assigned to them by Stalin. These negotiations had not yet officially been interrupted when the Germans, who had followed them not without anxiety, joined the game. On August 14, Ribbentrop instructs Schulenburg to read his telegram to Molotov without handing it to the latter. The telegram contained the assertion that Britain and France wanted to again draw Russia, as in 1914, into a war against Germany, into a war from which only "Western democracies" would benefit. Ribbentrop repeated his proposal that he wanted to fly to Moscow to report personally to Stalin on the Führer's point of view on this issue. The Kremlin replies that before Ribbentrop's arrival, a certain amount of preparatory work must be done. Now, however, Ribbentrop's appetite seems to have been worked up too, whom Soviet intelligence through various channels, in

volume

including through the Bulgarian envoy Draganov, supplied fakes about the alleged "progress" observed in negotiations with the Anglo-French. August 16 Ribbentrop telegraphs his ambassador again. Schulenburg this time must convince Molotov that, since Germany agreed to the idea of a political pact with the USSR, we must hurry, because every day a conflict could break out between Germany and Poland. On the same day, Molotov informs the German ambassador that Moscow is ready to conclude a pact. But, according to the Kremlin, a "secret additional protocol" should be attached to it, which would precisely define the spheres of influence of the signatory powers in Eastern Europe. On August 19, a trade agreement is signed between Germany and the USSR, and on August 22, Ribbentrop arrives in Moscow to conclude an agreement

political.

I have already pointed out that the idea of a trade agreement belonged to Ribbentrop, and the idea of a political agreement to Molotov. In order to achieve the conclusion of this political agreement, Moscow had to sign a trade agreement on conditions that were completely unfavorable for the USSR, and even to undertake to supply a potential military adversary with strategic raw materials to the obvious detriment of the interests of the defense of its own country.

The Soviet Union exported grain, oil, platinum, phosphorus and other raw materials to Germany. Dr. Schnurre, who signed the trade agreement with Mikoyan, telegraphed to Berlin that all this raw material "has the value of gold for us." Intoxicated by this first success of his, Ribbentrop arrived at the Kremlin fully convinced that his second victory in the form of a political pact with Moscow would allow the Führer to shred the map of Europe as he pleased. He wasn't wrong. On August 23, 1939, in the presence of members of the Politburo headed by Stalin, Ribbentrop and Molotov signed the "Non-Aggression Pact between Germany and the USSR."

Attached to the treaty was a "Secret Additional Protocol" drawn up in the Kremlin and sent to Berlin the day before. The essence of the protocol: Hitler and Stalin divide Poland among themselves. Ethnographic Poland is given to Germany with the statute of a protectorate, and the Polish eastern regions - Western Ukraine and Western Belarus - are annexed by the Soviet Union. Stalin recognizes Hitler's freedom of action in Western Europe. For this, the Soviet Union receives the right

annex Bessarabia, Northern Bukovina, the Baltic states and even Finland to the USSR. After the ceremony of signing the treaty, Molotov arranged a magnificent banquet in honor of Ribbentrop in the presence of Stalin and his entire clique.

These people, who decided the fate of five independent states with one stroke of the pen and in just five minutes, perfectly understood that they were preparing a world catastrophe unprecedented in history until now. However, they triumphed as their victory over the tragedy of these peoples. They ate caviar, drank champagne, listened to music, and there was no end to the toasts. One toast even went down in history. Ribbentrop found it necessary to immediately report to the Führer about this toast, which was completely not provided for by diplomatic protocol. This toast was made by Stalin: "I know how deeply the German people love their leader. Therefore, I would like to drink to his health" (see Koss1, A. "Kizap-Segtai haShapse. 1939-1941." Veason Prezs, Vozup, 1951, p. 75).

One need only imagine for a moment the anti-Semite Ribbentrop clinking glasses with the Jew Kaganovich in order to comprehend the whole abyss of the immorality of these dealers in the fate of mankind. The robber from Berlin not only clinked glasses with the robbers from Moscow in a friendly way, but even felt himself there as if in his fascist company. Recalling this banquet, Ribbentrop later told Italian Foreign Minister Ciano what thoughts he had then: "I felt in the Kremlin, as if among old party comrades" (ibid., p. 75).

Ribbentrop was not the only fascist who had kindred feelings for Bolshevism. It was the spiritual leader of fascism, Benito Mussolini himself, who in October 1939 authoritatively stated: "Bolshevism in Russia has disappeared, and the Slavic type of fascism has taken its place" (ibid., p. 77). The Bolsheviks did not remain in debt. Stalin

put into Molotov's mouth words that could well have belonged to Hitler or Mussolini. These are the words of Molotov in Pravda of November 1, 1939: "The ideology of Hitlerism, like any other ideological system, can be recognized or denied ... But any person will understand that ideology cannot be destroyed by force, it cannot be ended with war. Therefore, it is not only senseless, but also criminal to wage such a war as a war to destroy Hitlerism.

Stalin, like his current successors in the Kremlin, justified the pact with Hitler by referring to the absurd argument that the Soviet Union had won two years to prepare for war with Germany. No one dared to bring counterarguments: what have we been doing for twenty-two years if not preparing for war in order to "beat the enemy on his own territory," as Stalin put it. Besides, are they really preparing for war, supplying the future enemy with military-strategic raw materials at the same time?

In order to satisfy Hitler's appetites even more fully with such raw materials not only from the USSR, but also from other countries through the USSR, and in February 1940. a new Soviet-German agreement was concluded, again clearly to the detriment of Soviet interests. In the light of the future date of the German attack on the USSR, the timing of the deliveries of goods by the parties is also interesting. While the Germans had to deliver their goods to the Soviet Union within twenty-seven months (machinery and equipment), the Soviet Union undertook to complete its deliveries in 18 months, that is, just in time for the start of the German attack on the USSR. In addition, Moscow undertook to buy metal and other raw materials for Germany in third countries in order to bypass the British blockade. Plus, the Soviet Union allowed Germany to transit German purchases from Manchuria, Afghanistan, Iran, and Romania through its territory. Regarding the new agreement, Dr. Schnurre triumphantly reported to Berlin: "Undoubtedly, the USSR promises much more supplies than is justified from a purely economic point of view, and it must make these deliveries part of its own supply ... The agreement means for us opening the doors to countries of the East. The purchase of raw materials in the USSR and in the countries bordering on it can be further expanded ... The effect of the British blockade will be significantly weakened. ("Ma21-bokhley gelayops..." p. 134,

However, as much as Stalin was generous and careful in supplying Germany with strategic raw materials and in organizing a transit service for German purchases in countries neighboring the USSR, just as

Hitler was stingy and sloppy in reciprocal deliveries. The Kremlin once complained about this to the same Schnurre. Schnurre knew the reason. The German government acted deliberately, because, according to Schnurre, "there is a directive from Reichsmarschall Goering to avoid deliveries to the USSR that would directly or indirectly increase the Soviet military potential" (ibid., p. 200). The contours of the "Plan Barbarossa" (the plan of attack on the USSR) loomed in Hitler's head even at the conclusion of the "Pact of Ribbentrop and Molotov." In democratic countries, they wrote about this openly at that time, but only one "brilliant leader and teacher" and his clique could not unravel the insidious plans of a political corporal from Berlin. This is the main reason that at dawn on June 22, 1941, German planes filled with Soviet gasoline began to bomb Soviet cities on a wide front. They were followed by German tanks filled with the same Soviet gasoline. Under the cover of these tanks, the German infantry also moved, which ate Soviet bread.

The criminal pact between Stalin and Hitler unleashed the Second World War, in which more than twenty million Soviet people died alone.

U. Expansion of the Soviet Empire Party historians write about the "Great Patriotic War", ignoring the obvious

historical facts. After all, there was no single "Patriotic War", but there were three wars of the USSR that grew into one another: one war was an aggressive colonial war against

Finland and Poland and the almost simultaneous annexation by the Soviet Union of the Baltic countries, Northern Bukovina and, considered a disputed territory, Bessarabia (1939-1940); the second war is a defensive war, called "Patriotic War", against Germany; the third war was the aggressive colonial war of the USSR in Eastern Europe and the Balkans under the slogan of "liberation" of the peoples there from fascism.

Only the second war—a defensive war against Hitlerite aggression—was just and truly Patriotic; as for the first and third wars, they were imperialist wars, because they were waged in the name of expanding the Soviet colonial empire.

In the Baltics, unlike in Finland and Poland, the Kremlin achieved its goals through peaceful expansion.

The relative ease of Stalin's victory in Poland and the Baltic states, among other things, was explained by the fact that Stalin was in alliance with Hitler, with whom he had already divided spheres of influence in Eastern Europe under the "Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact". The peoples of these countries did not have to expect help from the democratic powers either. True, France and England declared War on Germany over Poland, but did not take any military action, and as for the annexation of the Baltic countries by the Soviet Union, here too the democratic powers limited themselves to platonic statements about non-recognition of the Soviet annexation. If we talk about Poland, then Stalin, who dealt her a treacherous stab in the back, extended his hand of "fraternal help" not at all to Western Ukrainians and Belarusians, who, like the plague, were afraid of his bloody hand. No wonder the Soviet people then quipped: "We will stretch out our hand to them, and they will stretch out their legs themselves." Stalin held out his hand to his ally Hitler. Poland fell after heroic resistance, because it could not simultaneously fight on two fronts - against Germany and the USSR.

In order to prevent the revival of national Poland in the future, Stalin-Beria's Chekists selected 15,000 Polish officers from the captured Polish army and shot them all (about 5,000 of them at Katyn in 1940). A commission of experts from neutral countries in 1943 established that the officers at Katyn were killed in the summer of 1940. When the Polish government in London inquired about the fate of other officers, Stalin replied: "They fled, maybe to Mongolia."

In Poland, Finland, and the Baltic countries—Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia—Stalin presented the peoples with Lenin's unpaid bill. Although Lenin in 1918 tried to return

by military force, all the peoples of the former tsarist empire into the Soviet empire, but it was precisely the Baltic peoples, along with the Poles and Finns, who put up such stubborn resistance to the Red Army of Lenin and Trotsky that they had to pass off their capitulation to their rebelliousness as virtue: we, they say, recognize the right peoples for independence. Thus, having self-determined in 1918, the Baltic peoples created flourishing states with a Western European standard of living. In these countries there were large colonies of Russians who lived here since pre-revolutionary times. Large groups of Russian refugees found political asylum here, including many Russian intellectuals. Russian cultural and religious centers, Russian theaters, an independent Russian press were created, and famous Russian professors of almost all sciences taught at the universities of the new states. Their sympathy and sympathy were on the side of the indigenous peoples when mortal danger hung over them from their former Russian homeland. Moscow annexed the Baltic countries in stages, so as to mask the ultimate goal - the inclusion of these countries in the USSR.

First, the Kremlin suggested that the Baltic countries conclude a pact with the Soviet Union on mutual military assistance against a potential "aggressor". Moscow stated that these countries could be attacked by "aggressors", and to protect themselves from these "aggressors" it was necessary that these countries be allowed to deploy "limited contingents" of the Red Army on their territories, as is now in Afghanistan.

Moscow promised to respect their national-state sovereignty, not

to interfere in their internal affairs, but at the same time made it clear that if this Soviet demand is not satisfied, then the Red Army will simply occupy these countries, and then they will lose their independence. Summoned to the Kremlin, one after another, the heads of these states were forced to sign such pacts within twelve days. Estonia signed the pact on September 28, 1939, Latvia on October 5, 1939, Lithuania on October 10, 1939. It took the Kremlin nine months to spend in the occupied countries a radical cleansing. The governments that signed the "mutual assistance" pacts, the parliaments that ratified them, were sent to concentration camps. They were followed by about one third of the deported population. They arranged so-called "free elections" to the new parliaments, in which Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian communists sent from Moscow received from 92 to 99% of the votes cast, according to a well-known method. The parliaments thus elected in the summer of 1940 turned to the USSR with a request to accept Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania into the USSR. The Kremlin generously granted this request. Next, June 24, 1940. In accordance with the "secret protocol" to the "Ribbentrop Molotov Pact", the Soviet government issued an ultimatum to Romania within three days to clear the territory of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina to include them in the USSR. Knowing that Hitler was standing behind Stalin, Romania capitulated. On June 27, 1940, the Red Army occupied both territories.

With the annexation of the Baltic countries, the occupation of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina, the conquest of the Finnish border lands and waters, the Soviet Union dramatically improved its territorial and strategic position in the West, but at the same time showed the true face of Soviet global imperialism.

As the chronicler tells, the old Russian prince went to his enemies with an open visor, announcing in advance for all to hear: "I'm coming at you!"

Civilized aggressors are preparing wars on the sly and need what diplomats call "casus belli", that is, a pretext for attack, which they also come up with

themselves.

Before attacking Poland on September 1, 1939, Hitler dressed a squad of German soldiers in Polish army uniforms and attacked his own border post with Poland to tell the outside world that Poland had attacked Germany. As for Stalin, he managed to present as a pretext for aggression an event that did not happen at all. Before starting the war against Finland on November 30, 1939, Stalin accused this small country no more, no

less than in the attack on the USSR. A government report on this attack stated that the Finnish border units, having opened artillery fire on Soviet territory, killed four Soviet soldiers.

The real war against Finland was preceded first by the Soviet psychological war against the Finnish people with unprecedented cynicism by the Soviet government on the government of Finland, demanding that the Finns peacefully cede to the Soviets what they want to take by war.

On October 5, 1939, Molotov issued an ultimatum to the Finnish government to begin negotiations with the Soviet government on "important political issues" within 48 hours. Sent from Helsinki to the representative of the Finnish government and the future President of Finland, Paasikivi, Stalin briefly and businesslike explained: "You threaten the security of Leningrad, which is 32 kilometers away from you. Since we cannot move our Leningrad, we have decided to move our borders deep into your country." Specifically, Stalin demanded that Finland cede to the USSR a number of islands in the Gulf of Finland, and on the peninsula west of Helsinki allowed the Red Army to build a naval base on a lease basis, and also agreed to some "corrections" of the borders in the north. In total, Stalin demanded 2700 square meters. km., for which he generously offered Finland, as compensation, wild Karelian swamps. Stalin even joked, like a Tiflis kinto of old times: "After all, we demand only

2700 sq. kilometers, and for this we give in exchange 5500 square meters. kilometers. Tell me, what great power would do that? None. Only we are so stupid."

When the government in Helsinki, agreeing to fix the borders at Leningrad, rejected other Soviet demands that offended its sovereignty, Molotov coolly told the Finnish representative: "Since civilians cannot agree, from now on the word belongs to the military." The word of the military brought the Kremlin not glory, but eternal disgrace. On November 30, 1939, the Red Army, numbering 450 thousand people, having 1,900 guns, 1,000 tanks and 800 combat aircraft, crossed the Finnish borders on a wide front and, after some initial successes, came across such resistance of the Finns, unparalleled in courage, that about an easy military walk along Finland, which the Kremlin was thinking about, was out of the question. But in the entire Finnish army there were only 215 thousand people, it had only 75 aircraft and 60 old tanks. That is why the Bolsheviks started the war as a war of one Leningrad military district, but in fact it turned into a war of the entire Red Army, because half of the then personnel of the Red Army fought against the Finns.

Many still think that the Kremlin pursued a limited territorial strategic goal in this war - to fix the borders and get some islands and peninsulas. It's a delusion. The ultimate goal was the Bolshevization of all of Finland and, following the example of the Baltic countries, its inclusion in the USSR as a union republic. This, in fact, explained that as soon as the Red Army captured the Finnish border village of Terioki (now Zelenogorsk), the Kremlin hastened to solemnly proclaim the creation of the mythical "democratic republic of Finland" with the "temporary capital of Terioki". At the head of its, so to speak, government was placed an old comrade-in-arms of Lenin, the political secretary of the Presidium of the Executive Committee of the Comintern, Otto Kuusinen. And so, on December 2, 1939, Kuusinen "arrived" in Moscow from Terioki to ask for military "fraternal" help and conclude an agreement on the price of such help. It was, of course, the purest comedy, and besides, it was completely mediocre, which does not even look like Stalin. Kuusinen, at least for appearances, could come from Terijoki. But he came on foot to the Kremlin from his Comintern office near the Manezh, next to the Kremlin. Kuusinen signed the treaty in the presence of Stalin, Molotov, Voroshilov and Zhdanov. A photograph of the "historical act" of signing the treaty and the treaty itself were published in Pravda. Under this agreement, Kuusinen satisfied all the desires of Moscow, giving the Soviet Union not 2700 sq. m. km of Finnish territory, and 4000 sq. km in front of Leningrad, plus all the islands and peninsulas that the Soviet government demanded. The parties undertook to exchange their instruments of ratification in the near future in Helsinki, when Kuusinen's residence

transferred there from the convoy of the Red Army. That's when the Finns really rose to the national liberation war against Soviet imperialism. It was hard for the small northern people to withstand the monstrous onslaught of the Soviet colossus, but the Soviet losses were colossal. According to official figures, the Red Army lost 207,000 soldiers (in fact, the numbers were much higher), the Finns lost 25,000 soldiers. Voroshilov lost his post as People's Commissar for Military Affairs. Marshal Timoshenko, appointed in his place, brought the army to 500,000 soldiers. However, Stalin came to the conclusion that if the war continued, he risked clashing with the Anglo-French, who intended to send an expeditionary army to help the Finns. Since Western aid was only planned, but never came, and besides, Hitler, who was in a pact with Stalin, demanded that the Finns give in to Stalin, the Finns decided for the best to accept Stalin's conditions. The entire border region with Karelia with the city of Vyborg, as well as segments of the territory in the east and north of the country - a total of 35,000 square meters. km. - The Finns were forced to cede to the Soviet Union.

It was a rare war in history, in which the people lost part of the territory, but did not sacrifice their national honor.

Preparing for war with the Soviet Union, Germany achieved in early June 1941

deployment of one German division in Finland. However, when the war broke out between Germany and the USSR, Finland declared that it would remain neutral. Despite this, on June 25, 1941, Soviet aircraft bombarded Finnish territory. Only after that, on July 10, the Finns crossed the Soviet borders on a wide front and regained back all the regions occupied by the Soviet army, taking at the same time the whole of Karelia, including its main city, Petrozavodsk. Despite pressure from the Germans, Marshal Mannerheim refused to continue the war against the USSR. The large offensive launched by the Red Army at the end of July was repulsed at the initial stage. Its losses were, as in the first war, great - the Red Army lost 260,000 soldiers killed and wounded.

September 2, 1944 Finland withdrew from the war. The new peace conditions for her were even harder than in the first war. Still, even this difficult peace could not force Finland to become a Soviet satellite, as the Eastern European countries had become.

The Kremlin tried through the so-called "Allies" Control Commission, which met in Helsinki, to impose communist orders on the Finns, but very quickly realized that it was dealing with an enemy that could be destroyed, but not conquered. Subtle diplomats, courageous warriors, the Finns taught the Soviet generals how to treat the vanquished with courtesy. Characteristic in this regard is the scene at the meeting of the Allied Control Commission, which, by the way, included British officers. When Marshal Mannerheim, summoned to the meeting, entered the hall, the Soviet representative, Politburo member Colonel-General Andrey Zhdanov, did not deign to stand up, despite the fact that his British colleagues stood up. Then Marshal Mannerheim turned to Zhdanov in excellent Russian (after all, he was a general of the Russian imperial army): "Well, is there a custom in your army - the generals continue to sit when the marshal enters the hall?" Witnesses say that Zhdanov even blushed and stood up. At the reception of the Finnish government delegation in the Kremlin in 1947, Stalin made a toast: "I drink to the brave Finnish army." Stalin this time did not flatter and did not lie, but spoke the truth unparalleled in his mouth.

MI. Yalta - the triumph of the Soviet Empire

After the victory of the anti-Hitler coalition in World War II, all Eastern European countries from under the yoke of fascism came under the yoke of Bolshevism.

The Yalta Conference was a belated attempt by the Western Allies to save these countries from such a fate. In fact, it turned out the sanction of the Western powers on the division of Europe. It would have been better if the Yalta Conference had not taken place at all. The time and place of each conference was imposed by Stalin when it suited him. After Stalingrad, the Tehran

conference, after the Red Army occupied most of the Eastern European countries, the Yalta Conference took place. If the Western Powers wanted to save Eastern Europe and the Balkans from Communism, then the first Allied Conference had to be called when Hitler approached Moscow and Stalin was in great panic. Then the fate of the communist regime hung in the balance, and Russia was threatened with dismemberment. In order to save both, Stalin and his clique would have been forced not only to guarantee the restoration of the freedom and independence of the Eastern European peoples, but also to undertake internal political and social reforms, as proof of their sincerity. It cannot be thought that such a requirement would be unrealistic. After all, left alone with Hitler, without a second front in the West, Stalin would have died first, not Hitler. The Yalta Conference was the great deception of Stalin and the self-deception of the West.

Two factors played a role in American self-deception: an overestimation of the military potential of its second enemy, Japan, and an underestimation of Stalin's political cunning.

The Yalta Conference, with the participation of Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin, took place from February 4 to February 11, 1945, three months before the surrender of Germany and six months before

surrender of Japan. The fate of Germany has already been decided - the Red Army occupied the Eastern European countries - Poland, Romania, Hungary, Bulgaria (although the latter was neutral in the war). The Red Army moved irresistibly along the main front towards Berlin and a side front towards Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. Meanwhile, the Western Allies occupied most of Italy from the south, and entered German territory from the west. Since the Germans concentrated their main forces on the Eastern Front, the Western allies had a chance to occupy not only Saxony and Thuringia, as happened, but also Berlin, which, by military agreement, was ceded to the Red Army without need and to the detriment of political strategy. Thus, by the beginning of the Yalta Conference, the surrender of Germany was a matter of several weeks, but the situation with Japan remained unclear. The chiefs of staff of the American armed forces informed President Roosevelt that without the participation of the Soviet Union, the war against Japan by American forces alone would continue for at least 18 months, that is, until mid-1946. Until now, the Americans have liberated the countries and islands occupied by the Japanese in Asia and the Pacific, but have suffered heavy losses in the process. Now they were about to land in Japan itself.

American strategists calculated that this landing would cost the American army hundreds of thousands of soldiers. As it turned out later, these calculations turned out to be erroneous, because Japan was running out of strength, even without the use of American atomic bombs.

Probably, Roosevelt also did not take into account that with the use of atomic bombs, the war against Japan would have ended without any participation of the USSR. But be that as it may, the American president, well aware of the stubbornness of the Japanese in the war in the Pacific and fearing the heavy losses of the American army during the landing in Japan, decided by concessions at the Yalta Conference to persuade Stalin to participate in the war against Japan. In addition, the president probably took into account that, unlike the Western strategy to save the lives of soldiers as much as possible, the strategy of Stalin and his generals was based on the massive and reckless spending of soldiers' lives. That is why the losses of the Red Army, even in defense, were three to four times higher than the German ones.

The American and British concessions at Yalta in themselves seemed more like tactical than strategic concessions. Moreover, on the main issue - the post-war fate of the Eastern European peoples - in Yalta they came to an agreement that these peoples would create democratic regimes in their own countries with free secret elections. Here is what the "Declaration on a Liberated Europe" adopted at Yalta said on this score: "The establishment of order in Europe and the restoration of national economic life must be achieved by such a process that helps the liberated peoples to create democratic institutions of their own choice. The basic principle of the "Atlantic Charter" is: the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they want to live; restoration of sovereign rights and self-government for those peoples who were forcibly deprived of them. It goes on to say that the three governments—the United States, Britain, the USSR—will help "create provisional bodies

authorities, which, being organized on a broad basis, representing all the democratic elements of the population, are obliged in the near future, by free elections, to form governments in accordance with the will of the peoples. With regard to Poland, because of which England, in fact, declared war on Germany, it was said that the so-called Provisional Polish Government created by Moscow, together with the Polish government in exile in London, form the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity. It is the duty of this government to hold free, unhindered elections in the country as soon as possible, on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot. Stalin assured his colleagues at the conference that Poland would not be a communist country, for, he said, "the Poles are nationalists and individualists"; Poles will not depend on Moscow either. On the occasion of the fortieth anniversary of the Yalta Conference, Pravda wrote: "The head of the Soviet delegation stubbornly defended "... the creation of a powerful, free and independent Poland" (Pravda, 8. 2. 1985). The same promises

Stalin also gave in regard to all other countries of Eastern Europe. However, the Red Army, entering Eastern Europe, carried in a wagon train the communist rulers for each "liberated" country - all these Beruts, Dmitrovs, Rakosi, Gottwalds, Ulbrichts - who immediately set about Bolshevizing the countries captured by the Red Army. The argument is made that Stalin and his Western allies interpreted the Yalta agreements differently. However, the agreements of a fateful nature, such as the Yalta agreements, should not allow for the possibility of their different interpretations, especially since both Roosevelt and Churchill knew with whom they were dealing. Roosevelt, on the eve of the war, declared that the Bolshevik power in Moscow was just as tyrannical as the fascist power in Berlin, while Churchill was generally considered from the time of the British intervention to help General Denikin in 1919 a sworn enemy of Bolshevism. So the Yalta catastrophe of the West is explained not only and not so much by the different interpretations of the parties, but by more prosaic things: it was important for Roosevelt to persuade Stalin to enter the war against Japan, which he would have done without the persuasion of the president, and it was important for Churchill to save the British Empire from collapse, if not in friendship with Stalin, then at least in neutrality with him, which was also a complete self-deception. The current President of America, Ronald Reagan, declared on the fortieth anniversary of Yalta: "There is one line symbolizing Yalta that can never be legalized: this is the watershed between freedom and oppression ... I do not hesitate to declare that we want to abolish this line."

Having included additional Eastern European countries in its last empire in the world, the Soviet Union was not satisfied with this. He began to expand his imperial power to all the continents of the world. It is paradoxical, but true: the old empires were enriched at the expense of the colonies, and the Soviet empire is impoverished because of the new communist regimes, which must be protected, fed and armed at the expense of the mother country. In order to keep the victims of Yalta in the empire, the Kremlin has to keep armed forces in some of these countries, and threaten others with the introduction of troops if they decide to withdraw from the Warsaw Pact, as Hungary tried to do in 1956, or simply take the path of liberalization, as Czechoslovakia wanted in 1968. As for the "Marxist-Leninist" regimes in Africa, Asia and Latin America, they are all dependent on Moscow for material and military reasons, not because of "fraternal solidarity" with them, but because they serve as a springboard on the way to further global Soviet expansion. Each new territorial acquisition is a new burden on the neck of the Soviet people. The question is, how many such weights can he withstand?

In conclusion of this chapter, I want to dwell on the reasons why the Red Army suffered defeat in the first stage of the war.

When party historians write about the Soviet military catastrophe of the first years of the war and the successes of the German troops, they repeat Stalin's factually incorrect and politically absurd thesis that the Germans were successful due to the element of surprise. In fact, the deep causes of the initial defeats of the Red Army and the secret of German successes lie in a completely different area - in the field of political, military personnel, and partly even in the field of psychology. Let us first point to the political causes and factors.

Only at the very beginning of the war, Stalin and his Kremlin clique completed their unprecedented in the history of mankind inquisition - the "Great Purge", as a result of which from 10 to 15 million Soviet citizens were locked up in concentration camps. This meant, if we add here the ten million victims of forced collectivization, that there was practically no family in the country that was not directly or indirectly affected by the purge. Hence the torment and suffering in all corners of the country and in all strata of the people. Hence also the general despair, reaching defeatist feelings in the outbreak of the war, if only to get rid of Stalin's tyranny. Many wanted to believe that cultured Germany would come to them as a "liberator" from the NKVD, concentration camps, collective farms, and Stalinist tyranny. When they were convinced in practice that Hitler came to Russia not to liberate her from tyranny, but

to multiply political tyranny by racial, anti-Russian, Great German tyranny - that's when the "Great Patriotic War" began, in which Stalin already appealed not to Marx and Engels, but to the ancient Russian princes, the famous tsarist commanders and the Russian Orthodox Church. And the Chekists were still secretly spreading purposeful rumors that after the victorious end of the war everything would be different, in a new way - there would be no more terror, the secret police would disappear, the camps would be closed, the collective farms would be dissolved. In a word, Stalin will cease to be Stalin. And all this - the people also wanted to believe. The second most important reason for the defeats, and even decisive in the field of military art, lay in the general defeat of the Soviet military and military-political cadres, which Stalin and the Chekists perpetrated just on the eve of the war. Here I want to quote an official and authoritative Soviet source. This source is the book "The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union 1941-1945. A Brief History, edited by P. N. Pospelov and Marshals Grechko, Sokolovsky, Zakharov, Bagramyan" (M. Military Publishing House, 1965). So, on pages 39-40 of this book, the following is literally said: "In 1937-1938, as well as in the subsequent time, as a result of unjustified repressions, the color of the command and political staff of the Red Army perished. Three marshals (out of five) were killed as "foreign intelligence agents" and "enemies of the people"; all the commanders of the military districts were killed ... many prominent military figures and heroes of the civil war were destroyed or demoted and subjected to long-term imprisonment ... All corps commanders, almost all division commanders, brigade commanders were removed from the army; about half of the regimental commanders, members of the military councils and heads of the political departments of the districts, most of the military commissars of corps, divisions, brigades, and about one third of the military commissars of the regiments. If Stalin and the Chekists had not staged this anti-state and senseless purge, then we can say with confidence that the German army would not have dared to attack the USSR, and if it had attacked, it would never have reached Moscow and the Volga. There is a third factor that determined the initial defeats of the Red Army. Until Hitler attacked the USSR, the Soviet government believed that Nazi Germany was waging a just defensive war against Western democracies. Since Stalin divided Poland with Hitler, the Soviet government and the Soviet press accused the German attack on Poland not of the aggressor, but of his victim, who did not want to submit to the dictates of Berlin. Although the Soviet Union, even after the "Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact" of 1939, continued to consider itself neutral in the outbreak of World War II, but in fact, by virtue of this pact, the Soviet Union became the intendant of the belligerent Germany.

The Kremlin had not only political and strategic miscalculations in wooing Hitler, but also gross psychological miscalculations. The Kremlin systematically instilled in the press and radio broadcasts the cult of the invincibility of German weapons, raising to the skies the quality of German military equipment and the success of the "blitzkrieg" strategy. Look through the Soviet newspapers of those times and you will easily be convinced of the truth of what was said. Among other things, this circumstance, which inflicted something like a mental trauma on the consciousness of the Soviet soldier, added a tragic note to the mass panic of the Soviet troops, when in the initial period of the war they surrendered in whole armies or fled the battlefield in hundreds of thousands without looking back, throwing down their weapons. These were people who read from Soviet newspapers, heard on Soviet radio and saw in film magazines, how this German army in a few weeks marched triumphantly across Europe, defeated great France, expelled the world English empire from the continent - how was it possible to resist this modern miracle hero!

This is how the psychosis of panic was prepared and cultivated, as well as the prejudice that German weapons are invincible, and the defeat of one's own country in this war is a lesser evil, because it will save the country from Stalin's tyranny. It must be admitted that in this case the people thought exactly as Lenin thought about the first war between Germany and Russia when he wrote in the Manifesto of the RSDLP of November 1, 1914: "For us, Russian Social Democrats,

there can be no doubt that ... the least evil would be the defeat of the tsarist monarchy", that is, Russia ("CPSU in resolutions", part I, M. 1954, p. 323).

However, it soon became clear that the Soviet Union was attacked by the same barbarian and murderer of the people as Stalin himself, with the only difference being that he was a foreigner. Then the peoples of the USSR preferred their own barbarian to a foreign one - especially since people believed the disinformation of the Chekists that after a victorious war, Stalin would immediately begin new "great reforms".

PART IV. POST-STALIN NATIONAL POLICY 1. National politics in the era of Khrushchev and Brezhnev

Stalin was a cold, scrupulous and patient calculator in politics, who knew not only the limits of his possibilities, but also the nature of the object to which his policy was directed. A politician among criminals and a criminal among politicians, Stalin found in the synthesis of politics with criminality that universal and magical recipe, with the help of which he acted both in general and in national politics. In his rich criminal-political career, you will not find a single political action taken by him in which he would be defeated. Even as an unrestricted dictator, he allowed himself neither emotional outbursts nor impromptu decisions. Both new decisions and the revision of those already taken were prepared with the expectation of absolute success.

In all this, his successor Khrushchev was the opposite of his predecessor.

Stalin liquidated the Leninist NEP and NEPmen and survived, Stalin liquidated the free peasantry, which constituted 80 percent of the country's population, survived, Stalin liquidated the Leninist party, the organizer of the victory in the October Revolution and the Civil War, survived. But when he approached the problem of liquidating the national republics and merging non-Russian peoples with Russian into one communist nation with one common Russian language, then Stalin stopped, as if sensing that he would not survive here.

Khrushchev decided: what Stalin did not dare, he can dare. On his instructions, the ideological apparatus of the party, under the leadership of Suslov, developed a whole comprehensive program for the denationalization of the non-Russian nations of the USSR in order to prepare for their merger with the Russian nation. There are no elements of direct violence in this program, and it is called hypocritically and idyllically at the same time: "The flourishing and rapprochement of nations." But "flourishing" was understood as the instillation of Russian culture into non-Russian peoples, and "rapprochement" as a merger. The core of the program is to make the Russian language the native language of all non-Russian peoples as a precondition for the creation of a single communist nation.

Methods and channels of Russification provided for diverse. The main ones are:

In connection with the school reforms of 1958, a law was passed according to which the study of the national language and teaching in the national language in national schools were considered voluntary. It depended on the parents which Russian or national school to send their children to. Parents also decide in which language the national school should teach - in Russian or in their native language. Of course, parents, thinking about the successful career of their children and knowing full well that the road "upstairs" goes through a Russian school, send their children there.

Russian words and Russian terminology are deliberately generously included in the vocabulary of national languages, despite the presence of corresponding equivalents in these languages. Even Russian new word formation, in connection with the development of technology, is proposed to be included in the national

language, although national word formation would immediately make it clear what it is about (for example, "helicopter", "vacuum cleaner", "television", etc.).

3. Mass colonization by the Slavic population of Turkestan and the Caucasus with the establishment of the creation of a Slavic majority there in the general national composition of the republics.

This practice of Russification of non-Russian languages began under Stalin, but was widely carried out in the Khrushchev era. Therefore, it is not surprising that, for example, according to experts, in the Turko-Tatar dictionary for 1958 there are twice as many Russian words as it was in the dictionary of 1929, and about 20 percent of words of Russian origin are registered in the Uzbek dictionary for the same period. . Since then, the process of Russification of national languages has been developing rapidly and on a larger scale. The enthusiasm of Russifiers in the field of literature sometimes takes ugly forms, bordering on absurdity. Moscow, for example, does not allow the writers of the national republics to translate into their native language foreign classics from the original language, i.e. they must translate them from a Russian translation (quite recently the Azerbaijanis translated Goethe into their own language from a Russian translation).

Even Russian authors themselves oppose this practice of translating foreign books. So, in Kazakhstan, the Russian critic V. Lobin gave a devastating description of such translations when he wrote: "Translating foreign writers, works of foreign scientists from Russian translations into Kazakh is the same as getting butter from milk that has passed through a separator." The government newspaper Izvestia was so offended by this speech by a Russian in defense of non-Russian languages that it called it a daring "sally against the great Russian language" (Izvestia, 28. 12. 1963).

There were cases when the nationals themselves came out in defense of the purity of their languages (in the same Turkestan, see "Party Life of Kazakhstan", No. 9, 1959). In Georgia, even a special "Committee for the purity of the national language" was created on an informal basis. The same Izvestia was not slow to subject the Georgian initiative to devastating criticism from purely Great Russian positions, so that other non-Russian peoples would be reluctant to imitate the Georgians (see Izvestia, 24. 9. 1963). Now, almost a quarter of a century later, the famous Soviet writer, writing in Russian and Kyrgyz, Chingiz Aitmatov, told the outside world how the Kyrgyz national culture is developing. He stated: "There is no need to portray the matter in such a way that everything has been resolved in our national spheres and there are no problems ... We need to think about how deeply and democratically the national culture, national self-consciousness is developing ... The Russian language is great, but it is not means that it is not necessary to pay attention to the internal laws of another national language and bring into it, in particular, from Russian, what you can not bring. A curious fact in this sense are the names of two regional newspapers published in the Kyrgyz language - one of them is called "Isyk Kol iravdasi", and the other "Naryn pravda-si" ... This deeply offends me. What kind of a nation with a thousand-year history is this, in which the words "truth", "truth", "justice" are absent in the language. Who needs such a distortion of the Russian language and the humiliation of the Kyrgyz language, in which there are only about ten synonyms for the concept of "truth." ("Literary newspaper", 31.8.1986).

What Aitmatov is outraged about here, however, was and remains the "general line" of the party in language policy. In the Khrushchev era, party philosophers even put forward a completely new idea regarding the further prospects for the development of the national cultures of the peoples of the USSR. The new idea was based on the thesis: non-Russian peoples can create their national culture in Russian. Thus, the journal Questions of Philosophy argued that the loss of their native language does not mean for non-Russian peoples that they are thereby deprived of the opportunity to create their own national culture. The successes of linguistic Russification among the small peoples of the USSR were presented as an anticipation of the transition to the Russian language of the culture and literature of the nations of the Union republics. The magazine wrote: "We have facts in the USSR when many tribes, nationalities and small nations use the Russian language to develop their national culture" ("Problems of Philosophy" No. 9, 1961). In this regard, the magazine named the peoples who began to create a national culture and literature in Russian: Karelians, Udmurts, Maris, Komi, Mordvins

Ossetians.

If in schools the party applies direct and open methods of Russification to literature, then there are spheres where it resorts to indirect and covert methods in order to achieve the same goals:

mass migration of the Slavic, predominantly Russian, population to non-Russian republics;

new buildings - factories, factories, state farms - are created in the national republics with a mixed "international" contingent of workers from different nations, so that they are forced to speak Russian among themselves;

3) there are no national formations in the army, not only because of distrust of the nationals, but also in order to mix national soldiers with Russians and put them in the conditions of the need to learn the Russian language;

4) places of detention (prisons, camps, exiles) were also and are the "school of international education" of nations in Russian. In 1959, Khrushchev wanted to know how successful the policy of "internationalization" on a Russian basis had been in the forty-odd years of the Soviet empire. In that year, for the first time since 1926, the All-Union Census of the USSR population was held, where the question was specifically raised of how large the percentage of non-Russians who consider Russian as their mother tongue was. The successes of the language policy turned out to be modest when compared with the great efforts of the party, with its unlimited power. So, if according to the 1926 census, there were 6.6 million non-Russians who recognized Russian as their native language, then in 1959 there were 10.2 million of them. Linguistic assimilation sensitively affected mainly small peoples and peoples who do not have their own territory. Among larger nations, its successes are insignificant. If we take the union republics, then only among the Slavic peoples living in cities with a mixed population, the number of people who consider Russian their native language in 1959 was from 10 to 15 percent, among the Baltic peoples and Moldovans it did not reach even 5 percent, while in all the Turkestan republics and Georgia this percentage is below two, and in Azerbaijan it is above two. Among Armenians, 44 percent of whom live outside of Armenia, 8 percent consider Russian their mother tongue. The picture was also varied in the autonomous republics. In nine of the 17 autonomous republics where the population lives in a compact mass, the percentage of nationals who consider Russian as their mother tongue is estimated at one to five, and in republics with a mixed population it rises to eight. The greatest success of linguistic assimilation was noted among the peoples living in the USSR without their own territory, without their own schools, without national literature and art. Thus, among Russian Germans, 25 percent recognized Russian as their native language, among Poles 45 percent, and among Jews 78 percent.

I want to be rightly understood. The greatness of the Russian language and the brilliant creations of the Russian classics who wrote in it are the achievements of the entire world culture and literature. Just do not, as Lenin himself spoke of Russification, "drive into paradise with a club," even if it is wrapped in the velvet of pseudo-internationalism.

The rejection of indigenization in the 1930s meant the proclamation of a new course in national politics, consisting of two interconnected elements - linguistic denationalization from below and decorenization of authorities from above. We have already spoken about the first aspect of the new course, and we will continue to talk about it, but now let's talk about the second aspect. Even under Stalin, the institutions of "second secretaries" of the party and "first deputies" of the head of government, appointed directly from Moscow, were introduced in the national republics. There was an unwritten rule that the first secretary of the party, the chairmen of the government and the "parliament" were appointed from representatives of the indigenous nationality of the republic (except for Ukraine and Belarus). Since the 1930s, this new provision has become a law specifying the functions of the "second secretaries", who from now on lead two branches of party work: the distribution of personnel and the "internationalization" of the republics. This post cannot be held by a local national or even a local Russian. It takes

party apparatchik directly appointed from the Central Committee of the CPSU and responsible only to him.

The second secretary is not only Moscow's watchful eye, but also the de facto ruler. The legal ruler - the "first secretary" - the national - knows this for sure, he also knows that at the slightest violation of the rules of the game he will be unceremoniously thrown out of the chair of the "first".

In the appointment of "second secretaries" no exception is made for those republics whose first secretaries have reached the Politburo itself in their party career (Kunaev, Rashidov, Mzhavanadze), even if these first secretaries were Chekist generals (Aliiev, Shevardnadze). The same is true for government agencies. There is a certain range of positions that are also occupied here by persons directly appointed from Moscow - "first deputies" of the chairmen of the councils of ministers and presidiums of the Supreme Soviets, as well as positions that, in principle, can be occupied by Muscovites: heads of state security, internal affairs, military districts, garrisons and border troops, as well as heads of enterprises of all-Union significance.

Khrushchev at first also adhered to this Stalinist order, but made adjustments to Stalin's inconsistent policy. Stalin did not allow the appointment of "second secretaries" to Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia from Moscow. Khrushchev introduced the institution of "second secretaries" there as well. Stalin did not allow Ukrainians and Belarusians to be appointed first secretaries of Ukraine and Belarus. Khrushchev abolished this order for the first time, appointing a Ukrainian and a Byelorussian as first secretaries in both republics, respectively. Khrushchev revealed at the 20th party congress Stalin's criminal offenses bordering on genocide - the total deportation of Chechens, Ingush, Karachays, Balkars, Kalmyks to Central Asia and Kazakhstan, and restored them

autonomy.

Khrushchev was not consistent in this either, having not rehabilitated the Crimean Tatars, Meskhs, and Germans. Nor was he consistent in pursuing the old personnel policy in the Turkestan republics—appointing local people as first secretaries. With Khrushchev, accordingly, the practice of appointing Russians as first secretaries in Kazakhstan began. When the first secretary of the Central Committee of Kazakhstan, the Kazakh Shayakhmetov, and the second secretary, the Russian Afonov, opposed the Slavic colonization of Kazakhstan under the guise of raising virgin lands, Khrushchev summoned them to Moscow and informed them that they had been removed, appointing Ponomarenko and Brezhnev in their place.

Khrushchev decided to return to pre-revolutionary Leninism - to the fusion of nations.

We have seen that before the revolution, Lenin was the enemy of any form of federation for Russia. The republic that he proclaimed after seizing power, he first declared simply the Russian Soviet Republic. Only at the Third Congress of Soviets on January 25, 1918, Lenin, anticipating the danger of the collapse of the Russian multinational state, if he insisted on a unitary form of government, decided to declare the Russian Republic the Russian Federation (RSFSR).

Lenin soon saw that even this form of federation was rejected by both national communists and non-Russian peoples. They were frightened and repelled by the word "Russia". And so, when in 1922 the Russian and national Bolsheviks decided to unite the independent Soviet republics into one new federation, then a new type of federation arose - the USSR.

According to the constitution of the USSR, only six branches of state administration were assigned to the competence of the government in Moscow:

foreign affairs,

naval Affairs,

international trade,

way of communication,

post and telegraph,

finance.

In all other branches of state life, federal Soviet

republics remained sovereign. Accordingly, government authorities (people's commissariats) were created: some of dual subordination, like the Supreme Council of National Economy, food, labor, finance and the RCT, others only local subordination - like people's commissariats of internal affairs, justice, education, health, social security. Of course, there was a single centralized communist leadership over all the republics, but here, too, the Leninist Charter stipulated the autonomy of national communist parties in solving local problems. Some of these prerogatives of the Leninist constitution, including the right of a union republic to freely secede from the USSR, also migrated to the Stalinist constitution of 1936. Of course, any constitution under a one-party system is an empty piece of paper, just a pro forma to give the dictatorship of the party the appearance of a law-based state. Still, Stalin preferred pro forma, maintaining a federation of quasi-sovereign national republics.

Khrushchev came to the conclusion that the time had come to think not only about the specific timing of the onset of communism, but also about the merging of nations, as the very goal of communism envisaged. Khrushchev posed both of these problems in the third Party Program, setting a very specific deadline for solving the first problem - to build communism in 20 years (1961-1980), and the second problem was formulated in the Program in Aesopian party jargon, and therefore was not understood. Meanwhile, it was not difficult to decipher the Aesopian language. Khrushchev wanted nothing more and nothing less than the transformation of national republics into geographical concepts. Instead of the Stalinist formula "the flourishing of cultures national in form and socialist in content," Khrushchev and his chief ideologist Suslov put forward a new formula, which has already been mentioned: "the flourishing and rapprochement of nations." Stalin's "national form" was deliberately excluded from this formula, that is, the national language as the main instrument of any national culture. The reason is clear: when there is a "merging of nations" through "rapprochement", then the language will be the same for everyone - Russian.

The first step towards the merger of nations and the creation of a single communist nation is a new social community - the so-called "Soviet people".

Bashfully avoiding mentioning Lenin's pre-revolutionary formula, "the goal of socialism is not only the rapprochement of nations, but also their merger" (Lenin, Soch., vol. 22, [U ed., pp. 135-136), "Program CPSU" says that parties is "the further rapprochement of nations and the achievement of their complete unity." (Program of the CPSU, 1961, pp. 112-113).

Let's see how the fate of the union republics in the next two decades was drawn in the Party Program. Let us first stipulate that Khrushchev's current national government policy, like his general policy, was more liberal, more moderate, and more tolerant after Stalin's thirty years of tyranny.

In a number of laws and acts of 1957, the rights of the union republics were significantly expanded. However, the main and decisive situation has not changed: the sovereignty of the Union republics has always been fictitious. They expanded the range of administrative powers, without touching their vassal status. After all, there is absolutely no difference between a "sovereign" union republic, say, Uzbekistan, and a simple administrative-territorial unit (say, the Oryol region) in law-initiative and legislative activity. The Central Committee of the Party of Uzbekistan has the same rights and obligations as the Oryol Regional Party Committee (the Charter of the CPSU itself puts the Central Committees of the Communist Party of the Union Republics on a par with the ordinary regional committees of the RSFSR in terms of their rights and obligations).

The organs of supreme power in Uzbekistan - the Supreme Council and the Council of Ministers - exercise the same "legislative" and administrative power as the Oryol Regional Council and the Regional Executive Committee, with the only difference that in Uzbekistan they duplicate those already adopted in Moscow.

laws as if they were their own, and the Oryol region enforces them without duplication. Therefore, there was nothing surprising and unexpected when the Kremlin wrote down the following provision in its Program: "The expanded communist construction means a new stage in the development of national relations in the USSR,

characterized by a further rapprochement of nations and the achievement of their complete unity ... The borders between the Soviet republics within the USSR are increasingly losing their former significance "(Programma KPSS, 1961, p. 20). The Program also speaks of a common language for all the nations of the USSR: "The Russian language has actually become the common language of communication and cooperation of all the peoples of the USSR" (ibid., p. 22).

That the Program dealt with the liquidation of the long-defunct federation of union republics in the near future was evident from the interpretation of the Program by the authoritative organ of the USSR Academy of Sciences, the journal *Soviet State and Law*. Here is what the named journal wrote in the fresh wake of the adoption of the Program: "At present, the question of national relations in the USSR has only a directly communist formulation - the achievement of an all-round unity of the Soviet nations with the ultimate prospect of their complete merger ... if earlier the degree of federation, the nature of national statehood, the legal content of national-state borders had the value of a guarantor of national freedom, now they essentially no longer have such a meaning ... Already now we can say with confidence that from this side, national statehood and the federation as a whole have fulfilled their historical mission" ("Soviet state and law", M., 1961, No. 12, pp. 15, 23). In other words, since the federation and federated republics have already fulfilled their historical mission, they are subject to abolition. Probably, as a preparatory measure for the reorganization of the union republics into administrative-territorial units of the usual Russian type, the Khrushchev leadership also conceived new branches of the CPSU Central Committee - the Central Asian Bureau of the CPSU Central Committee and the Transcaucasian Bureau of the CPSU Central Committee. The same bureau, apparently, was planned to be created in the Baltic states. At the head of these bureaus of the Central Committee were placed middle-ranking Moscow party apparatchiks who were neither members nor candidates of the Central Committee. They led the central committees of the union republics of Central Asia and Transcaucasia, the first secretaries of which were members of the Central Committee of the CPSU, two of them were even candidates for membership in the Politburo (Mzhavanadze, Rashidov). So, the secretary of one of the Moscow district committees, Lomonosov, was instructed to lead, as chairman of the Central Asian Bureau of the Central Committee of the CPSU, four union republics - Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan. One of the ordinary secretaries of the Moscow city committee, Bochkarev, as chairman of the Transcaucasian Bureau of the Central Committee of the CPSU, was instructed to lead the three Caucasian republics - Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan. Thus, the union republics, which, according to the constitution, are in direct federal connection between themselves and Moscow, moreover, according to the same constitution, are "sovereign" in exercising power within their territory, were deprived of their own, even paper, but still constitutional rights and placed under the supervision of the Moscow governor with emergency rights.

The charter of the party was also grossly violated, according to which the central committees of the communist parties of the union republics are in direct connection and direct subordination.

Central Committee of the CPSU. There was no doubt that this action was in common connection with the preparations for the liquidation of the federation and the transformation of the union republics into

administrative and economic regions. You come to this conclusion when you get acquainted with the personnel of the above-mentioned bureaus of the Central Committee. Here is the composition of the Central Asian Bureau. Four nationals are represented in it - the first secretaries of the central committees of the listed republics and five Russian officials: the chairman of the Central Asian Economic Council, the head of the main irrigation department, the head of the Central Asian cotton growing department, the manager of Sredneazstroy and the chairman of the bureau of the Central Committee of the CPSU.

From this composition, the functions of the Bureau of the Central Committee are visible - to complete the economic zoning in Central Asia, as a result of which their national-state status will disappear.

This was to happen within the same time frame that the CPSU Program called for building communism in the USSR - before 1980. By this date, the merging of all the nations of the USSR into one communist nation was to be completed. Quoted author from

The Academy of Sciences of the USSR wrote on this subject: "Mutual assimilation of nations essentially denationalizes national-territorial autonomies and even union republics, bringing Soviet society closer from this side to the point beyond which a complete state-legal merger of nations will become a matter of the foreseeable future" ("Soviet state and law", 1961, No. 12, p. 24).

There really is no need for comments.

When Khrushchev's own nominees overthrew him by conspiracy, all the reforms he had undertaken and planned were declared the fruit of his unbridled imagination, the fruit of subjectivism and voluntarism. This even explained his world-historical merit - exposing the cult and crimes of Stalin, which was proved by partial restalinization in the Brezhnev era. It was also declared erroneous and his aim was to liquidate the national republics in the near future. Hence the decision of the Brezhnev leadership to dissolve the Central Asian and Transcaucasian Bureau of the Central Committee of the CPSU. They returned to the proven Stalinist great-power policy of denationalization of nationalities, designed for a long historical period.

|. Nations and national languages in the USSR

Initially, the formula "Soviet people" was general and served to refer to people of different nationalities living under a common Soviet regime for all. "Soviet people", "Soviet Union", "Soviet government", "Soviet Army", "Soviet people" - the adjective "Soviet" in all these combinations in the national sense is absolute nonsense, and in the political sense it is deliberate disinformation. A more or less informed person knows that Soviet power in Russia existed - and then only half (the so-called "dual power") - only eight months: from the February Revolution to the Bolshevik October Revolution of 1917. After that, power passed from the Soviets to the Bolsheviks, and the Soviets turned into a screen for a mono-party dictatorship. But then the party proclaimed at its 21st Congress in 1971 that the term "Soviet people" does not mean what people have believed until now, but some fundamentally new and even phenomenal phenomenon: "the Soviet people" is an international nation! Read the party's official definition of what the "Soviet people" are, in which all the signs of a normal nation are present: "The Soviet people, a new historical, social and international community of people with a single territory, economy, socialist culture in content, a union state of the people and a common goal - the construction of communism ... The common language ... is the Russian language" and there is a quote from Lenin that back in 1914 he foresaw "the destruction of the current national partitions" (TSB, vol. 24, part 1, p. 25, M. 1976).

Stalin spoke only of the "socialist nations" of the Soviet Union, which is also nonsense, because in history there were neither slave-owning nor feudal nations, just as there are no capitalist nations. Brezhnev went further than Stalin, proclaiming a new united nation that would disappear only with the disappearance of Soviet power. The new dogma was not terrible, its consequences were terrible. The XXGU Congress was followed by a number of decisions of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the central committees of the communist parties of the Union republics to expand the program for studying the Russian language in schools by sharply reducing the share of the native language. It was then that the idea first appeared not only of the gradual transfer of all types of schools to the Russian language of instruction, but also of the creation of a special network of kindergartens in the national republics for non-Russian children in Russian. Demagogy was also used: "the great Russian language is the language of the great Lenin"! Who among the nationals would dare not to learn the language of the great Lenin? Although the ultimate goal of the Kremlin's language policy at all stages was the transformation of the Russian language into a common language for all non-Russian peoples, nevertheless, such a famous "linguist" as Stalin (remember his work "Marxism and

Linguistics, written in 1951) decided that the path to this lies through national consolidation, that is, through the merger of kindred nations and nationalities into separate "zonal nations" with their own "zonal languages". After all, the former Russian, and now the Soviet empire was and remains the modern Babylon of nations, nationalities and languages. Population census 1926 took into account 194 nationalities with their own language, some of them, of course, were dialects of some main language, although each of the nationalities insisted on the independence of their language. According to linguistic features, the languages of the peoples of the Soviet Union are divided into the following groups:

Slavic group (Russians, Ukrainians, Belarusians plus national subgroups from Western Slavs).

Turkic group (Uzbeks, Kazakhs, Azerbaijanis, Turkmen, Kirghiz, Tatars, Chuvashs, Bashkirs, Yakuts, Karakalpaks, Tuvans, Karachais, Balkars, Khakases, Altaians, Gagauz, Kumyks, Nogais, Uighurs, Shors, Krymchaks and others).

3. Finno-Ugric group (Estonians, Mordovians, Udmurts, Mari, Komi, Karelians, Finns, Vepsians, Mansi, Hungarians).

Letto-Lithuanian group (Lithuanians, Latvians).

Armenian group.

Kartvelian group (mostly Georgians).

Romanesque group (mostly Moldovans).

Jews (including Mountain, Georgian, Central Asian Jews, as well as Krymchaks by faith).

Iranian group (Tajiks, Ossetians, Kurds).

Chechen-Dagestan group (Chechens, Ingush, Batsbits, Avars, Lezgins, Dargins, Laks and others).

German group (Germans).

12. Abkhaz-Adyghe group (Abkhazians, Adyghe, Kabardians, Circassians, Abazians).

The language policy of the Kremlin in relation to each of these groups initially focused on the completion within the group of "language consolidation" and the creation of a common literary language for some groups based on the dialect of the leading people. In this regard, commenting on the language policy of the party, the journal Questions of Philosophy wrote under Khrushchev: "Under socialism, partial processes of voluntary merging of small ethnic and extraterritorial national groups embedded in large socialist nations with these nationalities can take place ... Especially important in this process is the assimilation by the merging ethnographic and extraterritorial national groups of the language of the large advanced socialist nation among which these groups live" (Problems of Philosophy, No. 9, 1961). The author even emphasized that "linguistic consolidation" is not a natural process. Here is what the same magazine wrote, commenting on the new Party Program: "The rapprochement and flourishing of nations ... proceeds not spontaneously, but systematically ... In our multinational state, this is carried out in the process of unified state planning" (ibid.). The well-known Soviet statistician P. Podyachikh in his book "The Population of the USSR" (1961, pp. 111-112) cited data that were supposed to prove that, firstly, there is a special intra-group assimilation in the form of "Uzbekization", "Tajikization", "Georgianization", "Avarization" - when small nationalities among the named peoples are simply ranked as the main people, secondly, another, parallel, process of intergroup assimilation takes place in the form of "internationalization". This means in this case as "linguistic consolidation" within the Slavic group based on the language of the "leading

socialist nation", that is, the Russification of Ukrainians and Belarusians, and the transition to the internationalization of non-Slavic peoples. The author cited above also points to this, without calling the process by its proper name - Russification, when he ends his analysis with the following conclusion: "The census materials show that assimilation occurs in parallel with consolidation" (Podyachikh, *ibid.*). As a result of this manipulation of statistics in

The "USSR Population Census" of 1959 named only 108 nations and nationalities, but already in the statistics of 1979 there were 119 of them.

Brezhnev's leadership moved away from the policy of roundabout Russification through an intermediate stage of "zonal languages" and "zonal assimilation". It preferred the direct path of "internationalization" of all languages on the basis of the language of the sovereign nation - the language of Lenin. But even here a new manipulation began - and even with "adscripts" on two questions in the census forms - in relation to the "mother tongue" and "second language" of the respondent. "Application" here is clearly obvious, especially among the "younger Slavic brothers" - Ukrainians and Belarusians. If for more than 300 years of Ukraine's being a part of Tsarist and Soviet Russia, only 12% recognized Russian as their native language, then only in 20 years - from 1959 to 1979 - this number among Ukrainians rose by five percent, and among Belarusians even by ten percent (from 15 to 25 percent). But here it's not a big problem to make a "subscription", after all, all three nations easily understand each other's language, but in Central Asia and the Caucasus over the same period there was a linguistic "explosion" regarding the recognition of the Russian language as their "second language", although the number of those who recognized it as their "native language" fluctuates around zero. Census witnesses say that Russian was recognized as a "second language" by all those nationals who could answer a couple of simple questions in Russian, as well as by national children in schools and kindergartens with instruction in Russian. It is only strange that in Russian fiction its heroes from the nationals, who even graduated from Russian secondary and higher schools, speak distorted Russian, not to mention the indestructible accent of Caucasians. Soviet authors are now recalling, in hindsight, the Georgian accent of the "father of nations" himself. Not without malice they whisper about the same accent in Shevardnadze, but then some wit remarked: Shevardnadze was appointed not the announcer of the Moscow radio, but the Minister of Foreign Affairs. It will do.

Propaganda and the imposition of the Russian language on non-Russian peoples is accompanied by a deliberate humiliation of national languages, as "non-written," young-written "(Turkestan) or" unpromising" languages (Ukraine, Belarus). What is only in the mind of the Kremlin's great-power leaders is in the language of their grassroots functionaries when they pursue the policy of "internationalization" in practice. There are countless examples of deliberate and rude insult to the national feeling even among such a large and ancient people as the Ukrainian. Here are just a couple of examples from Ivan Dziuba's completely Marxist-Leninist book "Internationalism or Russification?". A literary evening in Ukrainian was held at one of the Ukrainian enterprises. The Russian chairman of the factory committee interrupted the reading of poetry by shouting: "Translate your speech into human language, we do not understand the language of Bandera." Another example. In the case of the famous Ukrainian writer and dissident Vasyl Stus, who died in the camp, there was a witness' testimony: "Vasyl Stus is an obvious nationalist, because he stubbornly speaks only Ukrainian." This book was compiled with the knowledge or even with the support of the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Party. Dziuba went to jail for her, and Shelest, a member of the Politburo and the first secretary of the Central Committee of Ukraine, was removed for "nationalism." Yes, they will notice to me, all this happened in the Brezhnev era - in the era of corruption, "stagnation" and "negative phenomena." Now we are living in the era of "revolutionary perestroika" in all spheres, in the era of "glasnost and democratization", in the era of "new thinking" and "new psychology". But the trouble is that neither "perestroika" nor "new thinking" touched upon the area of national relations. Only with the new perestroika were the great powers and their local vassals and functionaries rebuilt. It is not known how long this situation will last, but new examples of refined great power cannot but disturb, especially since the organ of the Pravda Central Committee itself provides the tribune for the great powers. A couple of examples in this regard. Corresponding Member of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR O. Trubachev is very dissatisfied with the fact that Ukrainians and Belarusians claim priority both in the formation of the ancient Slavic state "Kievan Rus" and in the initial Slavic writing. He writes in Pravda on March 28

1987: "It comes to the point that now in the scientific literature, and among the general public, the opinion has gained strength that supposedly

it is inconvenient to call our initial writing and its language Russian, since this is a common heritage of the language and culture of not only Russians, but also Ukrainians and Belarusians. Here is an example where wrong conclusions are drawn from a correct premise. After all, Rus' of the 10th-11th centuries did not call itself anything else, but only Rus ... One thing is clear: the tradition of the names "Rus", "Russian", "Russian Land" that has been living since antiquity should not be lightly canceled or replaced "... In the author it is not the objective historian that makes the difference, but the arrogant polemicist with the undisguised odor of a chauvinist. This actually explains that the author, in his long discussions on this topic, carefully avoids using the concept generally accepted both in Russian and Western historical science: "Kievan Rus". The author is terribly dissatisfied with the fact that the peoples of the Union republics do not show any enthusiasm in mastering the Russian language. He writes: "From the union republics, especially from Central Asia, there are signals (what an academic language! - A.A.) about the deterioration of the knowledge of the Russian language." In this regard, he gives an "outrageous" example. It turns out that there was a case when a national researcher came to Moscow for a meeting of the All-Union Attestation Commission with his translator. The author says: "A Soviet scientist who does not know the Russian language cannot be called a normal phenomenon." And then he asks: "Can we talk about this as Russification?" And he himself confirms with new examples that it is possible and necessary to speak about Russification. The author argues that it was precisely the science of the 20th century that made a discovery: in the group of contacting languages, one culturally most influential language plays a leading and organizing role. In the USSR, this role is played by the Russian language. He leads, on this score, a really weighty argument: you cannot compare the Chukchi language with the Russian language. This cheap argument of the author leads us astray. Each language is a great and unique phenomenon; how great and unique every nation is, including the Chukchi. In his speech in Literaturnaya Gazeta on November 24, 1986, the Latvian poet Berzins cited an interesting quote from the poems of Peter Vyazemsky on this subject: "Language is the confession of the people: its nature, its soul and life are heard in it," adding immediately the saying of an anonymous sage: "Each nation speaks with God independently." It would be foolish to deny the benefits of learning the Russian language by non-Russian peoples. It must be studied not because it is the language of Lenin, but because it is the language of Pushkin and Lermontov, Gogol and Turgenev, Dostoevsky and Tolstoy, Chekhov and Bunin. It just cannot be studied instead of the native language, but along with other languages - English, French, German, Spanish, Arabic and with any other language, but only by voluntary choice. The only language that cannot be learned voluntarily is the mother tongue!

If Khrushchev declared the study of the native language a voluntary matter, then Brezhnev took another step forward in the Russification policy - he declared the Russian language not only an interstate language for the national republics, but also the state language for the republics themselves and their inhabitants, although formally not, at least least published, legal acts in this regard. His third step was no less anti-national: it was Brezhnev's leadership that forced Soviet historians, as we have already noted, to rewrite the entire history of non-Russian peoples, putting a new historical concept at its basis. The new historical concept was not only anti-scientific, but also blatantly anti-historical. From above, three principles were set that formed the basis of this new concept:

the first principle is that all non-Russian peoples allegedly joined the tsarist empire on their own, voluntarily;

the second principle is that all the national liberation movements that opposed this were reactionary movements;

the third principle - the inclusion of these peoples in the old tsarist empire was a historically progressive act for them.

While studying the Brezhnev period, I made another startling discovery: in the Great Soviet Encyclopedia (third edition) there is no term "Russification"! There is Russification, but there is no such word.

And this is understandable, according to Ozhegov, Russification means: "to make

Russian in language, customs! In his report on the 60th anniversary of the formation of the USSR, Andropov made the old utopian thesis of Bolshevism about the fusion of all nations into one nation, a thesis that Lenin himself later tacitly abandoned when he headed multinational Russia, the central point of his national program. However, after his death, Stalin and his heirs returned to this "primitive Leninism". Therefore, it is worth dwelling on this issue again.

III. Language denationalization strategy

The path to the final victory of communism on a national and world scale lies, according to Lenin, as we have seen, through the assimilation of small peoples by large peoples, which he calls the merging of all the peoples of the world into one communist nation with one or two languages.

True, Lenin was against the forcible or artificial imposition of the Russian language on the non-Russian peoples of Russia, but he believed that when communism triumphed in Russia, then all national languages were doomed to disappear, only Russian would remain, which would become the language of all the peoples of Russia. Comparing incomparable historical processes - the formation of an American nation from different ethnic groups and even different races with a single English language, Lenin thought that the formation of a single communist nation of the peoples of Russia with a single Russian language would follow the same "American path".

Lenin wrote: "The world-historical tendency of capitalism to break down national partitions, to erase national differences, to assimilate nations ... which constitutes one of the greatest engines that transform capitalism into socialism" (Lenin, On the national and national-colonial question, p. 123, M., 1956).

It is well known from history with what fury Lenin fought the Jewish socialist Bund, which advocated the "cultural-national autonomy" of the Jews in the Russian Empire and against their assimilation into the Russian people. Lenin wrote that America "is like a mill grinding national differences", and he calls this whole process "the progressive grinding of nations in America" (ibid., pp. 124, 126), which he considered an argument in favor of an even faster "grinding" non-Russian peoples together with Russians in the future communist Russia.

Lenin overlooked one "little thing": the American nation was formed from various ethnic groups who voluntarily emigrated to America to become Americans. The Russian Empire was formed mainly from forcibly conquered peoples who did not want, just as they do not want to now, to become Russian. This "trifle" was first noticed by Lenin himself when he seized power over a multinational empire. He not only noticed, but also drew sober conclusions from this: the assimilation of non-Russian peoples, like the whole theory of the merger of nations, is a utopia, but as for the fate of his new Soviet empire, its stability, despite the action of the centrifugal forces of non-Russian nationalities, can only be achieved on the path of creating a federation and legally and de facto equal and sovereign national republics. This is how he pictured the USSR as a federation.

Lenin's heirs, keeping the Leninist screen, decided to return to pre-revolutionary Lenin and embark on a new, "Soviet" path of "grinding peoples" in order to create one common communist nation with one common language. For this purpose, a new "national" strategy was developed, in which four components played a decisive role: firstly, instead of a federation, without changing its form, to implement in all spheres of state life the hierarchical principle of absolutist centralism, which turns the union republics into purely administrative-geographical concepts; secondly, to abandon the former concept of the national economy of the republics, allowing in these republics only such "buildings of communism" that constitute an integral part of the all-Union economy, and calling it

"division of labor" between the union republics; thirdly, to pursue in the union republics such a social policy,

which contributes to the maximum, not only class, but also national leveling, for which practice the mass migration of the Slavic population to the Baltic, Caucasian and East Asian regions; fourthly, to take a course towards the translation of all party, state, economic, scientific institutions and schools into Russian, limiting the operation of local languages only to the sphere of propaganda, fiction and art.

The father of this strategy was Stalin himself. This national strategy is consistently and methodically pursued by Stalin's heirs.

With regard to the first two components, Stalin's "national strategy" was a complete success for one well-known reason: Stalin completely destroyed the local national cadres, whom he considered potential enemies of the new strategy, and nominated unreasoning careerists in their place. As for the last two components of the national face and national languages, the matter turned out to be more complicated than Stalin and the successive leaders of the party imagined. Already from the definition given by Stalin to the nation, it is clear why the party suffered and continues to suffer defeat here.

According to Stalin, "a nation is a historically established stable community of people that has arisen on the basis of a commonality of four main features, namely: on the basis of a common language, a common territory, a common economic life and a common mental make-up, manifested in the commonality of the specific features of the national culture" (Stalin, The national question and Leninism).

Just from this, far from complete, definition of a nation, it is clear that if the territory is a given value, then all other signs of a nation have developed over millennia, and therefore are not only "stable", but also indestructible by any decrees. Some of these signs, for example, languages, continue to serve humanity even after the disappearance of the peoples who spoke these languages, if their written monuments have survived (I mean the so-called "dead languages", one of which - Latin - served as the language of diplomats and scientists in the Middle Ages, and even the basis for the formation of Romance languages). All the main languages of the non-Russian peoples of the Russian Empire were written languages, some even several centuries before the emergence of this empire itself. Written monuments of the most ancient peoples on the present territory of the Soviet Union - Armenians and Georgians - date back to the beginning of the Y century of the new chronology. The Muslim peoples of Russia, whom the Soviet propaganda called "non-literate" in order to emphasize that the Soviet regime brought them written language, have been using writing based on Arabic script since the 20th-20th centuries. Even printing among some non-Russian peoples of the Caucasus and the Baltic appeared half a century before the famous Russian pioneer Ivan Fedorov, who organized his printing house in 1573 in Lvov in Ukraine. Book printing appeared in Armenia in the first half of the 17th century, in Georgia - at the beginning of the 17th century, in Azerbaijan much later - at the beginning of the 20th century, in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia in the first half of the 18th century (the organizer of the first printing house here was the Belarusian educator Francis Skorina in 1723-25).

All this is said not to belittle the culture of the Russian people, but to emphasize the difficulty of the problem that the Bolsheviks want to solve by decrees of officials. This problem says: in order to create a common communist nation, it is necessary to create the main and leading principle of the nation and national culture - one common language for all. In the conditions of Russia, only Russian could be such a language. This problem was also raised by Stalin himself back in the late 1920s in the article "The National Question and Leninism", stating that at the first stage of the development of Soviet culture the priority of the flowering of national languages prevailed, but at the second stage, according to Stalin, the non-Russian nations themselves they will feel the need to have, along with their national language, "one common, interethnic language", that is, non-Russian peoples themselves will declare the Russian language first as a second, and then as their first native language. The practical language policy of the Kremlin is now switching to the implementation of the Stalinist idea of creating one common language f

national republics. Here, as we have seen, his heir and debunker Khrushchev made a significant contribution to Stalin's theory by declaring that the study of the native language and the education of children in schools in the native language is a voluntary matter.

However, the Russian general secretaries of the Central Committee were tactful enough to entrust this great-power mission to their local national vassals - the local first secretaries. In Moscow, the leadership of the implementation of this new program of Russification was entrusted to the member of the Presidium of the Central Committee and Secretary of the Central Committee, the Uzbek Mukhitdinov. At the 21st Congress of the CPSU, Khrushchev put into his mouth the party's demand that "mastery of the local and Russian languages should be given the most serious attention" (Pravda, January 31, 1959). The "local language" was fastened here to comply with the "international" pro forma. In fact, it was about a radical revision of the old language programs, according to which instruction in all schools took place in the native language, and Russian was only a compulsory subject. Now all types of schools have begun to be translated into Russian as the language of instruction, retaining the native language only as a subject of voluntary study.

Here is how the organ of the Central Committee of the CPSU, the journal Questions of the History of the CPSU, justified the new language course of the party: "An increasing number of parents of non-Russian nationality send their children to Russian schools completely voluntarily or raise the question of transferring education in national schools into Russian ... Experience shows that teaching non-Russian children in Russian from an early age makes it much easier for them to study the foundations of the sciences" ("Questions of the History of the CPSU", No. 4, 1959).

This directive of Khrushchev and the 21st Congress was consistently and intensively put into practice by Brezhnev. The fruits of this language policy were felt very soon. If, for example, in 1955, according to Professor Ye. the fact that, according to the head of the Kiev city council Timchuk, out of more than three hundred thousand Kiev schoolchildren, only 70 thousand study in Ukrainian (Literaturna Ukraina, April 9, 1987). And these 70,000 probably belong to the parallel classes created now for "window dressing" with instruction in the Ukrainian language.

Undoubtedly, parents voluntarily send their children not to national schools, but to schools in Russian, for one well-known reason: only those children have the opportunity for a successful life career who graduated from a Russian school. For such a career, it is not necessary to know your native language even in your own republic. Thus, the voluntariness of the choice of the language of instruction - Russian or native - is in fact revealed as a disguised form of Russification. After all, if the union republics are sovereign and their national culture is not an empty formula, then teaching children in their native language should not be voluntary, but mandatory. This also applies to higher schools, whose diplomas must be recognized throughout the USSR. Then there will be fewer adherents of voluntary Russification.

The situation is even worse in another Soviet, also Slavic republic - in Belarus. This was told by the great Belarusian writer Nil Gilevich at the plenum of the board of the Union of Soviet Writers in April 1987. Here is a brief excerpt from his speech: "Neither in the capital of Belarus, Minsk, nor in any of the regional centers, nor in the city and even the urban village of the republic, there is practically not a single Belarusian school. There are English, French, Spanish ones, but there are no Belarusian ones" ("Literaturnaya Gazeta", 8. 5. 87). Gilevich added: "There is no literature without language... We are deeply concerned about the language situation in Belarus. But is our concern only our concern? At the same plenum, the well-known Ukrainian writer Boris Oleinik quoted Lenin as demanding "every way to counteract attempts to push the Ukrainian language into the background" with the following comment: "In some of our regional centers, the number of Ukrainian schools is approaching zero" (ibid.).

The speeches of Gilevich and Oleinik were supported by other participants in the plenum, including Russian writers Sergei Zalygin, Yuri Surovtsev, Viktor Rozov, Sergei Mikhalkov, Yuri Bondarev, Stanislav Kunyaev. The head of the writers' organization of Ukraine, Yuriy Mushketik, said: "The school charter, old and new, which is now being discussed in the country and will form part of

the basis of the law on the school, one of its clauses allows parents to choose a school with the language of instruction in the territory of the republic for their children. Mushketik added that this "in practice led to the fact that, say, in my native Chernihiv, where during my youth most of the schools were Ukrainian, as in many other cities, there was not a single school in the Ukrainian language left."

Stanislav Kunyaev gave a curious example, when the love of nationals for their native language is declared in the Soviet press as "national egoism". Here is an example: "Recently, one Kazakh poet published in his local press: "To be proud of the native language, to take care of its purity, to promote its development is one of the main duties of every Kazakh ... The strength of the people is the strength of the language. We must turn the native language into one of the most ... literate and richest languages "». Kunyaev adds: "Probably, each of us, thinking about his native language, will say the same thing in his heart. But how is this natural appeal commented (in the central press): "In the words behind the concern for the development of the native language ... national egoism is visible," wrote the central newspaper.

"I think," Kunyaev continues, "that any normal Kazakh would be indignant after reading this in the newspaper, and I would be indignant in his place and would think: here it is, Russification." Kunyaev adds: "Fortunately, real Russian intellectuals bear no responsibility for such Russification." The writer Kunyaev diplomatically kept silent about where he got the quote from the Kazakh about his native language and who owns the commentary on it. This will be clear if we say: Kunyaev took all this from the article "The Price of Self-Admiration", in "Pravda" dated 11.2. 1987.

But the very fact that in this connection the Russian writer dares to criticize the Great Russian chauvinism of Pravda itself is highly symptomatic.

The speech of the Chairman of the Union of Writers of the RSFSR Sergei Mikhalkov was extremely important. He said: "If we want to preserve national literatures, we must urgently take the most decisive measures to teach two languages in schools: Russian and native. The first language should be your own, native, and the second Russian. In the Bashkir and Mari Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republics, a generation is growing that does not know their native language. How can national culture develop in these republics?"

Indeed, in all programs the party preaches the flourishing of nations and national cultures, but in reality it is carrying out planned and systematic denationalization. Declaring the Russian language as the state language of the non-Russian Soviet Union republics, they also refer to Lenin and the Leninist national policy. Meanwhile, in the article "Is there a need for a mandatory state language?" Lenin clearly and categorically stated: "Russian Marxists say what is necessary is the absence (underlined by Lenin. - A. A.) of a compulsory state language, while providing the population with schools in all local languages, and with the inclusion in the constitution of the basic law declaring invalid any no matter the privileges of one of the nations" (Lenin, On the national-colonial question, p. 148). The entire language policy of the Kremlin in the last 50 years is a blatant refutation of these Lenin's principles.

No. Colonization and Russification as levers of denationalization

The tsars did not send colonists to the national outskirts they conquered, but the army and the bureaucracy. Therefore, the Russian population there in 1926 was only 5%. The Bolsheviks, in addition to the army and the bureaucracy, also set a course for the mass settlement of the national republics by representatives of non-indigenous nationalities, mainly the Russian-Ukrainian population. This course of colonization is carried out under the slogan

"permanent exchange of cadres between nations", as written in the third "Program of the CPSU" Khrushchev. Brezhnev carried out this program installation most intensively for 18 years. It has now been confirmed by the leadership of Gorbachev-Ligachev at their 20th Congress of the CPSU. The results of this successive policy of the general secretaries have also had an effect in practice: now in the national republics the non-indigenous population makes up more than 20%, and in some even the majority. Soviet

philosophical journal under Khrushchev assessed the fact of denationalization of the national republics as a positive phenomenon. Here is what the journal "Problems of Philosophy" wrote: "In the course of socialist construction, in the republics that were especially backward before the revolution ... republics, there is a clear tendency to reduce the proportion of indigenous nationalities ... At the same time, the proportion of representatives of other peoples in the population of national republics and areas steadily increased" (No. 6, 1963, p. 6). The magazine made such a conclusion from the 1959 census, according to which in two union republics, namely in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, the indigenous population amounted to 30 and 40 percent, respectively, and in seven national union republics, the non-indigenous population, mainly Slavic, ranged from 33 up to 47 percent. This process was even more intense in the autonomous republics and regions. In seven autonomous republics, the Russian population was then 39%, and in ten autonomous republics and regions even more - 65%. The mass, in the order of "organized recruitment of labor", the settlement of the national outskirts by the Russian population, the Kremlin calls "internationalization". The cited journal wrote: "Today, not only the republics, but also cities and regions, thousands and thousands of collectives of enterprises, construction projects, collective farms and state farms, and even individual brigades have become truly international" (ibid.).

What is the strategic meaning of this "truly internationalism"? The political goal is the permanent denationalization of the republics, the military goal is the creation of imperial bases with a Slavic population in the most important regions of the national republics, in order to rely on them in the event of national uprisings.

However, in its "internationalization" strategy, the Kremlin did not take into account two factors: firstly, the growing shortage of labor in Russia itself, associated with the consequences of the war (large casualties, slowdown in the growth of the Russian population), and secondly, the factor is completely unforeseen and from the point of view from the point of view of Marxism, even irrational, because according to Marxism the same social conditions have the same consequences, this factor is a phenomenal demographic explosion in the Soviet Muslim republics, where the spearhead of "internationalization" was directed. And this at a time when population growth in the Slavic republics tended to decline. Here are the official data on population growth in the Muslim republics. In 1959, the Muslim population was 24 million people, in 1970 - 35 million, and in 1979 it rose to 43 million, that is, in 20 years the Muslim population increased by twenty million people, while over the same period of time the share Russians in the population of the USSR began to fall. The share of Russians in the USSR in 1959 was almost 55%, and today it fluctuates around 50%, and according to some estimates, it has even dropped below fifty percent. All this complicates "internationalization" based on "personnel exchange" but, apparently, does not stop it. At the 20th Party Congress, Ligachev announced what the essence of the national policy of the Gorbachev leadership would be. He said that under the former local leaders in the national republics, "parochial, compatriotic sentiments prevailed. They hindered the promotion of representatives of all nationalities to the leadership, hindered the interregional exchange of personnel, the exchange of experienced workers between the republics and the center ... (Pravda, 28. 2. 86). If we translate these tirades into understandable political language, then Ligachev, by the words "localism" and "fellowship" means the efforts of national cadres to defend the interests of the national republics before Moscow, as for the fact that the nationals "hinder the exchange of experienced personnel between the republics and the center", then everything is clear: the center wants to "internationalize" the national republics from above with "experienced

personnel", as it later happened in Kazakhstan, and in a number of regional committees of other republics, where nationalists used to be at the head, now "internationalists"-Slavs were appointed. What kind of "cadres" should these republics give to Russia in exchange? Workers who categorically do not want to leave their republics. Of course, there would be communists among the Central Asian peoples who would agree to leave in order to take command positions somewhere in Russia, but the question is: will the "internationalist" Ligachev himself agree to appoint an Uzbek, Kyrgyz, Tajik, Turkmen, Kazakh as the first secretaries of the Russian regional committees? There have never been and never will be such cases in the history of Soviet "international" power. Therefore, the talk about the "exchange of pers

nothing but hypocrisy, designed to cover up the unclean "international" conscience of the purest Russifiers.

We have already said that the strategic goal of migration is the denationalization of nations, at the end of which the indigenous population of the republics will form a national minority in their own republics. From this it is clear that the newcomer population, having become the majority in the republic, will claim to occupy all the leading positions, and the very existence of national republics with a Russian majority will become an anachronism.

The Russian language, the language of this majority, will replace local languages in all spheres of life. What exactly is the linguistic goal of migration was reported by the same journal *Voprosy Philosophy*: "The growing mobility of the population ... contributes to the gradual linguistic convergence of nations and nationalities both along the line of mutual influence and mutual enrichment of national languages, and along the line of turning one of them - Russian - into common language of all socialist nations" (No. 6, 1963, p. 11).

"Mutual enrichment" comes down to the massive clogging of national languages with Russian words, as for the transformation of the Russian language into a "common language for all", this remains the Kremlin's utopian goal.

According to the 1979 census, less than one percent of the population in Central Asia called Russian their native language, two percent in Kazakhstan, about three percent in the Baltic countries, and less than two percent in Azerbaijan and Georgia. Even in the Slavic republics with kindred languages - in Ukraine and Belarus, where the number of schools in the national language is approaching zero, the Russian language is recognized as the native language by 17 and 25 percent, respectively. With such modest progress, the task of turning the Russian language into a common language for all will take thousands of years. Probably, the Kremlin ideologists also came to this conclusion when they came up with a new method of Russification, which promises to achieve this goal in one or two generations. This is the education of non-Russian children in kindergartens in Russian. The first experiment on this part was carried out in some autonomous republics (Mari ASSR, Bashkir ASSR), an experiment that, judging by the speech of the writer Mikhalkov, fully justified itself. The completely legitimate pride of a Russian person for his great language in a Russian great-power man turns into a painful swagger, bordering on the mania of national superiority over all mankind. Hence his desire to impose the Russian language not only on the non-Russian peoples of the USSR, but also on the peoples of the whole world in the future communist humanity. Here is the reasoning of one Soviet philosopher: "It is possible that after the victory of socialism in most countries or throughout the world, one of the existing national languages, which now performs the function of a means of interethnic communication, will be completely voluntarily accepted by all socialist nations as the basis of the future single world language." In order for the reader to understand what language he was talking about, the Soviet philosopher decided to be more specific: "The Russian language ... creates a new linguistic community ... This can already be seen as an anticipation of some ways and forms of the future merger of nations in a single communist humanity" ("Questions of Philosophy, No. 9, 1961, p. 36). Here the party ideologue went against Lenin, who, as we have seen, believed that under communism the world language would be English, although adding: "... and maybe plus Russian."

Inviting the nationals to call themselves "elder brother" (Rashidov: "Uzbeks, like

of all our peoples, there is an older brother - the great Russian people" - from his speech at the Twenty-First Congress of the CPSU in 1976), the Russian bureaucrat, the very one whom Lenin called the Great Russian bullshit, behaves in the national republics as a despotic guardian over young children. The "elder brother" teaches them, urges them, punishes them, but never considers them equal to himself, which is quite natural for the "elder brother" in his relations with his younger brothers when they are still young. But the misfortune of the "elder brother" lies in the fact that the "younger brothers", according to the laws of nature, mature over time and begin to disobey the "elder", who has turned into a decrepit despot. I think that we are living in a time when national relations in the Soviet Union are beginning to develop in this direction.

The latent national forces spoke openly about themselves for the first time just at the beginning of the Gorbachev era, with its official slogans of "glasnost" and "democratization." The signal on this score was given by them at the last congresses of Soviet writers of the national republics, and then repeated at the eighth congress of writers in Moscow in June 1986.

The Ukrainian writer Boris Oleinik, diplomatically placing the responsibility for Russification not on Moscow, but on the local authorities, said at the congress of writers in Moscow: "The issues of language were touched upon at the recent congress of writers of Ukraine. And this is natural, because the problem of the development of the native language has always disturbed and will disturb the writer ... The problems of the native language in school, theater and kindergartens are already issues of national policy, and violation of its Leninist principles hurts acutely. Further, Oleinik turns out to be at odds with the facts when he confidently asserts: "The main danger here is this: the enemies know very well that Moscow, the Russians, as a rule, do not know in a dream or spirit that somewhere has decreased, say, number of schools with teaching in the mother tongue. But it is beneficial for them to attribute to Moscow the distortions made mainly by local, native, home-grown zealots of our political virginity, who inherited the lackey psychology from those who received allotments of their own native land from the tsar for a warped Russian. What is true is true - from the kings they received allotments, and from the general secretaries - nomenklatura positions, dachas, special distributors, orders, even "heroes of labor" for purely lackey service. However, the writer Oleinik for the first time before the All-Union Forum raised the problem of all problems in its entirety: to be or not to be a native language? He was supported by almost all national writers. The Latvian writer Janis Petere gave a speech - a genuine apology for his native language. He even dared to touch on a topic that had been taboo until now when he said: "There is a tense demographic situation in Latvia with a threatening trend towards a decrease in the population of the indigenous nationality" ("Literaturnaya Gazeta", 2. 7. 1986). Writers from Georgia and Armenia criticized those Russian works of literature and art in which nationals are portrayed, if not from great-power positions, then with a clear insult to their national honor. So the writer Georgiy Tsitsishvili said: "We read with bitterness and annoyance the story of the writer Viktor Astafiev "Catching minnows in Georgia", in which the author, resorting to impermissible generalizations, rudely, tactlessly writes about the customs, customs of the Georgian people, presenting national characteristics in the wrong light. ". The Armenian writer Vardges Petrosyan noted that a Russian writer has no right to make any artistic generalizations about peoples he has not studied in depth. He added: "Unfortunately, such attempts are sometimes made, especially on the movie screen: if, say, a representative of Central Asia and the Caucasus appears, this is, as a rule, a deep provincial, speaking with a terrible accent, in a hat or in an old-fashioned ridiculous cap, and most often he is a person from the sphere of trade.

The Armenian publicist and new emigrant Eduard Hovhannisyan told even more picturesquely what the type of Armenian looks like in other Soviet films: experienced Russian sergeant. If he is a scientist and came to Moscow for a scientific conference, then he will definitely start somewhere in the hotel

fry shish kebab and burn an expensive carpet, and his Russian colleagues with a smart look will teach the stupid Karapet that shish kebabs are not fried in Moscow hotels. If he is a switchman, then he will definitely turn the switch in the wrong direction and only a resourceful Russian colleague will save the train from imminent disaster. It has always been like this, and national minorities are used to it."

The classics of Russian literature — Pushkin, Lermontov, Tolstoy — did not know the Caucasus and Caucasians like that.

U. "The Constitution of the USSR" and the national question

Since there have been constitutional states, you will not find a single article in their constitutions that would contradict constitutional practice. If there are violations of the constitution by the executive branch or even by a parliamentary majority, then there is a supreme constitutional court, independent of both the government and parliament, which monitors compliance with the constitution and obliges state bodies to liquidate

committed violations. Now take a look at the Constitution of the USSR of 1977. This is the only and unique Constitution of all known in history, in which the absolutely fictitious rights of the union national republics are recorded. Here are some of the rights:

"Article 76. The Union Republic is a sovereign Soviet socialist state." But what does "sovereign state" mean in the legal sense of the word? Let's take the official Soviet definition from the TSB of the third edition: "State sovereignty is the supremacy and independence of state power, manifested in appropriate forms in the domestic and foreign policy activities of the state." What kind of "supremacy" and "independence" of state power do the union national republics exercise in domestic and foreign policy? It is worth putting the question in such a way to see the absurdity of the Constitution's assertion that the union republics are "sovereign states". If, according to the USSR Constitution of 1924, in some areas the union republics were conditionally "sovereign", for example, in the field of public education or public health, now these branches of state life have fallen under the competence of Moscow, where the Ministry of Education of the USSR and the Ministry of Health of the USSR were created, which were not provided for by the Constitution of Lenin in 1924 or even the Constitution of Stalin in 1936. Another article of the USSR Constitution sounds even more absurd: "Article 80. The Federal Republic has the right to enter into relations with foreign states, conclude agreements with them and exchange diplomatic and consular representatives, participate in the activities of international organizations". What is the constitutional practice on this article? Ukraine and Belarus are members of the UN and have the right to vote at its meetings in the same way as the Soviet ambassador votes, while in other allied "sovereign" states the situation is even simpler. In the composition of the local governments, one of their members is called the "Minister of Foreign Affairs", but if he and his government simply put the question before Moscow about the desire to enter into diplomatic relations with foreign states, such a government of a "sovereign" state would immediately disappear. There is another article in the Constitution of the USSR, which is not only absurd, but downright provocative. It is as follows: "Article 72. Each Union Republic retains the right to freely secede from the USSR." This article mechanically migrated from the Constitution of the USSR of 1924 to the Constitution of the USSR of 1936, and from there to the Brezhnev

Constitution of the USSR in 1977. Hundreds of thousands of representatives of national party cadres and almost all of the old national intelligentsia in the Union republics were destroyed during the Yezhovshchina on the charge that they supposedly wanted to take advantage of this article and withdraw their republics from the USSR. Recent examples of our time: Lukyanenko in Ukraine and Hayrikyan in Armenia, referring to the Constitution of the USSR on the right of each union republic to secede from the USSR, organized in their countries

movement for such an exit. Repressions immediately followed: Lukyanenko and Hayrikyan, along with their supporters, were arrested and imprisoned in concentration camps for long periods. The same thing happened and is happening in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, where mass repressions are still going on for resistance to Soviet imperialism and its crude Russification policy.

Let's move on to the structure of power in the Union republics. Here, as Stalin put it, "cadres decide everything." What kind of cadres in the national republics have the final say—local national cadres or Moscow cadres sent here? The answer is very simple and it is known to everyone: in form, local cadres "rule", but in essence, Moscow imperial cadres rule. In practice, this imperial principle of leadership is implemented as follows. In all the union republics, except for Kazakhstan, as already mentioned above, the first secretaries of the Central Committee of the parties are people of indigenous nationality, and the second secretaries, who are in charge of the personnel of the republic, are Moscow envoys. In all departments of the Central Committee, where the chief is national, his first deputy is a Muscovite. In the Supreme Soviet of the republic, the chairman is a national, and his first deputy is a comrade from Moscow. At the head of the Council of Ministers of the republic is a national, and his first deputy is from Moscow. In all ministries where a Muscovite is not a minister himself, the first deputy is again a messenger from Moscow. These second party secretaries and first deputy ministers, as trusted by the Central Committee of the CPSU, make policy and exercise power in the union national republics.

In the national republics there are positions that are generally not trusted to the nationals: the heads of the garrisons, the commanders of the military districts. In the Turkestan republics, as a rule, Turkestans are not appointed as chairmen of the KGB and commanders of border detachments. The same practice is followed in the Caucasus, the Baltic republics and Moldova. By shooting Beria, the Kremlin attributed to him that he wanted to radically change this order in favor of the republics.

Another small but characteristic remark: all meetings and meetings of the highest authorities in the national republics must be held in Russian, because Russian workers who sometimes work here for decades are not required to learn the local language, and national workers, starting from the chairman of the village council, are obliged know the Russian language - otherwise you will not get the corresponding position.

Let us say a few words about the nature of Soviet "federalism" and about how much the Constitution of the USSR protects and guarantees the rights of the national minorities of the Soviet empire. The Soviet Union considers itself a federal state. The Constitution says: "Article 70. The USSR is a single union multinational state formed on the basis of the principle of socialist federalism as a result of the free self-determination of nations and the voluntary unification of equal Soviet socialist republics." In this article, every phrase is a lie. Anyone more or less familiar with the history of the formation of the Soviet empire knows for sure that not one of the non-Russian nationalities voluntarily joined Soviet Russia. All non-Russian peoples, as already noted, a few months after the seizure of power by the Bolsheviks in Petrograd solemnly announced their withdrawal from Russia and the creation of their independent states (Ukraine, Belarus, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia, the North Caucasus and all Turkic peoples in the East). Lenin, Trotsky, Stalin on the bayonets of the Red Army attached them back to Russia. As for the "federalism" of the Soviet state, this is also pure fiction. There has never been a state in history, beginning with the despotisms of the East and ending with the fascist states in Europe, where centralism, absolutism and totalitarianism would have reached such a pinnacle of perfection as precisely in the Soviet state.

Therefore, the national question is considered in such a state as a colonial question, only it is not called by this term. The skill of the founders of the Soviet type of colonialism lies in the fact that they managed to fabricate props

federation, passing it off as reality.

Now about the guarantees of the rights of national minorities. The Constitution of the USSR does not know such guarantees at all. Usually, if the state is federal, then next to the parliament elected by popular vote, there is another constitutional body chosen from the federated parts of this state. This body, for example, in the Federal Republic of Germany, where only Germans live, and not different peoples, as in the USSR, is called the Federal Council (Bundesrat) and it strictly ensures that the parliament (Bundestag) or the government do not infringe on the interests and rights federated German states. Even other laws of the Bundestag that affect the interests of the lands cannot enter into force if they are not approved by the Bundesrat. The Soviet, so to speak, "parliament" also has two chambers: the Council of the Union and the Council of Nationalities, but the difference between them is only terminological, although for the same props, a Russian is appointed chairman of the Council of the Union, and a national is appointed chairman of the Council of Nationalities.

According to previous Soviet constitutions, only representatives of the indigenous nationalities of the union, autonomous republics and regions were sent to the Council of Nationalities to listen to their specific national needs and national problems, but now in many cases, sometimes half of the indigenous nationalities in the republics and regions are represented in the Council of Nationalities by Russians, predominantly by leading officials from Moscow. Such are the words and deeds of the Constitution of the USSR on the national question.

Nothing illustrates the neo-colonial face of Soviet great-power imperialism so clearly and vividly as its mechanism for electing to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. According to the Constitution of the USSR

(Art. 108) The supreme body of state power in the USSR is the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, but every literate Soviet citizen knows that the highest body of state power is not the state body itself, but the party body - the Politburo, which is not even mentioned in the Constitution. According to the same Constitution, the government of the USSR is the Council of Ministers of the USSR, but in reality the government of the USSR is the Secretariat of the Central Committee and its departments, to which the formal ministers of the USSR are directly subordinate. So the Supreme Soviet of the USSR is not a parliament, not a legislator, as the Constitution considers it, but simply a props, a pseudo-parliament created to give the communist dictatorship an outwardly "constitutionally democratic" facade and decorum of a legal state. Only one article in this Constitution has real force and exactly corresponds to Soviet reality. This is Article 6, which reads: "The guiding and guiding force of Soviet society, the core of its political system, state and public organizations is the Communist Party of the Soviet Union."

Thus, the Supreme Soviet of the USSR in itself has no power, except for its duty to unanimously vote for the laws and decisions that the Politburo and the Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU present to it. The fact that the party apparatus formalizes its decisions through the Supreme Soviet makes the latter, though powerless, but an imposing institution. In addition, the one who got into this institution automatically becomes a member of the highest elite, close to the rulers of the Politburo, because he sits with them under the same roof.

To illustrate the practice of "federalism", let us consider how and to what extent the Asian and Caucasian peoples are represented in this Supreme Soviet of the USSR. In view of the importance of the national question for the stability and unity of the multinational Soviet empire, the Constitution of the USSR of 1924 for the first time introduced an article stating that the then supreme Soviet body between congresses - the Central Executive Committee of the USSR (CEC of the USSR) - consists of two equal chambers: the Union Council and the Council of Nationalities. The Union Council was formed by the All-Union Congress of Soviets from representatives of the Union republics in proportion to the population, in the amount determined by the congress. The Council of Nationalities was formed from representatives of the allied and

autonomous republics in the amount of five people and one person from each autonomous region. But what was important: only representatives of this indigenous nationality could be elected to the Council of Nationalities from each federal and autonomous republic and autonomous region. This article is present in the 1977 Constitution as follows: "Art. 109. The Supreme Soviet of the USSR consists of two chambers: the Soviet of the Union and the Soviet of Nationalities ... the chambers are equal in rights. Article 110 says: "The Council of the Union and the Council of Nationalities consist of an equal number of deputies... The Council of the Union is elected from electoral districts with an equal population. The Council of Nationalities is elected at the rate of 32 deputies from each union republic, 11 deputies from each autonomous republic, 5 deputies from each autonomous region and one deputy from each autonomous district. From this, a person who is not familiar with the procedure for the formation of the Council of Nationalities of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR may conclude that the situation here is exactly the same as it was in the old Soviet Constitutions. In other words, the Council of Nationalities from the RSFSR includes Russians, from Ukraine - Ukrainians, from Uzbekistan - Uzbeks, from Georgia and Armenia - Georgians and Armenians, etc. As for the Council of the Union, it includes deputies in proportion to the population of each union republic. It was precisely in this most important issue of the constitution in a multinational state that the Soviet leaders were able to oppose their written "Constitution" with the unconstitutional practice of virtuoso deceit. It is quite normal that, due to the fact that the Russians make up the majority of the population of the USSR, they send the majority of deputies to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, plus another 32 deputies from the RSFSR. But this is not only a violation of its own Constitution, but also a direct mockery of small nations, when the Kremlin, in addition to the prescribed 32 deputies from the RSFSR, sends not only to the Council of the Union, but also to the Council of Nationalities a large number of Russian deputies from all non-Russian republics and regions, absolutely disproportionate to the size of the Russian population there. In connection with the last elections to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, I will give clear evidence of this. In order not to expand too much, I will confine myself to some typical examples from Central Asi

Caucasus. Let us take one union republic in Central Asia—Uzbekistan. 39 people were elected to the Council of the Union, of which 13 were Russians. 32 people were elected to the Council of Nationalities, of which 7 were Russians, if we add here the three Russians elected in Kara-Kalpakia, it turns out that 23 Russian deputies were sent to the Supreme Council from Uzbekistan, that is, much more than is due to the Russian minority in Uzbekistan. The picture is the same, if not worse, in the Caucasus. From the Georgian USSR, 14 deputies were elected to the Council of the Union, of which 4 were Russians, 32 deputies were elected to the Council of Nationalities, of which 3 were Russians, and counting Abkhazia and Adzharia, ten Russian deputies were elected from Georgia to the Council of Nationalities. Let's move on to the autonomous republics and regions of the North Caucasus. From Dagestan, deputies were elected to the Council of Nationalities, of which 4 were Russians; 11 deputies were elected from Checheno-Ingushetia to the Council of Nationalities, of which 7 were Russians; from North Ossetia, 11 deputies were elected to the Council of Nationalities, of which 7 were Russians; 11 deputies were elected from Kabardino-Balkaria to the Council of Nationalities, of which 8 were Russians. 8 autonomous regions of Adygeya and Karachay-Cherkessia elected five deputies to the Council of Nationalities, of which, in each case, three Russians. In the language of Soviet propaganda, this is called: all the peoples of the USSR are equal among themselves, but practice shows, directly according to Orwell, that the "big brother" is "more equal" than others.

With regard to the technique of voting in the elections to the Supreme Soviet, I am surprised by the excessive modesty of the Soviet leaders. They always get 99.9% and never 100%, because according to the Central Electoral Commission, about 200,000 people voted "no" in the last elections of both chambers. In the last election of Enver Hoxha in communist Albania, only one person voted against. Now the disgraced Chekist General Aliyev, apparently, was haunted by the "successes" of Enver Hoxha. In Azerbaijan, out of 3,439,765 voters in the elections to the Council of the Union, only 11 people voted against it. This is already an all-Union record, and in the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region and

The Nakhichevan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, which is part of Azerbaijan, Aliyev also broke the world record of Enver Hoxha - 100% voted for the "bloc of communists and non-party people" there! (All data from Pravda 7.3 1984).

In the era of "perestroika" it would be wise to stop this children's comedy "elections", the actors and directors of which are still serious people.

PART V. GLASNOST GORBACHEV AND THE CRISIS OF NATIONAL RELATIONS

I. Results of the language denationalization strategy

In the Brezhnev era of "stagnation and negative phenomena", the national republics, on the contrary, experienced a phenomenon that had a crucial significance in their history. They experienced a quiet revival of national self-consciousness at the same pace and with the same persistence with which great-power practice raged in these republics - under the false banner of "internationalization". Lenin's warnings in his last notes on the national question came true: the more the great powers press and infringe on the national feelings of the non-Russian peoples, the wider, deeper and sharper these latter will react. According to Lenin, in any multinational state, local nationalism is a natural and inevitable reaction to the chauvinism of a powerful nation.

The reaction of the new leadership of the Kremlin to the Alma-Ata events correctly records that they were prepared by the practice of the Brezhnev era, but ignores the true background of the events themselves, distorting their great historical meaning. Referring in passing to the Alma-Ata events, Gorbachev said at the January Plenum (1987) that in recent decades "negative phenomena and deformations ... have manifested themselves in the sphere of national relations." In fact, "negative phenomena" come down to the growth of national self-consciousness, and "deformation" - to the deliberate falsification of not only Lenin's instructions in his dying article "On Autonomization", but also to the grossest violation of the principles of the "Declaration on the Formation of the USSR" dated December 30, 1922 and agreements between the Soviet republics on their sovereignty, which were the basis for the creation of the USSR in 1922 at the 1st Congress of Soviets and its first constitution in 1924 Gorbachev

made a false diagnosis of the disease, assessing the growth of patriotism of non-Russian peoples as "negative phenomena and deformation of national relations." But since the diagnosis is false, then the prescription for treatment will also be false, which will further aggravate the patient's illness. The name of this patient is the Soviet empire, which is seriously ill not only socio-economically, but also, first of all, national-politically. Stalin at an early stage of the existence of the Soviet empire called such phenomena growing pains, and in a certain sense this was correct. But the present illnesses of the Soviet Empire are the illnesses of its decline, its progressive decrepitude, the beginning of a general crisis of national relations simultaneously in all its parts. After all, the Kremlin and its new leaders deceived themselves when, in the next edition of the Program of the CPSU, at the 20th Party Congress they categorically stated: "The national question, left over from the past, has been successfully resolved in the Soviet Union." And after this "successful solution" of the national question was followed by the Alma-Ata shock, Crimean Tatar demonstrations in Moscow, repeated and massive demonstrations in the capitals of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania under the banner of the restoration of their national rights, the new leaders of the Kremlin, instead of a sober analysis of in-depth reasons for the growth of the national movement in the border regions, instead of revising the great power policy of their predecessors, they continue the same old policy under the same false slogan of "internationalization", now renaming it the policy of "bilingualism".

However, as we have already said, the growth of national self-consciousness is not local and not

sporadic occurrence. National self-consciousness, which is most clearly manifested in the field of culture and in the "reevaluation of values" of one's own historical past, is growing in all the strategically important outskirts of the empire - in Ukraine and Belarus, in the Caucasus and in the Baltic states. Moreover, it is not some "bourgeois nationalists" who speak as convinced heralds of the national revival, but outstanding cultural figures, communists, appealing to the same Lenin, whom Gorbachev often began to turn to to justify "radical reforms", "glasnost", "democratization". And they all unanimously affirm what we have already said: the immortality of a nation rests on the immortality of its language, adding that their national languages are doomed to disappear if there are no "radical reforms" in the field of party language policy. The well-known Armenian poetess Silva Kaputikyan demands the restoration of equal teaching of the Armenian language, Armenian literature and Armenian history in Armenian schools, along with the teaching of the Russian language, Russian and world history. She gave typical examples: 1) for intensive study of the Russian language in Armenian schools, the Ministry of Education of the USSR proposed to divide each class into groups of 10-12 people, but, she adds, "The Ministry does not allow the same method of learning the Armenian language to be used in the Russian schools of the republic, where 90% of students are Armenians, although many students do not know their own language well"; 2) The second example concerns the teaching of national history in national schools. Kaputikyan writes: "In the schools of the Union republics, few hours are devoted to the history of their peoples. For example, in the fifties we allotted 102 hours for this, and now only 50." Her general conclusion is very sad: "In Armenia, the scope of the Armenian language is shrinking from year to year. Not only in institutions of federal significance, but also in purely local ones, the Armenian language is gradually disappearing from business use ... When the language remains mainly everyday, it stiffens, lags behind and loses its age-old ability to be included in the general movement of the development of human thought" ("Pravda, 7. 5. 1987). The strategic course of the Kremlin's language policy is precisely this - to carry out Russification on the basis of expulsion from politics, economics, culture, science, institutions of native languages, which over time should become something of a rudiment. One can easily imagine how such a language policy is carried out in other republics, if this is how one of the most ancient peoples in the world, with its two thousand-year history of culture and literature, is treated. A document of historical importance on the national question in the USSR is a letter dated December 15, 1986, from a group of prominent cultural figures of Belarus addressed to Gorbachev. It was signed by 28 people - writers, artists, composers, journalists, scientists, among whom are well-known figures in literature, art, science, such as Vasil Bykov, Yanka Bryl, Ryhor Borodulin, Vasil Vitka, Vyacheslav Adamchik. Attached to the letter to Gorbachev is a special document entitled: "A set of proposals for a radical improvement in the situation of the native language, culture and patriotic education in the BSSR." Before evaluating these two documents

in essence, it is important to note that the documents of the Byelorussians were drawn up two or three days before the Almaty demonstration for the national rights of the Kazakh people (December 17-18, 1986). However, the events in Kazakhstan and the Belarusians' letter to Gorbachev are in an invisible but deep spiritual connection. What the cold-blooded Europeans from Minsk argued on paper, the temperamental Kazakhs from Alma-Ata took out into the street. Documents of Belarusians accurately and without emotions essentially reproduce the actual situation in all national republics, regions and districts.

Let's turn to the documents themselves. The main significance of the Belarusian documents lies in the fact that they raise the cardinal question of the national policy of the party, which at this stage of "glasnost" Gorbachev can hardly answer except in general terms. This question is the following: what is the goal of the national policy of the CPSU - the extinction or preservation of national languages, consequently, the extinction or preservation of non-Russian nations? Since one of the ultimate goals is the merger of all Soviet peoples into one

a communist nation with one common language, that is, the Russian language, then the following provision of these documents sounds like a challenge to the entire great-power doctrine of the party: "Language," the authors write, "is the soul of the people, the highest manifestation of its cultural identity, the basis of a full-fledged spiritual existence. While the native language lives, lives, has a historical perspective and the people. With the decline of the language, the culture withers away, the culture degrades, the people cease to exist as a national historical organism" (" Sheets and Garbachov. Issue 2. London, 1987). The authors inform Gorbachev that since the mid-fifties, that is, after the death of Stalin, in the cities of Belarus there has been an "intensive liquidation" of the school network with the Belarusian language of instruction.

Many of the pre-existing periodicals in the Belarusian language are now published only in Russian. Rural schools in the last two decades have actually been turned into Russian schools. There are no higher educational institutions and technical schools with the Belarusian language of instruction. The pedagogical institutes of the republic have not trained teachers of the Belarusian language for several decades. The publication of books is growing only in Russian. Of the 15 theaters of the republic, only three stage plays in the Belarusian language. There are no films in Belarusian at all. The authors sum up the party's national policy in Belarus: "The native language," they write, "was ousted from almost all spheres of society. The Belarusian language as a working language and the language of office work is almost never used either in party or state bodies and institutions ... Persons who use their native language often automatically

are credited as "Nationalists."

The authors remind the General Secretary: "We are going through a difficult period in the history of the Belarusian people, when decisive action is required to save (namely, save, because individual measures of a superficially cosmetic nature of the situation will not correct) the native language, native culture, and, consequently, the Belarusian people from the spiritual extinction." In conclusion, the authors formulated their demands on the Kremlin in three points.

Point one: it is necessary "to start introducing the Belarusian language as a working language into party, state (first of all, this concerns the ministries of education, culture, higher and secondary specialized education, communications, state committees for publishing, printing and book trade, for cinematography, for television and radio broadcasting, the Academy of Sciences) and Soviet bodies and institutions of the republic. Point two: introduce compulsory examinations in the Belarusian language and literature for secondary school applicants. Point three: to introduce compulsory examinations in the Belarusian language and literature for all graduates of higher schools and technical schools" ("Lyuty da Garbachova", London, 1987).

How did the Kremlin and Gorbachev personally react to the Belarusians' letter? We will learn about this from the second letter of the Belarusians, which will be discussed later.

It has already been emphasized that in the matter of Russification, the disciples and heirs of Stalin went much further than their teacher in the cardinal issue of any national policy - in the question of

fate of national languages. In language policy, Stalin opposed Lenin's assertion that a victorious world socialism would use one or two of the existing languages, English or Russian. Stalin, on the contrary, argued: "After the victory of socialism ... there can be no question of the defeat of some and the victory of other languages," and the languages "will merge into one common international language, which, of course, will be neither German, nor Russian, nor English, but a new language" (Stalin, "Marxism and questions of linguistics", 1950). But it should be noted that referring to the role of the Russian language in such a multinational state as Russia, Lenin said that all languages should enjoy equal rights. According to Lenin, the government of a democratic state "unconditionally must recognize the complete freedom of native languages and reject all privileges of one of them" (PSS, vol. 25, pp. 71-72).

Proceeding from this, the 10th and 20th party congresses in 1921 and 1923 declared the languages of the peoples of the Soviet national republics the state languages of these republics - in this

in fact, this was the external form of their "Soviet national sovereignty." But already in the early 1930s, Stalin completely erased both of these congresses from history, although under the Constitution of 1936 Georgians, Azerbaijanis and Armenians (and only them) were allowed to indicate in their own constitutions that in these republics their languages were state. However, Stalin had not yet reached the official declaration of the Russian language as the state language for the national republics. But his heirs came to this, however, without calling a spade a spade. In the "Program of the CPSU" they wrote down as a law:

1) it is necessary to "voluntarily" learn Russian,

2) the Russian language is now "the common language of interethnic communication of all peoples of the USSR." Since then, not only the doctrine, but also the forced practice of "bilingualism" has appeared. The term "bilingualism" for the peoples of Russia-USSR is completely unknown to Lenin. In Stalin, it is found in a distant perspective plan of development.

But the main thing is different. In the mouths of Stalin's heirs, "bilingualism" does not mean at all what follows from the combination of these two words. Indeed, what does "bilingualism" mean in the classical sense? Its linguistic interpretation is given in Ozhegov's Dictionary of the Russian Language in the following definition: "The use of two languages as equivalent." But how can one politically define "bilingualism" under the conditions of sovereign Soviet national republics according to the Soviet constitution? The answer to this question, inimitable in its cynicism, was given by the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Party of Belarus Sokolov to the figures of Belarusian culture, who turned to Gorbachev with a demand to declare the Belarusian language the state language of the Belarusian Republic. Here is the answer: "No one tells anyone," Sokolov said, "in what language to address friends, to speak from the podium." "No one tells anyone," he added, "in what language to write poems and novels." Sokolov made this statement on behalf of the Central Committee of the CPSU at the March Plenum (1987) of the Central Committee of the CI of Belarus, which caused a second letter addressed to Gorbachev by 134 figures of science, culture and labor dated June 1, 1987 ("Lyuty da Garbachova", Ssh. 2 London, 1987, p. 4). The extremely concise, rich in facts, second letter of the Belarusians is devoted to refuting the following thesis of Sokolov: "All conditions have been created in the republic for the development of the Belarusian language, Belarusian national culture ... The fact that our republic has become a region for the development of bilingualism is an indisputable achievement of the party's national policy" (p. .2). Belarusians cite facts against this unfounded assertion: 1) in Belarusian cities in 1979, the share of the population of Belarusian nationality was 71.5 percent, but now there is not a single national school; 2) in all secondary schools, colleges, technical schools, universities - instruction in Russian; 3) "for the entire post-war period, not a single teacher for the Belarusian school was trained"; 4) "practically all office work in the republic is conducted in Russian"; 5) "even simply for the consistent and conscious use of the Belarusian language, a person is often insulted, accused of nationalism" (ibid., pp. 2-3). The authors of the second letter to Gorbachev remind the Secretary General: "We should not forget that all this is happening in a republic that has state sovereignty and is one of the founding members of the UN, in a republic where 83.5 percent of the inhabitants of the indigenous nationality consider the Belarusian language to be their native language" (ibid.). The authors of the second letter also write about what were

the results of the first letter of Belarusians to Gorbachev: "Dear Mikhail Sergeevich! The aforementioned letter of representatives of the Belarusian intelligentsia, sent to you earlier, in fact, had no effect. The individual measures that have been taken or are being planned are of a non-principled, rather 'superficial cosmetic' nature. The conclusions of the commission of the Central Committee of the CPSU, which worked on this letter, were not made public" (ibid., p. 5).

Here the authors of the second letter, of course, are mistaken. Sokolov's speech at the March Plenum of the Central Committee of Belarus was precisely the response of the commission of the Central Committee of the CPSU to the first December letter of the Belarusian intelligentsia. This is in the custom of the Soviet rulers: every time when national relations become aggravated, resort to the method of creating commissions on the national question in order to solve it "cosmetically" in form, but

great power in essence (alas, I'm afraid that the same fate awaits the unfortunate Crimean Tatars, already judging by the fact that the commission to resolve their issue includes such honored Stalinists as Gromyko, Chebrikov, Shcherbitsky, Demichev). Sokolov is right when he declares that "bilingualism" in the national republics is already an established reality, because the Russian language is imposed there as a state language, while national languages exist as everyday ones. He is right when he evaluates this "bilingualism" as an achievement of the Kremlin's new great power policy. The misunderstanding between Sokolov and his Belarusian critics actually occurs due to the fact that by "national policy" both sides mean diametrically opposite things: Belarusians understand the national policy of the party, referring to the post-revolutionary Lenin, the flowering and even perpetuation of nations. The leaders of the Kremlin, also referring to Lenin, but pre-revolutionary, understand by it a gradual but systematic denationalization of all nations. Therefore, the Kremlin allows only such "bilingualism" that does not contradict this strategic goal, namely: the Russian language is the state language throughout the USSR, and the native language, doomed to extinction, is only everyday language (after all, "everyday languages" exist in different regions Russia itself, they are usually called "dialects"). Another historical misunderstanding has taken place, which cannot be explained by any ingenious laws of Bolshevik scholasticism, called Marxist dialectics. The form clearly claims to be the content. In order to preserve and expand the empire, the Bolsheviks resorted to a unique trick in legal thought and legal practice: the republics that made up the USSR were declared "sovereign", while sovereignty was understood as one form to cover up the imperial essence of the Soviet totalitarian state. The current crisis of Soviet nationality policy is the result of the contradictions that have burst out, thanks to "glasnost", between this ephemeral sovereignty of the non-Russian republics and Moscow's imperial dictates.

First of all, the crisis affected the largest, after Russia, Slavic republic - Ukraine, which, under the conditions of "glasnost", is at the forefront of the struggle for the return to the native language of the right usurped from it by the party apparatus to be the state language. The great-power rebuff, which the mouthpiece of the Kremlin - Sokolov - gave to the intellectuals of Belarus, did not discourage the Ukrainians. It can even be said that both Sokolov's speech and the earlier speech on the national question by the ideological secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine, from the same positions as Sokolov, gave new additional arguments in the hands of Ukrainian intellectuals. The facts of blatant violation of all the foundations of the policy that Lenin and his party had declared and decreed many times on the national question were so obvious that the primitive arguments of the party apparatchiks with references to Lenin falsified by them were easily exposed when Lenin's theory and Lenin's practice of the 1920s were compared with the theory and the practice of his students in the eighties. Two examples are enough to demonstrate the depth of the revision of the Leninist national policy in Ukraine: the Leninist government decreed and carried out a total Ukrainization of the party, state, economic apparatus and cultural institutions. Today the word "Ukrainization" is equivalent to "bourgeois nationalism". The Leninist government declared the study of the Ukrainian language and instruction in it compulsory, and the study of the Russian language voluntary. Today it is just the opposite - the Russian language is mandatory, and Ukrainian is voluntary. Dissatisfaction with such a national policy of Moscow came out, first of all, in the speeches of highly honored Ukrainian writers, figures

culture and science, among which there are many members of the party. In a sense, Moscow was taken by surprise by the patriotic uprisings of the Ukrainian and Belarusian intelligentsia. In all likelihood, there was no unanimity in Moscow as to how to respond to the Ukrainians and Belarusians, especially since their demands essentially refer to a radical revision of the entire national policy of Stalin, Khrushchev and Brezhnev. Judging by external data, the Politburo hesitated for a long time between two

positions - either invariably continue the old course of Russification, or try to resolve the crisis in national politics by concluding a compromise with national patriots. When the first option fell through due to the stubborn opposition of the Belarusians, the Kremlin decided to compromise first with the Ukrainians. Hence the resolution of the Central Committee of the Party of Ukraine of August 14, 1987 "On Measures for the Implementation in the Republic of the Decisions of the 20th Party Congress and the June Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU in 1987 in the field of national relations and strengthening the international and patriotic education of workers" ("Pravda", 16. 8. 1987).

We note right away that this resolution, in a certain sense, is jubilee in nature - this is the first resolution of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine in 60 years, I repeat - in sixty years - "On improving the study of Ukrainian, Russian and other languages of the peoples of the Ukrainian USSR." Everyone understands that the Russian language and the languages of other peoples were fastened here only to comply with the pro forma, because all the decisions of the Central Committees of the republics and the Central Committee of the CPSU from the end of the 20s to the end of Brezhnev's rule were devoted to only one language - the study of the Russian language among non-Russian peoples, but not a single party resolution in these 60 years was devoted to national languages. In this sense, the decision of the Ukrainian Central Committee, adopted, of course, on behalf of the Moscow Central Committee, is an unusual phenomenon. Its declarative goal is to perpetuate the role of the Russian language as the state language of Ukraine, proposing for this a conditional and limited expansion of the scope of the Ukrainian language in everyday life, literature, art, at school, and partly even in party and state institutions. The resolution emphasizes that all this is being done on the basis of the principle of a new doctrine - "national-Russian bilingualism." This means that in each republic, as already mentioned, two languages are used: for state affairs - Russian, and for everyday communication - the national language.

The Moscow great powers are forever haunted by the idea of a fix, namely: if all the nationalities of the Soviet Union speak Russian, they will become Russian and then the national problem in the USSR will finally disappear. Hence the practical measures: teaching children in national primary schools in Russian, teaching pre-conscripts and soldiers the Russian language (it is dangerous to form national units in the army), and even a special network of kindergartens is being created in republican cities and towns, where non-Russian kids are spoken only in Russian. The Kyrgyz-Russian writer Chingiz Aitmatov complained that he could not wait for the day when a kindergarten in the Kyrgyz language opened in the capital of Kyrgyzstan, Frunze, and this is where, according to the first secretary of the Central Committee of Kyrgyzstan, 42% of Kyrgyz children do not speak Kyrgyz. Aitmatov diplomatically recognizes "bilingualism", but only with the complete equality of both languages in all areas. His critic, the Kyrgyz writer A. Tokombaev, "expressed the conviction that bilingualism should be a purely voluntary matter, only knowledge of the Russian language is obligatory for everyone" ("Literaturnaya Gazeta", 2. 3. 1988). In this role, the herald of Russification is Tokombaev in the singular among non-Russian writers.

There is already a decision of the February plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU (1988) on "bilingualism", which says: "National-Russian bilingualism should be actively developed. To radically improve the study and teaching of the languages of the peoples of the USSR, the Russian language ... to expand the practice of joint teaching in Russian and native languages in schools ... No privileges or restrictions are allowed on the issue of education" ("Pravda", 20. 2. 1988). This resolution does not contain the main thing: there is no abolition of the law on voluntary education in the native language! "Study" and "teaching", and then voluntarily, of national languages, but compulsory education in Russian in all schools of non-Russian peoples - such is the essence of the doctrine of "bilingualism".

However, great powers do not know enough about the history of Western colonial empires to understand that knowing the language of a great power nation is not a panacea against separatism.

Quite the contrary: this knowledge of the language of the oppressor eventually becomes the surest weapon in the national liberation struggle against

colonizers. Moreover, the language of the former metropolis becomes for many liberated colonial peoples their state language, sometimes along with one of the local languages (former French colonies in Africa, former English and American colonies in Asia, long-standing Spanish and Portuguese colonies in Latin America and Africa). The gentlemen from the Kremlin think differently and therefore complain about the insufficiently vigorous spread of the Russian language in Central Asia, the Transcaucasus and the Baltics. Pravda wrote in this regard: "The task of qualitatively improving the knowledge of the Russian language remains urgent, especially in rural areas of Central Asia, Transcaucasia, and the Baltic states" ("Pravda", 02/13/1987).

I know that not a single national, even in his own republic, can make a scientific, technical, or administrative career without knowing the Russian language, but, one wonders, why does Pravda want every national collective farmer to learn the Russian language?

The Soviet empire demands from its colonial peoples what the Western empires did not demand that all non-Russians learn the Russian language without exception, for this, as Pravda notes, is "a natural process of internationalization of culture and interethnic mixing of the population", that is, the same formula of "fusion of nations » by absorption of small nations by a large, powerful nation. Hence the requirement: small nations must know the language of the sovereign nation.

In national-cultural policy, Stalin's heirs became more to the right than Stalin himself. His famous two-element formula was: "Culture, national in form, socialist in content." Stalin's heirs found that the most important third element, great power, was missing from this formula. Hence the addition of Stalin's formula with this new third

element.

In the cited article from Pravda, the new formula, already put into use under Brezhnev, reads as follows: "Culture united in socialist content, diverse in national forms, internationalist in spirit." Since the connoisseurs of party Aesopism are well aware that the term "internationalization" in Soviet national politics is synonymous with "Russification", then everything falls into place. It is in the interests of such "internationalization" that the newspaper advocates that national historians do not delve into their national past, artists do not cultivate the "reactionary" traditions of their peoples, and akyns and ashugs do not sing the greatness of their historical heroes. Pravda states: "Unfortunately, in some works of fiction and art, scientific works, there are attempts under the guise of national identity to idealize reactionary nationalist and religious survivals, to embellish the history of one people, to belittle the role of other peoples." In a word, what is supposed to be the "elder brother" (to sing of princes Igor, Alexander Nevsky, Dmitry Donskoy, commanders Suvorov, Kutuzov, Nakhimov) does not befit a younger brother (Turkestanis are forbidden to sing Timur, Ba-bur, Kenesary, Caucasians - Sheikh Mansur and Imam Shamil, Ukrainians - Mazep and Grushevsky, Baltics - their national heroes). But the tsarist generals, who conquered the Caucasus and Turkestan with fire and sword, are erected monuments on the territory of the peoples they conquered, as well as to Tsar Peter I in the Baltic region he conquered.

All those who resist this in the national republics are listed as nationalists. It is strange that these Soviet ideologists still call themselves Marxists. I call them monarcho-Marxists, because they wrote the same thing in the old tsarist textbooks. Finally, the question of nationalism and chauvinism. Of course, any nationalism that turns into chauvinism is essentially an anti-human phenomenon. Especially terrible is the chauvinism of a powerful nation in such a multinational state as the Soviet Union, precisely because the powerful nation decides the fate of the peoples subject to it. Local nationalism in such a state is only a reaction to the great-power chauvinism of the ruling nation. Lenin understood this well and fought against it in order to

prevent the collapse of the Soviet empire. Stalin, taking a great-power position, composed the doctrine of "bourgeois nationalists", who, it turns out, are operating in all the union and autonomous republics, but not among the most powerful nation. In this matter, all the general secretaries after Stalin consistently and scrupulously continue the line of the former "father of the peoples." In the 1920s, party documents and the party press still spoke of two deviations in the national question—of "Great Russian chauvinism" and "local nationalism." Moreover, "Great Russian chauvinism", in agreement with Lenin, was declared the main danger. Ever since Stalin, at the 17th Party Congress in 1934, declared "local nationalism" the main danger, the concept of "Great Russian chauvinism" has completely disappeared from literature, but not a single party document, not a single work of Soviet ideologists can do without mentioning the pernicious "local nationalism". nationalism", without a persistent call to fight against it. But here, too, Stalin's students, as diligent students should, surpassed their teacher. After Stalin, both deviations of "nationalism" and "chauvinism" were joined together and found only among nationalists. The new party program states that every Soviet person must show "intolerance to the manifestation of nationalism and chauvinism, national narrow-mindedness and national egoism." At the January Plenum of the Central Committee (1987), which took place after the events in Kazakhstan, Gorbachev limited himself essentially to reaffirming the old line on the national question. But at a meeting in the Central Committee of the CPSU with the editors-in-chief of the capital's newspapers, magazines, and television and radio, Gorbachev, for the first time in his term as General Secretary, said something that admits the possibility of perestroika extending to the area of national relations. Here is a passage from Gorbachev's speech:

"The national question requires special attention ... we are for a respectful attitude to national feelings, and to history, and to culture, and to the language of all peoples, for complete and actual equality. We live in a multinational country, and inattention to these issues is dangerous. Unfortunately, we sometimes assessed the situation in this direction in the form of healthy toasts ... The cultural level of all peoples and nationalities is growing, rising, its own intelligentsia has grown. But addressing the intelligentsia, he added: "It studies the roots of its past, sometimes this leads to the deification of history and everything connected with it, and not only progressive" ("Pravda", 02/14/1987). But there were not so many "healthy toasts" in the past. There was a permanent purge directed against the so-called "bourgeois nationalists" in the Ukraine and Belarus, the Caucasus and the Muslim East; there was a Hitler-type genocide against national minorities during the war. The Great Powers still sing hymns to the tsarist generals for their progressive cause—for the forcible annexation of foreign peoples to Russia. When national historians and writers "deify" their heroic past, they are accused of nationalist idealization of the "reactionary past".

History does not forgive such atrocities, and the peoples never forget them. In this regard, the further, the more the Soviet empire will feel uncomfortable, for it is the last empire in history.

The ideologists of the Gorbachev era promote in national politics two concepts that did not exist before: the concept of "Big and small homeland" and the already mentioned concept of "bilingualism". Outwardly, this looks like a tribute to the national feelings of the non-Russian peoples by the great powers. Indeed, until now only one big "Soviet motherland" has been recognized, which, moreover, must be written with a capital letter, and now it is allowed to write about one's national homeland as a "small motherland", but with a small letters. This is a game of propagandistic balancing act in a semantic sense - a clear "distortion", because a person can have only one homeland, where his people have lived and live for thousands of years. What is the "skew"? At least in the following: Georgians have Georgia a "small motherland", and the USSR has a "big motherland", Russians have Russia a "small motherland", and the USSR has a "big motherland". This division of the "big motherland" into numerous national "small motherlands" is, on the one hand, a forced compromise between the official ideology and centuries and

internally indestructible complex of feelings of national exclusivity, authenticity and uniqueness of each people, and, on the other hand, a compromise testifies that the Bolshevik doctrine of the assimilation of non-Russian peoples by the Russian people with a single Russian language and

the disappearance in the historical perspective of all other languages (more than 100) is tacitly recognized, if not a utopia, then at least something not relevant. Unfortunately, any forced compromise between the strong and the weak is usually short-lived. As soon as the circumstances that forced the authorities to make concessions disappear, a reaction sets in. This is especially true of the doctrine of "bilingualism". Judging by official documents, "bilingualism" is also, in its own way, a concession of the great powers to non-Russian peoples, because from the beginning of the thirties to our time, not a word was said in any of the party documents of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the central committees of the parties of national republics about the need for "bilingualism" or study of the native language, but multiple decisions were made on the need to study the Russian language. Now it is said that it is necessary to study both languages - Russian and the native language, in order to make all the republics and national regions and districts "bilingual". They even begin to say that children of a non-indigenous nationality could learn the language of the nation among which they live. In the report of the Secretary of the Board of the Union of Writers of the USSR Yu. Surovtsev on the 70th anniversary of October, the theses of which were undoubtedly tested in the Central Committee of the CPSU, the following is said on this score: "The literary community of the country almost completely, one hundred percent, stands for real bilingualism ... teaching, in-depth knowledge of the Russian language (in other republics, especially in rural areas, this matter is poorly organized) ... At the same time, for expanding the real functioning of the language native to the indigenous nationality of each republic, for improving its teaching, for spreading this teaching to children of citizens of all nationalities living in this republic" ("Great October and Modern Literature", "Literaturnaya Gazeta", 14. 10. 1987). Notice the difference in the setting of accents and priorities: the intensification and in-depth study of the Russian language even in national villages, auls and kishlaks, and as for the national language, the requirement is not only modest, but even awkward, because what does the "real functioning" of the native language mean? It really functions among its people, but only it is not recognized as a state one, and therefore it does not have access to higher schools and higher institutions of the party and state, where

The new doctrine of the great powers - "bilingualism" - is not only a new pseudonym for the same Russification, but also a meaningless requirement, because a person can know many languages, but can think only in one - in his native language.

Another new concept for the national republics has appeared - this is "patriotism" without the adjective "Soviet". They do not want to speak directly "Georgian patriotism", "Ukrainian patriotism" - this is still the strictest taboo. But even such "patriotism" of the "small motherland" is necessarily associated with "internationalism", that is, with the pseudonym of Russification. Therefore, the complete formula reads: to deploy in such and such a republic "patriotic and international education." But what is important is not propaganda tricks, but the practice of "real functioning" and the unconditional recognition of the language, culture and history of nationalities. Excerpts from letters from the national readers of Pravda, published on August 25, 1987, show how great the gap between word and deed among party ideologists is still. It is worth quoting here some excerpts from them. A Ukrainian from Dnepropetrovsk asks: "Doesn't this lead to an impoverishment of the language - in Russian schools, Ukrainian is not required for study, it is optional. English or German is required, but Ukrainian is optional. Isn't it a paradox?" Pravda comments: "The same kind of lamentations in letters from Belarus. About 20 years ago, the republic adopted a resolution giving parents the right to "exempt" their children from studying their native language at school." Another Ukrainian from Kharkov reports that "one can cite dozens of sad examples of the philistine-Black-Hundred attitude towards

Ukrainian language" and that "Ukrainophobia reigns" in Kharkiv. The correspondent, apparently a nationalist, from distant Khabarovsk, according to Pravda, "belongs to that category of people who lack the culture of national relations." Here is the continuation of the quote: "This is manifested in the deeds and actions of representatives of different peoples of the country. Is this not evidenced by the statement of A. G. Topolev from Khabarovsk, who accuses the Russian people of being a great power? For more than 60 years, Pravda has not found a single example of Great Russian chauvinism in the deeds and deeds of Russian bureaucrats in the national republics, but almost every day it finds examples of local nationalism. Even the act of the Russian chairman of the city council of Kharkov, who threw out all the signs in Ukrainian in the city as

superfluous, Pravda does not condemn it as a manifestation of great-power chauvinism, although it itself reports this in the letter quoted above from a Ukrainian from Kharkov. On the contrary, the author of a review of letters from Ukrainian readers, defending the Great Russian chauvinists, declares that here he is, you see, "a Ukrainian himself by nationality" and therefore he "is especially outraged by this kind of slander of his fellow countrymen against the inhabitants of the second capital of Ukraine." You can be born a Ukrainian, but be burnt out as a "Great Russian bullshit" — in the terminology of Lenin himself. People who consider themselves his disciples should at least know Lenin's work on the national question. Here is what Lenin wrote in his well-known article against the "Great Russian juggernauts" from non-Russian peoples - against Stalin, Dzerzhinsky and Ordzhonikidze: "It is necessary to distinguish between the nationalism of an oppressing nation and the nationalism of an oppressed nation, the nationalism of a large nation and the nationalism of a small nation. In relation to the second nationalism, we, the nationals of a large nation, almost always find ourselves guilty of an infinite amount of violence and insults, and even more than that, we imperceptibly commit an infinite amount of violence and insults ... Therefore, internationalism from ... the so-called "great" of a nation (although great only by its violence, great only as great as the dzhimorda) should consist not only in observing the formal equality of nations, but also in such an inequality that would compensate for the great inequality on the part of the nation, the inequality that develops in life in fact. How did Lenin want to eliminate this actual inequality between Great Russia and the non-Russian peoples, between Soviet Russia and the national republics? Lenin's instructions on this matter are relevant to this day. Here are his instructions: "We must introduce the strictest rules regarding the use of the national language in the national republics that are part of our union, and check these rules especially carefully ... There is no doubt that under the pretext of unity ... etc. we will have a mass of abuses of a truly Russian character... This will require a detailed code, which can be compiled with any success only by the nationals living in the given republic" (Lenin, On the national and national-colonial question, pp. 518-519).

Such statements by Lenin are unpopular in Moscow today, because according to all the current criteria of the Kremlin in the national question, it is Lenin who is an inveterate "local nationalist" who slanders the great Russian people. Therefore, such quotations from Lenin are strictly forbidden to be quoted in the current literature on "Lenin's national policy".

I. Old Kremlin thinking in national politics

The national question has always been a functional dimension of the general strategy of Bolshevism. This was how he was on the path to gaining power before the revolution. So he remains on the path of retaining and strengthening this power after the revolution. Therefore, the formulation of the national question, the approach to it, the nature of its solution, changed depending on the change in the strategy of the party and its immediate goals.

Thus, the national policy of the party in the strict sense of the word was not

even politics in general, but was the tactics of the party, which changed every time the general policy of the party changed. We have already seen what stages the party's general line on the national question went through under Lenin, Stalin, Khrushchev and Brezhnev.

Today, when the general strategy is formulated in terms of "revolutionary perestroika" in all spheres, "new thinking", "glasnost" and "democratization" of Soviet society, the national question, precisely because of this strategy, acquires self-sufficient significance. The very practice of the current dosed "glasnost" shows what potentially explosive forces lurk in the depths of national relations. It was enough for the Pravda newspaper to set an example of glasnost by reporting on the Kazakh national demonstration in Alma-Ata on December 17-18, 1986, it was enough for the Kremlin to keep the KGB and the Ministry of Internal Affairs from dispersing the demonstration and arresting demonstrators who demanded the release of prisoners of conscience in Moscow in early 1987. how new demonstrations in defense of the rights of national minorities followed in different parts of the Soviet empire, the most striking of which were the July demonstrations of the Crimean Tatars in Moscow and Tashkent, supported by the Uzbeks, the August demonstrations of the Estonians in Tallinn,

Latvians in Riga, Lithuanians in Vilnius with slogans demanding that the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact, according to which Hitler gave Stalin independent Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, be declared invalid.

It was precisely the dosed glasnost (under the tacit supervision of the KGB) that many prominent figures of national cultures from almost all republics took advantage of to boldly and openly raise the question of the doom of non-Russian nations to disappear if the current language policy of the party continues. Thus, the Kremlin faced an unpleasant dilemma for it: either to exclude the national republics from "perestroika" and "glasnost", or to announce publicly that the party was returning to their full internal sovereignty, which Lenin had promised them in the 1924 constitution, and Stalin and his heirs completely rejected. So far, the Kremlin has chosen the first path - to exclude the national republics from "perestroika" and "new thinking", while maintaining intact the post-Leninist policy of Russification. That this is the case is evidenced by the resolution of the Central Committee of the CPSU of July 16, 1987 No. "On the work of the Kazakh republican party organization for the international education of workers" ("Pravda", 16. 7. 87). In this document, drawn up in the style of Ligachev, both perestroika and "new thinking" are completely absent.

There can be no greater sin for the political leadership than self-deception in order to deceive others. This often happens when optimistic calculations are based on an erroneous analysis of a new situation. This, in my opinion, is now happening with the Gorbachev leadership in assessing the real situation in the national republics. A few words about the external characteristics of this document. The authors of the document, apparently, never read Lenin's works on the national question, but they firmly remembered and learned what Stalin wrote on this subject. Stalin's attitudes, asserting that in the conditions of a Soviet multinational state, the main and only danger is the nationalism of small peoples, and the danger of Great Russian chauvinism does not exist at all, the authors pass off as Leninist attitudes. Lenin, of course, was a great-power man on a global scale, but he was not, as pointed out, a Russian chauvinist. This showed his flexibility, this made his national policy attractive to non-Russian peoples. The authors of the resolution of the Central Committee give themselves away without knowing it, both as great-power leaders and as Russian chauvinists at the same time. Anyone who knows how to read Party documents will notice this.

The resolution of the Central Committee on national policy was drawn up according to the established stencil - to start for health, to end for the repose. At the same time, "health" is absolutely sober, but it is in deep contradiction with the conclusions of the resolution itself.

This is "health": the Republic of Kazakhstan "is a large industrial and agricultural region. A genuine cultural revolution has taken place, a scientific and creative

intelligentsia... The former leadership of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan, party committees made serious mistakes... The rapid growth of national self-consciousness was not taken into account. The entire subsequent "mortuary" part of the decision just contradicts this sober statement. Accusing the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan that it did not take into account the "rapid growth of national self-consciousness" of the Kazakh people, the Central Committee of the CPSU itself grossly and defiantly ignores precisely the "rapid growth of national self-consciousness" of all non-Russian peoples, which manifests itself in the current era of "glasnost" not only in various demonstrations, but also in the numerous requirements of the national creative intelligentsia.

Let us now turn to the essence of the document. I shall speak only of those most important points on which lie not only Stalin's style, but which are thoroughly imbued with the spirit of Stalinism. It turns out that the leaders of Kazakhstan "had a feeling of national egoism", which was reflected in the fact that when selecting personnel for the party and state apparatus of Kazakhstan, they gave preference to the Kazakhs, and "when entering universities for Kazakh youth, preferential conditions were created" - so it literally says in the decision of the Central Committee. That here we are talking not only about Kazakhstan, was proved by Ligachev's speech in Tbilisi, when he said that there were too many Georgians studying at the Georgian university. All this is condemned

a falsified reference to the Leninist nationality policy. But after all, the essence of Lenin's personnel policy, set forth in his writings, as well as in the resolutions of party congresses during his lifetime, boils down to only one thing - to the indigenization of the party, state, economic apparatus and cultural institutions of all non-Russian peoples. This order was canceled by Stalin, and even excluded the word "indigenization" from the party lexicon. It is, of course, the right of the Kremlin to follow in this case the policy of its still immortal teacher, Stalin, and not Lenin, but then is it not possible to sacrifice political hypocrisy in the interests of historical truth?

In one accusation and in the conclusion that follows from this, the Central Committee even goes further than Stalin. The resolution says: "Proper representation of the nations living in the republic in all parts of the socio-political structure was not ensured. With nationalist distortions, the party and state apparatus, law enforcement agencies, institutions of science and culture were formed. If we follow the exact meaning of such an accusation and the conclusion that follows from it, then in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan in all authorities, in all institutions of science and culture, the majority should be not representatives of the indigenous nationality, but Slavs, because the majority of the population in these republics are Slavic colonists, settled here in the last four decades. Since the Central Committee, judging by this decision, is determined to pursue a policy of "proportional representation" there, eliminating even the appearance of a "sovereign" national republic, a new reality is being created, which not only Stalin, but even Khrushchev had no idea about.

Here is what the resolution says in this regard: "To achieve proper representation in the leading party and state bodies of all nations living in the republic." In simple terms, this means that from now on, not Kazakhs, but newcomers will rule. Understanding that such an open course towards Russification may meet with national resistance worse than in Almaty, the resolution requires: "Convincingly explain the objective nature of the process of deepening the internationalization of all spheres of public life."

In other words, since the "objective process" of "internationalization" is an inevitable process, the Kazakhs have every chance of becoming the first Soviet "internationalists" controlled at all levels by aliens. But in order to become authentic "internationalists", Kazakhs are required to renounce their past – historical, cultural and everyday, and traditionally religious. Indeed, how else to interpret the following passage in the decision: "In scientific

In works, works of literature and art, the past of the Kazakh people was often idealized, attempts were made to rehabilitate bourgeois nationalists... The tendency towards national isolation intensified... The fight against feudal-bay customs, patriarchal customs was curtailed... The struggle to expose the reactionary essence of Islam is inactive, with his attempts to preserve obsolete traditions ... The influence of clergymen on various aspects of life and life of the population has increased. Moreover, it turns out that religion is supported and even leading communists participate in religious rites. Therefore, the resolution says, it is necessary "to conduct an active struggle against nationalist sentiments, feudal Bai customs, tribal traditions, and religious prejudices." Anyone more or less familiar with the history of the national-colonial policy of the party understands that all this anti-national verbal rubbish is taken from the writings of Stalin and the decisions of the Stalinist Central Committee of the late twenties and early thirties. What the Central Committee now demands from its functionaries in Turkestan has been practiced there for sixty years not in words, but in deeds: the physical destruction of beys, mullahs, "bourgeois nationalists", the closure of all mosques, permanent terror against the people, and finally, repeated purges even against the communist intelligentsia on charges of the same "local nationalism". And the result? The result is the one noted in the document of the Central Committee - "the rapid growth of national self-consciousness."

This is not a local Kazakh phenomenon. The growth of national self-consciousness is a universal phenomenon, because, as the Central Committee correctly notes, national cadres, national creative intelligentsia have grown. It was easier for Stalin to manage the national republics, because he systematically and methodically removed their top layer - the intellectual elite, while in it

national self-consciousness had not yet awakened, and Khrushchev and Brezhnev were forced to abandon such Stalinist methods. This is the secret of the emergence of a new phenomenon - the revival of the whole complex associated with the concept of nationality, which includes not only interest in one's history, culture, language, literature, but also a sense of pride that one belongs to this original and unique people. Ignoring all this, the Kremlin is fighting against the sign of the times, when its Pravda organ demands: "Educate in such a way that the Soviet person feels first of all a citizen of the USSR and then a representative of this or that nation" (04/07/87).

This call is destined to remain a voice crying in the Asian desert!

For all my pessimism, I am still inclined to think that Gorbachev and his leadership have not yet said the last word on the national question. In view of the ever-increasing pressure of the national intelligentsia of all the republics, the Kremlin will be forced to go for some kind of "perestroika and democratization" in its national policy as well. This follows from Gorbachev's speech on the 70th anniversary of October, when he declared: "National relations in our country are a living issue of living life. We must be extremely attentive and tactful in everything that concerns the national interests or national feelings of people ... We intend to analyze these issues in more depth in the near future, taking into account what perestroika, democratization, a new stage in its development brings to the life of the country "(Pravda, 11/3/1987).

In this regard, Gorbachev remarked: "We are now increasingly turning to the latest works of Ilyich." So, the penultimate work of Lenin was the article cited above "On the question of nationalities or "autonomization"". In it, Lenin proposed to return to the Union republics their full sovereignty. If the new leadership in the Kremlin is capable of fulfilling this will of Lenin, then this is really perestroika, and everything else is cosmetic.

When one reads the documents of the Central Committee and the speeches of its two leading leaders, Gorbachev and Ligachev, on the national question, one gets the impression that the Politburo has not yet worked out a single line in national policy. If there is no intentional division of functions between Gorbachev and Ligachev in tactical

goals on the principle of pleasing both "ours and yours", which I do not exclude in the general policy of perestroika, then in my eyes Gorbachev vacillates in the direction of Lenin's position against the great powers, and Ligachev remains a staunch supporter of the continuation of the Russification policy of Khrushchev and Brezhnev. This fact is attested in the documents of the February plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU (1988). In a report on school restructuring, Ligachev supported the policy of voluntariness in the study of native languages, except for Russian. Here are his words: "Refusal of voluntariness in the choice of the language of instruction for children by parents would lead to a violation of democratic principles in the national question" ("Pravda", 02/18/1988). If you follow the logic of Ligachev, the tsars and their ideologists were great "democrats", because under them it was not necessary to study their native language even voluntarily, moreover, the "democrat" himself is not very consistent, because his "democratism" does not apply to Russian and foreign languages .

Ligachev sternly warned the non-Russian peoples: "It must not be allowed that ... love for the native language turns into linguistic chauvinism!" It is terrible that this man controls the fate of a great empire, half of which is non-Russian peoples.

Gorbachev in his speech did not mention either "voluntariness" in the choice of language, or "linguistic chauvinism", but only repeated his old theses, without contradicting the second leader.

As Moscow's reaction to the February national independence day demonstrations in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania shows, the Kremlin is still deluding itself if Soviet propaganda documents express its true opinion. It is ridiculous and absurd when Soviet propaganda ascribes the growth of the national movement in the empire to malefactors from "extremists" or even foreign "radio voices".

However, the most terrible thing is that, apparently, the Soviet imperialists are not averse to directing the growth of national self-consciousness of both the Russian people and national minorities to the tried and tested path of all dictators since Roman times: "divide and rule." The anti-Semitic slogans of the right wing of the Russian national movement "Pamyat" and the Armenian-Azerbaijani clashes in February 1988 with many dead and wounded are ominous symptoms of this. After all, the massacre began when the Deputy Prosecutor General of the USSR A. Katusev publicly stated that two Azerbaijanis had been killed in Karabakh. Katusev resorted to equivocations, but his spiritual predecessor, the chief commander in the Caucasus before the revolution, Prince Golitsyn, inciting Georgian nationalism against the Armenians, expressed himself more clearly: Once upon a time, Armenians also lived in the Caucasus."

If a multinational empire is pregnant with two revolutions at once - a social one in Russia and an anti-colonial one in the outskirts - then the easiest way to hasten a miscarriage is to organize anti-national pogroms. In addition, the point is not in Karabakh (there is neither Azerbaijani nor Armenian power there - there is, like everywhere else, Moscow power), but the point is in the slogan that flaunted on the posters of the almost million-strong demonstration in Yerevan: "For a non-partisan Armenia!" .

Sh. Problems are new, but solutions are old

Since the statistics on this score are the greatest secret of the Kremlin, it is impossible to calculate who lives at the expense of whom in the Soviet empire - the metropolis at the expense of the Soviet colonies or the Soviet colonies at the expense of the metropolis. But one thing is clear: the most important strategic raw materials and resources, their exploitation and processing are largely in the non-Russian republics - in Ukraine and Belarus, in the Baltic republics and Moldova, in the Muslim East and in the Caucasus. All the most important products of the mining and processing industries go to

centralized "all-union fund" in Moscow. The union republics have not the slightest influence on the distribution of income from this fund. They, of course, receive back a certain part through the all-Union budget, which has nothing to do with the size of their contribution to the said fund.

Even this part is actually disposed of by the State Planning Commission and the Moscow ministries, placed above the local ministries. The desire of the latter to get "more" Moscow qualifies as "national egoism", "localism" and "dependency". The meaning of these labels is that the republics give less than they can, but try to take more than they deserve. When the center draws its conclusions from here, cutting the budgets of the national republics, the republics respond by tacit sabotage of the implementation of the imperial economic plans. Vivid evidence in this regard is contained in the resolution of the Central Committee of the CPSU of June 20, 1987 "On the unsatisfactory use of the natural and economic potential of the agro-industrial complex in the Uzbek SSR, the Tajik SSR and the Turkmen SSR." In view of the importance of the question, we will quote from it. The resolution notes that "the agrarian-industrial complex of the Uzbek SSR, the Tajik SSR and the Turkmen SSR occupies a particularly important place in the all-Union division of labor. The collective farms and state farms of these republics are the main producers of cotton... However, the powerful production and economic potential created in this region, water resources, and favorable natural conditions are used unsatisfactorily... deliveries of many types of products to the all-Union fund are not fulfilled... Productivity livestock here is one of the lowest, and the cost of feed is almost twice the cost in the country ... For ten years, labor productivity in the Uzbek USSR did not increase, in the Tajik SSR and the Turkmen SSR it even decreased with an increase in wages by 1.3-1, 4 times".

Such a deplorable state of affairs in the Central Asian republics has developed despite the fact that in the last decade there was invested in the national economy twice as much money as in the previous decade, namely 43 billion rubles. How does the Kremlin explain this, not

only stagnation, but regression, in the supply of cotton and other products of the agro-industrial complex of these republics? The answer given in the resolution of the Central Committee of the CPSU repeats what all the general secretaries from Khrushchev and Brezhnev to Andropov and Chernenko said on this score. Here is what he says: "The leading cadres of the republics are subject to dependency, the desire is developed to receive as much material and financial resources from the state" ("Pravda", 06/20/1987).

Such aspiration of the leaders of the union republics in the party press is qualified as a manifestation of "national egoism" and a violation of the principles of "internationalism". Until now we have known from Party documents that the directive imposition of instruction in Russian in non-Russian schools was called "internationalism." Now we learn from another resolution of the Central Committee of the CPSU, this time about Kazakhstan, that "genuine internationalism" has another, perhaps even more important, aspect - an economic aspect, namely: to supply material values from the republics to the all-Union fund in an increasing progressions. Here is the relevant place: "The Central Committee of the CPSU emphasized that internationalism, not in words, but in deeds, should be manifested, first of all, in increasing the contribution of Kazakhstan to the country's unified economic complex, the steady increase in the return of the scientific and production potential created in the republic, and active participation in solving national problems ". ("Pravda", 16.7.1987).

If these formulations are freed from verbal husks and juggling with concepts, then only their true essence remains: not the interests of these republics, but the interests of the metropolis above all else. Hence the requirement for the national republics to increase their contribution to the "single fund of the country." Marx called this the colonial robberies of the imperialists, the Soviet imperialists renamed them the contribution of "internationalists".

The Pravda newspaper, commenting on the decision of the Central Committee, accused the national republics of becoming a brake on the economic development of the Soviet Union. The newspaper writes:

"The economy is the material basis on which the unity of our society, the USSR, is based ... The brakes on the path of socio-economic acceleration are relapses of isolation, parochialism, dependency, attempts to snatch more from the all-Union pie and give less to ourselves. Therefore, it is necessary to raise the responsibility of the communists, of all working people for increasing the contribution of each republic to the national wealth" ("Pravda", 21.07.1987). In other words, according to the Kremlin, a phenomenal process has taken shape in the Soviet empire, unknown to Western imperialists: the capitalist empires grew rich at the expense of their colonies, while the Soviet empire, on the contrary, became impoverished because of its "dependents" — the national republics. This phenomenon is based on the same social law that operates in Soviet society - the absence of personal material interest. It is in the nature of things - every person strives for material security, and every nation - for wealth and abundance. But the Soviet economic system has deprived both the individual and the nation as a whole of impulses to free creativity, and, on its basis, to enrichment.

In the union republics, there are added to this the specific national reasons for the "braking mechanism" pointed out by Pravda. As already noted, in the time of Lenin, the national republics were sovereign in internal affairs and developed their own economy based on the use of local resources in the interests of this nation.

Stalinist socialism, which still dominates the USSR, radically eliminated not only their sovereignty, but also their national economies. Instead of national economies, they began to create "all-Union construction sites of communism", directly subordinate to Moscow. Masters of all leading qualifications were brought to the "great construction sites" in the order of "organizational recruitment" from Russia. Laborers were to be supplied by local rulers in order to create a "national working class". But none of their efforts helped here and still do not help - the nationals for the most part refuse to go into production, young people do not go to vocational schools, preferring universities to them, and adults manage to arrange their lives in such a way that they live

materially better than collective farmers and workers in Central Russia. This second phenomenon, noticed even by foreign tourists, is explained in different regions by different reasons.

In the Baltic republics, which are highly developed in science and technology, this is explained by their ability to adapt to existing laws in their national interests, and in the Caucasian and Muslim republics, by their amazing ability to circumvent these laws.

I have already noted that the strategic plan of the "all-Union construction projects" was not only to make the most efficient use of the raw materials of the outskirts, but also to create important strongholds of the empire with a Slavic population there.

The mass colonization of the Muslim republics by the Slavic population, not only industrial areas, but also virgin ones, led to a sharp drop in the proportion of the indigenous population (for example, in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, the indigenous people are national minorities). When the decline in the growth of the Slavic population of the USSR was indicated, with the continued growth of the Muslim population, a double crisis immediately arose: in the Slavic republics there was not enough labor, and in the Muslim republics a dangerous excess of it formed. Hence, a new "international" doctrine of "personnel exchange" arose - from now on, Moscow will send only the highest bureaucracy and technical command staff to the national republics, and these republics must supply Russia with their surplus labor force. As can be seen from the current Soviet press, the doctrine of "personnel exchange" also worked only one-sidedly - Moscow party apparatchiks moved in masses to the national republics to take the places that had become vacant after the total purge of nationalists accused of corruption. However, the counter movement of nationalists to Russia did not take place. On the contrary, a process has begun that cannot but disturb Moscow: Russian colonists in whole groups

returned back to Russia, due to the growing hostility of the natives to the newcomers.

Attempts to replace "re-emigrants" in production with natives have had little success.

All of the above is noted, albeit in the obscure jargon of party Aesops, in the same resolution on Kazakhstan, which we have already quoted. Here are the relevant passages from it: "The governing bodies of the republic have abstained from the purposeful formation of national cadres of the working class... The share of Kazakhs among industrial workers has decreased... few young people of Kazakh nationality enter vocational schools and secondary specialized educational institutions... At the same time, without sufficient grounds, the network of higher educational institutions expanded. When entering universities, Kazakh youth were provided with preferential conditions" ("Pravda", 16. 7. 87). Only the spiritual heirs of Purishkevich, but not Lenin, can agree to the fact that in Kazakhstan Kazakhs are created "preferential conditions" for entering Kazakh universities and consider this as a violation of the "Leninist national policy".

The resolution of the Central Committee claims that the reverse movement of Russians from Kazakhstan is also explained by the nationalist policy of the former leadership of Kunaev in relation to these Russian groups, but deliberately omits the fact that it was not Kunaev who was in charge of personnel and "internationalization" under Kunaev, but the second secretary from Moscow, a direct protege of the Central Committee of the CPSU. The resolution says: "These violations, as well as inattention to the needs and demands of some national groups (here we are talking about Slavic national groups - the author) caused the outflow of part of this population from the republic, especially from Guryevskaya, Dzhezkazganskaya, Kzyl-Ordynskaya, Semipalatinsk, Tselinograd regions" (ibid.).

The named document of the Central Committee of the CPSU regarding the Kazakh Republic is unique in the entire history of the national policy of Bolshevism. One wonders how such a work could appear in the era of "perestroika", "glasnost" and "democratization".

IM. "Opressed" Negroes, "free" Crimean Tatars and "bandits" Chechens and Ingush

At the reception of the delegation of the American Congress in the Kremlin in April 1987, Gorbachev asked the Americans a question that testifies to how little America was known not only by Lenin, but also by his seventh successor General Secretary Gorbachev.

There are many different peoples living in the United States, but why don't you have state formations based on an ethnic and cultural basis for blacks, for Poles, for Puerto Ricans and others? - that was the question. At the same time, Gorbachev referred to the pseudo-autonomy of the small peoples of the USSR.

The Negro pastor Jackson, a former and future candidate for the post of American president, who was present in the delegation, considered himself mortally insulted as an American and, after returning to America, filed a protest with the Soviet ambassador against Gorbachev's tactlessness. The pastor probably remembered that in the West such "state formations" for blacks exist only in one state - in the Republic of South Africa with its policy of apartheid, where the so-called "fatherlands" of blacks have been created, which have as much independence from whites as its have Soviet union republics from Moscow.

Under the American constitution, all races are equal. America knows neither institutional nor territorial segregation. Of course, there were and still are racial prejudices among a part of the population, but just after the Second World War, America took a giant step forward in overcoming them, which was facilitated by the mass heroism of Negro soldiers and officers in this war. Who does not know that even such a small state of America, in terms of the number of aboriginal populations, as Hawaii (200 thousand inhabitants) enjoys much greater independence in its internal self-government than

Soviet Ukraine with its fifty million people. Moreover, the Ukrainian rulers, like the rulers of other Soviet republics, are appointed from Moscow, and the Hawaiian governor, like the governors in all other states, is chosen on the spot, completely independently of Washington and in truly free elections with the participation of several candidates from competing among themselves political parties.

With his strange remark, the Secretary General hit, as they say, a finger in the sky because of ignorance of the history of the formation of the American nation.

Gorbachev only repeated Lenin's mistake by comparing the national question in the Russian Empire with the process of integration of national minorities in the United States. The Russian Empire was formed by the annexation of non-Russian peoples to Russia, who never wanted, as they still do not want to become Russian, and the United States was formed from immigrants of different peoples who wanted to become Americans and created from the former English colonies in the war for independence (1775- 1783) a new single nation - American.

In the Declaration of Independence of July 4, 1776, sacred to democracy, not in words but in practice, the principles of equality of people of all races and beliefs before the law, their inalienable rights to "life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness" were proclaimed. No one else, but Karl Marx himself, called the American "Declaration of Independence" "the first declaration of the rights of man", for it was twelve years ahead of the famous "Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen" of 1789, with which the Great French Revolution began.

The only ethnic group that was brought to America as slaves against their will were blacks from Africa who had to work on plantations in the southern states. It took the Civil War of 1861-1865 to free them from slavery. Created in 1854 in the northern states, the Republican Party, one of the organizers of which was Abraham Lincoln, set as its goal the elimination of slavery in the southern states. When Lincoln was elected president of the United States in 1860, the southern states announced their withdrawal from the United States and the formation of their own state. The Civil War began, bringing the victory of the North over the South and the complete elimination of slavery. Recall that at the same time that Lincoln freed black slaves from white slave owners by war, in Russia Tsar Alexander II freed white slaves from white slave owners by the Great Peasant Reform.

The fate of both liberators was tragic: Lincoln was killed by a mercenary of former slave owners, and Alexander II was killed by people who fought for the "people's will." The paradoxes of Russian history are truly inscrutable.

But back to black Americans, American Poles, Puerto Ricans. With the same right to include American Italians, Irish, Hispanics, Jews and others. If the unbelievable happened and the American Congress, following Gorbachev's recommendation, would pass a law on the "restructuring" of the United States along ethnic lines, then all the named American "nationalists" would be the first to rebel against such a law. All of them are equally proud that they are Americans, and only then do they remember the romance of the distant historical memories of grandparents, about how their parents or grandparents once arrived in America from such and such countries, having a couple of dollars in their pockets, otherwise and without a cent. Grandparents still somehow spoke the language of their former homeland, and their children and grandchildren spoke only English - not because it was imposed on them by the government, but because knowledge of English made it possible to succeed in any part of this large countries.

Their new homeland - a country of immigrants from various parts of the world - after the Civil War did not know and does not know national or racial discrimination. In America, blacks are still lynched only in the fantasies of Soviet propagandists. In many cities with an absolute majority of the white population, blacks are elected mayors of cities (for example, in Los Angeles, Chicago, Atlanta and other cities). Even in the

the capital of the United States - Washington - the mayor of the city - black. There are also many blacks among high-ranking officials, ambassadors, generals, outstanding athletes and representatives of the arts. It will not be surprising if, over time, a black man will sit in the White House. If we talk about Puerto Ricans, then the population of Puerto Rico was in 1970. 2.7 million, while 1.3 million had emigrated to the US by this time to become Americans. The number of people from South American countries who illegally cross US borders to settle there for life is in the millions. Recently, the government has taken steps to legalize them.

It is strange that the promised country of the "Soviet way of life", which proudly advertises itself as the "fatherland of all the working people of the world", has never known such a craving for these working people. On the contrary, everyone who succeeds is trying to break out of it. For example, the list of "refuseniks" among Jews now includes about 400,000 people. Tens of thousands of Germans and Armenians are also "refusal."

Any American can leave America, even to the Soviet Union. Allegedly full-fledged Soviet citizens of the Crimean Tatar and German nationalities cannot return (within the USSR!) to their own territories, the autonomy of which, on an "ethnic and cultural basis", was recognized under Lenin. Therefore, Gorbachev's reference to the allegedly successful Soviet experience in resolving the national question sounds like a historical anecdote (Gorbachev told congressmen that America oppresses national minorities, but we, they say, gave "autonomy" to the Tatars, Jews and Chukchi). As the congressmen answered him, we do not know, but we know something else: the Tatars, a six million people of ancient culture, were not given the rank of a union republic on the grounds that they live inside Russia and cannot, if desired, secede from the USSR, using the constitutional right union republics, as if the Kremlin would allow this to the outlying republics. As for the Jews, there are about two million of them in the USSR. But they were not even given "national-cultural autonomy", but were given autonomy to Birobidzhan, where 60,000 Jews live (after the war, Jewish schools, theaters, and literature were banned by Stalin).

The Crimean Tatar people are the only small peoples of the former Russian Empire to which autonomy was given on the personal initiative of the chairman of the Soviet government, Ulyanov-Lenin, who supported the proposal of one of the leaders of the Crimean regional party committee, his younger brother Dmitry Ulyanov.

Dmitry Ilyich Ulyanov, MD, was the representative of the Bolshevik party center in the Crimea before the revolution, in the underground, during the revolution and after the victory of the Bolsheviks, until 1921. He spoke highly of the national culture, traditions, wisdom and diligence of the Crimean Tatars and had many friends among them who provided him with help and hospitality in the difficult years of his persecution. I know this well from first hand: the Ulyanovs' maternal cousin, Zalezhskaia, nee Blank, was my professor at the Institute of Red Professors in the thirties. Lenin signed the decree on the formation of the Crimean ASSR on October 18, 1921, eleven months after the White troops of General Wrangel left the Crimea.

This fact alone proves that the Crimean Tatar people were on the side of the revolution.

The Crimean Tatar people are one of the most ancient peoples of Turkic origin in the current territory of the USSR, and their state is much older than the Muscovite kingdom itself. The Crimean independent state, called the "Crimean Khanate", separated from the "Golden Horde" as early as the 15th century (1443). In view of the Slavic tribes advancing from the north, the Crimean Khanate entered into a military-political alliance with Turkey (1475), which provided it with more than three hundred years of independent existence. However, after the formation of the centralized Russian state, and then the Russian Empire, the Crimea, along with the Caucasus, becomes the main object of the increasing expansion of "Russian military-feudal imperialism", as Soviet historiography of the times of Lenin and Pokrovsky expressed it. In a long war against the Crimean Khanate and its ally

Turkey, the Russian army defeated the Tatars and Turks and captured the Crimea (1772). According to the so-called Kuchuk-Kainarji peace of 1774, the Crimean Khanate was preserved, but placed under the protectorate of Russia; what kind of "protectorate" it was, is clear from the motto of Empress Catherine II: "Blessed is the hour when the Crimea will be cleared of this wild tribe and replaced by a noble breed."

The Crimean Tatar patriots, in their address to the Politburo on the eve of the 60th anniversary of the October Revolution, characterized this motto as follows: "It meant Crimea without Crimean Tatars." But the motto remained a mere threat. Neither Catherine nor the subsequent kings of the Crimean Tatars destroyed or evicted from their homeland. The Crimean Khanate, annexed in 1783, ceased to exist, turning into an ordinary province of the Empire.

In order for Crimea to be left without the Crimean Tatars, and for this nation itself to be almost half destroyed after 160 years of its forcible incorporation into the Russian Empire, it took this empire to turn from a tsarist empire into a Soviet empire. On May 18, 1944, within one day, 422,000 people of Crimean Tatar nationality were loaded into freight wagons and deported without exception to Central Asia on a false charge: "For treason." The same appeal, under which there are 2,500 signatures of people's representatives, speaks about the fate of the Crimean Tatar people upon arrival at the place of exile: "For the first year and a half in the grip of a special regime! according to the census of the people - the payroll (materials are stored in the Central Committee of the CPSU) - 46.2% of the total number of the entire deported people died from mass mortality. This is about 200,000 lives, of which over 100,000 are children" (see A. Nekrich, Punished Nations, New York, 1978).

At the 20th Party Congress in 1956. The Soviet government condemned the practice of evicting entire peoples on the false accusation of collaborating with the Germans during the war. It was the practice of Hitler's type of genocide, when an entire nation, including the elderly, women, children, was declared an "enemy people" on just one racial basis. This massacre was recognized as the cost of the "cult of personality of Stalin"; but Stalin has been dead for more than thirty-five years, and the Crimean Tatar people, like the Volga Germans and Georgian Meskhs (more than 200 thousand people), are still deprived of the right to return to their ancestral lands. This is all the more strange because already after the fall of Khrushchev, the initiator of the rehabilitation of the victims of the Stalinist genocide - in September 1967. Decree and resolutions of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR were issued, according to which the accusation of the Crimean Tatar people and their eviction were recognized as indiscriminate. Be

Crimean Tatars were recognized the right to reside in any part of the territory of the USSR, which means that including Crimea. True, the "costs of the cult of Stalin" were still preserved, because the Crimean ASSR was not restored, but something else was important: the Kremlin allowed the Tatars to return to their homeland. It quickly became clear that the very right of the Crimean Tatars to return to their homeland turned out to be fictitious. The Soviet government signed with one hand the decree on the right of the Tatars to live wherever they please, and with the other hand signed a secret instruction to the authorities in the Crimea: do not let the Tatars go there; who has already arrived, do not prescribe; if someone bought a house in the Crimea, then the deal should be declared invalid. Only the "dialectics" from the Kremlin could think of such a "double-entry bookkeeping". It was then that a massive Crimean Tatar national movement for returning to their homeland arose, led by its courageous leader Mustafa Dzhemilev, who spent twenty years in prisons, camps and exile for this. At the beginning of 1987, the Crimean Tatar movement for the right to return to Crimea and for the restoration of the Crimean Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic took on such a large scale that the whole people was drawn into it, including even the Crimean Tatar communists occupying leading positions in Uzbekistan. When the Crimean Tatars staged a demonstration in Moscow, on the Red Square itself, the Kremlin was forced to react to this. But how? Double and ambiguous. The "TASS Report" dated 24.7.1987 was issued. The TASS report begins with a statement of some facts: "Recently," it says, "the Crimean Tatars have become more frequent

Soviet

authorities with a request to revise the legislative acts relating to the abolition of the Crimean ASSR. They ask to recreate an autonomous republic, to restore, as they say in their appeals, "violated historical justice." Further, the TASS report says that the attention of figures of Soviet culture is also drawn to this issue. The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR in favor of "restoring the rights of the Crimean Tatars" addressed, in particular, writers - Baruzdin, Yevtushenko, Okudzhava, Pristavkin ("Pravda", 24. 7. 1987). Further, TASS is trying to prove that the decision of the State Defense Committee of May 11, 1944 to deport the Tatars was due to the fact that the Crimean Tatars collaborated with the Germans during the war. Fictitious figures are given about the Tatar volunteer military units allegedly created in the Crimea. Everything that the Germans did in the Crimea they occupied is attributed to "Tatar nationalists." It turns out that not the Germans, but the Tatars exterminated 86,000 inhabitants of the Crimea, and even 42,000 prisoners of war, 85,000 civilians were "driven to Germany." In order to create the impression that it was not the occupiers who were in charge in Crimea, but the Tatars, another lie was invented - that a Crimean national government headed by a Tatar was created in Crimea. After all, the Soviet government itself is well aware that Hitler did not recognize any "national governments", and those who created them on the territory of the USSR occupied by him were immediately imprisoned by the Germans in the Gestapo so that others would not imitate them. So it was with the real first national government of Ukraine, created in Lvov. The entire composition of this Ukrainian government was imprisoned by the Gestapo until the end of the war. That for the most part the peoples of the USSR, including the Russian people themselves, did not want to defend the tyrannical regime of Stalin, is proved by the well-known fact of the surrender of about five million Red Army soldiers in the first two years of the war. Only when Hitler, in his bestial, anti-human practice in the occupied regions, proved that he was the same scoundrel as Stalin, then the peoples of the USSR preferred their own scoundrel to an alien one.

The Tatars could not create any military units to help the Germans also because the entire adult and healthy male population of the Crimean ASSR was mobilized into the Red Army and was at the front. That the Crimean Tatars fought bravely at the front and that the accusation of the Crimean Tatar people in cooperation with the Germans is false, TASS also admits in the second, so to speak, positive part of its report. It says: "But in any case, the act of total eviction of the Crimean Tatar population is not fair, especially since thousands of Crimean Tatars actively participated in the hostilities against the fascist invaders and were awarded high state awards of the Soviet Union." The report says that "to consider the whole range of problems" on the Crimean Tatar issue, by decision of the Central Committee of the CPSU, a commission headed by Gromyko was created. Later it became known that in addition to Gromyko, the commission also included Chebrikov, Ligachev, Shcherbitsky, and Vorotnikov. The presence in this commission of three well-known Stalinists - Gromyko, Ligachev and Chebrikov - does not really set the mood for

optimistic mood. The very first communication about some of the conclusions that the commission made gives reason to think that the prospects for the return of the Crimean Tatar people to their homeland and the restoration of their autonomy are very disappointing. A new TASS report in Pravda of 16 October 1987 states that the commission heard reports from the leaders of Russia, Ukraine and Uzbekistan on the "living and working conditions" of the Crimean Tatars in these republics. The commission proposed to "improve the social and living conditions of the Tatars, as well as to assist in the development of the national language and culture" in their places of residence. At the same time, it was emphasized that it is necessary "to take decisive measures to suppress the activities of extremist-minded persons from among the Crimean Tatars." This is already an open call for repressions against activists from the Crimean Tatar movement for returning to Crimea.

However, if "glasnost" and "democratization" are not empty words, then the Kremlin will have to give in to the Crimean Tatars - to allow them to return to their ancestral homeland and

at the same time restore their national autonomy.

So far, the Kremlin is not going to take this path of resolving the Crimean Tatar issue. The "State Commission" created by the Politburo, headed by Gromyko, has already made its decision on this issue. Here is what it says: "Additional conditions have been created for the development of national culture, opportunities for learning the native language in the schools of Uzbekistan have been expanded ... The volume and circulation of newspapers have increased, the hours of broadcasting on the radio in the native language ... Significant demographic and social changes ... with the overwhelming majority of the Russian and Ukrainian population ... Taking into account all these circumstances, the commission came to the conclusion that there are no grounds for the formation of the Crimean autonomy" ("Pravda", 9. 6. 1988).

It would be strange to expect Gromyko, Ligachev and Chebrikov, worthy students of Stalin, to betray their teacher Stalin even in the era of "perestroika", but another thing is striking - how miserable and ridiculous the arguments for refusal are: we will increase the number of hours for a radio program in their native language, besides, your Crimea is occupied by Russians and Ukrainians, there is no place for you there!

Our Eastern sage, Mulla Nasreddin, was more resourceful if he had to justify his refusal to some unpleasant request.

The neighbor comes

- Mulla Nasreddin, lend me your rope, I want to go to the forest for firewood.

— I can't, I'm going to dry wheat on it.

= Well, Mulla Nasreddin, what nonsense, how can you dry wheat on a rope?

It's not your concern, it's enough for you that I found a reason for refusing.

The "arguments" and "reasons" that Stalin's heirs find to reject the demands of the Crimean Tatars for the restoration of their former autonomy testify not only to the Kremlin's completely incomprehensible carelessness in matters of national politics that are crucial for Russia, but also to the fact that it recognizes the validity of the motives deportation of those peoples who were returned to their homeland. These include the North Caucasian peoples Chechens, Ingush, Balkars and Karachays. These peoples are periodically reminded that the Soviet authorities justly punished them for collaborating with the Germans during the German occupation in the Caucasus. This accusation was absurd: firstly, during the war, there was never a foot of a German soldier, for example, on the Chechen-Ingush land, and secondly, how could old people, women, children, and Chechen-Ingush and Karachay people cooperate with the Germans? -Balkarian communists and Chekists, who were also deported without exception? The accusation of collaboration with the Germans Chechens and Ingush was exposed because of its obvious absurdity (I wrote a special memorandum on this subject back in 1948 addressed to the UN, which later came out as a separate book under Stalin under the title "People's Killing in the USSR"). Now another accusation is being put forward in the first place: the Chechens and

The Ingush organized themselves into gangs and fired at the back of the Red Army. They even find "witnesses" from among the Chechen-Ingush people who prove that Stalin was right in evicting them from their homes. One of these "witnesses" is a certain Bokov, who even became a "candidate of historical sciences", substantiating the thesis about the justice of the act of genocide against his own people. Moreover, he managed to prove that it was Stalin's deportations that saved the Chechens and Ingush from a worse fate - from the Nazi genocide. To prove this, on the instructions of the Central Committee of the CPSU, he put into "scientific circulation" a fake, which says that on December 8, 1941, the Wehrmacht issued a directive that says: "When Grozny, Malgobek and other areas are in our hands, we will be able to enter into mountains are the necessary garrisons, and when relative calm comes in the mountains, we will destroy all the mountaineers. There are not so many mountain people in Checheno-Ingushetia, and a dozen of our Sonderkommandos can destroy the entire male population in a short time "(Sovetskaya Rossiya newspaper, 06/13/1970).

Of course, there is no such document of the Wehrmacht in nature, besides, why would Hitler need to destroy the Chechen-Ingush people, who never put up

with Stalinist tyranny? The moral of the fake: the Soviet government, as it were, "evacuated" the Chechen-Ingush people, and this saved them from destruction by Hitler. From the "evacuation" only half of the people died, and Hitler was going to "destroy everyone." This Chechen-Ingush "historian", judging by his writings, a secret agent of the local KGB, reached the pinnacle of his career in his republic - first he was made the second secretary of the regional party committee, now he is the "president" of the republic - chairman of the presidium of the Supreme Council of the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. This type, in the midst of perestroika and glasnost, was commissioned by the Kommunist magazine (No. 2, 1988) to write an article under the directive title: "Forming Internationalist Convictions." In it, the author repeats the old accusations, adding to them new accusations against his people: the Chechen-Ingush people are expanding the scope of Islam by opening new mosques, stubbornly holding on to "reactionary traditions", cultivating religious holidays, inciting local nationalism, from which they are fleeing the republic Russians. The Kommunist magazine did not dare to repeat on its pages the old fake about the "directive" of the Wehrmacht, but conscientiously reproduced the old accusations about the validity and justice of the Stalinist genoc

I will give only one quote, which speaks for itself: "The Great Patriotic War became a severe test for all the peoples of the USSR. The sons and daughters of the Motherland defended it with weapons in their hands... However, the true face of the anti-Soviet elements was also revealed... Here (in Checheno-Ingushetia), traitors, enemies of the Soviet power became more active: they formed terrorist groups, committed acts of sabotage, attempted and Soviet activists... The dirty crimes of traitors served as one of the reasons for the tragedy that befell the lot of Chechens and Ingush - their total eviction from their homes. Yes, there were traitors, and there were many of them" (p. 89). It is true that there really were "a lot" of "traitors" during Stalin's time – about 10-15 million people were sitting in the concentration camps of such "traitors".

Since the author is a genuine "internationalist", he moves from slandering his people to praises of his "big brother". But look at how stupidly the Great Russian chauvinists from Kommunist act, putting into his mouth such words: "The Russian people show such concern for the peoples of the North Caucasus that the elder brother shows the younger in the family" (p. 90). This means dancing the Naur lezginka at a Caucasian funeral. The North Caucasians were driven to certain death in the "special camps" of Kazakhstan, where half of them died from hunger, cold and a typhus epidemic. Another such "concern" of the "elder brother" - and then only memories will remain of the North Caucasians, which remained of the other North Caucasian peoples of the Ubykhs and some Turkic-Nagai tribes, who were completely exterminated during the conquest of the Caucasus.

On the same issue of the motives for the deportation of Chechens and Ingush and its legitimacy, another representative of this people, Moscow professor, Doctor of Economics R. I. Khasbulatov, spoke in an interview with Komsomolskaya Pravda on June 17, 1988, to which the following words were prefaced by the editors :

"Our five-year plans are the Leninist policy of friendship between peoples, translated into the language of economics." Until recently, such slogans proudly flaunted in many cities. But today it suddenly became clear that the language of our economy is not very intelligible, and interethnic relations are not so impeccable... Our special correspondent Stanislav Oganyan talks about the reasons for these phenomena with Professor R. I. Khasbulatov, Doctor of Economics."

I will cite from it only those answers that are directly related to the topic of the deportation of Chechens and Ingush.

— Ruslan Imranovich! Today it is already obvious that the conclusion was made too hastily about achieving harmony in national relations. This is evidenced by recent facts. You are an economist. Let's discuss a difficult topic from the point of view of an economist ...

"Subtleties", "shades" of the issue I present far from as deep as we would like. I accept the offer to discuss the problem - as an economist. For in the trend towards a certain increase in interethnic conflicts, I see, first of all, the economic aspect.

- Is it correct to consider the economic aspect as decisive? Shouldn't the "national factor" be regarded as an independent force?

— "Nothing arises from nothing"... Everything has its beginning. It is known that where there is a real, real equality of people - and the basis, the basis of all equality is primarily economic equality - there are few contradictions. There is often a harmony of interests. Why? Because the interests of everyone are realized by the same measure. It does not matter what kind of team it is: single or multinational. In a multinational collective, the element of inequality is aggravated, further complicated by suspicions of ethnic discrimination. And if you do not solve the problem radically, i.e. does not ensure the true equality of all in practice, then the national factor, acquiring additional layers, contradictions, difficulties, turns into a truly independent, self-sufficient, autonomous force, often confusing the very essence of the issue.

- It would be nice to illustrate this situation with a specific example ...

- If possible, on your own. My childhood was spent in the very north of Kazakhstan, in the small village of Poludiko, where we, Chechens, were moved in February 1944 with the status of "special settlers". The village involuntarily turned out to be international. In addition to our family - my mother, my two older brothers and sisters, several more families of our relatives and former fellow villagers settled there, a dozen or three families from the former Volga Germans of the ASSR, Koreans, Tatars. With the absolute predominance of the Russian population.

We lived there for ten years. And I do not remember a single scandal on ethnic grounds, not a single insult. But we were "special settlers"... Why in this case was there a discrepancy between the official state position, expressed in the fact of violence against us, and public opinion in this small, godforsaken village? I find the answer precisely in the factor of our actual equality with all the inhabitants of this village.

Judge for yourself. From the age of 5-6, just like other boys, I helped my mother and family to the best of my ability. Mother worked as a collective farm milkmaid. I (as, I repeat, others) did what I could: I got water from a deep well, watered the cows, cleaned the cowsheds in winter, looked after the calves in 40-degree frost. He carried hay, dug potatoes, went to the forest for firewood, etc. Everyone in the village was in the same position - equally poor. Everyone lacked everything, especially bread - the workdays were mostly empty...

The mothers of my peers worked next to my mother - and also to a bloody sweat: Russians, Kazakhs, Germans, Koreans ... My first teacher Vera Vladimirovna came to our house almost daily, walking a good five kilometers. Why did she have to do this - to mess with a boy from a family of criminals? She could calmly "bring" me to an exception ... I

I think about her and understand that on her part it was a lesson in true internationalism and human kindness.

I associate the authorities with 2-3 foremen and the chairman of the collective farm. They were strict but fair people. They themselves worked next to the collective farmers when the situation demanded. Mother was not offended, on the contrary, they encouraged her, calling her the best milkmaid. Of course, it was "equality of the poor." But it was for everyone and, by its very nature, excluded the causes for interethnic conflicts.

- Well, if we digress a little from the purely economic side of the problem, what, in your opinion, causes outbreaks of nationalism? What is their nature?

- There are many reasons. I'm not going to judge everyone. However, the Leninist methodological approach is important in the analysis of such situations. It consists in the following: never, under any circumstances, seek to make the people a "scapegoat". This Leninist method is our "provincial dantons and republican Robespierres"

they resolutely reject it, shifting all the blame on the people and at the same time pushing the "leadership" itself beyond the brink of criticism, whose unreasonable actions just offend national pride and pride.

Let's leaf through the newspaper "Groznsky Rabochiy" for January 26, 1988. There is a plenum of the regional party committee. On the agenda is the leadership of perestroika. But what is it? Instead of analyzing the current situation, the speaker returns to the "troubled" times of the tragic year 1944 and begins to talk at length about how the enemies (we are talking about Chechens and Ingush) vilely stabbed the Red Army in the back, how many gangs there were, their numbers, weapons, equipment and etc. Indeed, even for me, who has never lived in this republic, it is unpleasant to read all this. And what about the inhabitants of Checheno-Ingushetia?

And yet, let's deal with these "gangs" to the end. They "appeared" as a result of falsifications invented by Beria, Stalin and their local hangers-on. A criminal idea was concocted about the "guilty" of the people, their complicity with the enemy. But the truth prevailed. The people are completely rehabilitated. Almost 30 years have passed since that day, and talk about "gangs" has gained an independent life and freely "walks" around the world, taking revenge on the whole people, "shooting" them. From time to time, local figures "break through" their false articles in the central press. The question is: what is the purpose of the "shelling"? It seems that there is a relapse of "local Stalinism" here: to intimidate, to put "in place": "You are guilty anyway ..." Isn't this the reason for the extraordinary, downright pathological fear of local Chechen and Ingush leaders to be branded as "nationalists"? They cannot and do not want to speak in their native language on television, in local newspapers. And they are even proud of it. There is no need to talk about the leaders of Russian origin - for the most part, they do not know the language of the indigenous people. Indeed, one might think that Comrade Kolbin, who learned Georgian while working in Georgia, and now also Kazakh, is less busy than some officials from Checheno-Ingushetia." From another interview with Izvestiya (March 22, 1988) by Russian historians L. Drobizheva and Yu. Polyakov, it turns out that one can write about the "Chechen-Ingush gangs", about their "treacherous blows in the back of the Red Army". But one cannot write about the restoration of the republic, because then one would have to talk about its liquidation. Here is the answer to the corresponding question of Yu. Polyakov, Corresponding Member of the USSR Academy of Sciences:

"... We are great masters of hushing up difficulties in national issues. Here is the North Caucasus, the expulsion of entire peoples, their return. Chechens, Ingush, Karachays, Balkars, young and old, know what happened to them from 1944 to 1956. And when historians were silent about this, what respect for history can be? Starting to write the history of the North Caucasus, the employees of the Institute of History of the USSR faced direct objections from local party and scientific workers ... The arguments of the objections were strange: if, they say, talking about restoration, one cannot but say about liquidation, and this means stirring up the past.

Even in the era of glasnost and the second wave of exposure of Stalinism, people who consider themselves "internationalists" write the wildest things about Chechens and Ingush and their tragedy. Stalin, who is accused of all sins, his own and others, is emphatically justified when they talk about his deportation of Chechens and Ingush. In a strange way, just now a new spiritual genocide is being perpetrated on the Chechen-Ingush people. It turns out that the favorite hobby of the Chechens and Ingush - since ancient times - is "cutting Russians"! And the Russian people believe this. N. Startseva wrote an article on this topic in Literaturnaya Gazeta dated August 3, 1988, entitled "On National Pain". She writes: "Russians, Ukrainians, Armenians, Tatars, people of other nationalities living side by side with Chechens and Ingush have little idea of what excites the original inhabitants of these places, they are deprived of the very opportunity to learn about their traditions, customs, culture, topical issues. national existence. (Why, under these conditions, and not take on faith the statement of the protagonist of the story A. Pristavkin, that among the Chechens "cutting Russians is

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such a national pain!", as the author of one literary review did.) ". N. Startseva continues:" In 1944, the Chechens and Ingush, along with several other peoples of the North Caucasus, were transported a thousand kilometers. In 1948, in a decree on the opera V. Muradeli, "claiming to depict the struggle for the establishment of Soviet power and friendship of peoples in the North Caucasus in 1918-1920. ", it was instructed to understand that "the Ingush and Chechens were an obstacle to the establishment of friendship between peoples in the North Caucasus at that time."

This decision of the Central Committee of the Party, in which Stalin and Zhdanov retrospectively tried to justify the genocide, was the greatest lie and a direct mockery of historical facts. After all, it was General Denikin who wrote that moving to Moscow, he was forced to leave one third of his armed forces in Checheno-Ingushetia, because Checheno-Ingushetia, having entered into an alliance with the Bolsheviks led by Ordzhonikidze, turned their country, in his words, into a "seething volcano ". After all, it was the same Denikin who demanded from the Chechens and Ingush, with the threat of burning their villages, to extradite Ordzhonikidze, the leader of the Chechens Tashtemir Eldarkhanov, the leader of the Ingush Vassan Giray Dzhabagiev, and when the Chechens and Ingush refused to extradite them, indeed, the Whites burned to the ground two dozen Chechen- Ingush auls. After all, it was Stalin himself who wrote on the pages of Pravda in 1918 that revolutionary Chechnya, led by the commander of the Chechen Red Army, Aslanbek Sheripov (killed by the Whites in 1919 in the battles near Vozdvizhenskaya), is bravely fighting for Soviet power. After all, it was Sergo Ordzhonikidze who reported in 1919 in a telegram addressed to Lenin that in Vladikavkaz, under his leadership, the congress of the Ingush proclaimed Soviet power. All these facts are well known to historians. But what did Stalin care about historical facts? If the facts spoke against him, then he usually deflected them with the argument of a criminal: "If the facts are really such, then so much the worse for the facts themselves."

Stalin has been gone for a long time, but why do the "innovators" from the Kremlin allow their ideologists to continue to preach Stalin's Cainian philosophy about "counter-revolutionary peoples - Chechens and Ingush"? Well, all right, Stalin closed all archives, including old Soviet newspapers. Therefore, the young Russian generation does not know not only the history of non-Russian peoples, but even their own history. However, the "Patriotic War" took place in the memory of the current leaders of the Kremlin. After all, these leaders know for sure that the Chechens and Ingush did not cooperate and could not cooperate with the Germans for two reasons: firstly, the Chechens and Ingush could not go over to the side of the German army, because, starting from February 1942, they were in the Red Army they didn't take them, but those who were already in the Red Army were demobilized; secondly, the Chechens and Ingush could not cooperate with them, since the Germans did not occupy a single piece of Chechen-Ingush land.

Let's return to N. Startseva's article. She writes: "Literature, throwing off the covers from Stalinism, also exposes the psychological mechanism, thanks to which people began to believe in what it would seem impossible to believe in, began to persuade and deceive themselves. In L. Chukovskaya (Neva, No. 2), Sofya Petrovna has long been convinced that other mothers are mothers of traitors, murderers and enemies, she is among them by chance, because her son is innocent. Consciousness

it is common to look for some plausible explanations ... "The fact is that children, like many others, by the way," G. Murikov writes in another Leningrad magazine (Zvezda, No. 12, 1987) about A. Pristavkin's story "A golden cloud spent the night," they brought to the rich and fertile lands of the Caucasus ... liberated after the eviction of the Chechens. Why were they evicted? G. Murikov answers (I quote from N. Startseva): "Mass cooperation with the Germans, treason are the most serious crimes against the people, - this was the basis for such a decisive action (meaning the Stalinist eviction of peoples - N. Startseva). But, of course, some escaped. And now - already on a new basis - something similar to Basmachism flares up again. N. Startseva refutes this statement about "mass cooperation with the Germans" with references to facts. Here is her comment: "Before backdating the justification for Stalin's decisions, which resulted in the death of hundreds of thousands of innocent people, it would not be bad to look

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maps of military operations in the Caucasus in 1942-1944 and to see that the territory of Chechen Ingushetia was not occupied at all - for this reason alone there could not be "mass cooperation" with the enemy. A critic who turns to generalizations, after reading history, could also learn that the Chechens and Ingush did not have even a single small military formation that would fight against our troops. N. Startseva concludes: "I was struck by the words of the poet Hussein Satuev, said by him at our meeting in Grozny: "It is necessary that there be truth. Our peoples experienced the monstrous cruelty of the cult. We still cry on our stones. Why do we die twice? After all, when different fictions are written about the people, we again die in public opinion. The author ends the article with a question: "Has everything been done to ensure that the rehabilitation of those who have returned is embodied in material forms, including the creation of equal opportunities for the creative amateur activity of peoples?"

Probably a long, long time to wait for an answer to this question. Just in August 1988, the US Congress passed a law according to which Japanese Americans who were imprisoned in camps after Japan declared war on America receive a reward of twenty thousand dollars per person. President Reagan called the very act of confining these people to camps (without confiscation of property) "a great tragedy." Of course, there can be no comparison with Stalin's genocide in the USSR and the temporary deprivation of freedom of communication of Japanese Americans with the outside world in order to protect the country from espionage. But another comparison arises: the victims of the Stalinist genocide not only do not receive rewards for their torment, on the contrary, some of these victims are still not allowed to enter their ancient lands, others who were returned by Khrushchev are still being hounded for imaginary treason and "mass cooperation with the Germans." Gorbachev could have easily put an end to this incomprehensible campaign of a new "spiritual genocide" against the Chechen-Ingush people by calling the Stalinist genocide a Stalinist crime.

At the same time, I would like to bring here the story of a member of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, the famous writer Rasul Gamzatov, about anti-national "distortions" in his native Dagestan. Gamzatov, like Oleinik in relation to Ukraine, blames the great-power policy not on Russian bureaucrats, but on their local lackeys. Here is his reasoning in an interview with Izvestia:

"In Makhachkala there is not a single kindergarten, not a single school, not a single class where they would teach the language of our ancestors. But where can they come from if the local teacher training school no longer graduates teachers of the Avar, Dargin, Lak languages ... and after all, half of the Dagestanis live in cities ... I am convinced that no one in Moscow was interested in teaching at the teacher training school national languages, literature and history.

Here Gamzatov, like Oleinik, is deeply mistaken. The Avar language is the language of the great imams of Dagestan, who fought with Russia for more than half a century for Caucasian independence. One cannot teach the true history of the Caucasus without talking about them. Indeed, Gamzatov himself reports: "Until now, the topic of Shamil remains forbidden in Dagestan literature ... Today, in Dagestan, at the direction of the local authorities (!) In vain they are looking for facts that would confirm ... voluntary annexation to Russia ... Monument to General Yermolov in Grozny, as far as I know, still evokes by no means harmless emotions." Gamzatov concludes his criticism

words: "Once the fusion of national languages was promised as a quick apotheosis of the friendship of peoples. Today it sounds wild" (Izvestia, 29. 3. 1988).

Gamzatov is a great poetic talent of the Caucasus and the author of the wonderful book "My Dagestan", but where is his book about the tragedy of the deported Caucasian peoples. The Russian writer Anatoly Pristavkin wrote a story on this subject. Another Russian writer, to whom the poetic and folklore East is forever indebted for his classic translations into Russian, Semyon Lipkin published a fascinating book about the same Caucasian tragedy. Moreover, Semyon Lipkin, about civil courage and high feeling

of humanism which Vladimir Voinovich told me, published his book in the West, during the time of Andropov, obviously risking a prison or a psychiatric hospital, but the Caucasian Gamzatov stubbornly keeps silent about the tragedy of fellow countrymen, although he does not risk anything, and even Gorbachev himself considers him his "old friend". Meanwhile, he is in a great moral debt just to the Chechens and Ingush for his writings about them from the "cult" era.

D. Alternative: Forced Empire or Confederation of Independent States

In the USSR there is not only a national, but also a Russian question. No one oppresses nationally Russians, but politically and socially Russians are just as oppressed and just as deprived of rights as other peoples. Previously, reference was made to Latvians, Jews and Caucasians, but now the Russians are being oppressed by the Russians themselves. This does not make it any easier for the Russian people. To understand the tragedy of the non-Russian peoples, it is important to know the origins of the tragedy of the Russian people themselves. Countless works are devoted to the "mysterious soul" of a Russian person, who, it turns out, likes a whip more than a carrot. But no one wants to notice that he actually fell under the whip in search of a carrot, a carrot not only for himself, but for everyone, on an international scale. It is in the nature of a Russian person - not being happy himself, to strive to make everyone happy. Guided by good intentions, he can destroy himself and others. No wonder the poet said about the Russian people: "Good impulses are destined for us, but nothing is given to accomplish." The breadth of his character is largely due to the properties of both spiritual and geopolitical order. Pushkin is unfair when he said that the Russian people are lazy and incurious. His initial expansion was not actually dictated, as with other colonialists, by mercantile motives in search of sable skins, gold mines, or captivity of foreigners in order to turn them into their slaves. He was driven by an irresistible itch of extreme curiosity: to find out what lies further beyond the horizon, what and how the peoples live there. It is no coincidence that a Russian man was also the first to fly into space. The colonial appetite came with food - the curiosity of the people, put at the service of the state, served the cause of expansion, starting with Yermak. Moscow Rus', modest in size, stretched its borders from the Baltic to the Pacific Ocean and even reached the American mainland - territorially to Alaska and industrially to California itself. The Russian tragedy became apparent when Rus' began to go beyond its territorial and ethnographic boundaries. The expansion of Rus' led to a narrowing, and then to the elimination of the freedom of the Russian people. The man who wanted to make others happy became the unhappiest man in the world. The historian Klyuchevsky clearly saw this connection between the swelling of the Russian, also in its own way "patchwork", Empire and the loss of freedom and civil rights by the Russian people. He wrote: "Until the middle of the 19th century, the external territorial expansion of the state was in inverse proportion to the development of the internal freedom of the people ... As the territory expanded, along with the growth of the external strength of the people, its internal freedom became more and more constrained ... In the expanding field of conquests, the scope increased power, but the lifting power of the people's spirit decreased. Outwardly, the successes of the new Russia resemble the flight of a bird, which the whirlwind carries and throws up beyond the strength of its wings. Not only did the people lose their freedom, but they did not grow rich from external conquests, as the Western peoples from their colonial robberies, but, on the contrary, became even poorer. Klyuchevsky expressed this truth in a lapidary formula: "The state is plump, and the people are sickly" (V. O. Klyuchevsky, "Course of Russian History", vol. 3, p. 8). This was precisely the fatal deviation of the Russian historical process from the Western one. The greatness of the state was achieved at the cost of physical and spiritual slavery. It has always been so. So it is today, when, in order to play the role of a military superpower, it is necessary to keep people at a standard of living

underdeveloped countries, and the borders of the state itself are locked. It was precisely because of the eternal need and enslavement that the deepest sense of social

justice, turning directly into a pathological hatred of their oppressors. In both, he did not know the measure. All these Pugachevs and Razins, Zhelyabovs and Perovskys, Nechaevs and Tkachevs and their ingenious synthesis - Lenin could only be born in Russia. It was precisely these extremes in the Russian character - love and hate, mercy and cruelty, "all or nothing" - that were masterfully used by Lenin and Trotsky, when they easily imposed on the same people, unprecedented in history, barracks police socialism. The Russian people did not dream of such socialism just as a free man does not dream of going to prison. The promised "heaven on earth" turned out to be the greatest deception in history. However, a great nation has no right to enjoy the privilege of being deceived. Putting chains on himself, he does not dare to shackle other peoples in them. Yes, he was raped because of an oversight, but, as Marx put it, an oversight is forgivable for a frivolous girl who lost her innocence because of her, but not for a wise and great people. Moreover. The Russian people are historically responsible for their truly fabulous patience. Stalin, at the celebrations in the Kremlin to celebrate the victory in the war, praised the Russian people precisely for their patience, adding that the Soviet government made mistakes for which another people would have expelled their government. Stalin was right. During the war, power passed from Stalin's clique to the armed Russian people. He overthrew and destroyed foreign tyrants, but retained his own tyrant, and even attributed his own victory to him alone, the first deserter of the first period of the war. What is the reason for this endless long-suffering?

Hitler killed six million Jews, of which his subjects were less than three hundred thousand, and Stalin killed, according to Prof. I. A. Kurganov, 66 million of his own subjects (in the USSR they write that Stalin killed "only" 55 million people). And yet nostalgia for him grows. After all, Khrushchev lost his post mainly because he exposed the greatest criminal in the mask of a false god. But even Khrushchev did not dare to do more than take Stalin out of Lenin's mausoleum and bury him right there on Red Square. It is surprising that even today, in the era of Gorbachev and his "glasnost", 35 years after the death of the tyrant, the leaders of the party are still overcome by Hamlet's doubts: "Should Stalin be a criminal or not?" Even Gorbachev himself did not put an end to doubts, when, on the occasion of the 70th anniversary of October, he gave a "dialectical" answer about the role of Stalin: "The leading core of the party, which was headed by I.V. . (1987). But he immediately added that later, in the 30s, Stalin became a criminal. There were even "engineers of human souls" like Chuev, who imperiously demanded from the Kremlin: "Return Stalin to the pedestal, we young people need an ideal!" A unique criminal as the ideal of the Soviet youth - only a spiritual slave can write such a thing, and only state slave owners can heed such an appeal. One involuntarily asks oneself whether we are dealing here with the phenomenon of atavism among the descendants of serfs. Let us recall the famous Lermontov: "Farewell, unwashed Russia, the country of slaves, the country of masters ...". Let's remember Chekhov: "We must squeeze the slave out of ourselves drop by drop...". Let us recall once again Lenin's quote from Chernyshevsky: "A pitiful nation, a nation of slaves, from top to bottom - all slaves." Let us also recall the absolutely correct comment of Lenin, which can be entirely attributed to the slaves of the state he created: "No one is to blame if he was born a slave; but a slave who not only eschews the desire for his freedom, but justifies and embellishes his slavery ... such a slave is a lackey and a boor that evokes a legitimate feeling of indignation, contempt and disgust. Surprisingly similar to them is the thought of a talented Soviet critic of our day, Tatyana Ivanova, in her article in Literaturnaya Gazeta. Here are her words: "Isn't the essence of perestroika that we are all obliged to wake up, pull ourselves together and remember our basic rights, those rights for which our ancestors fought without sparing themselves, went to hard labor ... which they defended in 1917 ... The main of these rights was the right to freedom ... To rebuild means to overcome slavery in oneself, to overcome one's own insignificance.

The question is, what are the sources of greatness and "insignificance" of the Russian character?

Why, even now, a purely internal task - "perestroika" - should also become, according to Gorbachev, a world program? The famous formula of the Pskov monk Philotheus about Moscow: "Two Romes

fallen, the third is standing, the fourth will not happen," recently modernized the Moscow "monk" from the "Memory" movement: "Moscow is the fourth Rome plus socialism," he said. The Moscow "monk" clearly echoes the philosophy of Gorbachev's "perestroika" global strategy. Gorbachev, like all his messianic and communist predecessors, began by saying that in the very title of his book he expressed the essence of his historical mission: "Perestroika and new thinking for our country and for the whole world." He concluded the book with the words: "Now the whole world needs restructuring ... a qualitative change ... We have embarked on this path and call on other peoples and countries to embark on it" (M. S. Gorbachev, titled book, Moscow, 1987) .

Why should the free and prosperous countries of Europe and America follow the example of the Kremlin's perestroika, conceived to bring their own country out of a deep economic and social impasse? Gorbachev gave the answer in his report on the 70th anniversary of the October Revolution: "Perestroika" is a continuation of the October Revolution of 1917; adding: "Today we see: humanity is really not doomed to exist forever as it lived before October 1917. It is October, it is socialism that shows humanity the routes leading to the future" ("Pravda", 3. 11. 1987).

A country that has been vegetating in semi-poverty for 70 years is showing mankind "routes leading to the future" — what is it: a real analysis of its own situation or is it the ritual nonsense of dogmatists? Or is it just the political schizophrenia of the Kremlin? Filofey dreamed of a "Third Rome", Lenin dreamed of a "World Soviet Republic", and Gorbachev wants to carry out a world "perestroika". More than 450 years have passed from Filofey to Gorbachev, but is the philosophy the same? What is her secret?

Berdyaev thinks that the roots of Russian maximalism must be sought in the Russian character and Russian way of thinking. Berdyaev is a Russian philosopher of a broad way of thinking. In his role as an interpreter of the "Russian idea", as a truly Russian person, he is unique, because there has never been another Russian thinker who could speak so freely, so impartially about his own people, as he did. Berdyaev likes to express himself in paradoxes, sometimes striking, but often controversial. When Berdyaev wrote his most famous book, *The Russian Idea*, he had before his eyes not his own Russian audience, but the Western world, always hostile to Russian identity. Berdyaev to some extent indulged Western prejudices about Russia. Hence the incredible popularity of Berdyaev in the West, while in Russia he enjoys success mostly with liberal intellectuals. With all these reservations arising from my subjective perception, nevertheless, Berdyaev's contribution to "Russian studies" in its originality surpasses everything that foreigners and Russians themselves have written on this topic. I am neither a philosopher nor a psychologist to allow myself to talk about the Russian character and the Russian soul. Therefore, I am not a judge of the writings of Berdyaev. And yet it seems that without Berdyaev it is impossible to understand the political genealogy of "Filofey - Lenin - Gorbachev", with only one obvious caveat: the basis of Soviet communism is not the messianic idea of Filotheus, as Berdyaev thinks, but the well-known communist idea of the English utopians Thomas More and Robert Owen, the Italian utopian Tommaso Campanella, the French utopians Fourier and Saint-Simon, and the German utopians Marx and Engels with their so-called "scientific socialism". Marxism, according to Lenin himself, is a synthesis of the "three sources" of French socialism, English classical political economy, and German classical philosophy. Yes, Russian tanks brought communism to Eastern Europe, but communism in China and Indo-China, Cuba and Ethiopia, Angola and Nicaragua (to be continued) is not a product of the Russian soul, sometimes even a product of the anti-Russian soul (China, Yugoslavia, Albania, Poland). As for the Russian contribution to communism in the form of the famous Russian peasant community, Marx recognized its communist role only if, even before its disintegration, a "proletarian revolution" takes place in the West. The only and real contribution of Russians to Marxism

comes from Lenin and his disciple Stalin. It can be characterized very briefly: "the total and totalitarian dehumanization of Marxism", which develops from it the idea of physical violence ("The Dictatorship of the Proletariat") and turns Marxism into an ideological riffraff, into an ersatz religion. One thing is indisputable: the global concept of utopian communism is somehow related to the global philosophy of Russian messianism. But Berdyaev goes further, making far

running generalizations about the character of the Russian people. The people in the dogmatic fantasy of the Marxists, as Berdyaev once was, play a leading role in history. In fact, the people are what their leaders make of them. The reverse effect is very conditional. But each nation has its own specific national traits, noble and base, cruel and merciful, aggressive and peace-loving, which political manipulators use, each time appealing to that side of the polar traits that best serve to achieve their goal.

In this sense, Berdyaev is wrong in attributing to only one Russian the polarized features inherent in any nation. However, it is useful to know what Berdyaev says about Russian national traits. Berdyaev begins his "Russian Idea" with a famous quote from Tyutchev: "Russia cannot be understood with the mind, cannot be measured with a common yardstick, it has become special, you can only believe in Russia." Berdyaev's entire book is devoted to "understanding Russia with the mind" and "measuring it with a common yardstick." The conclusions to which he came are outlined in the very first chapter. Here are the brightest from these conclusions:

"The Russian people are an extremely polarized people, that is, a combination of opposites. He can be fascinated and disappointed, you can always expect surprises from him, he is highly capable of inspiring strong love and strong hatred".

"In terms of polarization and inconsistency, the Russian people can only be compared with the Jewish people. And it is no coincidence that these peoples have a strong messianic consciousness."

"The inconsistency and complexity of the Russian soul may be due to the fact that in Russia two streams of world history collide and come into interaction - the East and the West. The Russian people are not a purely European and not a purely Asian people; two principles fought in the Russian soul, the eastern and the western.

4. "There is a correspondence between the immensity, boundlessness, infinity of the Russian land of the Russian soul, between the geography of the physical and the geography of the soul. In the soul of the Russian people there is the same immensity, boundlessness, aspiration to infinity, as in the Russian plain.

5. "The Russian people were not predominantly a people of culture, like the peoples of Western Europe, they were more a people of revelations, inspirations, they did not know the measure and easily fell into extremes."

6. "Two opposite principles formed the basis of the formation of the Russian soul: the natural, pagan Dionysian element and ascetic-monastic Orthodoxy. One can discover opposite properties in the Russian people: despotism, hypertrophy of the state and anarchism, liberty; cruelty, propensity to violence and kindness, humanity, gentleness; ritual belief and the search for truth; individualism, heightened consciousness of the individual and impersonal collectivism; nationalism, self-praise and universalism, all-humanity; eschatological-messianic religiosity and outward piety; the search for God and militant atheism; humility and arrogance; slavery and rebellion" (N. Berdyaev, pp. 5-7).

A little further, Berdyaev connects the Russian idea of imperialism and communism again with the Russian idea of messianism: "After the Jewish people, the Russian people are most characteristic of the messianic idea, it runs through all Russian history right up to communism ... The imperialist temptation enters the messianic consciousness ... Spiritual the failure of the idea of Moscow as the third Rome was precisely in the fact that the Third Rome was presented as a manifestation of royal power, then as an empire, and, finally, as the Third

International" (ibid., pp. 11-12).

Then Russian purely religious messianism moved into the political realm and became the creed of Russian imperialism. Berdyaev writes: "In Russian messianism, so characteristic of the Russian people, the pure messianic idea of the Kingdom of God, the kingdom of truth, was obscured

imperialist idea, the will to power. We have already seen this in relation to the ideology of Moscow - the Third Rome. And in Russian communism, into which the Russian messianic idea has passed in a non-religious and anti-religious form..." (ibid., pp. 197-198).

With all its outwardly Russian nihilism and criticality towards the "polarized" features of the Russian people, with all the pathos of freedom and condemnation of tyranny, Russian imperialism for Berdyaev is not a consequence, but a distortion of both Russian history and Russian messianism. Here is his conclusion: "The Russians thought that Russia was a very special country with a special vocation. But the main thing was not Russia itself, but what Russia brings to the world, above all, the brotherhood of people and freedom of spirit. The Russians are not striving for the kingdom of this world, they are not driven by will to power and might. The Russian people, spiritually speaking, are not an imperialist people; they do not love the state. At the same time, this people is a colonizer and has the gift of colonization, and it created the greatest state in the world ... The result was a painful hypertrophy of the state, which crushed the people and often tortured them. In the minds of the Russian idea, the Russian vocation in the world, a substitution has taken place. Both Moscow - the Third Rome and Moscow - the Third International are connected with the Russian messianic idea, but represent its distortion. It seems that there is no people in history that would combine such opposites in its history. Imperialism has always been a distortion of the Russian idea and Russian vocation" (ibid., p. 218).

When Berdyaev put this "Russian idea" on paper - it was already in 1946 - "Moscow - the Third Rome" closed its "Third International", but expanded its borders in Europe to the Elbe itself, including half a dozen Eastern European states, one a third of Germany, half of Austria, and in Asia all of Manchuria, southern Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands right under Japan's nose. But I have always made and am making a difference between tsarist imperialism and Soviet imperialism. The difference is not in the substance of both types of imperialism, the difference is quantitative and qualitative. Tsarist imperialism was not global even in the mask of messianism, it was regional - Eurasian. Soviet imperialism is global, because its strategic goal is the creation of a communist community throughout the world. The qualitative difference is unparalleled in its enormity - tsarism pursued the goal of appeasing the recalcitrant peoples, Bolshevism - the extermination of the recalcitrant by methods of mass terror and even genocide on a racial basis, like Hitler did (the total deportation of Chechens, Ingush, Karachays, Balkars, Crimean Tatars, Kalmyks, Meskhs, Germans Volga region). Tsarism practiced a policy of Russification, but not a single tsar had the idea of denationalizing the non-Russian nations of Russia, forcing them to study Russian without exception instead of their native language.

But the main drawback of Berdyaev's theses on the Russian character lies, in my opinion, in their "non-historicity". Berdyaev writes at the end of the first half of the twentieth century about the Russian people who lived in the late Middle Ages. Hence the light game of terminology: "Moscow the Third Rome" by Philotheus, which, as it were, along the high road of Russian history leads directly to the Moscow of the "Third International" of Lenin. The disadvantage of such a scheme lies in the fact that the Russian people, about whom Berdyaev spoke, had been in the cemetery a long time ago. The year 1917 is a break in Russian spiritual and national history with the past. The Russian people who carried out the October Revolution were recruited, in addition to a group of deceived idealists, from Marx's "lumpen proletarians", Bakunin's anarchists, Turgenev's nihilists, Dostoevsky's "demons", led not only by the penitent nobleman Lenin, but also by criminals like Stalin. The Soviet people who grew out of this revolution, this "international hybrid", in many respects have other character traits than those that

were familiar to Berdyaev. Some of them were inherited from his new teachers, while others were acquired under the new political system. This people is therefore called today not the "Russian people", but the "Soviet people" (a meaningless term, because it indicates not a nationality, but a political system) and has already existed in the fourth generation. The peers of October are already over 70 years old, and those born after 1917 make up 90% of the population. During this time, new features have already taken shape in the character of both the Russian and non-Russian peoples of the Soviet empire. It would be more correct to say that not new polar features were formed, but new polarized peoples within each people. This happened on the basis of its artificial division into parts, when the "silent majority", despite all the efforts of ideologists,

remained itself, the other part succumbed to decomposition. The decomposed part, ready for anything and everything, is a social and international cesspool, which Stalinism nurtured, turning it into a pillar of its power. The current difficulties of the Kremlin were predetermined not so much by the utopian in design and anti-economic in essence "socialism", but by the systematic and deliberate practice of the Stalinist power machine, aimed at total destruction, corruption and spitting on the thousand-year-old spiritual world of the Russian man - his history, his culture, his religion, his traditions, his soul. The Russian man, who believes in God, honors historical shrines and national ideals, was reformed by the Stalinist regime into a "Soviet man" - into a hypocrite and a boor, who does not believe in any ideals - neither in heavenly, nor in earthly, nor even in his own socialist ones. Yes, the regime succeeded in many ways in destroying the old spiritual world of the Russian nation, but suffered a historic defeat when it tried to bring its own ideals into the resulting spiritual vacuum. Now everyone knows that Marxism itself is a kind of new atheistic religion that promised heaven not in heaven, like all classical world religions, but "heaven on Earth." This, in fact, explained the triumph of the social demagoguery of the Bolsheviks in 1917.

However, what then served in the eyes of the ignorant masses as the advantage of the new religion over the classical religions, was later exposed, when they switched from theory to practice, when the promised "paradise on Earth" did not take place! "The criterion of truth is practice," say the Marxists. Practice has just shown that anything can be built on Russian soil - from the Leninist revolution to the Stalinist inquisition - but it is impossible to build communism on it. The Soviet communists themselves will not allow anyone to build even that first phase of communism - socialism without material privileges for the bureaucracy, which Lenin promised in the April Theses and in the book *State and Revolution*. Khrushchev wanted to build communism in the USSR in 20 years - flew off. Yeltsin wanted to build Leninist socialism without material privileges for bureaucrats in at least one Moscow - he also flew off. If Gorbachev tries to encroach on these privileges even before he removes the Brezhnevites from the Central Committee, then he will fly off too. After all, the notorious "Soviet people" actually consists of this one bureaucracy, for which the current system is the cherished "socialism".

How big is this "Soviet people" numerically? Gorbachev named the number of bureaucrats in the economic and party-Soviet administration: eighteen million people! This number coincides with the size of the Communist Party itself, which does not mean at all that all members of the Party belong to the "Soviet people" and that there are no "Soviet people" among the non-Party people. The multi-million army of *seksots* - the scum of society - is also the "Soviet people". The nominally powerful nation - the Russian people - is not involved in power, because power is not from it and not through it, but from the party, through the party, in the name of the party, through the political system, which I called *partocracy*. This party itself makes up some tenth of the adult Russian population. She once represented, according to Lenin, "the mind, honor and conscience of the era." This "conscience of the era" caused deep spiritual trauma to the essentially anti-Soviet Russian people themselves, who are forced to adapt to the prevailing conditions in order to survive. Therefore, he had

specific "Soviet features" that were not inherent in the Berdyaev Russian people: absolute apathy towards spiritual quests, atrophy of any civic feeling and civic dignity, panicky commitment to fear of the authorities, slavish obedience to the wildest acts of arbitrariness of the regime, ingenious political duplicity and purposeful lies as a means self-insurance, the deification of one's own executioners as great sages, and the condemnation of their victims as monsters of the human race - this is by no means a complete list of the acquired features of the Soviet image of "spiritual life." These traits had entered the blood and flesh of many before, having become familiar life guidelines, that they gave rise to the mass psychology of silent slaves. These traits are not the privilege of Russians alone. They are vaccinated to varying degrees and all non-Russians. This is precisely the kind of people the Bolsheviks need, for it is unlikely that the polarized Berdyaev Russian people would come to terms with Soviet tyranny and Soviet socialism.

Let's return to the national question. There are many examples of physical genocide in history, but for the first time only Soviet imperialism began to practice spiritual and ethnic genocide. This

ethnic genocide Moscow began with the language. If there is something eternal, secret and fateful, the dominant of all feelings and ideas in any small or great nation, then this is its national self-consciousness — the self-consciousness of its originality, uniqueness. But there is also a feeling of doom if the people lose the first attribute of their uniqueness - the national language. It follows that in any imperial multinational state, the government in the national question pursued a policy of linguistic denationalization of the conquered nations and imposing on them the language of the sovereign nation. However, here, too, the Soviet type of imperialism said a new word: not only to practice linguistic denationalization, but also historical denationalization, systematically erasing their historical past from the memory of peoples. Lenin's notorious "five signs of imperialism" in relation to the classical imperialism of the Western powers turned out to be innocent "birthmarks" in comparison with what Soviet socialist imperialism had in store for the peoples. Soviet imperialism is dynamic and attractive, because it is incomparable in the art of disguising its anti-national face, strategic goals in the formulas of supra-racial internationalism, it is insidious in the methods and means of achieving them, it is incomparable in the field of social demagoguery and political hypocrisy. The colonial system of classical imperialism in the subjugated countries was primarily and mainly interested in the material factor - pumping material values out of the colony; Soviet socialist imperialism is interested primarily and mainly in the human factor - how to bring the conquered peoples to their faith, how to reforge people, knowing full well that after that the rest will follow of itself.

The dynamism of Soviet imperialism was also expressed in that peculiar form of organization of the empire itself, which was unknown to any classical empire in the West. Soviet imperialism declared its colonies to be "independent" states with all the attributes that characterize independent states - they have their national governments, their national parliaments, their national communist parties, their national flags, their national emblems, but this construction has one drawback - it is through and through false, because the Soviet "independent" republics are governed not from their own capitals, but from Moscow. Lenin, like Marx, argued that capitalist monopolies, the concentration and centralization of production with social labor created ready-made forms for transferring the economy to socialist rails, it was only necessary to remove its capitalist shell from this production. The same can be said about the Soviet "independent" republics - with its props of "independent" "sovereign" Soviet national republics, Moscow has created a ready-made form for their future true independence, but they only need to be removed from the power of the Kremlin. All the prerequisites for this, ironically, were created by the Bolsheviks themselves: national culture, national intelligentsia, national cadres,

who will someday say: "We want to be masters in our national home!".

I affirm that the road to the freedom and sovereignty of the Russian people itself lies through the decay of the Soviet empire.

To understand this problem, it is important to expand its scope. When examining the growth of the national self-consciousness of the non-Russian peoples of the Soviet empire, one cannot ignore another phenomenon of epochal significance — the growth of the national self-consciousness of the Russian people themselves. We have seen that Lenin's original classical Bolshevism set before its ideologists the general task of the historical and ideological de-Russification of the Russian people. Therefore, everything that testified to the greatness of the Russian people, Russian sovereigns, Russian generals, Russian saints, Russian discoverers, Russian colonialists, that is, all those from whom the Bolsheviks inherited the Great Russian Empire itself, was expelled from spiritual circulation. The ultimate goal, as it was, remains to this day: to expel the concept of "Russian patriotism" from circulation, replacing it with "Soviet patriotism", so that Ivan would seriously become Alexander Zinoviev's "homo sovieticus", who does not remember kinship. In addition to language and culture, the Russian nation was based on two spiritual factors - the Russian Orthodox religion and the Russian state legal consciousness, although imported from outside, but Russified in the centuries-old traditions of the people. It was much easier to physically destroy almost without exce

thousands of landowners and just as many "bourgeois" in Russia than to eradicate precisely these spiritual factors from the consciousness of the people. The best evidence of the bankruptcy of the Bolshevik Marxist ideology in the face of the indestructible spirit of Russian religious and patriotic consciousness was brought by the "Patriotic War", when the country was saved from the invaders not under the banner of Marxism, but under the banner of Russian patriotism ("amnesty" of the Orthodox Church, amnesty of Russian princes and commanders, "closing" of the Comintern, etc.). The post-war campaign against "cosmopolitans" and "low worshippers" hit the same point - to exploit Russian patriotism for other purposes. "Other goals" were, as during the war, insidious. Prepare a new "great purge" to return the genie back to the bottle, forced out of it during the war. This gin was His Majesty the Russian Spirit. This was also the historical meaning of the notorious Zhdanovism, which aimed not only at the Jewish "cosmopolitans", but also at the Russian "common worshippers".

As soon as Stalin had time to condemn the "low-worshippers", execute the "Zionists" (1952) and imprison the "doctors of pests" ("conspiracy of doctors"), he was helped to die by his closest Russian comrades-in-arms, in whom he woke up to some extent the "Russian spirit" is Malenkov, Khrushchev, Bulganin, plus his countryman Beria, who cheated on him. (I find confirmation of my hypothesis from the "Mystery of Stalin's Death" in the notes of K. Simonov, who does not exclude that Stalin died as a result of Beria's conspiracy. See Znamya magazine, No. 4, 1988).

The subsequent era - Khrushchev-Brezhnev - was an era in the spirit of Great Russian autocracy in the formulas of pseudo-internationalism, which did not fully satisfy the Russians, but painfully infringed on non-Russians. The era of "glasnost" gives, however, in a very limited framework, both Russians and national representatives to speak out about their national aspirations. The nationals responded to glasnost with a demand that their native language be recognized as the state language, and the Russians with a stream of revealing literature about Stalinism, the era of Brezhnev's "stagnation" and the phenomenon of "Memory".

"Memory" for me is the whole "Soviet world" in miniature. In this microcosm, various currents are represented with their internal contradictions - monarchists and anarchists, Orthodox and atheists, patriots and anti-Semites, Leninists and Stolypinists, plus cells of the new Zubatovs from the KGB sent here. In the "Memory" movement, one can see not only the repulsive features of chauvinism, but also a revolt of healthy Russian patriotism against Marxist obscurantism in the present and a protest against Marxist vandalism in the past. The interaction of such mutually exclusive elements and ideological currents in the Russian movement probably lies in the same plane of polarized contradictions in

Russian character, which was drawn to us by Nikolai Berdyaev. "Memory" is a crack in the imaginary monolith of "the unity of the party and the people" and, as such, a precedent of the greatest historical significance with unpredictable consequences. And here it is useful to recall the thought of the great Frenchman Voltaire: I do not share your views, but I will defend your right to have your own views until the last breath, adding: except for chauvinistic ones.

Representatives of the creative intelligentsia of the national republics demanded that Moscow abandon the installation of the interpretation of the historical and cultural past of non-Russian peoples in the spirit of the Great Russian concept of the old historical schools of the times of tsarism. They demanded to return to Lenin and Pokrovsky in their assessments of the national liberation movements in old Russia. Without pressure from below, the Soviet leaders never made concessions and turns in their policy. The greater this pressure, the more radical are the very turns being made to avert the social explosion called revolution. Lenin, as it were, anticipated the situation in the USSR at the end of the Brezhnev era when he wrote: "The basic law of the revolution, confirmed by all revolutions and in particular by all three Russian revolutions, is this: for revolution is not enough for the exploited and oppressed masses to realize the impossibility of living in the old way and demand a change: for a revolution it is necessary that the exploiters cannot live and rule in the old way, only when the 'lower classes' do not want the old and when the 'tops' cannot in the old way, only then can the revolution win" (Lenin, vol. XXV, 3rd ed., p. 223, italics mine - A.A.).

Such is the situation in the Soviet Union today. Even the famous Soviet poet Bulat Okudzhava noticed this when he said: "There is a revolutionary situation, but there are no revolutionaries!" The very purpose of perestroika is to prevent such a revolution.

Russian patriots usually say: "Russians are the first victim of communism." This is undoubtedly true, but the logical conclusion follows from this: the Russians must be the first to overthrow him either by a revolutionary coup from above, or by legal methods of peaceful revolution from below, as exemplified by the glorious Polish Solidarity with its "peaceful proletarian revolution" in August 1980.

Once again, since the October Revolution, Russia faces a fateful stage in its development. Today, for the first time, the historical chances of a peaceful transition from mono-party tyranny to the rule of law have emerged. The Russian national movement, which has renounced the imperial concept, which is disastrous for it, and has united with the national movement of the non-Russian peoples of the Soviet empire under the old slogan of Herzen during the Polish uprising of 1863 - "For your and our freedom", will lead to the triumph of freedom and democracy throughout territory of the USSR. If Marx was right about anything, it was in his famous saying: "A people cannot be free if it oppresses other peoples." And here there is someone to take an example from - from the Western empires, which after the war - some voluntarily, others forcedly - gave independence to their colonies. Above the largest of them - over the British Empire - the sun did not set, as they said. During the heyday of this empire, its prime minister, Disraeli, said that the British colonies were millstones around the neck of England. The descendants of Disraeli were intelligent enough to get rid of these "millstones" in a good way. England lost nothing, but won. Many of its former colonies, including such a great country as India, united in a voluntary "British Commonwealth of Nations". If Russia follows the example of England, then everyone will benefit - the Russian and non-Russian peoples. The only way to do this is to dissolve the coercive empire and proclaim a confederation of independent states from among the national republics, which are ready to enter it voluntarily.

In this regard, of interest is the national clause from the "Cologne Appeal", signed by well-known Russian writers and publicists from the new emigration in the USSR and in the West. If the thoughts contained in this paragraph to some extent reflect the mood of the Russian intelligentsia in the USSR itself, then this would be the greatest progress towards solving the national question. Here is what the paragraph says:

"The most important condition for social transformations could be the acquisition of actual national independence by the various peoples of the country. The right of nations to self-determination, declared in the Soviet constitution, up to and including secession from the USSR, must be translated into a real process of transforming the empire into a voluntary community of independent states, with a guaranteed right for members of this community to secede from it. The existence of the empire became in all respects a blatant anachronism and one of the most important obstacles to the social, economic and cultural progress of the country. The "welfare empire", which the Soviet Union has now turned into, first of all exhausts the spiritual and material potential of the imperial people themselves. The experience of national movements of only recent times (Kazakhstan, Armenia, Azerbaijan, the Baltic republics, the movement of the Crimean Tatars, the struggle of Ukrainians and Belarusians for the recognition of their native language as the state language, etc.) convincingly shows that the national problems that arose already in the Soviet period of history countries cannot be satisfactorily resolved within the framework of preserving such an empire" ("Russian Thought", 1.4.1988, Paris). Whether "perestroika" and "new thinking" will invade the realm of national relations depends on the outcome of the struggle between reformers and conservatives at the top of the Soviet ruling class. The situation here is very confused, the balance of forces is unclear, the contradictions are sharp, and therefore it would be frivolous to venture on any reasonable forecast. The Kremlin denies that there are contradictions and disagreements, both in common policy and on the national question, and this indirectly confirms their existence.

True, in the international arena, and there are no disagreements here, "perestroika" worked perfectly. Gorbachev conquered the West with his rhetoric alone, borrowed from the explanatory dictionary of democracy. There is nothing easier than to subdue a good-natured democracy, skillfully using its own philosophy, but to subjugate or fool your own people with rhetoric is an absolutely hopeless business, because this people has a long and tragic historical experience; how many promises, how many deceptions, how many bloody crimes did the regime commit in the name and in the name of socialism? The people were taught and taught not to believe in anything. At a meeting between Gorbachev and writers and journalists, one of his advisers, V. M. Falin, expressed the same truth in other words: "We have exhausted the credit of trust or are close to exhausting it. And today we can write only the truth, the whole truth" ("Pravda", 13.1. the substance of the party created by Stalin, the state machine and the social order, then this occupation is not only obviously fruitless, but also dangerous in view of the presence of a gigantic explosive Stalinist potential in the ranks of the party, army and KGB. If it comes to that, Stalin is terrible not so much because of the monstrous terror in the past, although he surpassed all the tyrants in history combined in this, as he is immeasurably terrible with the vitality of his spirit in the present: in the way of thinking, in the way of action, in the way of life, in the whole psychological complex of people. Stalinism lives not only in every activist of the system, but in every person, even if he is a convinced anti-Stalinist, because Stalinism is a general psychological trauma that has been inherited into a chronic spiritual illness of the entire nation. Such a disease is cured not by spells, but by a gigantic shock. Such a shock could have been an explosion of the entire Stalinist state machine, organized from above, from the base to the superstructure, and the transfer of supreme power in the USSR from a party to a state with a truly democratic constitution, with the separation of parliamentary, executive and judicial powers, with freedom of conscience, speech, press, assembly, demonstrations, unions and political parties, with equal access for all to the media, with complete freedom to leave and return to the country for all citizens, with the transformation of the USSR itself into a confederation of independent states. Otherwise, the current experimentation with the Stalinist machine in order to "democratize" it may

end up like Khrushchev's experiments ended - the second triumph of the neo-Stalinists.

Now the Soviet state is ruled by a "troika": Gorbachev - Ligachev - Chebrikov. The distribution of roles between them is drawn to me, figuratively speaking, as follows: Gorbachev is the chief persuader, Ligachev is the chief manager, Chebrikov is the chief supervisor. As for the party, an unprecedented structural bifurcation of power took place at its top: Secretary General Gorbachev - chairman of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, that is, the head of the "talking shop" - the small "party parliament" (the big "party parliament" is the plenum of the Central Committee); "Second Secretary" or "Second General Secretary" Ligachev - Chairman of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the CPSU, that is, the head of the actual party and Soviet government. The actions of both of them are vigilantly supervised by the third member of the "triumvirate" - KGB chief Chebrikov. This "triumvirate" is the main "braking mechanism" of perestroika, because each of its members, like a swan, a crayfish and a pike from Krylov's fable, pulls the party-state cart in different directions: Chebrikov's pike pulls it into the fetid swamp of rabid Stalinism, Ligachev's crayfish backs away Back in the "glorious thirties," as he himself once put it, the swan Gorbachev aspires to fantastic heights, "and things are still there." And the great fabulist explained why this is so: "When there is no agreement among the comrades, their business will not go well and nothing will come out of it - only flour."

This situation at the top of the Kremlin was not accidental. A Marxist will explain it philosophically - "being determines consciousness", historically "the dead seize the living", dialectically as a conflict between generations. Each of these interpretations has its own rationale. After all, yesterday's reactionaries, but from different generations, took up the "revolutionary restructuring in all spheres". Spiritually educated on Stalin or on the unquoted Stalin, politically advanced in the serene era of "stagnation", that is, in the era of the dominance of the political swamp with partial restalinization, which for two decades mothballed Khrushchev's "perestroika", these organizers of the new perestroika are freeing themselves from the old thinking very tightly and in different ways, as if in proportion to their age - the old people, to whom the Stalinist inoculation entered into flesh and blood and became more organically entrenched, also want perestroika, but without

to anathematize Stalin himself—the “young” whom Khrushchev managed to infect with the bacilli of anti-Stalinism—do not imagine perestroika otherwise than with a complete break with the Stalinist past.

Today it is already obvious that the “old men” were headed by Ligachev, and the “young ones” by Gorbachev. At the April plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU (1985), both groups concluded a “historical compromise” and agreed to start restructuring only in two areas - economic and partly social, without touching the political system, but very soon it became clear that no radical economic and social reforms were possible without a radical reforms of the political structure established by Stalin and its governing bodies. That's when disagreements began between the “old” and “young”, between conservatives and “revolutionaries”. Only the plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU was competent to resolve this dispute, and even after the 20th Party Congress it consisted of 64% of the members of the Central Committee of the Brezhnev era, whose sympathy was on the side of the Stalinists in the Politburo. Under these conditions, Gorbachev resorted to a brilliant trick in party politics, which was first used by Lenin himself, when his entire Bolshevik Central Committee opposed his strategy of seizing power in the April Theses in 1917 (“the development of the bourgeois-democratic revolution into a socialist revolution”). . Lenin decided to play “democracy” and demanded that the strategic dispute be transferred from the Central Committee to a broad discussion of the entire party. This was Lenin's first “glasnost”. For its success in his own favor, Lenin headed the newspaper Pravda, expelling Kamenev and Stalin from there, who rejected the April Theses. A couple of weeks later, the whole party took the point of view of Lenin. At the end of April, the All-Russian Party Conference elected a new Central Committee, which announced the April Theses as the program for the future Bolshevik revolution. The current “glasnost” just looks like this Leninist tactical maneuver in the struggle for power over the Central Committee.

One can only learn from Lenin the tactical-strategic art, but one cannot learn from him questions of the philosophy of law and the rule of law, for in these matters Lenin is Stalin's spiritual father. Therefore, it is necessary to abandon the childish game of political hide and seek: not to oppose Stalin to Lenin, which is absurd and absurd, but to openly criticize Lenin's vicious legal philosophy and Stalin's criminal practice based on it. That's when everything will fall into place. As long as Lenin enjoys the privilege of absolute innocence, and his writings have the rank of Marxist “holy scripture,” all talk of glasnost and democratization will not reach the goal of a “perestroika revolution” in people's minds. Even the source

The current crisis of national relations is not in Stalin, but in Lenin. The theory of the fusion of all the peoples of Russia into one nation, that is, the policy of Russification, was put forward, as we have seen, even before the revolution by Lenin himself, and not by Stalin. The ethnic map of the Russian Empire after the revolution was shredded, according to the method of “fusion of nations”, by the same Lenin, not Stalin.

Lenin was a great master in revolutionary destructive creativity, but in state creative creativity he prepared only Stalin. Even the weapon to destroy his Bolshevik party and its leading headquarters - the Central Committee - was handed over to Stalin by Lenin himself, when he introduced the ongoing “state of siege” in the party in the form of a resolution “On the unity of the party”, according to which the party apparatus was placed over the party, with a ban on the party of everything that was previously considered the democratic right of everyone: dissent, groups, factions that disagree with the party apparatus. It was precisely on the basis of this resolution, which Lenin unexpectedly and without discussion in the party itself, imposed on the Tenth Party Congress in 1921, a year before Stalin became General Secretary, that Stalin destroyed first the entire “Leninist guard”, and then the Leninist party. And so it happened: Lenin sowed the wind, and the Leninist party reaped the whirlwind! No, without lifting the taboo on criticizing Lenin, Stalin will continue to live like “Lenin yesterday.”

Just as Stalin came from Lenin, so did the successive general secretaries, in turn, from Stalin, for they all learned their art of governing the state directly from him, from his deeds and from his practical instructions. No wonder one party politician of the Brezhnev period said: “We removed Stalin's creations from the libraries, but we ourselves are forced to look there often.”

Differences and serious disagreements between reformers and conservatives in the Politburo and at the plenum of the Central Committee are an absolutely indisputable fact. But this does not exclude the existence of a conspiracy between Gorbachev and Ligachev on the distribution of roles between them for tactical reasons, since both stand on the positions of "perestroika", which each understands in his own way. This is necessary for the success of the planned strategy in both spheres - domestically and in foreign policy. Inside the country, Ligachev is obliged to lead the conservative party-state bureaucracy to "perestroika", in foreign policy Gorbachev must inspire the West with "new thinking" and draw an attractive process of transforming the dictatorship regime into a rule of law state, which should open the door to the Western world in general and to a "pan-European house" in particular, for obtaining loans, machinery and technology.

In the West, everything is measured by its own yardstick, they exaggerate Gorbachev's capabilities, they ignore the factors that bind him. However, after Lenin and Stalin, the direction and priorities of Soviet politics are decided not by strong personalities, no matter how they stand out outside and no matter what titles they bear, but by "power factors" and their coordinated will in the "triangle of power" - the KGB, the army and the party apparatus. The General Secretary, nominated by this "triangle", depends on him. As soon as he deviates from the line set for him, he will fall, even if he is the most popular leader among the people. Everyone who closely follows the affairs of the party itself knows that, together with its moral authority, due to the total corruption in its governing bodies, it has lost to some extent its former power, while the power of the other two "corners" of the KGB and army - remained unshakable.

"Glasnost" and "openness" hit the KGB, disarmament and revision of the global military-political strategy hit the interests of the army. It is an ominous mystery of our time to what extent and to what extent these two pillars, on which the Soviet regime itself rests, will allow the reformers to undermine the foundation of a superpower. The Soviet armed forces and political police understand only too well that the logical end of total disarmament, "revolutionary perestroika", glasnost and real democratization with its inevitable decentralization of Moscow's "single and indivisible power" will mean not only the disintegration of the Soviet empire from within and the exit from under its control of the Eastern European countries, but also the loss by the Soviet Union of its position as a world superpower, since the USSR became a superpower not because of its economic and technical and technological power, like America, but solely because of the superiority of Soviet weapons. Russia has always valued its military greatness more than its social well-being. When, after the Allied victory in the Crimean War of 1853-56, Russia was forced to sink its Black Sea Fleet, Russian admirals and generals wept right in front of the soldiers.

Nobody has defeated Russia now, its warships are present on all the world's seas and oceans, its ground forces with strategic nuclear missiles are superior to those of the enemy. Whoever wants to voluntarily destroy all this will cause not tears in the home-grown militarists, but explosive anger against their own rulers, as happened with Khrushchev when he began to cut the army, the military budget and curtail the military industry.

The struggle for power in the Kremlin, the struggle between the reformers and the conservatives became quite obvious at the just ended 19th party conference. It is in the interests of the peoples of the USSR that Gorbachev emerge victorious from this struggle, but in the end it would be in the interests of the West for Ligachev to win, for he is as clear as Lenin and as predictable as Stalin.

MI. The National Question at the 19th Party Conference

In the Theses of the Central Committee of the CPSU for the 19th All-Union Party Conference, the seventh point is devoted to the national question. It says: "As part of the restructuring of the political system, urgent measures should be considered and taken for the further development of the Soviet federation... Life shows that constant attention is required to issues of interethnic relations, the development of each nation and nationality... There is a natural growth of national self-consciousness. ... Decentralization and the maximum transfer to the localities of many administrative functions fully apply to all forms of our national statehood and autonomy" ("Pravda",

May 27, 1988). Moscow is ready to expand the independence of the national republics only on one condition: if they continue to submit to the dictates of the Moscow bureaucracy. This is precisely the meaning of the following reservation: "The key to the further development of nations ... lies in the organic combination of the independence of the union and autonomous republics ... with their responsibility for the all-Union state interests" ("Pravda", *ibid.*). Not a word about events on the national outskirts of the empire. There is no mention of the danger of great-power chauvinism, but the importance of "internationalist ideology" versus "nationalism and chauvinism" is emphasized, terms which in both cases imply exclusively the growth of the national movement of non-Russian peoples for national independence. In Gorbachev's report at the party conference itself, these "Theses of the Central Committee" were developed without concretizing them in terms of "perestroika". Some of his comments on this matter deserve mention.

Gorbachev argues that "with all the difficulties that have been in our way, today we state that the union has withstood the test of time" and that "from now on, the only healthy basis for our development can only be the consistent implementation of

Leninist national policy" ("Pravda", 29. 6. 1988). This means that the national policy of Stalin, Khrushchev and Brezhnev was "Lenin's policy" and should be continued "consistently". If we are to endlessly refer to the "Leninist nationality policy", then it would seem that Gorbachev should also refer to the "last word" of Leninism in the national question, namely, to his "National Testament" in the form of the article "On the Question of Nationalities or autonomization" published after the exposure of Stalin's crimes at the 20th Party Congress. Neither in the "Theses of the Central Committee", nor in Gorbachev's report, nor in the resolutions of the HGH party conference is there any reference to this truly historic work of Lenin demanding a radical revision of the "only sound basis" on which Stalin created the pseudo-federation and pseudo-autonomy that still exists today. . Why the "conspiracy of silence" around this work of Lenin remains in force even during the period of "glasnost" and a new wave of exposure of Stalinism, anyone who reads at least Lenin's epigraph from it to this book will guess.

When people in the national republics take to the streets and demand, in demonstrations of many thousands, to put an end to Stalinism on the national question and to return their national sovereignty to the republics, in full agreement with Lenin, then such actions, according to Gorbachev, "take on a nationalist coloring." There is only one conclusion: "The internationalization of the economy, and indeed of the entire social life, we cannot avoid. And any desire for national isolation can lead to economic and spiritual impoverishment." "National isolation" here refers to the desire for national independence, in which non-Russian peoples outside the Soviet empire are supposedly doomed to "spiritual impoverishment".

The collapse of Western empires after the Second World War and the formation of about sixty independent states in Africa and Asia as a result of this proved that the colonial peoples considered the highest spiritual wealth to be masters at home, even if they lose economically. Moscow, apparently, will never understand that these are precisely the feelings of the peoples under its charge. After all, as I already wrote, Lenin's promise to give them national independence with a guarantee of the right to secede from the Russian Empire was the only reason why their sympathies turned out to be on the side of Lenin during the revolution and civil war. They were bitterly deceived, but such resentment lives on for centuries.

In the debate on Gorbachev's report, the national question found neither proper reflection nor a sober analysis. Not only Russian orators, but also their national vassals were unanimous in the "conspiracy of silence" about what was happening on the outskirts. The two speeches of the two new first secretaries of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan and Armenia still touched on the events in their republics. Azerbaijani Secretary A. Vezirov said that the situation in and around Karabakh "has acquired a socially dangerous character", "attempts to push our two peoples do not stop ... The situation has sharply aggravated due to the fact that thousands of people living there began to arrive from Armenia Azerbaijanis. Many Armenians have left Azerbaijan." Having condemned the anti-Armenian pogrom in Sumgayit, the leader of Azerbaijan said that the demands for a "revision

national-territorial system", as well as the events in Sumgayit, "destabilized the situation" in Azerbaijan and Armenia. He argued that the people who organized the "destabilization" were "striving to undermine perestroika, to spread hotbeds of interethnic discord to other regions of the country" (Pravda, 30. 6. 1988).

Armenian Secretary S. Harutyunyan approached the same set of issues from a different angle, linking the events in Azerbaijan and Armenia with the general principles of the party's national policy, and demanded the development of a new way of thinking in all national politics. Here is the relevant passage from his speech: "The origins of the current situation lie in the complex intertwining of historical, social, economic, cultural, ethnic problems, the distortions of national policy that took place during the period of the cult of personality and stagnation. It is blasphemous to assert that perestroika, democratization and glasnost were the causes of these events. Painful problems did not come today and

yesterday. They accumulated gradually over decades, without receiving not only the necessary solution, but even public recognition. It is the anti-democratic practice of silence and indifference ... attempts to drive them deep or solve them with authoritarian methods have led to their explosive manifestation today." Harutyunyan also objected to the unscrupulous propaganda theory that "extremists" who got out of control are to blame for everything. "This," said the speaker, "is a very simplistic idea... I cannot but say here that such explanations hurt the national feelings of the Communists and working people, and they simply contradict common sense." He proposed a general revision of the old national policy on a countrywide scale. Here is his main conclusion: "The urgent need today is the development of a new political thinking in the national question" ("Pravda", 07/01/1988).

Boris Oleinik, secretary of the Writers' Union of Ukraine, said that the national problem is not a regional one, but an all-union one. Here is his main thesis: "One of the grave consequences of the cult is the perversion of the Leninist national policy. Do not look for the guilty by region. After all, the problem is universal. In this regard, both the consequences and the causes are equally sad. The consequence, in particular, in Ukraine is this: the national language found itself almost on the outskirts of the spiritual and material-productive life of the people. He gradually somehow leaves office work, from state and party life. Moreover, in many cities there are no longer schools in their native language. In almost all institutions of higher education, students are deprived of the opportunity to study in the language of their mothers." B. Oleinik put forward a specific requirement: "There should be no discrepancies on this issue. It is necessary to create at the state level the most favorable regime for the functioning of the native language in all spheres and at all levels of society, reinforcing the theory with legal laws, up to the prosecution of persons who impede the development of national culture. These words of Oleinik were covered with applause of the conference, as well as his "dialectical" find in defining the difference between "motherland" and "country". Declaring that during the war Ukrainians fought and died not "For Stalin, for their homeland", but only for "homeland and country", Oleinik defined what this means: "I don't know how anyone, but me and those who sent me to conference is a homeland - Soviet Ukraine and there is a country - the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics" ("Pravda", 0

The conference adopted a special resolution "On Interethnic Relations". Gorbachev's favorite slogans of "radical reforms" and "new political thinking" are reminiscent of this resolution only by their brilliant absence. The whole resolution is a set of empty words from the nauseating propaganda chatter of the Stalin era that has become boring to everyone. In matters of national culture and national languages, the new leaders became even more right than Stalin. They fully support the Great Russian policy of Khrushchev-Brezhnev, stating in this resolution that teaching in schools in their native language is not obligatory, but voluntary. However, something else is striking: the Russification of the culture and apparatus of power of the non-Russian republics, as well as the declaration of local nationalism as the main danger in national politics, are repeatedly substantiated by the new leaders with references to Lenin, while Lenin's position on these issues was absolutely opposite and it is well known to the party, thanks to Khrushchev and XX Congress. Therefore, the following words are downright blasphemous for the founder of Bolshevism:

words from the resolution: "Any claim to national exclusiveness is unacceptable and insulting... In the spirit of the Leninist tradition, one should fight first of all with 'one's own' nationalism and chauvinism, and this should be done first of all by representatives of the corresponding nationality" ("Pravda", 5. 7. 1988). This is the most shameless falsification of Lenin and an open apology for Stalin in his dispute with Lenin. Lenin wrote in this way not about "his" nationalism, but about Great Russian chauvinism. After all, Lenin's words belong to Lenin: "It is necessary to distinguish between the nationalism of a large nation and the nationalism of a small nation ... Have we taken measures with sufficient care to

really protect the foreigners from the truly Russian juggernaut". "Great Russian chauvinism I declare a fight not for life, but for death."

I argue that the current crisis of national relations has its historical roots in the practice of great-power chauvinist rule from Stalin to Brezhnev. Apparently, the new leadership did not find anything better than to continue the same practice, defiantly ignoring that local nationalism in its chauvinistic form is only a reaction to the rampant Great Russian chauvinism in the national policy of the party. The same falsification is the new legend about the "Leninist tradition", according to which Lenin allegedly demanded that "all nations and nationalities be represented" in the authorities of the republics. Lenin did not demand this. On the contrary, he demanded the "indigenization" of the governing bodies of the national republics by ousting Russian officials from there. Whether the Kremlin likes it or not, these were the decisions of the Tenth and XVII Party Congresses that took place during Lenin's lifetime. (I note that in falsifying Lenin, new leaders often refer to Lenin, but do not indicate exactly when and where Lenin expressed this or that thought attributed to him.) Ominous and urgent problems of national relations, which at any time can cause an explosion with unpredictable consequences, the new leadership wants to solve it by creating another new central agency to oversee the national republics. The resolution says: "To consider the question of establishing a special state agency for nationalities." Such an initiative brings back bad memories. The fact is that such a body has already been in the history of the Soviet regime. It was called the "People's Commissariat for Nationalities" and was headed by Stalin. A second edition of such a body has a chance of success if the Kremlin finds another Stalin to lead it.

As I was writing these lines, news came from Moscow: the founder of the movement for the national independence of Armenia, Paruyr Hayrikyan, was deprived of Soviet citizenship by a decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and expelled from the country. He spent half of his life (18 years!) in Soviet prisons and concentration camps because he wanted to peacefully use Article 72 of the Constitution of the USSR, which reads: "Each Union republic retains the right to freely secede from the USSR." After his release in 1987, he again led the Armenian national movement for the secession of Armenia from the USSR with the declaration of its full state independence through a plebiscite. Neither terror, nor rebellion, nor other forms of violence, he preached to achieve his goal. The only means of struggle that his movement used was the word of persuasion. For this free speech, he was imprisoned again in March 1988. For the same free speech, he was expelled from the country, when the ink had not yet dried on the solemn resolutions of the 19th Party Conference on the introduction of "humane socialism", "the rule of law" in the country and on the "further expansion of glasnost" on the basis of "new political thinking". Thought seems to be new, but things, as we see, are still old. As for the dispute between Armenia and Azerbaijan: to which Muscovite vassal - Armenian or Azeri - should Gorny Karabakh obey - this is an empty and harmful dispute. The Armenians lead him from false positions, forgetting the folk wisdom: having taken off their heads, they don't cry over their hair. The tragedy of Armenia is not that Stalin in 1923 included Karabakh into Azerbaijan, but that Lenin in 1920, on the bayonets of the Red Army, occupied and annexed the independent national republics of the Caucasus - Armenia, Azerbaijan, the North Caucasus, including all of them together with Georgia into the Soviet Empire. During the independence of the Caucasus, this dispute did not exist, it arose only under the Bolsheviks - the successors of the policy of "divide and rule", which led to a nightmarish massacre in Sumgayit. True patriots of the Caucasus can pose a fateful problem, as Hayrikyan poses it - about the right of peoples to secede from the USSR.

In conclusion, I would like to tell you about one curiosity and, at the same time, praise the "efficiency" of Soviet ideological intelligence with its phenomenal clairvoyance of things that did not yet exist at the time of clairvoyance. So, almost a year before the writing of this book

the organ of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan, the Baku Rabochiy newspaper, claimed that I had published a book called The Last Empire. Even a quote is given from a book that did not exist at that time. First, the newspaper introduces me to readers with a deliberate distortion of my biography according to the well-known method of the KGB bashi-bazouks: "Meet Abdurrahim Avtorkhanov (that's not my name, but the name of my brother killed in the war - A.A.), an economist by training, a deserter of the Red Army .. He compensated for the feeling of his own insignificance with malice towards his native land. This book of his, The Last Empire, is the source for the sabotage antics of the authors of the broadcasts of the ubiquitous radio station Liberty. This is what Avtorkhanov claims: "Every Soviet citizen from birth to death is kept under total police supervision. Against any dissidents, individually or in a group, a scientifically prepared, diverse system of terror is used" "(Bakinsky Rabochiy, October 23, 1987.). I answer briefly: I am not an economist, not a deserter of the Red Army, because I never served in it, but sat as an "enemy of the people." I didn't publish books called "The Last Empire", but I am releasing this book on the same topic under a different name - "Kremlin Empire". As for the quote attributed to me, I confess that it belongs to me. Her newspaper obviously took from my series of scripts "The Last Empire", which was broadcast on Radio Liberty.

MI. XIX Party Conference: Strategic Rearmament of Bolshevism Inside and Out

At the HGH All-Union Conference of the KISS (June-July 1988), Gorbachev took some steps to publicize a number of reforms to restructure the political structure of the existing regime without affecting its substance. He wants to give the country "democracy", but while maintaining the dictatorship of the Communist Party, he wants to expand glasnost, but prohibiting the independent press (even the proposal to turn the Pravda newspaper from an organ of the Central Committee of the CPSU into an organ of the CPSU with the right to criticize the Central Committee was rejected at the conference), he wants to delimit the functions between the party and the state, but proposes to put the first secretaries of the party at the head of the Soviets at all levels, he wants to introduce "real pluralism", but without the right to criticize the party and the ideology of Marxism-Leninism, he wants to allow the initiative of the people and the activities of numerous popular "informal associations" in the country, as long as they are not involved in politics. Such is the general meaning of the "Theses of the Central Committee of the CPSU" and Gorbachev's report at the conference.

But there are also innovations. For the first time in the history of the Bolshevik dictatorship, new programmatic slogans were put forward, for which only yesterday people were put in psychiatric hospitals and prisons, some of whom continue to be imprisoned today. These slogans are as follows: from now on to build "democratic, humane socialism" and turn the Soviet state into a "lawful state." However, the Soviet people are not only short-sighted, but they are also great skeptics, whom the Party itself, through endless examples of lies and deceit, has weaned from believing in itself. "No one believes, so no one works," said one delegate at the conference. During these 70 years, Soviet people saw all sorts of forms of socialism - first "military-communist", and then Lenin's NEP socialism, then other "socialisms" went on, Stalin's "victorious socialism", socialism is now turning into Khrushchev's communism, "real", "mature" or "developed socialism" of Brezhnev, but the socialism that Gorbachev offers them now, namely, "humane

socialism" or, what is the same thing, "socialism with a human face", the Soviet people saw it only in passing - under the Soviet tanks in Prague. As for the "rule of law," Soviet people have been taught for 70 years in schools where desktop textbooks are Lenin's "State and Revolution", "The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky", in which the so-called "rule of law" is declared a fiction, and "democratic, humane socialism" is an invention of the Social-Democratic "lackeys" of the bourgeoisie from the Second International.

Nevertheless, what Gorbachev is doing now is not "window dressing", but deeply

a well-thought-out, politically-psychologically well-developed concept for the strategic rearmament of Bolshevism both inside the country and outside. Why has it become necessary? Sometimes dry facts from the source say more than long arguments. Such facts were announced at the 19th party conference. Let's look at some of them. USSR Minister of Health Academician Chazov said:

"We were proud of the public health system, but we were silent about the fact that in terms of child mortality we were in 50th place in the world after Mauritius and Barbados. We were proud that we have more doctors and hospitals than in any other country in the world, but we were silent that we rank 32nd in the world in terms of average life expectancy" ("Pravda", 30. 6. 1988).

The Soviet ambassador to the FRG, Kvitsinsky, said: "A significant increase in the sale of machinery, equipment and other highly processed products is not possible due to the technological backwardness of Soviet industry and the general low quality of our finished products. This is a widely known fact... In order to sell Soviet products, one sometimes has to go to the length of even removing the "Made in the USSR" label from them... We almost entirely pay for our purchases in the FRG with the export of irreplaceable natural resources: oil, gas, timber, diamonds ... Foreign currency imports continue not only of bread, which we do not have enough, but also of metal, which we produce more than the United States" ("Pravda", 3. 7. 1988). He forgot to point out that the USSR came out on top in arms exports, ahead of the United States.

To this it must be added that the share of the USSR in world trade fell below ten percent, and its exports, not only to the FRG, but also to other countries, consist of 90% of the energy and raw materials indicated by Kvitsinsky. Such resources tend to run out someday. What then? How then to build "socialism"? This phenomenon, in addition to the anti-economic nature of the Soviet system itself, has three more enemies that parasitize on the Soviet economy - a gigantic military machine, on which about 17% of national income is spent, a dozen "Marxist-Leninist" regimes in Africa, Asia and Latin America, for the maintenance of which about forty billion dollars are annually spent, 18 million bureaucracy, on which 40 billion rubles are spent.

When the Stalinist model of socialism finally went bankrupt (Yuri Afanasiev: "I do not consider the society created in our country to be socialist", Pravda, 26. 7. 1988), they decided to try another model. Therefore, the concept of the strategic rearmament of Bolshevism within the country was based on the Bukharin model of interpreting the Leninist NEP ("enrich yourself!"). In international politics, the party recalled Lenin's sober advice: all the achievements of world bourgeois culture, science and technology must be taken into the arsenal of Soviet civilization so that, relying on these achievements and using "market socialism" in the USSR, to prepare the victory of Soviet socialism over capitalism, not only inside Soviet Russia, but also on an international scale. Lenin prophesied that if the Soviet country took this path, proving with practical examples the superiority of the communist mixed economic system over the Western capitalist system in direct competition with it, then, Lenin said: "Then we won on an international scale for sure and finally" (Lenin, PSS, vol. 43, p. 341).

Gorbachev moved towards a break with the Stalinist model of socialism not according to Churchill's recipe for Khrushchev "You can only jump over an abyss in one go" but by a series of roundabout jumps, which is still far from over. With one blow, it would be possible to cut the "Gordian knot" of Stalinism during a revolutionary coup from above, which would require the support of at least one corner from the "triangle" of power - the party apparatus, the KGB and the army, which obviously did not happen. And the strategy of perestroika itself is an invention of a very limited circle of party statesmen who rely not on the "triangle", but on the intellectual and creative potential of the people.

Perestroika is not an anti-communist strategy, but only an anti-bureaucratic one. Hence the danger of a formidable conflict between the small vanguard of the "perestroika" and the gigantic army of bureaucrats at all levels. This bureaucracy was fed from two sources: the highest and

the middle bureaucracy with material privileges from the state, and the lower "proletarian" bureaucracy from using the shortage of goods and products (sometimes even artificial) to manipulate the deficit to make personal enrichment (in the Soviet press they write that a new class was formed in the country from such a "second economy" underground millionaires). Perestroika wants to take control of this state. From here, the enemies of perestroika from this higher and lower bureaucracy dress up in the costumes of "ideological Leninists" who oppose the "revisionists" undermining the foundations of "victorious socialism." Gorbachev is considered the inspirer of the "revisionists". Their main political argument is that the world bourgeois and social-democratic press are elevating Gorbachev's "anti-party doctrine of glasnost" to the skies and praising his perestroika, which means that Gorbachev is undermining the foundations of Soviet socialism. These "Leninists" probably remind Gorbachev of Lenin's favorite saying of the leader of the German workers, August Bebel: "You fool, old Bebel, the German bourgeoisie praises you - it means you betrayed the German proletariat."

Be that as it may, but Ligachev thought it best to remind the 19th Party Conference that it was he, Ligachev, who was not praised by either the bourgeoisie or the Social Democracy. Here is a quote: "They also write about us. Including different write abroad about Ligachev. Sometimes they ask how I feel about this? Paraphrasing the words of the great Russian poet, I will say: in the wild cry of anger, I hear sounds of approval" ("Pravda", 2. 7. 1988). Ligachev, of course, understands that his colleague Gorbachev cannot use such a quote. I think that both "Leninists" and fans of the West misunderstand Gorbachev's "long-range policy". Gorbachev does not betray Leninism, he is not looking for an alternative to socialism either. He is looking for, just relying on the tactical and strategic instructions of Lenin, another form or another model of socialism under which one can live and flourish, if, of course, such a model is generally conceivable and practically feasible. The search for a new model was dictated not by the good intentions of the new leaders, but by considerations of real politics, when the country found itself in the deepest structural crisis in all spheres - political, economic, social and spiritual. The choice of ways and methods for overcoming the crisis was limited. Actually, there was only a dilemma: either to get out of the crisis in the Stalinist way, that is, by the "great terror", but for this, in the current conditions, not just a new Stalin, but twice Stalin would be needed, which is difficult to imagine even in fantasy, or a simpler way out - to find a savvy master of "descent on the brakes" from Stalin's socialism to Lenin's-Bukharin's "market socialism". Such a master was found in Gorbachev. The very idea of "descent" also belongs to Lenin. In Notes of a Publicist, justifying the Bolshevik retreat from orthodox Marxist socialism to NEP capitalist socialism, he compared the behavior of the Bolsheviks with the behavior of a climber when climbing a high mountain. The climber, with great risk and with the gloating cries of the hostile crowd from below, climbs to the top of the mountain, only a small section remains, but it is so steep and sheer that there is a great danger of falling off and falling into the abyss. Then, Lenin argued, it is better to stop climbing, go down and start a new ascent to the same peak, but on the other side of the mountain. Such is the case, according to Lenin, in politics as well. Chebrikov, the chief of the KGB, was the first person in the new leadership of the Kremlin who, three years ago, uttered the word that was considered the greatest taboo in the vocabulary of Stalinist socialism - the word "reforms" (it was dangerous then for the secretary general, but not for the chief of the KGB) and substantiated the need for reforms by referring to Lenin's tactics of choosing "another way" of ascent to the socialist pinnacle. Here are his arguments: "Our party," Lenin said, "has learned the art necessary in the revolution—flexibility, the ability to quickly and drastically change its tactics, taking into account the changed objective conditions, choosing a different path to our goal, if the former path turned out to be

this period of time is inexpedient, impossible... Yes, we are changing tactics and improving strategy. We choose the most expedient and corresponding to the changed conditions of the path to our goal. Take a decisive course towards revising everything that has not justified itself ... towards reforms and changes" ("Pravda", November 7, 1985, Chebrikov's report on the 68th anniversary of October).

Gorbachev himself dared to utter the word "reforms" only at the beginning of the following 1986, at the 22nd Party Congress, without reference to the NEP (it was still dangerous), but only referring to the "tax in kind". Chebrikov could also refer to Lenin with regard to the need

strategic rearmament of Bolshevism with new methods for a new "peaceful expansion" into the outside world, such methods that correspond to new international conditions. He didn't. I want to do it for him, not to intimidate Gorbachev's Western admirers, but to inform his internal enemies. Here is one of Lenin's many tactical and strategic pieces of advice to his party: "To tie one's hands in advance, to speak openly to the enemy, who is now better armed than we are, whether we will fight him and when, is stupidity, not revolutionary. To accept a fight when it is obviously beneficial to the enemy, and not to us, is a crime, and such a policy of the revolutionary class is no good, which will not be able to continue "maneuvering", "agreement", "compromises" in order to evade a deliberately disadvantageous battle "(Lenin 4th ed., vol. 31, p. 58).

When the decision was made in the Politburo to descend from the Stalinist side of the socialist mountain in order to climb the same mountain from the other Leninist side, a new, no less terrible problem arose - how to discredit Stalin's "ascent" without risking falling into that very abyss that they want to bypass. In other words, how to scold Stalin and the Stalinist order without swearing at his "father and teacher" himself, or even sometimes praising him about his past merits in the struggle for Leninism against Trotskyism (Gorbachev), or how Stalin fought "like a lion" "with Western powers in Yalta for "Polish independence"" (Gromyko), or, finally, "remembering the glorious thirties" (Ligachev). The difficult problem was solved easily, according to a recipe that Machiavelli himself would have envied: writers, publicists and scientists were given almost unlimited freedom to vilify Stalinism and scold the Stalinist order, calling it all "glasnost". However, a significant reservation was also made - no one has the right to criticize Stalin's foreign policy, as well as his foreign policy crimes (the topic of Katyn is still taboo). The entire foreign policy from Lenin to the present day is considered positive and consistent, but it is recognized that there were individual "mistakes" and "miscalculations". Here is what Gorbachev said on this subject at the conference: "Despite some mistakes and miscalculations in the past, Soviet foreign policy, on the whole, has enormous merit for the country of socialism, for all mankind. Perestroika demanded from it a new quality both in essence and in form" ("Pravda", 06/29/1988). Therefore, the Stalinists are also wrong in that Gorbachev betrayed the international principles of Bolshevism in supporting the world communist movement. In this respect, I see no lack of consistency between Lenin and his successors in succession. One has only to recall the motto of each of the general secretaries (not to mention their deeds) in order to refute suspicions of Gorbachev's "treason" to the cause of world communism.

Stalin (in Questions of Leninism: "The victory of socialism in one country is not a self-sufficient task. The revolution of the victorious country must consider itself not as a self-sufficient magnitude, but as an aid, as a means to hasten the victory of the proletariat in all countries."

Khrushchev (in a conversation with congressmen in America): "We will bury capitalism without war, and your grandchildren will live under communism."

Brezhnev (at the 21st Congress of the CPSU): "The complete triumph of the cause of socialism throughout the world is inevitable. And for this triumph we will fight sparing no effort.

Gorbachev (at the 19th party conference): "The CPSU considers itself an integral part of the world communist movement, which is now conducting a difficult search for a way out to a new stage in its historical development. And we will ... actively participate in this search.

Only Gorbachev does not want to tease the capitalist bull with a red rag, and even repeat the dogmatic backsides of Stalin's ichthyosaurs, who, like those Bourbons, have not forgotten anything and have not learned anything.

The party deeply despised the Leninist reforms of the NEP, which Stalin took advantage of. The party is clearly sabotaging the reforms of the second NEP - Gorbachev's, which the Stalinists can take advantage of.

The 20th Party Conference, at which some delegates openly demanded the removal from the Politburo and the Central Committee of such perpetrators of Brezhnevism as Ligachev, Chebrikov, Gromyko, Solomentsev, proved that the country was heading towards a new political crisis in leadership with a continuing deepening crisis of national relations. It is easy to predict such a crisis, but it is extremely difficult to imagine its possible results, lost in conjectures, what are the real forces behind Gorbachev, while Ligachev's forces are in full view.

All decisions of the 19th Party Conference will remain on paper if their implementation depends on the will of the "collective leadership" of the Central Committee of the CPSU, because "collective leadership" under a one-party system is collective irresponsibility, as Brezhnev's stagnation with his total corruption from the bottom to the very top proved. . Looking back at the history and historical experience of all oligarchic regimes, which certainly include the Soviet regime of partocracy, we can state one historical pattern: the oligarchy is not capable of substantive reforms of the political system of epochal significance. Only a strong personality with an iron will, revolutionary determination and unlimited powers is capable of this. There are no words, any dictatorship - oligarchic or personal - is a disgusting phenomenon. However, personal dictatorship to prepare the leap "from the realm of necessity to the realm of freedom" is something like an "ambulance" to save a great nation from degeneration and the richest country from eternal poverty. Such a person is what the Soviet Union needs today. It may already exist in potency, in becoming. Now, at the top of the party, an obvious "dual power" has formed with two "tenseks" - there is a "de jure" secretary general Gorbachev, who presides over the "small party parliament", that is, in the "talking shop" represented by the Politburo (in which the secretary general "de jure" has a majority), but there is also the "de facto" Secretary General - Ligachev, who leads the Secretariat and the apparatus of the Central Committee, that is, the actual party and Soviet government of the USSR, nominated to this post by the "small party parliament" on behalf of the "big party parliament" (plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU, where the majority has Ligachev). Ligachev himself told this open secret to the entire party and the country at the 19th Party Conference when he declared: "A few words about the work of the Secretariat of the Central Committee. I have been instructed to conduct current work in the Secretariat of the Central Committee. This is an order from the Politburo. The Secretariat focuses on the organization and control of current work" ("Pravda", 07/02/1988). Starting with Stalin, all the general secretaries - Khrushchev, Brezhnev, Andropov, Chernenko - directly led the Central Committee apparatus and chose their own first assistant or "second secretary" in the Central Committee, but now the Secretariat is headed not by Gorbachev, but by Ligachev. In party language, this means that Ligachev is not responsible to the General Secretary "de jure", but only to the "small and large party parliaments", like Gorbachev himself. This unprecedented structural "dual power" in the Central Committee is actually the main "braking mechanism" for perestroika, democratization, and glasnost. After all, all the general secretaries were strong in that they had their hand on the wheel of the actual control of the party and the state - the Secretariat and the apparatus of the Central Committee. Behind this steering wheel is not Gorbachev, but Ligachev. That's why I call him the General Secretary "de facto". The party in its soul is on the side of the General Secretary "de facto", but in mind it vacillates in the direction of the General Secretary "de jure". This explains

The apparatus, despite all the reservations and doubts, nevertheless accepted, with some important adjustments, the plan for reforming the country's political structure proposed by Gorbachev. The most decisive and most important of all reforms must be recognized as Gorbachev's proposal for the unification of the highest party and state power in one person with powers on a large scale. This is the establishment of the post of chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, who is at the same time the head of the party, even without being the general secretary. Lenin was not a general secretary. In order to deprive the party of its monopoly on power and

to return "to Caesar - Caesar's" under the newly launched slogan of Lenin, proclaimed on the eve of October, "All power to the Soviets!", Gorbachev had no choice but to offer the party a compromise - to put the lower

government bodies of the first secretaries of each level. This, at first glance, seemed to contradict the general plan of Gorbachev himself about the division and delimitation of functions between party and state bodies. However, during the current transitional period, there was no way to get the consent of the party to the actual usurpation of its monopoly

authorities otherwise than by transplanting the first secretaries from their party chairs into the chairs of officials of the state apparatus, declaring state positions their main function, and party work a function of the ideological order. Gorbachev needed all this in order to make the next chess "knight's move" with strategic intent: to establish the title of the head of state with prerogatives similar to those of the American president. In other words, turn the Soviet general secretary system into a "presidential system". According to Gorbachev, these are the prerogatives of the Soviet president: "According to the Central Committee of the CPSU, the establishment of the post of Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR would correspond to the strengthening of the legal nature of power, the better representation of the Soviet Union in world affairs. It should be established that he is elected and recalled by secret ballot of the Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR... Under conditions of a general increase in the role of representative bodies, the chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR should be endowed with sufficiently broad state powers. In particular, he could carry out general management of the preparation of laws and major socio-economic programs, solve key issues of foreign policy, defense and security of the country, head the Defense Council, make proposals for the candidacy of the chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, and also perform a number of other duties traditional for such a position in the state" ("Pravda", 29.6.1988).

What then remains for the "de facto" Secretary General - the chief ideologist Ligachev? He is left with the archival-archival ideology of Marxism-Leninism, which no one needs, and above all, Ligachev himself does not need.

When Gorbachev presented his proposal as "the opinion of the Central Committee of the CPSU", then, in all likelihood, it was about the Politburo, and not about the Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU. This should explain that the party conference accepted the proposal to establish the post of chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, but passed over in complete silence the question of his functions and rights, described by Gorbachev in his report. Gorbachev does not necessarily have to have the current General Secretary "de jure" as the Chairman (President) of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, it can be Ligachev, and even the current Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet Gromyko, after all, and "elections with secret ballot". But since the president is chosen not by the party, but by the "Congress of People's Deputies", then Gorbachev has more chances to be elected. It is strange that such prominent figures and staunch supporters of perestroika as Boris Yeltsin and Academician Abalkin apparently did not understand Gorbachev's strategic intent in this complex of questions about the restructuring of the political system. But Ligachev and the conservative plenum of the Central Committee understood this and therefore did not include in the resolution what Gorbachev said about the prerogatives and broad state powers of the chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.

Those who are not aware of the intricacies of the functioning of the internal mechanism of the power of the partocracy will leave unnoticed one most important fact: the all-Union conferences of the CPSU have the value of only an advisory body of the party, in contrast to its legislative bodies: party congresses and plenums of the Central Committee between regular party congresses. Therefore, the conferences of the CPSU do not have the right to choose a new composition of the Central Committee or the right to update it, as Gorbachev's supporters demanded on the eve of the 19th party conference on the pages of Pravda, referring to the "precedents" created by Lenin at two conferences before the October Revolution and one precedent at Stalin's 18th century conference in February 1941. Most importantly, the decisions of the All-Union Conference, according to the Party Rules, acquire legislative force for the Party only if they are approved by the Plenum of the Central Committee. Such an affirmation always took place at the end of each conference at a special Plenum of the Central Committee. Such a Plenum of the Central Committee did not take place after the 19th Party Conference, and therefore the decisions of the 19th Party Conference are not law, but only recommendations. Only a month later the Plenum of the Central Committee confirmed them as recommendations. This leaves open the question of their fate in the ongoing struggle for power in the Kremlin. Gorbachev's only weapon in this struggle is his gift for analysis and propaganda. However, the party has a different hierarchy of values, brought up on the flat stereotypes of Stalin's jargon, all spiritual quests, political sophistication and oratory are alien to it. The gray party apparatchiks established themselves at the head of the party and the state on the basis of an unwritten Stalinist law - not to allow original thinkers and bright speakers to power. Who stood out from the gray

party apparatus mass, was already considered suspicious. Take the same Gorbachev. After all, already seven years before his general secretary, he was still one of the secretaries of the Central Committee of the CPSU, but he was reasonable enough not to stick out of the gray secretarial mass with his outstanding abilities. But these abilities have come in handy today for the Kremlin in its foreign policy. With his rhetoric alone, borrowed from bourgeois legal philosophy, Gorbachev creates political and psychological miracles. Who could even imagine that such an outstanding political talent of the entire Western world and an inveterate enemy of communism as Franz Josef Strauss, after a three-hour conversation with Gorbachev, would return from Moscow in complete admiration for his personality and his policies. Who could have imagined that after the last meeting with Gorbachev, such a staunch anti-communist as President Reagan would renounce his famous saying: "The USSR is an evil empire." What to say then about ordinary inhabitants. In opinion polls in Europe, which of the political leaders of the world deserves the most political trust, Gorbachev took first place. In a similar poll in Catholic Poland, that eternal enemy of Russia, both tsarist and Soviet, Gorbachev came second behind her own countryman, the Pope. However, all the records of participants in the world euphoria against Gorbachev were broken by one American. She resolutely and categorically stated: "The appearance of Mikhail Gorbachev is the second coming of Jesus Christ!"

This unsolved political sphinx is good for surprises and unpredictable actions. If he does fail, it will be not only because of his intellectual superiority over his own party and its antediluvian ideology, but also because he wanted to improve the system, which must be destroyed if you do not want to be destroyed yourself. This Stalinist system does not allow any other alternative. When Stalin was asked among his old Caucasian admirers: "Koba, why did you take the name 'Stalin' for yourself?", the answer was immediate: "Because steel does not bend, but breaks." Therefore, the criminal-political system created by Stalin is like steel: it cannot be bent, it can only be broken. The sooner Gorbachev understands this, the faster the process of economic prosperity of the country and the spiritual improvement of society will go.